:
I call this meeting to order.
Welcome to meeting number 126 of the House of Commons Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security.
Today's meeting is taking place in a hybrid format. I would like to remind participants of the following points.
Please wait until I recognize you by name before speaking. All comments should be addressed through the chair.
Members, please raise your hand if you wish to speak, whether you're participating in person or via Zoom. The clerk and I will manage the speaking order as best we can.
Pursuant to Standing Order 108(2) and the motion adopted on October 22, 2024, the committee is commencing its study of electoral interference and criminal activities in Canada by agents of the Government of India.
I would like to now welcome our witnesses today.
From the Privy Council Office, we have Nathalie Drouin, deputy clerk of the Privy Council Office and national security and intelligence adviser to the .
From the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, we have Daniel Rogers, director.
From the Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development, we have David Morrison, deputy minister of foreign affairs.
From the Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness, we have Tricia Geddes, associate deputy minister.
From the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, we have Michael Duheme, commissioner.
Thank you all for being here today on short notice. I understand Ms. Drouin will be leaving in the coming days, so it was really great that we could fit you all in on this date.
It has been agreed that Ms. Drouin will make an opening statement on behalf of the entire panel.
I yield the floor to you, Ms. Drouin. Go ahead, please.
:
Thank you very much, esteemed members of the committee.
My colleagues and I would like to thank the committee for the invitation to speak with you today regarding public safety of Canadians and foreign interference as it relates to the Government of India.
As this committee will understand, while we are here in full collaboration and ready to answer your questions, various obligations and statutes dictate what can be divulged to the committee owing to ongoing investigations, which limit what we can share. That is why we are not in a position to provide details on evidence.
However, we can share with you the rationale for concern for public safety, our attempts at co-operation with India, and how India’s refusal to co-operate led us to where we are today.
[English]
For context, law enforcement has been investigating extreme violence within communities and CSIS has been looking into India foreign interference for years.
As you are aware, on September 18 of last year the announced in the House of Commons that Canada had become aware of credible allegations, based on intelligence, of a potential link between the killing of a Canadian citizen in Canada and agents of the Government of India.
Since the 's statement last year, the government's response has followed two separate tracks: law enforcement and diplomacy. The diplomatic track addresses our relations with the Government of India in many areas. The law enforcement track has focused on public safety and the application of the rule of law.
The public safety of Canadians has been the paramount consideration for all our actions when evaluating our relationship with India. We do understand and value all that India represents to Canada as an international partner, as well as our significant people-to-people ties. However, we cannot ignore the attempts by agents of the Government of India to engage in coercion and violence in Canada to undermine our democracy.
The RCMP has also sent resources to work directly with India's central counterterrorism law enforcement agency to allow for co-operation on violent extremism.
[Translation]
It is important for the public to understand what steps have been taken toward co-operation with India.
Throughout a series of meetings since August 2023, we have been clear that it is essential for our officials to maintain meaningful channels of communication and co-operation with India.
Specifically, we have had engagement between Canada’s national security and intelligence adviser, or NSIA—my predecessor or myself—and other senior officials from Global Affairs Canada, or GAC, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, or CSIS, or the Privy Council Office, or PCO, and India’s national security adviser on six occasions: August and September 2023 in New Delhi, November 2023 in Dubai, December 2023 in Saudi Arabia, January 2024 in London and March 2024 in Dubai.
[English]
I also spoke to my counterpart in May 2024, when the RCMP made arrests in the Nijjar case. In addition, I spoke on several occasions to the then High Commissioner of India to Canada. The also discussed the matter with Prime Minister Modi at the G20 in New Delhi last year. The Indian government's response was to spread a false narrative that Canada showed it no evidence and that we were ignoring its concerns about Khalistani violent extremism.
After months of investigation and several updates, the RCMP approached the deputy minister of foreign affairs and me in late August of this year to present serious concerns for public safety and to explore all potential tools available to us to disable India's network in Canada. This unprecedented request from the RCMP during an ongoing investigation spoke to the seriousness of the risk posed to Canadians and people living in Canada. The evidence revealed the modus operandi used by India to target people living in Canada.
The Indian government's mode of operating starts with the collection of information on Canada-based individuals through diplomats and consular officials in Canada and through other individuals acting as proxies. Some of these individuals and businesses are coerced and threatened. This information is shared with senior levels of the Indian government, who then direct the commission of serious criminal activities against Indo-Canadians through the kinetic use of Lawrence Bishnoi's organized crime network. Bishnoi is currently in jail in India, and he is able to order these actions through his gang, which has extensive criminal networks in India and internationally. Serious crimes committed in Canada include homicides, assassination plots, perpetrated extortions and other extreme violence.
Given how alarming the evidence was, we knew we had to act and to act quickly. Our actions were driven by a pressing and serious concern for public safety. We needed the agents of the Indian government to stop their illegal activities in Canada, and we sought a collaborative approach with Indian officials.
[Translation]
We prepared ourselves for three scenarios for the Government of India’s possible reactions.
One, co-operative—India ceases its violent activities in Canada and demonstrates accountability.
Two, somewhat co-operative.
Three, unco-operative—no accountability and denial.
Our desired outcome to address the public safety concerns in Canada was without any doubt the co-operative scenario.
[English]
In October, the RCMP sought to meet their Indian counterpart on two occasions, unsuccessfully, in order to share evidence. First, the RCMP was scheduled to travel to India to meet with their law enforcement counterparts. Unfortunately, India used an administrative technicality to block this meeting from occurring. Second, the RCMP travelled to Washington on October 10. While an Indian officer confirmed a meeting, they never showed up.
To signal the seriousness of the matter, the RCMP deputy commissioner, the deputy minister of Foreign Affairs and I travelled to Singapore to meet with the Indian national security adviser on October 12. The deputy commissioner spoke about and demonstrated a body of evidence that established clear links between agents of the Government of India and violent criminal activities taking place in Canada.
We provided three options to the Indian national security adviser that would allow us to address public safety and accountability.
The first option was to waive immunity for the diplomats and consulate involved in the scheme, in order to allow the RCMP to question them.
The second option—the comprehensive option—was for India to take accountability and manage the violence by, first, stopping illegal activities in Canada, including directing Bishnoi to cease and desist; second, issuing a public statement to adopt a mechanism looking into the modus operandi within India, as they did with the U.S. case; third, recalling their diplomats involved in the scheme; and, fourth and finally, announcing a new India-Canada high-level dialogue on countering extremism.
If the first two options were refused, Canada would declare the diplomats personae non gratae and the RCMP would issue a public statement explaining the situation to Canadians. This is what we called the “unilateral option”.
In order to address Canada's serious public safety concerns, our objective, as I said before, was the accountability option. During the meeting, our counterpart did not refuse to look into the accountability option, but he refused to acknowledge any links and denied everything we presented. We eventually agreed to pause, keep the meeting confidential—as suggested by my counterpart—and reconvene on October 14, Thanksgiving Monday, to further discuss this. Instead, the Government of India chose to not respect our agreement and went public the next day, Sunday, October 13, again using its false narrative that Canada has not shown any evidence.
By going public, the Government of India clearly signalled it was not going to be accountable or take the actions we need it to take to ensure public safety. It then became clear to the RCMP that we had to take the unilateral option, meaning PNG the diplomats and issue a public statement. We also decided to roll out our media engagement strategy in order to seek a broader audience and maximize impact.
Deputy Minister Morrison and I spoke to The Washington Post on background in the late afternoon of Sunday, October 13. We provided non-classified information on the actions we had taken to co-operate with India, and we explained how the evidence showed that the Government of India was conducting illegal activities against Canadians, including threats to their lives.
The Government of India has, from the beginning, accused Canada of engaging in a politically motivated investigation and using the Canadian media to further this. This is clearly not the case. However, we were prepared for this accusation to resurface. Therefore, we made a strategic decision to engage a respected international news outlet that had already published on the subject, in order to ensure that the record was straight and that our side of the story could be widely heard.
[Translation]
In the interest of public safety and disrupting a network fuelling violence in Canadian communities, declared six accredited Indian representatives personae non gratae.
India reciprocated by declaring personae non gratae six Canadian officials from our high commission in New Delhi.
This is not a decision Canada took lightly. Engaging with India is a central component of our Indo-Pacific strategy.
Our position is clear: Canada remains open to co-operation with India, but we need to have meaningful engagement from India on our grounded and serious public safety concerns.
Thank you for your time, and we are available for answers.
Thank you to the witnesses.
It was a short while ago that the RCMP announced they had evidence that agents of the Government of India are actively involved, here in Canada, in a network of criminal activity that includes homicide, extortion, organized crime and interference in our democratic process. It's a network of crime that could potentially mean the involvement of some of India's highest-ranking diplomats and politicians.
First of all, I deeply thank the law enforcement agencies for your work, for uncovering this and for taking the action to protect Canadians. As I say this, I have a deep recognition that.... I don't know whether you folks know quite what you've done. For many Canadians of Sikh heritage, your words confirm what they already knew and felt. For decades, in gurdwaras, in homes and behind closed doors, Sikhs knew that they were being watched, monitored and targeted. What you've done is legitimize their concerns with the evidence and investigation that you engaged in.
Every time there's new information that comes out or an announcement that happens, I'm asked by my colleagues, my family and members of the community, “How are you? How is the overall community doing?” There's always a deep sigh of relief that their plight is not being ignored and, in fact, is being heard and acted upon. I think all Canadians can appreciate that the potential link of the murder of a Sikh, and other crimes in Canada, to the Indian state strikes at the very heart of the security that a lot of Sikhs and members of other communities come to Canada to find. This is why I think your work is so critical, and I deeply thank you for that work.
Ms. Drouin, my first question is for you. A criminal who is jailed in a foreign jail, in India, who acts at the behest of the Indian government for basic immunity to carry out his operations, is, quite literally, the plot of several Bollywood movies that I watched while I was growing up, and it's funny to see that the Indian government takes its hints from Bollywood. This is an individual who's being kept in an Indian jail, and there's potential involvement of Indian ministers and diplomats. How far does our jurisdiction reach? What action can be taken against a Lawrence Bishnoi type of figure if the evidence actually shows that there is a connection all the way through?
:
Mr. Chair, the priority of any police force is to ensure public safety.
You are correct, Ms. Michaud, in saying that it's an extraordinary situation. I've never seen a case like this before.
Let's look at the chronology of events following the announcement in June of Hardeep Singh Nijjar's murder. We held a press conference following the arrest of several individuals. We said we wanted to proceed with a separate and distinct investigation into the homicide of Mr. Nijjar. That investigation was looking into criminal activities in which the Government of India played a role.
Over the past year, we've seen a number of situations where people have been intimidated, murdered or harassed. On occasion, we've also had to issue duty to warn notices when we have information of threats deemed credible and imminent against an individual. We also have the obligation to meet that individual and warn them that their life is in danger.
There's been an escalation of events in connection with the investigation. Over the past week, it has become increasingly clear that diplomats and consular officials played a role in this matter. During its investigation, the RCMP took a rather unusual position to uphold public safety in light of what it portends for the future.
I want to come back to Ms. Drouin's opening remarks. We had proposed options. The RCMP looked for ways to reduce the public safety risk prior to the investigation.
Going to the media can sometimes create situations during the investigation. In this case, Deputy Commissioner Flynn tried to meet his Indian counterparts. He was denied a visa. Plan B was to go meet his counterpart at the Consulate of India in Washington in October. That request was also denied.
Consequently, we decided that Deputy Commissioner Flynn would join Ms. Drouin and Mr. Morrison in Singapore. During that meeting, Deputy Commissioner Flynn explained what evidence we had collected and the actions undertaken by the Government of India. In her opening remarks, Ms. Drouin mentioned that the desired outcome had not been achieved and that there was a leak in the Indian press following that meeting, which was not supposed to happen. We understood that there seemed to be no appetite for co-operating with Canada and the RCMP, hence the importance for us in moving forward.
I know that many people questioned why we chose October 14. That was a long weekend for me as well, but we deemed it essential to make that information public immediately. Ms. Drouin had to make a call on Monday, October 14 around 9:30 or 10:30 a.m., but it did not happen. We wanted to avoid misinformation, and that's why we decided to make two pieces of information public. First, we wanted to send the message that we are focused on public safety. We also wanted to advise community members that, if they wanted to meet with us, we would listen to what they had to say.
That's more or less the reasoning behind the decision to make some details public.
:
It is a very good question.
Obviously, you heard earlier from the commissioner about some of the most egregious examples of criminality the RCMP has uncovered that have links to the Government of India. From a CSIS perspective, we could add some of the things we have been saying to the public recently, which is that the Government of India seeks to advance pro-India narratives and align Canada's position with the position of India.
This is particularly true when it comes to individuals whom India perceives as supporting a pro-Khalistan independence movement, which is a particular sore point for India. We see India using proxy agents here in Canada to try to advance those goals, and we see different types of foreign interference attempts, ranging from disinformation to criminal activities, which the RCMP mentioned, to achieve those goals.
Obviously, this is a concern for the service. As Madame Drouin said earlier, this is something we've been tackling for a number of years. We do investigations to try to uncover information. We use the information uncovered to work with our partners across the Government of Canada and with our allies. In an effort to protect public safety, if we see information that could be harmful to an individual in Canada, we work very closely with the police of jurisdiction and the RCMP, sharing that information through a robust framework. Where necessary, we can do things like use threat reduction measures.
The last thing I will say on that point is that we have, especially recently, engaged in a lot of stakeholder and community outreach to make sure we build resilience across various communities that could be threatened through foreign interference by India and others. Bill has helped us do that, with a new ability to do resilience disclosures with Canadians.
According to the special report on foreign interference by the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians, after the People's Republic of China, “…India emerged as the second-most significant foreign interference threat to Canada’s democratic institutions and processes.”
The report goes on to state:
While India’s foreign interference efforts have slowly increased, it became clear…that its efforts had extended beyond countering what it perceived as pro-Khalistani efforts in Canada to include interfering in Canadian democratic processes and institutions, including through the targeting of Canadian politicians, ethnic media and Indo-Canadian ethnocultural communities.
Mr. Duheme, you said that when you realize the evidence gathered indicates that the life of an individual living on Canadian soil is in danger, you need to meet with that individual.
What kind of protection can we provide that individual? Is the RCMP authorized to provide protection to those people?
That leads me to another question.
Do you only meet with individuals whose lives are in danger? Do you also meet with individuals suspected of being involved in foreign interference activities?
It's often said that people could have been involved in foreign interference activities without realizing it. Politicians, in particular, are mentioned. I'm thinking of a context where a politician on a parliamentary mission abroad goes for a drink with a colleague from another country and communicates information about Canada to that colleague without realizing that it's privileged information, for example.
In that case, do you meet with individuals suspected of having collaborated with India, for example, or do you only meet with individuals whose lives might be in danger?
There's a debate about the names of those involved, about whom the spoke. The does not want to get his security clearance to warn those who might be involved in foreign interference activities. Could the leader of the official opposition warn them, or could you do it?
I apologize if my question is a bit long.
I have to say that I'm quite concerned. Following my colleague Mr. Sarai's comments, we're just over an hour and a half into testimony. There have been about five rounds of questions for the Conservatives, and I think at least three of those rounds were focused on information that was given as background to the media and confirming that the information was not classified. We know this by the sheer fact that their own received the same information, and we all know he doesn't have a security clearance. Information that was provided to all leaders was also provided to the media, and Conservatives have spent at least three of their rounds on that issue—information that their party already had.
Then there's what we just heard from Mr. Motz. Instead of to Mr. Sarai's point about the very real threat to community members—I can only imagine how it felt and feels to hear these reports—Conservatives just went around asking about Canadian criminals in India. Not a single question was about the fact that the Indian government worked with organized crime—this is what is being alleged in the media—to target Canadians with violence. There's a murder investigation. There are other investigations ongoing, and there was not a single question from the Conservative Party about how that might impact our community here in Canada. In terms of asking about Canadian criminals abroad, I would think Canadians across this country, in particular in the Sikh community, the Indo-Canadian community, must find very cold comfort in what we just saw. I don't know how to continue to not call that out for what it is. I just think that Canadians deserve better.
I thank all of you for being here to try to shed some light on this.
We have our top security officials here for almost two hours, and that's the quality of question we had. I have to look at it from the community's perspective, and I'm quite disappointed that that's how the time was spent. It is for Conservatives to answer to constituents across this country as to why they would rather not call out the alleged actions of the Indian government, which have been widely reported.
With that being said, I want to speak to Madame Drouin. In terms of the sharing of that information with media, you mentioned something that was not brought up in the three panels of questions obsessing over that instead of over the safety of Canadians. It's the fact that those reporters and the journalists had other sources, and that, had Canadian representatives and officials not responded with the Canadian side of things, there was an understanding that they were dealing with a lot of misinformation that would have been left unchecked. Was it part of the strategy to ensure that information the Conservative Party already had was also shared with journalists, to make sure that misinformation wouldn't go unchecked?
:
Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.
On the whole subject of foreign interference, I've heard it in my couple of years at this committee: We know the Iranian diaspora would have something to say about the Government of Iran. I've heard from the Tibetan community about what the People's Republic of China is engaged in. Now, of course, we're hearing the South Asian community with respect to the Government of India.
In my riding, I have a large South Asian population as well. The historic Paldi Sikh Temple is in my riding of Cowichan—Malahat—Langford. I think, to an earlier point, the attention on the Government of India is validating what many in that community have known for quite some time now.
I think my questions will be for both Director Rogers and Commissioner Duheme.
I don't doubt for a second that the men and women in your respective agencies are going to work every day and treating this with utmost seriousness. As a parliamentarian, it's also my job to hold to account, and I can't escape the fact that the most recent NSICOP report labelled Canada as a “low-risk, high reward” environment in which our foreign adversaries are able to operate.
I know that sources have reported to CBC News that the clandestine Indian network is still largely in place. You might see some elements of that disappear and go more quiet.
Maybe we'll start with you, Director Rogers. How do we flip those terms around? With the passage of Bill , do you feel confident that we're now on a path towards making Canada a high-risk, low-reward environment in which to operate for our foreign adversaries?
Again, thank you to the witnesses for being here. It is quite the panel we have: the commissioner of the RCMP, the national security adviser, the director of CSIS and two top-level deputy ministers for Public Safety and Global Affairs. I appreciate your time very much, and your commitment to national security in this country. I have no doubt that you all work extremely hard to keep Canadians safe.
Ultimately, of course, you all answer to the in some way or another. He is the head of our government. You'll recall that, in 2015, when Mr. Trudeau first became Prime Minister, a document was released called “Open and Accountable Government”. I'm sure you're all familiar with it. It mentions that, as the head of government, the Prime Minister has special responsibility for national security, federal-provincial-territorial relations and the conduct of international affairs.
Do you all agree that the Prime Minister is the head of our national security apparatus? Does anyone disagree with that?
No.
The responsibility ultimately ends with him, as you agreed.
We are in a circumstance in which multiple individuals—one for sure and perhaps others, according to the Washington Post article—have been murdered by those with direct ties to the Government of India. We have quite an extraordinary situation on our hands. We also have a situation in which we have a foreign interference inquiry with Justice Hogue. The real centre of that is China, which has been interfering in multiple elections and looking to undermine our democracy. We have misinformation en masse from Russia. We have issues with Iran. We have issues with Pakistan and others. Canada, in my understanding, has never been in this type of pickle—to put it lightly—where so many adversaries, and others whom we thought were certainly friends, are coming at us from all angles.
Can you point to any other time, deputy minister, when Canada was facing this many threats in this way, domestically, from foreign actors? Was there any other time in the last two generations, for example?
:
Mr. Chair, I'm sorry to cut off the national security adviser, but that wasn't, specifically, my question. I appreciate her commentary in response to my commentary, but she was not directly answering my question.
I just put that aside for now, as, actually, my colleague from the NDP mentioned that an NSICOP report labelled Canada “low-risk, high reward”, enabling foreign adversaries, in essence, to come to Canada, wreak havoc and cause a lot of crime, chaos and even death now—from India, for example—as you mentioned. My concern is about leadership from the top, given that the only individual ultimately responsible for national security....
We have death on our hands. We had 13 more individuals in peril. From an objective analysis, things are not going that well in Canada. I appreciate that there are things you've done that we'll never know but should be grateful for. I appreciate that very much, but the fact that there are individuals being murdered in Canada by a foreign government is beyond comprehension. I'm sure you agree.
From our perspective as the official opposition, tasked with holding the Liberal government accountable, this is an abject failure to maintain national security, the fact that individuals have been murdered and that there are communities in this country—the Sikh community, for example—that feel incredibly vulnerable under the so-called leadership of the current . I think that, really, the reason we are here is that he has failed to maintain national security. The reason we have the national inquiry into foreign interference is that there has been a failure to maintain the integrity of our democracy in terms of attacks from China: The confidence issue that creates across Canada is deeply concerning, and the message that sends to other adversaries is that they can take advantage of our democratic process and our trusting nature.
I think that really needs to be underlined, in the sense that your limitations are what the country's leadership's are. I just want to underline that, because I feel that members opposite seem to have an obsession with the , when I wish that the Liberal members would apply that same energy to holding their own accountable for failing to stop the murders, by a foreign government, of a number of people in Canada, and for failing to stop interference with our elections. That's really quite a frustrating matter that has happened on their watch, while they've been part of the Liberal government.
Just to conclude, I again thank you for your efforts, and I appreciate very much what you've done to protect Canadians and to fill the gaps created by the lack of leadership by our and his failure to do so.