CACN Committee Meeting

     We're back in session. Thank you very much for your patience as we get everything all set up.

    We are now in public and ready to hear from two very intriguing and interesting witnesses, I'm sure, as we look into our Indo-Pacific strategy. It's all about Canada-China relations at the root.

    I'd like to now welcome our two witnesses. Jennifer May is Ambassador of Canada to the People's Republic of China, and she's appearing by video conference at some probably incredibly beastly hour of the day, I would presume. Oh, it's 12 hours away. That's 8 a.m. That's good.

    David Morrison is the deputy minister of foreign affairs.

    I understand, Mr. Morrison, you're going to begin with five minutes, and then we'll turn it over to Ambassador May for five minutes.

    Thank you, Chair and members of the committee.

    Thank you for the opportunity to provide an update on Canada-China relations.

    Today I will share some views about Canada-China relations, reflections on my recent visit to Beijing, and highlight important elements of our overall approach to China. Then I'll be very pleased to take your questions.

    China has changed dramatically in the last 10 years, as has the rest of the world. China is both more assertive internationally and more authoritarian domestically. It “is looking to shape the international order into a more permissive environment for interests and values that increasingly depart from ours”, according to Canada's Indo-Pacific strategy.

    The strategy describes China as increasingly disruptive, and in that sense, the country's impact is global. That's why we have to be pragmatic. China is a trading partner and a key player in many international challenges. Given its size and influence, we need to co‑operate in looking for solutions, as the strategy recognizes.

    China remains a major force in a wide range of issues affecting Canada, from global problems such as climate change to bilateral trade issues.

    To put it simply, China matters whether in terms of climate change, development finance, the global economy, or as Canada's second-largest bilateral trading partner. Responsible management of relations with China is crucial to ensuring Canadians' security and prosperity in the years to come.

    Canada's Indo-Pacific strategy is clear that advancing Canada's interests requires meaningful engagement, and active and frank diplomacy with China. My visit to China in April was a cautious step forward in this process.

    In Beijing, I had wide-ranging discussions with my Chinese counterpart over the course of several hours. We exchanged views on how we are to manage bilateral relations, including Canada's commercial interests. We discussed sensitive issues such as foreign interference, human rights and cross-strait stability. We shared perspectives on global issues such as the Middle East, the Russian invasion of Ukraine, and North Korea.

    I found the exchange to be meaningful, with both sides seeking a way forward that would, at the same time, align with respective national interests. Not surprisingly, Canada and China have different world views. One of my goals was for the Chinese side to have a clearer understanding of Canadian priorities and perspectives. I believe that was achieved.

    Much work remains for us as we chart a path forward. I'm mindful of what Minister Joly has said about pragmatic diplomacy. It is during challenging times that such channels of communication become so important. Canada cannot ignore China, nor would that be in our interests. We need to talk to one another so that we can solve problems together. I am confident that we are in a position to engage China with eyes wide open, and with clarity about the opportunities, risks and challenges.

    Issues of foreign interference by the PRC are well documented by this committee and in the public domain, including the recent reports of the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency, NSIRA, and the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians, NSICOP.

    We have emphasized to Chinese interlocutors on numerous occasions that there is no tolerance for foreign interference on Canadian soil. This message has been delivered by the Prime Minister, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and by Canadian officials at all levels. I delivered the same message again during my recent visit.

    Efforts by Global Affairs Canada to address foreign interference are part of a whole-of-government approach led by the Minister of Public Safety.

    Other recent Government of Canada strategic initiatives have focused on critical minerals, foreign investment and research security.

    We have also invested in China-focused capacity building across the Government of Canada. We recognize that our relationship with China is a long game and that investments made today will yield benefits over time for our organization, for Canada and for Canadians.

    Co-operation with allies is also key to building resilience to China's increasing power and assertiveness. This co-operation is ongoing, particularly within the G7, as you saw in recent days at the G7 summit in Italy.

     This committee will have heard recently—I believe it was on May 27—from stakeholders about the importance of Canada's exports to the Indo-Pacific, and more specifically China, particularly in the agricultural sector. The Government of Canada is engaged in ongoing efforts to support the diversification of Canada's trade with the entire Indo-Pacific region. Canadian agricultural companies continue to focus on the China market, not least because of the purchasing power of that market and competitive pricing. This focus is despite well-known risks. This is, of course, how our free market system works, with individual enterprises free to pursue opportunities as they see fit. Of course, the fact that China's energy and food security remain reliant on imports will continue to offer significant opportunities for Canadian businesses well into the future. Indeed the growth we have witnessed in Canadian exports to China over the past two years is a testament to this, as most of it has been in commodities such as iron ore and canola.

    China remains Canada's second-largest bilateral trading partner and the third-largest merchandise export market after the U.S. and the EU, but it is important to put this into perspective. Canada's exports to China formed only 4% of our global exports in 2023. By comparison, we still export more to the state of New York. However, China also remains the second-largest economy by nominal GDP in the world. Its purchasing power remains attractive to companies that are looking for new markets, including in the clean-tech and life sciences sectors, and it continues to grow quickly. This is why direct engagement with China is imperative if we are to continue to support Canadian companies that remain committed to the market, while addressing the challenges that prevent new Canadian entrants that are interested in the market. Doing this requires a prudent approach, one that balances support for strong bilateral trading relations with efforts to protect Canada's overall economic interests.

    As for where we go from here, we are focused on diplomacy. We are taking a patient and steady approach, with a clear-eyed view of what is important for Canada and Canadians.

    I thank you for the opportunity to address you today on the state of Canada-China relations.

    Thank you for your attention.

    Thank you, Mr. Morrison.

    We'll turn now to Ambassador May for about five minutes. You can go a little over, as Mr. Morrison did.

     Thank you very much, Mr. Chair and members of the committee.

    Good evening, everyone.

    I would first like to thank you for inviting me to appear before the House of Commons special committee on Canada-China relations. I'm very pleased to have the opportunity to appear before your committee this evening.

    I was appointed ambassador of Canada to the People's Republic of China on September 23, 2022, after serving in Hong Kong from 1998 to 2000 and then in Beijing from 2000 to 2004.

    In my almost two years on the job, I have lived through the final stages of China's zero COVID policy, the gradual opening and the resumption of business as usual.

    I came to China with a clear mandate from Prime Minister Justin Trudeau and Minister of Foreign Affairs Mélanie Joly, namely to strengthen our dialogue with China to support Canadian interests while defending and promoting our values at every step.

    Since my first day in China, I have met with and continue to meet with a wide range of stakeholders in government, business and civil society in both China and Canada to better advance Canada's interests in China.

    Our China strategy, which is part of Canada's Indo-Pacific strategy, is being implemented through the greater China network. This network is made up of Canadian missions in Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, Chongqing and Hong Kong, as well as representatives from eight federal agencies and five provinces—Alberta, Quebec, Ontario, Saskatchewan and British Columbia.

     What does this mean, concretely? Underpinned by our Indo-Pacific strategy, I have five priorities for my team in China that we continue to deliver on.

     First and foremost is ensuring the safety and security of Canadians and our missions. Our consular team is committed to assisting Canadians and their families in China, including advocacy efforts to ensure Canadians detained in China receive fair and equal treatment under local laws.

    This entails engagement with Chinese officials, and I am pleased to announce that we re-established our consular dialogue this spring. Continuing engagement on consular issues with Chinese officials is essential to supporting Canadians on the ground in China.

    The second priority is promoting democratic norms and effective multilateralism, including human rights, media freedom and respect for international law. In all of my interactions with the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other interlocutors, global and sensitive issues such as the wars in Ukraine and the Middle East, cross-strait relations and foreign interference are always at the top of my agenda.

    I also regularly raise human rights issues with Chinese officials. This is an important part of my work, and our team is actively engaged on a daily basis in educating the Chinese public on Canadian values.

    Tomorrow I'll be going to Xinjiang. It will be the first visit by a Canadian ambassador to the region in over a decade. I will use the opportunity to share Canada's concerns with regional leaders and to assess the situation on the ground.

    The third priority is promoting Canadian trade and economic interests, including by advocating for the resolution of market access barriers. For example, we have resumed consultations with China's Ministry of Commerce, Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs and the Civil Aviation Administration of China.

    However, let me be clear: It is not business as usual in the China market. Our trade commissioner service team works to ensure Canadian exports are treated no differently in that market from those of competitors from the U.S. or the EU, but we do it in a way that makes sure they are also aware of the risks, with eyes wide open. At the same time, there are sectors where we don't actively support the expansion of trade and investment, and we actively encourage Canadian businesses already active to diversify both within and beyond the China market.

    Through our trade program within the greater China network, we help Canadian businesses trying to navigate the Chinese market find opportunities that are consistent with Canada's economic and national security interests. I returned to Canada to speak with with industry representatives, academics and provincial government officials to better understand the reality of today's China and what we mean by “informed engagement”.

    Despite these challenges, China remains Canada's second-largest bilateral trading partner, even though only 4% of Canadian exports go to China. China's influence on global trade, the global economy and supply chains is a reality that requires active diplomacy.

    My fourth priority is supporting the building of a sustainable green future, including climate change commitments. The environment remains an area of pragmatic co-operation and dialogue between Canada and China.

     We have been working in close collaboration with the China Council for International Cooperation on Environment and Development for over 30 years.

    Steven Guilbeault, Minister of Environment and Climate Change, went to Beijing last year and worked with his Chinese counterpart at the United Nations conference on biodiversity, or COP15, held in Montreal. These are examples of how we can work together on areas of common interest.

    In addition, where it makes sense, we support Canadian clean-tech companies and their green growth solutions.

    Finally, the fifth priority is supporting a high-performing China team and China expertise across the public service to help build China-focused analytical capability. I am pleased to report that our greater China network team is working to advance these priorities through constructive engagement and by building regular communication channels at all levels. This pragmatic diplomacy approach also means it will be clear about where our values and interests diverge. Visits such as the official visit by the deputy minister of foreign affairs in April are opportunities for productive and constructive discussions with senior officials.

    We need to be realistic and clear-eyed about our expectations for engagement. However, the only way to understand each other and address very difficult issues is through communication. Minister Joly's and Minister Blair's recent discussions with their Chinese counterparts, in Munich and Singapore respectively, are proof of that.

     I believe that dialogue helps to address misperceptions and potentially contributes to tangible progress on Canadian priorities vis-à-vis China.

    With that, Mr. Chair, I'm very happy to take your questions.

    Thank you, Ambassador May.

    We'll get to the questions now. We have Mr. Kmiec for six minutes.

     Thank you, Chair.

    First, Deputy Minister, I heard both you and the ambassador mention pragmatic diplomacy and pragmatic engagement, that type of terminology.

    I have the Global Energy Monitor here, and I want to mention it, because both of you mentioned climate change and the importance of working with the PRC on it. It seems to me that the PRC says one thing and does another. According to the Global Energy Monitor, the PRC has an estimated 114 gigawatts of capacity approved that use coal power, and they started construction of 70 gigawatts in 2023. For 2022, 104 gigawatts were approved, and 54 gigawatts were under construction.

    How can we believe anything they have to say on climate change when they are not going to meet any of their 2025 climate change goals? All the while they're using Canada's good name through this organization that's been mentioned now multiple times and that Minister Guilbeault is the executive vice-chair of.

     As with many things, when it comes to China, there's a duality here. I believe that the statistics cited in terms of building coal-fired plants are probably correct, and that obviously pulls in one direction. China is also the world's, I believe, by some measure, largest producer of photovoltaic solar panels.

    We have real issues with how and where those are produced, but they are helping. China's production is helping countries around the world transition off dirty fuels. If you look at what they're doing on electric vehicles, again, we have some challenges with that, but they're making even inexpensive electric vehicles for their own market, which is a huge market. That will help China and therefore the world meet its climate goals. As I said, with much of China, it's kind of a dual story.

    Through the chair, you said “duality” and “dual story”. Is it fair then to say that they say one thing and do another and that Canada seems to just be playing along with it and doing nothing? You mentioned renewable energy and solar panels. They are built with Uyghur forced labour. You didn't express any concerns about that. Why?

    I believe I did express concerns about that, with all respect.

    I'd like to hear it again then.

     Canada has been concerned for a very long time about the use of forced labour in Xinjiang and elsewhere, and it makes its concerns known. I believe we all just heard from Ambassador May that she's going to Xinjiang later today. We are engaged in efforts to ensure transparency in supply chains, including photovoltaic panels.

     Mr. Morrison, when you met with the PRC foreign vice-minister in April 2024, did you raise the specific issue with them? Did you raise that they're going to miss all of their climate change goals because of their massive production, construction and operationalization of these coal power plants?

    We discussed a range of issues, including climate change and human rights in Hong Kong, Tibet, Xinjiang and elsewhere.

    You did raise the issue of the coal power plants, the mass production, the hundreds of gigawatts of power they're putting on and the production.

    I am not going to get into the details of everything I raised. I just gave you the wave-tops of the kinds of issues that we discussed, and those included climate change.

     Is it fair then to say, based on this and the testimony you've given so far, that the executive vice-chairmanship by the environment minister of Canada on the executive committee of the China Council for International Cooperation on Environment and Development is simply a fig leaf being used by the Communist Party to hide this duality and that they're not going to meet any of their climate change goals, and we're simply playing along with it?

     Mr. Chair, I would simply submit that the committee that Minister Guilbeault is the vice-chair of has been around for many years. It has allowed Canada and other countries to engage China in all manner of discussions about the environment, including climate change and biodiversity, and most countries that are members of the committee continue to find it a very useful forum.

     Chair, I have a question for the ambassador.

    She mentioned consular affairs. I would be remiss if I did not mention the case of Huseyin Celil, who is now in his 19th year of imprisonment in the PRC.

    I'd like to hear from the ambassador regarding this Canadian, who is—I'll say it—illegally detained by the PRC. Has she raised the case with her counterpart? Could she give us an update on Huseyin Celil's case?

     Mr. Chair, regarding the situation of Huseyin Celil, who is a dual Canadian and Chinese citizen, yes, I have raised the case. There is a challenge there. Because of his dual citizenship, the Chinese authorities do not grant us consular access.

     Thank you, Mr. Kmiec.

     We'll go to Mr. Fragiskatos, now, for six minutes.

     Thank you, Chair.

    Thank you to the witnesses for being here tonight.

     Mr. Morrison, in order for any country to really understand another, there has to be a basic level of expertise as part of that engagement.

    What is Canada doing to increase its expertise in the Department of Global Affairs with respect to China?

    Mr. Chair, predating the Indo-Pacific strategy, we had a “China uplift” injection of funds that allowed us to hire more people and increase our linguistic capabilities—to up our game on China, writ large.

    As part of the Indo-Pacific strategy, that effort continues not just at Global Affairs Canada but also across the federal government. That's what made the Indo-Pacific strategy unique. It's not just a Global Affairs' strategy. It's a whole-of-government strategy. For example, Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada recently opened an office in the Philippines to promote Canadian exports.

    We're helping to increase China literacy across the gamut in parts of the federal government.

     Thank you very much.

    You mentioned agriculture. That's an area that has been an important sector, obviously, for Canada, writ large. With respect to the Chinese export market, I know it's important for the western provinces to see that continued level of trade.

    What do you see, Deputy Minister, as areas of potential co-operation and tension, going forward in the relationship?

    I'll go with the same question to Ms. May, subsequently.

    Thank you.

     Agriculture forms a large part of our exports to China. Last year, those exports were a record $30 billion. Most of those were commodities on the agriculture side—seed oils like canola—and iron ore. You talked about the west. However, from the east, there are a lot of seafood products exported to China. It really cuts across the country and across agricultural sectors.

    In terms of where we expect challenges, we are having market access challenges for a couple of goods—beef and certain kinds of pet food. Part of my visit was to make the case for why restrictions on those Canadian exports should be relieved.

    We can go to Jennifer, who will know more details.

    It's the same question for you, Ambassador.

     Thank you.

    As the deputy minister said, agricultural and agri-food exports are very important parts of the Canada-China relationship. In 2023, China accounted for over 11% of Canada's total agricultural, agri-food, and fish and seafood exports. To put a dollar figure on it, this meant $11.5 billion. It is the second-largest export market for this sector after the United States. As the deputy minister mentioned, these are quite wide-ranging, as well. They include grains, oilseeds and pulses—for example, canola seed, soybeans, wheat, barley and dried peas—as well as fish, seafood and pork products.

     The weight for it, in terms of their own market, is very high for China, but it's particularly important, for example, for wheat, canola, soy, barley, dried peas, ginseng and some fish and seafood products, as well as some pork products. The China market is heavily important for them. Before we had restrictions on pet food products containing pork imposed on us in 2021, China was Canada's second-largest market for pet food products.

     Thank you very much.

    I wanted to look at tensions or areas where you anticipate there might be further tensions.

     You raised the issue of human rights. Can you share more with us, Ambassador, on the place of human rights and the engagement you've had with your counterparts?

    Human rights are front and foremost in our engagements with China. This is an area where we are very clear about our values and about the importance that Canadians attach to human rights. It is an area that we raise both bilaterally here in China and in multilateral organizations and fora, such as at the UN in Geneva or in New York. We raise it through platforms such as the G7 and we raised it in the recent statement by leaders.

     It really is very much a fundamental part of the dialogue with China.

    Thank you, Mr. Fragiskatos. That's your time.

    We'll go now to Mr. Bergeron for six minutes.

    Thank you, Mr. Chair.

    Thank you to the witnesses for being here today.

    Your Excellency, an article in La Presse on February 6 described the trouble you had getting meetings with senior officials of the Chinese government in Beijing, so much so that Mr. Morrison brought it up with China's previous ambassador to Canada.

    First, how do you explain the trouble you had at the beginning of your term?

    Second, how would you describe the situation now?

    Thank you very much.

    As I mentioned in my opening remarks, I arrived in the middle of the pandemic, when China's zero-COVID policy was still in effect. That meant there weren't a lot of meetings and it was very difficult to travel in the country. The situation in China was different from what we saw in the rest of the world. At the beginning of my term, access was quite restricted, not only for Canadians, but also for everyone.

    Over the past year, I've seen a very significant change. We have a lot more access. I meet with many different ministers at a number of levels. When I travel to other parts of China, I have meetings with very high-level people. However, it took longer than I would have liked.

    In an interview you did on The House, you stated that China wouldn't appreciate the foreign interference commission's inquiry. You said that it was going to be deeply uncomfortable for the Chinese government.

    A few weeks or, rather, months on, would you say that the Chinese are still as uncomfortable?

    China says that it doesn't interfere in our democratic system or the systems of other countries. The Chinese are still uncomfortable as a result of constantly being in the headlines. However, it is still very important for Parliament to send these messages. Yes, it's uncomfortable, but for them, not for us.

    Speaking of interference, five members of the Canada-China Legislative Association went to the People's Republic of China from March 24 to 29, 2024, to attend the 24th bilateral meeting between members of the association and members of the National Congress of the Communist Party of China. The delegation was led by the Honourable Paul Massicotte, senator, and Han Dong, MP for Don Valley North, who was the other co-chair of the association at the time.

    We invited both of them to appear before the committee, but both declined. We will certainly have the opportunity to revisit that.

    Wasn't there something embarrassing about sending the member for Don Valley North to represent Canada given the foreign interference situation?

    Mr. Chair, dialogue at all levels and in all sectors is very important when working with China. The Canada-China Legislative Association has also given us access to senior officials in China's National Congress. A number of political parties were represented.

    For the Chinese, it was an opportunity to have direct access to the opinions of parliamentarians, see the plurality of their ideas and note the extent to which they defended Canadian democracy. The Canadian parliamentarians raised the same kinds of questions we do in our roles as government representatives, whether at the embassy or at the Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development.

    Mr. Morrison, the Government of Canada's overall approach to its relationship with the People's Republic of China going forward is to co‑operate with the Chinese and call them out when necessary, in keeping with Canada's Indo-Pacific strategy. In other words, the Canadian government now intends to promote pragmatic diplomacy—as was mentioned earlier—and forge ties with countries that have different viewpoints from Canada's. The ultimate goal is to prevent an international conflict.

    Did you call out representatives of the People's Republic of China when you were there? If so, on what topic? Did you happen to bring up the issue of the Uyghur genocide?

    Thank you for your question.

    I'm not sure what you mean by calling them out.

    I can't tell you what that entails. That's not my job.

    No, of course not. I'll try to answer the question.

    As I said before, we touched on a lot of bilateral and multilateral topics, even sensitive ones.

It includes the most sensitive areas, including human rights, Xinjiang, the situation in Hong Kong and Tibet.

    Yes, I think that my going to Beijing was a demonstration of pragmatic diplomacy, because we spoke of those areas where Canada and China may find some agreement, but we also spoke of the areas where we don't find any agreement, and that includes Xinjiang.

    Thank you, Mr. Bergeron.

    We'll now go to Ms. McPherson for six minutes.

    Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

    Thank you very much to the guests for being here today.

     If I could, Ambassador, I'm going to start with you and maybe follow up on some of the questions we've heard from other members.

     Obviously, in the Indo-Pacific strategy, I was disappointed. I don't think that there was enough of a focus on human rights, particularly knowing what we have seen coming out of Xinjiang and many of the human rights abuses that we've seen happen in China. How and how often are you raising these issues with your Chinese counterparts?

     In particular, I would go back to the case that Mr. Kmiec has brought forward. For Huseyin Celil, it has been almost two decades. He is a Canadian citizen, regardless of what China says. I would like to get more information. He and his wife came to Canada. They have four children. China convinced the Uzbek police to send him back to China, where he has been held for almost two decades. How are you advocating for him?

     I would certainly hope that it is not an instance where you just say, well, the Chinese government says they're not going to let us see him, and that's that. I mean, he is a Canadian citizen, and we expect that he would have the same access to consular support as any other Canadian citizen. What steps are being taken and how often are those steps being taken?

    The human rights are raised. Xinjiang is our concern in every single meeting that we have. We make the point that we have a genuine concern for these issues. It's not a tool that we are using against China; it is a genuine concern, as the member very strongly indicated.

     I agree completely that a Canadian is a Canadian is a Canadian, and that Mr. Celil is under Canadian law, under Canadian policy, under Canadian values. He is as Canadian as everybody else.

    The unfortunate reality is that as a Chinese citizen as well, under law, China is taking a very restrictive approach to that. The reality is that we can keep asking for access, but at the end of the day, it is China that will decide whether we get that access or not. I am raising it as well when I go to Xinjiang, and continue to raise our concerns, absolutely.

    I would like to be clear that this is something that you are repeatedly telling your Chinese counterparts is a priority for Canada, because he is, of course, a Canadian citizen.

     I know that some people have asked for there to be an appointment of a special envoy to work on securing Mr. Celil's release and to seek assistance from our allies. Has that been done?

    There is not a special envoy for this case.

     Is that being considered?

    It would not be my position to talk about what the government may or may not be considering at this time.

    I do want to just express that it does appear there is concern being shown, without particular steps being taken to do whatever can be done to protect Mr. Celil.

    One of the things that you had talked about in your testimony was the five points, and I know you talked about making sure that we are dealing with human rights, we are dealing with forced labour. I know we talked about solar panels with, to be fair, a quite light drive-by on how solar panels are made, Mr. Morrison. I would say it was not expressed. I think we heard from other members that it was not expressed terribly strongly.

    We do know that we have a challenge in this country where we have very soft, very insufficient legislation to deal with forced labour. We've seized no goods from the region, despite knowing that these goods are coming into this country. We know that the U.S. has a much stronger and much better ability to regulate that, so I do have a question on forced labour.

    There was an important story that came out from Alexander Panetta, in CBC, a few weeks ago about forced labour, and Canada's failure to stop shipments of goods made with forced labour. A U.S. law passed two years ago created the list of products made in forced re-education camps in China's Xinjiang region. The U.S. has surged forward in its enforcement and detaining of goods, and the system in the U.S. is having a real impact. However, in Canada, we are not doing that. CBSA is not detaining deliveries the way it should, and a U.S. senator is worried that shipments blocked in, for example, Oregon, are being rerouted to Canadian ports.

     Here in Ottawa we are still waiting for promised legislation from the Minister of Labour that should, we hope, limit goods from Xinjiang and China that are made with forced labour.

    How, when and how often are you raising concerns about the Uyghur genocide, forced labour in Xinjiang, and the impacts on trade with Canada when you're conversing with your Chinese counterparts? When can we expect there to be sufficient legislation to deal with this issue?

    I'll start with you, Mr. Morrison, please.

    The question on when the legislation will be in and operating in the way that I believe the government intends is a question better addressed to the government. I don't know.

    Unfortunately, it's difficult to get them to come to committee, but thank you.

    That is, of course, an ESDC lead and the Minister of Labour lead.

     In terms of the possibility of transshipment, that is something that we watch very closely, because the U.S. watches it very closely. We have no interest in allowing Canada to be used as a way of transshipping solar panels into the United States. That would be bad for reasons of our commitment to supply chains, and it would be bad for our relationship with the United States.

     Yet, that's what they do believe is happening.

    Thank you.

    Ms. McPherson, I'm sorry, but you are well out of time.

     We will now go to Mr. Kmiec again for five minutes.

     Thank you, Mr. Chair.

     Just so you know, I'll be passing some of my time to Mr. Seeback.

     I'll go back to Mr. Morrison. Canada helped establish the China council in 1992, and we've been one of the lead international donors to the China council since its inception.

    I was looking at the MOU on my phone here, and it says that Environment and Climate Change Canada contributed about $8 million in phase 6. I've quoted back to you the 114 gigawatts of coal power being put online in 2023 and 104 gigawatts of power in 2022. That's coal power, again, and the Global Energy Monitor says that, because of those, the PRC will not be able to meet any of its 2025 climate change goals.

    You've kept talking about duality and these two sides and that we can “solve problems together.” However, wouldn't it be fair, then, to say and for Canada to admit that the PRC is using this council and the environment minister's continued presence on the council as a form of greenwashing of the PRC's environmental record?

     Mr. Chair, as I've said in the past, the China council goes back some decades, as has just been pointed out, to 1992. I think governments of all stripes have found it a useful forum in which to engage with China on all manner of environmental issues, be they climate change, biodiversity or the full gamut of international issues. There's always the danger of greenwashing, but I believe that the China council has proven its worth over the past several decades.

    Mr. Chair, how much time do I have?

    You have three minutes.

    I'll pass it over to Mr. Seeback.

    Thank you very much.

    I want to go back to the Uyghur forced labour issue with you, Mr. Morrison.

    Article 23.6 of CUSMA says, “each Party shall prohibit the importation of goods into its territory...produced in whole or in part by forced...labor”. Therefore, we have an obligation. It says “shall prohibit”. It's mandatory.

     The next section says, “the Parties shall establish cooperation for the identification and movement of goods produced by forced labor”. The United States has an entities list. It's published, it's available and I could pull it up right now. It says that you cannot accept goods into the United States from these companies. They've seized $5 billion worth of goods the last time I checked.

     Canada, under this government, has seized nothing—zero.

    Why are we not just using or taking something from the entities list and sharing and establishing co-operation like we're required to under CUSMA? That would be a simple solution to this.

    Mr. Chair, I think those questions would be better put to our colleagues from the international trade side of things or from the labour side of things.

     You're the deputy minister, so these things all ultimately fall to you. We have an agreement with the United States that's going to come up for review in about a year and a half, and we are clearly not meeting our obligations on forced labour.

     You talked about dual purpose. There's a dual purpose in this Liberal government. They talk about doing something on forced labour, but the deliverables are absolutely zero in comparison with our United States counterparts.

     The department could easily adopt an entities list and share the information that's available, and, actually, our trade agreement with the United States says we should.

     You're the deputy minister. Why would we not be doing this? What's the great fear of actually doing something to stop the importation of goods? Canada's being called a dumping ground for goods made with forced labour. Why is there no action?

    With respect, Mr. Chair, I'm the deputy minister of foreign affairs and not the deputy minister of trade or the deputy minister of labour, and both of those people would be more competent than I at answering the question.

    Then you don't have any understanding at all of why this is not moving forward and why there have been no goods seized.

    My understanding is that this is under active review, that CBSA will play a role in the seizures and that, when the regime is up and running, it will fulfill our CUSMA commitments.

     Thank you, Mr. Seeback. We are now out of time for you.

    We will now go to Ms. Yip for five minutes.

    Thank you, Chair.

    Thank you, Ambassador May, for coming so early, and to Deputy Minister Morrison for coming, on the opposite side, so late. I do appreciate the Chinese characters on your backdrop. It's quite nice to see.

    Some of my constituents are saddened by the state of the Canada-China relations. They will come up to me and ask that everyone, please, have better relations. They want everyone to get along. How would you address that?

    I'm going to ask both of you that question.

    Ambassador May.

    Mr. Chair, there is very much a desire to make as much out of this relationship at this moment in time as we possibly can. I believe that is the underpinning of Minister Joly's approach toward pragmatic diplomacy.

    As outlined in the Indo-Pacific strategy and in our overall approach to China, this involves, at times, co-operating with China, as we've discussed, on issues like the environment or other global areas of concern, such as non-proliferation, and areas where we can find common ground. It also means challenging China on areas such as human rights. It means also competing with China, in particular in the economic sphere. It really means having a fully comprehensive, wide approach and encouraging people-to-people relations, to have as much of that basis of common understanding and co-operation as we possibly can.

    Mr. Morrison.

     I think Ambassador May has set the table as to what we're trying to achieve, and I agree it would be nice if everyone got along. However, as I said in my prepared remarks, Canada and China see the world very differently. We've already spoken this evening about some of the areas in which we just frankly disagree: on forced labour, on the shrinking of the democratic space in Hong Kong and on some of China's approaches to international issues. But as I also tried to say in my opening remarks, we need to deal with China. It's a consequential country globally, and it's consequential to Canada for the reasons that we have been outlining.

    We'll do it with eyes wide open. That doesn't mean everyone will get along, but as diplomats, we believe it's better to engage than not engage.

     Do you feel that the Canadian government's pragmatic diplomacy toward China has been effective?

    I would say it is becoming effective. I was bemused to see that my visit in April was featured in the national newspaper. There have been ongoing talks between Canada and China before, during, and after the Michaels. Minister Guilbeault went last fall, as we know. Minister Joly spoke with her counterpart for two hours in January, and saw him in Munich in February. She has spoken in person or on the phone with her counterpart five times since 2022. As was mentioned by Ambassador May, Minister Blair recently sat with his counterpart in Singapore.

    I would say we are on track to a different kind of relationship than we had at the end of the Michaels saga, for reasons everybody will understand. From December 2018 until the end of September 2021, we had a pretty narrow focus in our relations. It's taken some time to put things back together after that.

    Ambassador May, there's been significant news coverage of Hong Kong's national security law, article 23. You were previously posted in Hong Kong. How have things changed, and what can the Canadian government do to address these issues?

     Mr. Chair, there has been very significant change in China. As the member noted, the introduction in 2020 of the national security law for Hong Kong and recently the article 23 legislation really bring to the fore those significant changes. This is an area of great concern. We are raising these concerns with both authorities in Beijing and authorities in Hong Kong.

    We are very concerned, and we are doing what we can in order to make sure that there's prominence and understanding that these are significant concerns for the Government of Canada and the people of Canada, that Canada has had a very significant stake in Hong Kong over decades in terms of the large number of Canadians of Hong Kong origin and the large number of Hong Kong residents who are Canadian citizens. This is a significant relationship. This legislation directly impacts Canadians, and we're very concerned.

    Thank you, Ambassador May.

    Thank you, Ms. Yip.

    We'll now go to Mr. Bergeron for two and a half minutes.

    Thank you, Mr. Chair.

    For Mr. Morrison's benefit, by “calling them out” I meant “challenging them”.

    It is a bit rich to hear our Conservative colleague criticize the People's Republic of China for not meeting its climate change commitments, since Canada likely won't meet its targets either.

    In its report on the situation in Taiwan, the committee made the following recommendation: “That the Government of Canada offer and declare its clear and unwavering commitment that the future of Taiwan must only be the decision of the people of Taiwan”.

    Global Affairs Canada's response was not that the department agreed with the recommendation, but that it took note of it. In its Indo-Pacific strategy, the United States indicates that the U.S. will work with Taiwan to ensure that its future is determined in accordance with the wishes of Taiwan's people.

    Why is Canada so reluctant to simply recognize that Taiwan's future must be determined in accordance with the will of the Taiwanese?

    Thank you for your question.

    This is a very important issue.

    As the committee knows, Canada has followed the one China policy since 1970.

    As has the United States, by the way.

    Yes.

According to the Government of Canada, the one China policy has served Canada's interests very well for all of those years since 1970. The policy explicitly suggests that no party, neither the PRC nor Taiwan, should make unilateral changes to the existing situation, which does have some ambiguity built into it but has worked, I would argue—we would argue—for both China and the PRC for a very long time.

    If you look at progress that both entities have made since 1970.... We believe in the maintenance of the status quo, which is to say that we will not deviate from our one China policy, and we are not in favour of unilateral actions by either side.

     Thank you, Mr. Bergeron.

    Ms. McPherson, you have two and a half minutes.

    Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

    Thank you, again, to our witnesses for being here today.

    Ambassador, obviously, one of the biggest stories that is happening in Canada right now has to do with foreign interference. We have received a pretty explosive report that says that there are sitting MPs who have wittingly or unwittingly been involved. We know that the Conservative leadership race was implicated in being influenced by the PRC.

    What conversations are happening right now with representatives in China about this influence?

    Mr. Chair, we raise our concerns around foreign interference regularly, and the Chinese side regularly denies that it is taking place. We continue to raise the concerns. They watch closely what is happening in Canada. They have recently named an ambassador, who is new on the ground. I know that he will be paying very close attention as well and will be reporting back on this issue to his authorities back in Beijing.

     We look at this as an attack on our democracy, of course, but there is also influence and interference in our institutions and our communities.

     This committee did a study on the Chinese police stations. The University of Alberta is in my riding. We know post-secondary institutions are at risk, perhaps because there is not sufficient regulation in place.

    I understand raising it, but what will those next steps look like, from your perspective, from the Government of Canada?

    Mr. Chair, I would defer to Deputy Minister Morrison to respond further to this point.

    Thank you, Mr. Chair.

     The issue, as it has just been stated, is of central concern to all of us. It featured heavily in my visit to Beijing, and I know all of the issues around foreign interference will be part of my dialogue with the incoming ambassador.

     The government, as I think the committee is aware, has recently tabled legislation in Bill C-70 that will shore up the home game. It will help Canada's more domestically oriented ministries and institutions protect themselves from foreign interference from whichever country it emanates. We in the foreign ministry will play a supporting role, including by making this part of our ongoing dialogue with our Chinese counterparts at all levels.

    Thank you, Ms. McPherson.

    We'll now go to five minutes for Mr. Kurek.

    Thanks very much.

    Thanks to our witnesses for being here.

    We've seen a troubling trend under this Liberal government with its appeasement of authoritarian regimes. We saw gas turbines that benefited Russia, funding the war machine against Ukraine. We saw recent reports of one of our ships docking beside Russian ships in Havana, Cuba. We have participation in a council that seems to simply give credentials to a country that really does not have much to brag about when it comes to the environment.

    I'm wondering if I could hear first from Madam Ambassador and then from Mr. Morrison. Has concern been raised that our participation in a council like the one Minister Guilbeault attended would legitimize China in a way that allows it to cover up some of its bad actions, particularly when it comes to the environment in this case? I know human rights have been raised as well.

     Madam Ambassador can go first.

    Mr. Chair, the China Council for International Cooperation on Environment and Development, as it has been stated, is a very long-standing organization that provides policy advice to China from the international community.

    Is there concern that it's legitimizing the People's Republic of China's bad actions when it comes to its lack of action on the environment? Yes or no is fine.

    Mr. Chair, the council provides advice. At the end of the day, the Chinese government decides whether it takes that advice. What it does is very publicly make clear what the—

    Thank you very much.

     I would just note, given that China doesn't have a carbon tax, it's one of those things for which there is, I think, valid concern that Canada's participation in Minister Guilbeault's $140,000 trip legitimizes some of these bad actions.

     I'll hand my time over to Mr. Kmiec.

    Mr. Morrison, I'd like to go back to something you said, I think, in an exchange with Ms. McPherson. You said that on the issue of Taiwan, we're upholding the one China policy, but could I hear you talk about Hong Kong?

     The Sino-British Joint Declaration of 1984, the Basic Law, is being violated right now. They have jailed activists and legislators. They've pursued them overseas. They have levied fines. They shut down Apple Daily. Journalists from that newspaper have fled. Some have come to Canada.

    Is it still, in your view and in the view of the Government of Canada, truly one China, two systems, or is it one China, one system now, specifically when it comes to Hong Kong?

     The government has made its views on the shrinking democratic space in Hong Kong very well known, that was one country, two systems, according to the Sino-British agreement of 1984, and it was then rolled into the actual handover from the U.K. to China in 1997.

    Where China has violated its undertakings and those violations have increased and become more concerning, certainly since the crackdown on protests in 2019, the passing of legislation in both 2020 and 2024, and most recently, the conviction of a large number of pro-democracy and human rights activists, at each and every turn, Canada has called out violations of the fundamental agreement, and we have been active as well via our consul general in Hong Kong with the Chinese authorities.

    Mr. Morrison, is it still the policy of the Government of Canada that there is indeed one China, two systems, or is that gone in the view of the government?

    I noticed on your website, it says the extradition treaty has been suspended. Yes, you've raised the issue, but does Foreign Affairs, GAC, still believe that there is one China, two systems, specifically in the case of Hong Kong, or is that not the case anymore?

    I believe that is a question best put to the political level, which would make a pronouncement on such issues. What I have said is—

    Would it be your advice to the minister?

     My advice to the minister is not something that I share with this committee, with all respect.

     And with that, we'll say, nice try, Mr. Kmiec.

    We'll go to Mr. Oliphant now for five minutes.

     Thank you, Deputy and Ambassador, for being here. You're both consummate public servants.

    I, for one, Deputy, am very glad you're not deputy minister of labour or trade, and I'm very glad you're deputy minister for foreign affairs.

    It's very clear in the Indo-Pacific policy that we refer to China as an increasingly disruptive global power. You have used the expression, “eyes wide open”, and I'd like to pick your brain a little bit about defensive and offensive.

    We have coercive diplomacy, we have arbitrary detention, we have foreign interference and we also have huge opportunities that could cost Canadians opportunities if we don't address how we engage with them.

    How do you balance the defensive with the disruptive power and the offensive, and it includes also the very offensive with the human rights agenda we carry, but also the opportunities that we have?

    Conducting diplomacy is like conducting any kind of relationship. You have to be able to walk and chew gum at the same time, so with our closest allies we also have challenges and we have to go on the offence, and in some cases we have to play defence.

    That is much more the case with China than it used to be. As everyone knows, there has been a divergence in how China has developed vis-à-vis how many commentators thought it would develop as it adopted many market-based policies. In the recent decade, as I tried to say, it has been increasingly divergent from the path that many of us hoped it would be on. So yes, we do have to play offence when our....The framework that we tend to use is the one that Ambassador May already outlined, and the EU uses it and the Americans use it to a certain extent.

    Think in terms of three Cs. We compete where we can. Think of that in terms of the G7 trying to compete with China on an infrastructure offering for the developing world. We challenge where we need to. Think of that as human rights and the other areas where we have fundamental disagreements with China. And we co-operate where we can; that's across the range of bilateral, multilateral, and geopolitical issues.

     I often add “coexist”.

     Coexist, sure....

     There are just times when you can relate.

     Ambassador May, I took a lot of heat at this committee for many months as we waited for your appointment. It was worth the wait. I often said, both in the House and here, that we were waiting for the right person at the right time. Thank you for your work in Beijing and elsewhere in China.

     When you raise the issue of human rights, what kind of response do you get? Do they consider that foreign interference? Do they deny it exists or do they want to engage in any conversation at all?

     Mr. Chair, I appreciate very much the member's vote of confidence in my role here.

    When we raise the issues, the member's points are in fact all true. In some cases, they deny that it's happening. They believe and express to us that we are simply using this as a political tool in order to try to diminish China's stature. It is an area where they also claim that in raising these issues, yes, they consider this to be foreign interference in their domestic situation.

    I want to raise the issue of incarcerated people.

    When I did consular affairs, we had around 120 Canadians incarcerated in prisons, not just Huseyin Celil, but about 120, I believe, maybe fewer now. It was a big file that I carried.

     What is the status of incarcerated Canadians now in China? I don't need the number necessarily.

    It is in the range of 100 incarcerated Canadians at any given point in time, on a wide range of charges.

    Do we have adequate consular services to provide care for them or should we be asking for more from the government?

    We provide consular services to everybody, to the extent we can. One of our significant challenges is around access to Canadian citizens who are dual nationals and also nationals of China.

     Understood.

    Thank you, Mr. Chair.

    Thank you.

     Now we have come to the end of the list of people asking questions—at least the list that has been provided to me. We still have a bit of time left, though, and I thought that perhaps we'd offer Mr. Bergeron another two and a half minutes and Ms. McPherson another two and a half minutes to wrap up our session.

    Mr. Bergeron.

    I would like to ask a question, Mr. Chair.

    Yes.

    Is there any reason for us to end 15 minutes early?

    I have a few other bits and pieces to cover, but at the same time, we've run the full list of people who had put their name forward to ask questions.

    We're making an extra provision just for you and for Ms. McPherson.

    Two and a half minutes for you, sir.

    It's too kind of you.

    During his appearance before the Special Committee on the Canada-People's Republic of China Relationship on November 27, 2023, Canada's ambassador to Japan and Canada's special envoy for the Indo-Pacific, Ian McKay, stated the following: “Canada’s Indo-Pacific strategy was created in large measure as a response to the emergence of China as a major global economic and military power and to deepen and broaden our engagements with partners in the region”.

    Funnily enough—ironically enough, even—Mr. McKay also said this about China: “They're not spending a whole lot of attention and time thinking about our Indo-Pacific strategy. I don't think it has enhanced our dialogues going forward, but at the same time I don't think it has hindered our dialogues going forward.”

    Ms. May and Mr. Morrison, do you have any brief comments on that?

    Mr. Chair, if I understood the question correctly, I would say that we are setting up a kind of structured dialogue. However, what the Chinese wanted to do after what happened with Michael Kovrig and Michael Spavor was to go back to the way things were in 2018, which was out of the question. They did the same thing with the Americans and other allies. They always wanted to have structured dialogues.

     Structured dialogues were common more than 10 years ago. We don't want to do that. We want to focus more piecemeal on the things that are really core to Canada's interests, and that was very much the spirit of my visit there. We're not interested in something called a “structured dialogue” just because that's a deliverable from a visit. We're going to measure our progress in terms of things we actually get done rather than declarations we can sign.

I must say that China views these things a little differently. They would like to have us sign up to a set of principles. We would like to focus on an agenda to go forward. I'm quite confident that we can meet somewhere in the middle that melds those two approaches—that's what diplomacy calls for—but I don't think you'll see a return to the way that the relationship was run more than a decade ago.

    Thank you, Mr. Bergeron.

     Now we go to you, Ms. McPherson, for two and a half minutes.

    Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

     The Indo-Pacific strategy was created to help Canada diversify our relationships within the Indo-Pacific region and to stop the sole dependence on China, so that relationship is changing, as you mentioned, Mr. Morrison. We know that one of the biggest impacts geopolitically that could happen in the coming months is the potential election of Donald Trump in the United States. As the U.S. is our largest trading partner, what will the impact of that be on the Canada-China relationship? How are we preparing to manage that relationship?

    I start with you, Mr. Morrison.

     Much is up for grabs as we look to democratic events in the United States in the fall. I will say, however, that the Indo-Pacific strategy is much more than a China hedge. The Indo-Pacific strategy is very explicit that the centre of political and economic weight in the world has moved, and is continuing to move, towards the Indo-Pacific so, for the future security and prosperity of Canadians, we need to move there as well.

    China tends to see a great number of things through a China-U.S. lens, and the rest of us, in terms of close partners of the United States, are not in the same category. How this plays out under a future Biden or Trump administration is something we'll look at very closely. I have personally been at pains to impress upon our Chinese interlocutors that we are Canada. We're not just another entity near the United States. We have a long and proud history of Canada-China relations, and we don't agree with the United States about everything, either, so if they want to deal with Canada, they should deal with Canada.

     Ambassador, is there anything that you'd like to add very quickly?

    The United States is a very important lens, absolutely, and I think this is going to be very much dominating China's attention going ahead after the election, in terms of how they calibrate that relationship. Certainly that will have an impact, not just for Canada but for everybody.

    Thank you, Ms. McPherson.

    We're honoured to have you both here. We have a moment or so. Do you have any final thoughts? First we go to you, Mr. Morrison, and then to you, Ambassador May.

    I'd like to thank the members of the committee. It was a pleasure to be here and discuss these issues with them.

    It was a very civil exchange, and as an official, a non-political person, I greatly appreciate that.

    Thank you, sir.

    Your Excellency, go ahead.

    Thank you, Mr. Chair, for the opportunity to appear.

    I thank the committee for all of the work that you do in order to deepen Canadians' understanding of China and our relationship with China, and for raising your concerns that we can also parlay and relay back to the Chinese government as well.

     Thank you.

    We'll let you go.

    I have just a quick comment or two.

    Members, you will have received the proposed outline for the draft interim report on our Indo-Pacific strategy study, and we would look to you all to absorb that. You can certainly get back to our analysts with any additional thoughts you might have. You know, we have an opportunity over the coming months to do a little bit of deeper thinking on a lot of things to do with this committee and the work we've done.

    At this point, I think it's time to wish you all a most excellent summer. Thank you for the work you've done and the collegiality you've invariably shown. You know, we've had some very interesting discussions and the work that's come out of the committee has been top-notch, I think.

    Of course, our clerk, our analysts, our interpreters and all of the staff that help keep this going are all invaluable to us.

    With that, have a wonderful summer.

    The meeting is adjourned.