:
I now call this meeting to order.
Welcome to meeting number 70 of the House of Commons Standing Committee on Fisheries and Oceans. This meeting is taking place in a hybrid format, pursuant to the House order of June 23, 2022.
Before we proceed, I would like to remind everyone to address all comments through the chair.
In accordance with the committee's routine motion concerning connection tests for witnesses, and for members participating virtually as well, I am informing the committee that all tests have been completed and everyone is good to go.
Pursuant to Standing Order 108(2) and the motion adopted on January 20, 2022, the committee is resuming its study of foreign ownership and corporate concentration of fishing licences and quota.
I would like to welcome our first panel of witnesses.
Representing Institut de recherche en économie contemporaine, we have Gabriel Bourgault-Faucher, researcher, by video conference. Representing West Coast Wild Scallops, we have Melissa Collier, commercial fisherman, by video conference. Representing the Vancouver Anti-Corruption Institute, we have Dr. Peter German, chair of the advisory committee.
Thank you for taking the time to appear today. You will each have up to five minutes for an opening statement.
We'll start with Mr. Bourgault-Faucher.
:
Good morning, Mr. Chair and committee members.
As a researcher with the Institut de recherche en économie contemporaine, the IREC, I have been interested for over three years in the commercial fisheries and aquaculture sector in maritime Quebec from a regional development perspective.
This sector is facing many issues, and I would like to thank you for inviting me to appear this morning as an expert to give my opinion on the matter of foreign ownership and corporate concentration of fishing licences and quotas.
In Quebec, the presence of foreign firms and funds in aquatic product processing is very real but poorly documented. This is a topic we would also like to study in greater depth at IREC. However, this is an issue that falls under provincial jurisdiction, and I do not think the Department of Fisheries and Oceans, or DFO, should be involved in this segment of the industry.
That being said, I think DFO's efforts in recent years to enshrine the Owner-Operator and Fleet Separation Policies in regulations are commendable, even if, based on the testimonies heard in recent sessions, it seems that there is still a lot of work to be done to enforce these regulations fully.
In fact, it is the concentration of fishing companies, a phenomenon that has been observable in Quebec for some years now, that I would like to focus on today.
I have looked at the official DFO data and, for a period of about 10 years, between 2012 and 2021, there have been 465 fewer fishing licences in Quebec, representing a decrease of 8%, while the number of fishers has increased by 34, or 3%. In other words, there are now more fishers sharing fewer licences, which means that we are seeing a significant concentration of fishing licences.
At the same time, landed values have increased sharply in recent years, primarily as a result of higher prices for the main crustaceans on global markets. The result is that each fisher today earns, on average, almost two and a half times what a fisher earned 10 years ago, and that is in constant dollars, which account for inflation. These data are certainly very general and mask an infinitely more complex reality.
Recently, I had the opportunity to produce a fisheries portrait for the regional county municipalities, or RCMs, of the Gaspé Peninsula. In the course of this research, we toured the Gaspé region to gather qualitative data, namely through interviews with fisheries stakeholders. These interviews complement the statistical data and provide a better understanding of the dynamics at work in the Gaspé Peninsula, and possibly elsewhere in maritime Quebec and Atlantic Canada.
The concentration of fishing licences, which has been under way for a number of years, is creating two major challenges for coastal communities with regard to the redistribution of wealth and the establishment of the new generation of fishers. To put it another way, the concentration of fishing licences and quotas in recent years has resulted in a concentration of wealth and an increase in socio-economic inequalities among fishers from different fleets, especially between snow crab and American lobster fishers and other fishers.
This concentration of fishing licences and quotas has also had the effect of accentuating barriers to establishing a new generation of fishers, because it is now more difficult to acquire a first fishing business than it used to be, which in turn reinforces the socio-economic inequalities.
To conclude, I would like to note that in addition to protecting and conserving marine ecosystems, the aim of DFO's regulations and policies is to promote the economic prosperity of fishers and their communities. However, it appears that the department is failing to fulfill that role adequately. That is why it is necessary to consider other regulatory mechanisms to prevent too great a concentration of fishing licences, especially for the main species, and to facilitate access to these licences for the next generation.
:
Good morning, everybody, and thank you very much for having me here today.
My name is Melissa Collier, and I am a commercial fisherman based out of Courtenay, B.C. I am here today to represent my fishing family, and, more specifically, my husband Joel Collier, who is a fourth-generation fisherman. Joel is actively harvesting prawns as we speak, as was I until a few days ago.
Prawn season is the busiest time of year for my family, especially because we earn the majority of our annual income from this fishery, so the fact that I am speaking here today is a testament to how important I find this issue to be. I have spent the last several days trying to prepare for this meeting, listening to the past sessions as much as I could, while balancing the demands of our business and, more importantly, my little ones, who missed their mom while she was gone. From what I have seen, you have heard, and will continue to hear, from individuals significantly more knowledgeable on this topic than I am, but I would like to take the opportunity to share some of our story and speak to what we see and hear out on the water.
My husband and I fish for spot prawns, salmon by troll, and swimming scallops on our 42-foot vessel, the Lisa Jess. We are owner-operators. Even though we own our licence and quota, much like what Ms. Strobel said in a previous session, we also lease additional quota or licences when needed to make specific fisheries economically viable.
Being owner-operators allows us to decide what to fish and whom to sell to, and to negotiate a fair price. Through many years of effort and developing relationships, most of our catch stays here in Canada. We have worked very hard to maintain full autonomy, even when it has made our path significantly more challenging. It's hard, and in many cases impossible, for our little family business to compete with bigger enterprises. Our expenses are higher to operate. The work is massive for only two people, and we just can't match prices.
We do it because it means a lot to us, knowing that each person or business in our community that supports us gets direct value from our seafood, whether that be all the businesses that supported us to get out on the water in the first place, the two young men we employ, or all those who help us get our seafood to its final destination. It's everything from the local freight company to the fishmonger to the chef.
We also take a lot of pride in producing the highest-quality seafood we can. We love to be able to share it with our friends, family, communities, and fellow Canadians. Feeding people the amazing, sustainably caught seafood from our pristine B.C. waters is what it's all about.
Every year, it gets harder to be a fish harvester, especially in the last four to five years. It seems as if there has been a big shift in the fishing industry, and barriers like never before are constantly being thrown in our path. Every year, we have to work harder than the last just to make this life work. With the current trends in our coastal communities, it will likely only get worse.
I've complied a list of observations in the hope that they frame the issue, and I can elaborate on any of these during the question period, if there is interest.
We are seeing fewer and fewer owner-operators participating in the industry. We are seeing fewer boats tied up at the dock. We are watching multi-generational fishing families unable to pass their business down to their children. We have watched the fleet grey, which should be an opportunity for new fishers to enter and existing fishers to build their fishing businesses. Yet, due to overinflated prices, the fact that the licences are married, or being outbid by larger entities and corporations, it's nearly impossible for independent harvesters to purchase these licences.
We have personally witnessed vessels and licences being used as physical assets and investments, being bought by individuals who, themselves, have no plans to fish. We see fishers our own age leaving the industry at an alarming rate, many of whom are multi-generational fishers. We have watched lease prices driven up so high that there is a financial incentive for owners to lease instead of fish. We are watching as the food security of our country is being put at risk, as the access to our fishing resources is being taken away from local fishers. We have seen drastic changes to our coastal communities and a reduction of services available to fishers.
If you had asked us five years ago what we felt about the future of the fishing industry, we would have been optimistic. Fishing is a very hard life, but it is worth it, and we saw a future. Our future is now uncertain. We honestly don't know whether we can remain in this industry long enough to pass it down to our children the way it was passed down to us. If fishers like us who are so heavily invested in the fishing industry are already having such a hard time, how are new entrants supposed to make it work? What is an industry without a next generation to continue it?
The fishing industry is struggling for so many reasons. I will not say that all of these observations are a direct result of the current licensing system, but a system that allows anyone to own licences and quota exacerbates the problem. Access to and the income generated from fishing continue to be concentrated in the hands of a few, instead of flowing to the men and women actually doing the work, and the coastal communities in which they live and work. For those of us who do own and operate, we can't possibly keep up. We will be slowly squeezed out as fishing becomes less economically viable.
Thank you very much.
:
Good morning, members of the committee. Thank you for the invitation to appear here today.
By way of a brief introduction, the Vancouver Anti-Corruption Institute, VACI, was established in 2021, in the wake of money laundering and other disclosures within British Columbia. It's an integral part of the International Centre for Criminal Law Reform and is located at the University of British Columbia. We have a distinguished board of advisers, many of whom would be known to you. We are non-profit and do project work internationally, as well as research and writing, and host conferences and workshops.
On a personal note, I'm a former deputy commissioner of the RCMP and of Corrections Canada. I also authored two reports for the Attorney General of British Columbia, who is now its premier, entitled “Dirty Money” and “Dirty Money—Part 2”.
I do not profess to have any experience in fishing or the fisheries. Mine lies in the areas of money laundering, organized crime and corruption.
The work of this committee is vitally important to Canada's fisheries, to coastal communities and to individual fishers. As an addendum to the terms of reference that I received from B.C.'s Attorney General in 2017, I was asked to review the issue of money laundering in the context of the purchase and sale of fishing licences and quotas. We spoke to several individuals, reviewed documents and included our findings in “Dirty Money—Part 2” at chapter 5-1.
It is worth noting that the linkage between fisheries, organized crime and money laundering is a subject that has been studied internationally, including by the UN Office on Drugs and Crime. When you do not have a transparent ownership system in which the public is able to see who are the ultimate beneficial owners of fishing licences and quotas, you are vulnerable to the involvement of state actors, organized crime and money launderers.
In our research, the high degree of concentration of ownership of fisheries licences and quotas on the west coast was alarming. Equally alarming was the high degree of ownership by foreign entities and non-citizens. We were advised that the top four visible owners of groundfish trawl, halibut and sablefish quotas were foreign entities or individuals, amounting to 50% of B.C.'s quotas for those species.
The move to a beneficial ownership registry in B.C. for land ownership and the federal government's recent commitment to a beneficial ownership registry for corporations reflect the importance of transparency. The same should apply to the fisheries. We cannot simply allow our fishery to be sold to unknown persons using unsourced funds.
This brings me to the money. Money laundering is the back office of organized crime and walks in tandem with it: how much, from where and why are critical questions. We refer to three stages in a money-laundering cycle: placement, layering and integration. The intent is to obfuscate the paper trail. Virtually all countries have anti-money-laundering laws. Few actively enforce them. In Canada, our record has been spotty, although budget 2023 and initiatives in B.C. do offer hope, as does civil forfeiture in the provinces.
Determining the source of funds or wealth used to purchase licences and quotas is incredibly important. Is the source of funds legitimate or are the fisheries being used as part of a broader attempt to invest money obtained through crime, or money avoiding overseas capital controls or money evading taxes? Inadequate vetting of the source of funds entering our casinos led to the casino debacle in B.C. With much stricter rules and thresholds now in play, the issue within our casinos has been reduced dramatically. However, dirty money must be laundered, and it will inevitably move to areas of less resistance.
We must also be alive to the fact that fish quotas and boat sales are not reportable to FINTRAC, Canada's financial intelligence unit. This is regrettable, as it eliminates an important source of intelligence for investigators seeking to ensure that the fisheries are not being used by organized crime.
I will end by noting that solutions require strong legislation and cross-agency co-operation. However, there is no point in creating regulations if they are not enforced, or if those tasked with enforcement do not have the necessary skills and resources.
Members of the committee, yours is a particularly important task. I thank you for your work, and I'm happy to answer any questions you may have.
It's a good question with a huge answer. It's really a cross-party issue, and this is something that we've seen for years despite governments.... Money laundering is not one of those topics that tend to rise to the top of agendas. It does from time to time, when there is some sort of an issue, but it has increasingly been receiving attention, certainly in British Columbia as a result of our casinos, but also nationally. We do not have a lot of systems that other countries do.
For example, and I'll pick on one, we do not have what's referred to as universal cash reporting, which means that all suspicious transactions from all industries have to be reported. Fisheries are an example. Boat sales, auto sales and auction houses are not reportable to FINTRAC. FINTRAC, our financial intelligence unit in Canada, receives a lot of intelligence, but not from certain segments of the economy where it should, and this is one of them. That's one example.
:
Thank you for the question.
There are two main factors, which stem mainly from policies implemented by the Department of Fisheries and Oceans. The first is the rationalization plans, most of which were implemented between the late 1990s and the 2010s in various fisheries. This rationalization essentially consisted of buying back existing licences in order to eliminate them. In some cases, this increased the quotas associated with each licence and improved the profitability of fishing enterprises. However, it has also had the undesirable effect of concentrating ownership of fishing licences.
The other factor is the shift in many fisheries from competitive fishing to individual transferable quotas. With those, fishing licences are attached to a set quantity of the resource to be harvested. This has increased the value of licences and led to a buy-back of licences among fishers, contributing to the concentration of licence ownership we see today.
I would like to point out that the rationalization plans and the move to individual transferable quotas are not necessarily inadequate, but they've had undesirable consequences on the concentration of ownership of licences, which in turn leads to problems with wealth redistribution and succession planning.
:
Based on the discussions we had when we went to meet with Gaspé fishers, in particular, consideration must be given to the global economic situation in terms of the concentration of wealth. In fact, in the last 10 years, there has been a very significant increase in the price of major crustaceans on world markets. These include American lobster and snow crab. These are factors associated the global socio-economic conditions that are beyond the control of fishers. As a result, incomes of American lobster and snow crab fishers have increased sharply, even as licence ownership has become more concentrated. Fishers from other fleets haven't been as fortunate in terms of the prices of the species they fish.
It was clear from our discussions that the concentration of wealth is increasingly visible among fishers. This can be seen on the docks, as material disparities between the fishers of the various fleets increase in parallel with the rising ability of some to buy out others. As a result, only the wealthiest fishers are now able to buy licences, which again has the effect of concentrating ownership and accentuating inequalities.
In terms of barriers to establishing the next generation, the main problem is the increase in the value of licences. Again, this is due to rising prices for major crustaceans, licence concentration, rationalization plans and individual transferable quotas. As a result, the next generation has less and less access to these licences, which are currently going to the highest bidder. For the next generation, gaining access to licences and, more generally, acquiring a first fishing enterprise has become almost impossible, unless they come from a fishing family and therefore "inherit" a fishing licence, or are from a wealthy family. This situation also ends up reinforcing inequalities.
:
I'd say that there are several possible solutions. I could come back to community licences, of course, but I'd like to point out that the owner-operator and fleet separation regulations play an important role in the Atlantic provinces to preserve the independence of fishers and promote economic benefits in the communities.
On the other hand, based on what I've also heard from others who have appeared before me, it's quite clear that the enforcement of these regulations needs to be strengthened, as it's not working right now. To avoid too much concentration of fishing licences, it would also be appropriate to add certain criteria, such as monitoring transactions more closely and blocking those deemed abusive. There are certainly other regulatory mechanisms being studied to ensure a better distribution of licences and to promote the establishment of the next generation, such as by giving them preferential access to certain licences.
I also think the Department of Fisheries and Oceans should seriously look into the possibility of issuing community fishing licences, not just to indigenous communities, but also to non-indigenous communities. A pilot project could be run in different communities, which could be very interesting. Do we have enough time to talk about those licences?
:
I think the B.C. spot prawn fishery is a prime example of that. The leasing prices for that fishery in the last couple of years have been between $40,000 and $60,000 to access that licence. At the same time, in 2022, the overall coastwide fleet catch of spot prawns was in half. For that lease price to stay high, while the catch rate is going down, doesn't make a lot of sense.
At this point in time, instead of going out and fishing myself, taking the risk of fishing and possibly not catching enough prawns, and also taking on all of the financial burden of getting out on the water—my boat, fuel, food with inflation, the cost of everything rising, packaging, paying my crew, etc.—if I could just sit at home, lease that licence and earn that much money, that would be incredible. It's incredibly tempting to owners to access that, especially some of the older folks who are getting on in their careers. Rather than taking that risk, they can sit at home. Having a system that actually incentivizes that doesn't make any sense.
I firmly believe that if fishers were leasing to fishers, the leasing price would be more respective of what they could potentially earn from the fishery.
:
Those licence owners may be opposed to it.
I'd like to clarify what I mean by that. I'm proposing that there be a pilot project. It would be exploratory, and the issue would need to be explored in greater depth. I don't claim to be an expert on this issue. In any case, it's a project that's never been done outside indigenous communities. However, what we do know about community fishing licences is that they put aquatic resources in the hands of the communities, which are then responsible for managing fishing activities and making business decisions in the public interest.
The fishing licences cannot be sold or acquired by individuals. These fishing licences are the property of the community. In this case, the fishers would be hired by contract by the community. The profits would be shared fairly according to the terms of the contract between the two parties, that is, the community and the fishers. The community would then decide where to invest its share of the profits. It could be in the development of its fishing activities or in another area, such as health, education, public services, transportation infrastructure, or housing.
So, the pilot project—
:
That's precisely the issue we had with the casinos in British Columbia. People were filling out forms and it just became rote after a while and no one was really looking past the paper and saying, let's delve into this. Where exactly did this money come from? What bank account? Can we trace this? Where is the ultimate ownership? Once we started doing that, all of a sudden the suspicious transactions plummeted.
I don't really see it any differently. That's why the Attorney General at the time said, let's take a look at other sectors of the economy, because we also know that if you clean up one area, people are going to move into another, particularly if you're talking about investors. These don't necessarily have to be the organized criminals themselves; these can be people somewhere in that chain.
It's not just organized crime money; it's also, as I mentioned, capital outflow. Lots of countries have currency controls. You can't bring money out of those countries, so people try to bring it out through different investment means, and you also have tax evasion money.
It's great to be back at fish committee.
Mr. German, I saw you at the procedure and House affairs committee not that long ago. I'm a bit surprised to see you here under the same kind of conversation when it comes to foreign interference, even though the procedure and House affairs committee is dealing with it from the perspective of elections.
You mentioned boat sales and FINTRAC. Could you elaborate a bit more and give us an indication, and any examples that you might have, about people actually laundering money through the purchase or sale of boats? These are large fishing vessels and they're worth a lot of money. It would be quite the feat to pull that off. How does that happen?
:
Yes, I was at the electoral interference committee. I'm just responding to notices that I receive. I was actually pleasantly surprised to receive one from fisheries.
The Attorney General and I have both referred to our system as really one of whack-a-mole. You try to regulate one industry to deal with the money-laundering issue, and then it moves somewhere else. That's why a universal system, such as the one they have in the United States, where all cash transactions over a certain amount have to be reported to their financial intelligence agency, to my mind makes sense. We don't have that in Canada. You have this whack-a-mole phenomenon where organized crime will move to luxury goods, say, if things are difficult in casinos, or to cannabis sales. They keep on going.
With regard to boat sales, people laughed to a certain extent when we talked about money laundering through luxury cars, but then in our report, “Dirty Money—Part 2”, we looked at that phenomenon. I think we convincingly showed that organized crime was using luxury car sales to launder money. It was during that examination that we realized there were very similar parts of the economy where there was no reporting, one of them being boat sales. There's a lot of money tied up in boat purchases.
I can't speak specifically about fisheries vessels versus pleasure craft. We simply don't know. We don't know whose money is going into the purchase of boats, because it's not reportable. That's why I also noted earlier auction houses and so forth.
That concludes our first hour of committee testimony.
I want to thank the witnesses who have appeared here in the first part of this particular meeting. If they want to stay online to be able to answer more questions if anyone has any for them, they are more than welcome to do so.
We have one witness joining us in person for the second part of our meeting today. We haven't been able to contact the other witness, and we've been trying since early this morning, so we'll have to get him another day.
We'll suspend for a couple of moments just to get things straightened out for the next session.
Thank you.
:
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for the opportunity to appear here.
I am the research director for the Canadian Council of Professional Fish Harvesters, which is a national human resources sector council for the fish-harvesting industry. The comments I'm making here, however, are my own views and opinions.
I've been working with the council since its foundation in the mid-1990s. We've been tracking economic performance, the labour market and labour supply trends in the industry since that time. I've been paying close attention to the fisheries on both coasts and what's going on in them. I've provided you with a presentation that has some numbers in it about comparing the socio-economic outcomes of the industries on the two coasts. I won't go into the details; maybe we'll have time for discussion around that.
Basically, fishing incomes in the fishery in British Columbia have grown since the great recession. We're using tax filer data here up until 2019, before the pandemic. After inflation, incomes in the B.C. fishery did improve, but only at about a third of the rate of the east coast fishery.
The harvester workforce in British Columbia is the second-oldest, next to Newfoundland and Labrador, but much older than what we see in the Maritimes. We have an aging workforce and a paucity of young people coming into the industry. We have a situation where.... When we look at landed value issues and so on, one of the things that jump out at me from the numbers most dramatically is that in the Atlantic region the total harvester income—income earned from fishing employment and contributing to local economies in the Atlantic region—represents 37% of total landed value. That share of the total value of the fish being landed remains with harvesters in their communities. In British Columbia, the proportion is 29%, significantly less. If there was the same proportion of total landed value being returned to fish harvesters as employment income, there would be an increase of $6,000 in the average income of fish harvesters in British Columbia. It's just one measure of how the fisheries are structured. The different licensing systems and industry structures produce very different socio-economic incomes.
Mr. Hardie referred to the omelette, the famous omelette. I'll make the argument that we don't have an omelette situation here; we have a failing policy system that needs to be fixed. Questions, I know, have been raised in previous testimony about whether that can be done or how it can be done. There is no cheap and easy way to do it. We're pretty far down what I believe to be the wrong road, so there's no easy way to get back.
However, there are two simple, straightforward models that we can see in operation in other regions, other countries, for fixing it. The obvious one is the PIIFCAF model, where DFO's minister issues licences every year. The minister has the authority to simply say that over a fixed period of time—seven years in the PIIFCAF case—all those licences have to be in the hands of working fish harvesters. That sets in place a market process whereby licences and quotas will change hands. People who aren't working harvesters will have to find buyers at prices that buyers can afford, etc.
The second option is a different ownership or licence structure altogether. We can see this in Maine in the very successful lobster fishery or in the very successful small-boat inshore fishery in countries like France, in Europe, where the licences are not tradeable commodities. The fish harvesters don't own the licences. They have long-term use of them through either just granting procedures or leasing arrangements, etc.
Similar to a PIIFCAF kind of time period, we could, in British Columbia, go through a process whereby all licences return to the ownership of the Crown and then are made available to working harvesters on either a lease-to-own basis or a leasing basis at affordable lease rates. I can go into some detail about what that might look like financially.
There are, however, two caveats around either of these kinds of approaches to solving this problem. One is that neither option will work unless harvesters are able to buy licences and quotas at fair market value for a working fish-harvesting enterprise. At the moment, most licences and quotas, certainly in British Columbia, are not trading at fair market value from the perspective of having to pay for them and finance them as a working harvesting enterprise. So—
:
I've been watching this for over 40 years. I see this a little differently than some of my friends in the fish-harvesting industry and so on. I believe that the biggest driver of licence and quota price increases is the value of the fish in the water. There is a rising global demand, and the opening of markets and the free trade agreements that we've seen over the last 20 or 30 years have created a whole new fishing economy, in which we now have fairly effective conservation regimes in most of our important commercial fisheries.
That means the supply of fish to the market is not going to grow dramatically, because we try not to threaten the sustainability of stocks. We have a fixed quantity of product, generally speaking. There are some ups and downs with different species, but we have a fixed quantity of seafood that goes to a market in which there is rising demand. There is significant growth in the number of consumers and in the willingness of consumers to pay for seafood becoming a high-quality food product and becoming, in many environments, a luxury food. We've all heard about the expanding middle class in China and all of these factors.
The fundamental is that the fish in the water is more and more valuable. That, in turn, has generated the interest of speculative investors to try to get control of an asset that's going to keep growing in value. When you take a long-term view.... We're going through a tough year right now, and people can say, “oh, we're in big trouble”, etc., but when you look at it over 20 or 30 years, it's a really good investment to own access to a fish quota or fish licence. Anybody would want to do that if they're a small investor.
The whole process of keeping licences and quotas in the hands of working harvesters faces a whole lot more challenges than it did 20 years ago, when people didn't see the fishery as a growth sector. It's a time in which I think we—
:
The point I was trying to make is that we have growth in the fair market value of the enterprise, and then we have amplified or inflated growth because of speculative interest in gaining that access. If we were to eliminate or dramatically reduce the speculative investor—or the illegitimate investor, in these terms—then it makes sense for an investor, whether it's a bank or a licence board or whatever, to support a harvester who's qualified and who has every opportunity to run a successful business and to purchase that enterprise at fair market value, because in the medium to long term they'll be able to sustain the investment. Yes, there is a need.
The second caveat I was going to mention was.... First, we have to get to a situation where licences and quotas are changing hands at fair market value and, second, we need to have the financing mechanism available. In southwest Nova Scotia, for the last several years, the banks have been quite willing and able to do that, because the licence can be collateral to get the loan. The banks are providing that service. It seems to be going reasonably well, and others can comment on that, but I think that in a place like British Columbia, a specialized mechanism.... In a recent report we completed for ACOA, we recommended a serious look at Agriculture Canada's farm loan board, Farm Credit Canada, as a model that would work in the transition we are trying to make.
Before I get into my questions, I just wanted to give a shout-out to the people of Nova Scotia. The ridings of MP and are being hit hard by fires out there. I want to give a special shout-out to the volunteer firefighters, who happen to be fishers, by the way, who are doing double duty.
Mr. Williams, you said there is no easy or cheap way to fix the issue. You highlighted PIIFCAF and the main examples in terms of approaches and systems. I wonder if you could take some time to unpack how this looks from your perspective. You talked about loan boards, and other people here have talked about them. Can we get to some ballpark in terms of money and where it would be best directed if the federal government, working with the provinces, looking to tighten things up, provided more clarity to fishers and provided more flexibility and adaptability in terms of fixing this issue, but at the same time provided more community wealth for fishers on the west coast and on the east coast?
:
Well, I can take one example. Questions have been raised about the idea of a transition process or a fair transition. I did look at the halibut fishery in British Columbia. At the moment, at the inflated rates driven by speculative investors, to buy halibut quota you pay from $100 to $125 a pound to get access to the quota. That would be lower if there was less speculative pressure.
There were seven million pounds of halibut landed in 2021, for a total quota value of $700 million to $870 million. That's what it would cost to buy, to own, all that quota. About 85% of that quota, according to recent research, is owned by non-fish harvesters, people who are not working fish harvesters—retired harvesters, companies or speculative investors. Basically, it would take $600 million to $700 million to buy that quota and take it out of the hands of non-working harvesters.
Who's going to pay for that? If we were to go through a PIIFCAF process, fish harvesters somehow or other would have to finance that purchase. That's why I tend to think more along the lines of government having the capacity to make a purchase like that. If they then establish community-based licence banks, or a provincial licence bank, or some other system like that, then fish harvesters, by my financial analysis, could access quota for about 30% of landed value, as opposed to the current 70% to 75% that they're paying from the current owners of that 85% of the quota.
Yes, I think it's a justifiable investment. It's a manageable investment for government to undertake. That's just halibut, which is the most lucrative fishery in British Columbia, but there are others as well.
:
Thank you for your question.
I'm glad there's an interest in food sovereignty or, as it's more recently called in Quebec, food autonomy. In fact, it's a direction the Government of Quebec wants to take in terms of food more generally. Food autonomy includes food security.
I think Ms. Collier, the shrimp fisher, also stressed the importance of considering the aquatic resources of Quebec and Canada as food, not just as commodities. This could have an impact, among other things, on limiting the voracity of speculators, particularly abroad, with regard to these commodities. Considering the aquatic resources of Quebec and Canada as food to feed local populations is a key direction that should be taken by our governments.
This requires a completely different development model from the one we've been seeing in Canada for centuries and that we at the institute call the "extractivist" model. It corresponds to the raw materials economy referred to by Harold Innis, who passed away today and was very active in the 20th century. It was a seminal theory in Canadian economics. This model has been around for centuries in Canada, as we've seen with cod and now with shellfish, at least in Atlantic Canada. It involves the massive exploitation of one, two or three species that are then minimally processed before being exported.
Moving toward food sovereignty or autonomy therefore requires a complete review of this development model.
:
How much time do I have left, Chair?
The Chair: You have 50 seconds.
Mr. Ken Hardie: That's great.
You know, when you look at the situation today, if somebody wants to lease quota, they go to a processor and the processor says, “We can get our hands on this much quota. It's going to cost you this much, whatever you get at the dock.” It's like the old Tennessee Ernie Ford song Sixteen Tons: “Another day older and deeper in debt”. You and I are old enough to remember that one. Maybe a few others are as well.
How do we break that? We've talked about the transition to owner-operator, but getting there is still going to be somewhat difficult. The 2019 report suggested that everything up for lease, the licences and quotas, be on a board somewhere. It's more of a competitive process: willing buyer, willing seller. Could that kind of system work even if the financing was done through a processor?
:
All right. Is everyone in favour and okay with that?
Some hon. members: Agreed.
The Chair: Okay. That's done.
I want to say thank you to our witnesses today for appearing and sharing their knowledge with the committee as we go through this report. It was very informative and very good to listen to, as well, and to see the difference between the east coast and the west coast, and the rules.
Have a good week, everyone, and we'll see you on Thursday.
The meeting is adjourned.