:
Good morning, everyone. I call the meeting to order.
We have with us, on our panel, Mr. Dan Stanton, former executive manager, Canadian Security Intelligence Service, CSIS, and Mr. Artur Wilczynski, former assistant deputy minister and director general, intelligence operations, Communications Security Establishment, CSE.
You will each have up to five minutes for opening statements, after which we will proceed to questions from committee members.
To keep it nice and tight, we'll start with you, Mr. Stanton, and then you can pass the floor to Mr. Wilczynski. We'll continue with questions after that.
Welcome to the committee.
Mr. Stanton, the floor is yours.
:
Thank you, Madam Chair.
Good morning, members of the committee.
My reason for speaking today, and the message I'd like to get across, is that I do not agree with the decision to not have a public inquiry on the foreign interference allegations. I will address the rationale used to support that decision.
Additionally, I do not want the onus falling to the opposition to push for a vote to have a public inquiry. Instead, I wish to see the government—more particularly and respectively the —reconsider the decision to not have a public inquiry.
The special rapporteur's review found “no examples...of Ministers, the Prime Minister or their offices knowingly or negligently failing to act on intelligence, advice or recommendations.” He focused on the machinery of government, the policy-makers, and he did acknowledge that he found significant and concerning gaps in the sharing of intelligence and sensitive intelligence.
He advised that the does not have access to top secret emails that national security officials use to share intelligence, including potential threats to members of Parliament. This has led to “situations where information that should be brought” to the political level does not get there “because it can be lost in the sea of material that floats through the government.”
In the case of intelligence and the targeting of , we're told, from the review, that while it was sent to the and his chief of staff, it was sent through a top secret email system for which they lacked log-in details.
I ask, respectfully, this: How can there not be indications of a failure to act on intelligence warnings when decision-makers at Public Safety and a number of national security intelligence advisers never saw, or were unable to access, the reports?
We are told that some of the allegations reported by The Globe and Mail and by Global News were proven to be without foundation and were taken out of context. Which allegations? I think it's important to know that.
Canada recently expelled a Chinese diplomat. Should we reconsider the PNG action?
Security experts have advised the rapporteur—and he reported this—that we cannot have a public inquiry as it might upset the Five Eyes. Having worked with nine of the 12 Five Eyes partners' HUMINT and SIGINT agencies for many years, I can say with confidence that they have the highest regard for Canada's intelligence agencies and national security infrastructure.
The Five Eyes have survived existential leaker damage from Kim Philby to Edward Snowden, and they have much bigger preoccupations with the China target than what could be considered our slightly more pedestrian, but certainly domestic, foreign interference investigation. Five Eyes reporting—and, yes, I have no doubt there probably is some—can be sanitized for disclosure. Additionally, it can be reviewed either through witness testimony or through reports in camera at a public inquiry. The Five Eyes are not a showstopper. The Five Eyes are not like the Eye of Sauron, looking down at our public inquiry with grave concerns.
We do have precedents for public inquiries on national security matters. We have Justice John Major's commission inquiry into the bombing of Air India flight 182—anniversary next month, by the way—where sensitive reporting and witness testimony were reviewed in camera. The same could be done with a public inquiry on foreign interference, where the can request the commissioner to review sensitive information privately.
Finally, I wish to address the issue of the question of privilege related to an intimidation campaign against the member of Parliament for . I am very proud of my 30 years of service in the Canadian Security Intelligence Service and of the work it does every day to keep Canadians safe.
That being said, I believe that, when it received credible information that a member of Parliament's family members were being targeted by the People's Republic of China, he should have been apprised of that information on a priority basis. CSIS should have told directly, rather than waiting for the machinery of government to fix its email problems.
Thank you, Madam Chair.
:
Thank you, Mr. Stanton. Thank you, Madam Chair.
I would like to begin by saying that the foreign interference experienced by Mr. Chong and other members is incompatible with democracy. Threats against members are inexcusable and threaten the integrity of our democratic institutions and their ability to represent Canadians.
In his testimony, Mr. Chong raised a series of key issues to address threats posed by hostile state actors such as China and Russia. In his report, the special rapporteur also highlighted elements that undermine Canada's ability to respond to foreign interference. Both of them have raised some key issues, and I'll try to address a few of them.
[English]
For many years, I was a consumer of intelligence. At Public Safety Canada and at Global Affairs Canada, as director general, I consumed highly classified intelligence from across the Canadian intel community and from international partners. I engaged regularly with deputy ministers, ministers and their staff to discuss a wide range of issues.
After serving as an ambassador, I returned to work at the Communications Security Establishment as the director general of intelligence operations. I was asked to join CSE because of my years as a consumer of intelligence. Part of my mandate as DG of operations was to improve the experience of consumers of CSE's intelligence products. I was responsible for CSE's client relations officer or CRO program. I was also the chair of the board governance of Canada's top secret network, the platform that provides access to highly classified intelligence to clients across government.
[Translation]
My experience has given me a better understanding of the collection, analysis, dissemination and use of information. That's why I agree with many observers that the dissemination, consumption and use of information in Canada must be modernized. This issue isn't new. It was in part to address some of those challenges that I was appointed to the Communications Security Establishment. Unfortunately, this is still a work in progress.
[English]
While some intelligence consumers have effective partnerships with producers, particularly personnel in the Canadian Armed Forces and other security organizations, there remain significant gaps. This unfinished business of modernization is why I was not shocked by 's experience or the observations shared by Mr. Johnston. They are familiar complaints of consumers of intelligence and a require a systemic response.
My work was at CSE, Canada's foreign signals intelligence agency. Intelligence in Canada is produced by a wide range of actors including CSIS, the Canadian Forces Intelligence Command, FINTRAC, CBSA and the Privy Council Office. It is complemented by classified diplomatic reporting from Global Affairs. That's just material generated by Canada. We also access intelligence from the Five Eyes, NATO and other arrangements.
This is a vast information ecosystem. Ensuring that the right people see the right information at the right time to make decisions in Canada's national interest is the goal. There is still much work to do to effectively achieve that self-evident objective. We invest heavily in the collection of intelligence. We need to invest more in effective assessment and consumption. We need better coordination in the dissemination of intelligence.
As a consumer of intelligence, it is difficult to prioritize classified information coming from multiple sources and at a volume that is almost impossible to effectively manage. Consumers of intelligence, whether ministers, their staffs or deputies and other senior officials, need better training to understand what intelligence is and how to effectively use it in their decision-making process. We need a better intelligence culture in Canada.
That culture is comparatively robust in addressing security threats to Canada and Canadians. It is far more tenuous when it comes to new and emerging issues, where new consumers have less experience with intelligence and are deciding how to allocate scarce time to reading highly classified material.
We need greater transparency in intelligence, so Canadians better understand what it is and how it's used. We need greater coordination of dissemination processes. We need to value and empower the people that share that intelligence with clients and strengthen the systems used to do so. This should be the role of the office of the national security and intelligence adviser. The Office of the Director of National Intelligence in the United States is an excellent model. While much can be done through policy change, I believe codifying the NSIA's role in law would help.
Finally, I believe that deputy ministers should be more accountable for how their organizations use the intelligence they ask for. The accountability currently rests with collectors and assessors who respond to requirements set out by all of government. Consumers should be accountable for providing feedback and saying how the intelligence was used to achieve outcomes in the national interest.
Much of that information will need to be classified, but these are important strategic fixes that I think will address some of the challenges raised by and the special rapporteur.
There are systemic challenges in our intelligence system. I hope we dedicate the time and resources to address them. I'm happy to share greater details on possible next steps with the committee.
Thank you very much, Madam Chair.
:
It's not inspiring. The thing to appreciate is.... We talk about threat-related, and in this context, of course, it's a member of Parliament. With a lot of threat-related intelligence, whether it's dealing with terrorism or espionage, or things like that, there already is a drill. There already is a performance. They don't wait for CSIS to send assessments into that email system. This would go in as an assessment piece on the foreign intelligence threat with all sorts of other information that probably goes in on a routine basis.
I've heard it said by the public, “Why doesn't CSIS call, or why doesn't CSIS hint there's something in there?” What we don't want to have, with security intelligence, is the agencies shaping the narrative or saying to the policy-makers, “Here, you must read that.”
What I'm saying is that I don't think that report went into the system and that the producer, CSIS, thought, okay, this needs immediate attention. It just goes in as a routine process on that. I do find it disheartening, because I spent 32 years in the business where you collect information. There's considerable risk and expense in producing intelligence reports, so you like to think that somebody read them or found them interesting.
Perhaps what this initial review is revealing is that those gaps are more significant than maybe we appreciated, if reports are just floating around the system.
Thanks to both the witnesses for being here today. I really appreciate your expertise and lending your perspective to this important conversation. I think you bring a lot to it.
Mr. Stanton, maybe I'll start just with a question for you in a follow-up to Mr. Cooper's line of questioning.
In this particular case that Mr. Cooper was speaking about, we're sort of inferring things from what the Right Honourable David Johnston has reported on in his report. What he's able to say and what he's able to report are based on obviously lots of classified intelligence that he's able to review. I just wanted to know if you are intimately aware and knowledgeable about those specific allegations.
You bring a lot of expertise to the conversation. but there's a part of me that's assuming that you don't exactly have the detailed information that David Johnston has been able to review. Am I right on that?
:
That's helpful, because I wouldn't put you in a position to confirm or deny certain things that you don't have knowledge of. I think that's putting you in an unfair, compromising position.
Mr. Dan Stanton: Yes.
Mr. Ryan Turnbull: I do think this conversation has become overly partisan in lots of our dealings on the Hill with foreign interference. It's such an important conversation to be had. I think the report from David Johnston, which I reviewed thoroughly multiple times now, really points to areas where we need to see improvements. At least from this side, the government side, we sit around the table hoping that we're going to get to the detailed, good-faith suggestions that can improve our system of intelligence.
I think the big thing that comes up in the report for me is the way in which information is dealt with, coordinated, how it's fed up and how it's used to make decision-making.
Mr. Stanton, maybe I'll start with you. Maybe you could give us some of your sentiments on that. Then I'll go to Mr. Wilczynski.
:
Thanks for asking that, Mr. Turnbull, because I wouldn't want anyone to interpret my comments in any way in a partisan way, because I am the antithesis of that. That's why I don't want a vote in the House. I'm trying to avoid what would be a divisive vote.
I raised the issue of these gaps, the email system and such in the context that we're hearing from the reviewer, Mr. Johnston, that there was no sign of interference, negligence or anything like that in reaction to the reporting. I am simply asking how you can make those conclusions when the policy-makers who are making these decisions didn't see, hear, read or find a report.
With these gaps in the system of being briefed, how do we reach the conclusion that the decision-makers carried out their decisions in a way that was either competent or devoid of that?
I didn't mean it in a partisan way, but in the initial question you asked me, no, I have no insight on that side of the House. I spent my whole life in what was called “collection” in field and headquarters, collecting reporting and sending it over to the consumers of reporting, so I have no insight into the system and whether it.... I am simply going by what Mr. Johnston publicly disclosed he found and acknowledged were serious and significant gaps in sharing intelligence.
:
Sure. There are a number of ways we can improve that.
First, we need to make sure that all government departments have access to that top secret network, so that they can receive that information. The way that access is managed in those departments needs to be from a policy perspective and a response perspective, as opposed to a technical, departmental security point of view, which is how it's managed right now.
I also think we need to modernize and improve the coordination of the client relations officers. Those are the human beings who meet with clients around government to make sure that they get the information at the right time. At the moment, there are too few of them. At the moment, they are employed by the Communications Security Establishment. They are my former colleagues and, again they reported to me, even though they were providing a whole-of-government service in many cases. There needs to be more of them. They need to be better trained. In my opinion, they need to be at a more senior level when they are meeting with deputies and other senior officials, in order to make sure that they have the ability to engage.
Another important element is ensuring feedback. When consumers read the intelligence, they tell the collectors whether or not it is, in fact, the information that they are seeking. This is because part of the challenge is making sure that people spend time on the intelligence, and too often, when it isn't what consumers want, there is no feedback provided. That affects the volume of information that goes to key clients, which I think is part of the problem with the system as it exists.
:
Thank you, Madam Chair.
I'd also like to thank you, witnesses, because you're reassuring me in a way. You're reassuring me because, since November 7, we've been worried and have been doing everything we can to get to the bottom of this.
When I hear you say that there's no reason not to hold an independent public inquiry, that the list of measures taken has already been prepared, and that you've been working in the field for over 30 years, I ask myself the following question: Since we can go back on our decision, as you said, why do you think an independent public inquiry isn't being held, in your opinion?
:
I can't answer why, but I do feel that it's very important. I feel there's increasing distrust in Canada in terms of our democratic institutions. I was at the other committee on April 10, and if you had asked me then, I would have said, “No, we don't need a public inquiry; I don't think it's necessary,” and I'd come in with all sorts of security reasons for it.
Since then, there's been so much reporting and, even assuming that a percentage of the reporting has some truth, I—and I'm usually not someone who believes in conspiracy theories, and I'll always give someone the benefit of the doubt—keep thinking that there may still be some negligence. I think maybe there is, but I think Canadians are increasingly wondering what's going on. That's why I am.... I want a public inquiry, because I want Canadians to regain that trust in institutions. I'm sad about that.
When I had a performance agreement as an executive manager in the service, the first priority that we had to sign off on was the protection of Canada's democratic institutions and processes. That was it, and we were evaluated on that. All I've been hearing in the last couple of years is how Canadians are increasingly becoming less and less trusting in their system. That's why I want an inquiry.
:
Thank you so much, Chair.
I thank the witnesses for being here today. I'm really finding this interaction very interesting. I share your concerns about the fact that so many Canadians are losing faith in our democratic institutions. That worries me, and I think it worries all of us, hopefully, in this place.
The other thing that I'm concerned about is that it seems like the debate right now is if the special rapporteur should or should not have the job. I feel like this is not what we should be focusing on. We need to be focusing on the issues and getting to them. It seems like this is a bit of a barrier to that, and that concerns me.
You both talked a little bit about how information should have been given to more effectively and more quickly. Of course, I know that I also have a member of my caucus who is facing the same or a similar challenge of just not having that information.
Could you, from your expertise, share with us if this is a legislative gap? Is it a process gap? What is preventing information? It seems strange to me, and it sounds like our legislative rules say that this has to go to the minister, and then the minister decides. It seems to me that, if a member of Parliament, a candidate during an election, is targeted, they need to have that information. Not having that information is an issue of security.
I'm just wondering—
:
Let me address that, because I've had that experience, and I've spoken in the past to members of Parliament on this type of issue. When the service does these interviews, there's a certain amount they can disclose, like talking to you. I'm going to have to tell you who I am and then you're going to tell me things, so it's a bit of a back-and-forth of information getting.
Then, when there's information that comes in.... Perhaps some of the information that came in on was not really necessarily assessed as credible. It could have come from a source of unknown reliability. It could have come from some other party or something. It's not like the moment the service gets that information, they're going to go to that member of Parliament and say, “Look, we understand you're...”. They have to assess that. The process of assessing could be a number of interviews with that subject.
I did, in my final words, say that, when the service obviously understood that this was accurate, that some entity in the PRC was targeting him, they should have told him, but they don't always have the luxury of that accurate, full picture as the threat is unfolding.
I don't know what the mechanism is other than to have trust in the intelligence service that they will know when it's reaching a point where they should act or turn it over to policy-makers.
:
I was just going to add what I think is an important conversation to have: Exactly what are the thresholds for that reporting?
As my colleague Mr. Stanton pointed out, you really do need an assessed understanding of what the threat is, as opposed to any kind of information that may be in the domain that comes to the attention of the intelligence services and names or addresses a specific member of Parliament.
The challenge if you do that, if you have this open-ended “any time anyone says anything about an MP”, you're opening yourself up to a whole new threat vector in terms of disinformation, misdirection and information campaigns.
I think there does need to be an exercise of judgment around when that happens. It has to be based on an assessment of the level of threat to that member of Parliament or any other Canadian, and whether some kind of engagement with that individual who is targeted would help them manage the risk, or if there is another course of action that would be more appropriate that mitigates the risk to them and, in the case of members of Parliament, to this institution.
There are good vehicles. The thing with the parliamentary committees such as NSIRA and NSICOP is that their prime work—and they do excellent work—is to review the compliance of the collector agencies. They are hard-driven to focus on that, not so much focusing on the machinery of government and how they are handling things. There's obviously merit in having that.
What I am sensing, mostly through media, parliamentarians and everything else, is that a lot of Canadians are getting frustrated or agitated to find out if there's any clarity to this. We also have the concerns with leaking. I am very much against leaking. Part of the reason I'm speaking publicly, and part of the reason I'm saying I'd like to have an inquiry is that I'd like to see the leaking stop as well.
It is kind of odd for me, as the security guy, to be saying, “Let's have an open hearing.” It's kind of against my DNA in a way. My mind tells me that this is the best route to go right now, because I don't think a lot of people want to wait a couple of years.
:
Thank you very much, Madam Chair.
Through you, I'd like to thank the witnesses for being here today. I want to follow up a little bit on some of the questioning we've heard today.
Gentlemen, in your expertise I'm hearing a lot of the same conclusions, which are actually identified in the special rapporteur's report with respect to the governance of the communication between the intelligence community and the machinery of government. This problem has been identified and you've alluded to it as well.
Mr. Wilczynski, you brought up a very interesting topic about education and about training people to understand what is intelligence and what is evidence. It takes years to be a consumer and understand completely what intelligence is. For full disclosure, my son is an intelligence officer with the Canadian Armed Forces. Trust me: We do not have conversations around the kitchen table.
However, in Mr. Johnston's report, he clarified very clearly that he had access to cabinet information, that he had access to top secret information and that his conclusions were based on evidence. In the annex, he includes a top secret reference, which shows how he got to where he got to in terms of his decision.
He has also offered the leaders of the opposition access to top secret clearance to get access to the same information, so parliamentarians can see this to determine for themselves whether or not his conclusions were sound. They may not agree with the conclusions and they can say publicly that they don't agree. However, they've been offered that.
What are your thoughts on that?
:
Actually, on that note—that's where I wanted to go with this—I think, honestly, that this is going to be a multipronged approach. We have NSICOP and the special rapporteur looking into this. We have NSIRA and PROC looking into this. We have multiple branches looking into this issue.
The special rapporteur also mentioned that in terms of bringing back confidence to the Canadian public, that is why he wants to do outreach with the community to explain to people what intelligence is, what evidence is, how they too can play a part in terms of recognizing something and where they should bring that information.
As intelligence officers you know yourselves that pieces of information help bring the portrait to light, and there are many ways to capture this information, whether it be discussions with MPs individually when they see something that maybe they should be reporting....
Would you not say that what the special rapporteur is doing and proposing to do can instill some more faith in the Canadian public, who are concerned, by also educating them on what it is?
:
—wondering why I'm more than a little bit hesitant on that process.
It is around information security. We're talking about highly classified documents. We have obligations in terms of protecting the information, and I think we need to be as robust in the protection of that information as possible, which is one of the reasons that—much like my colleague—I believe, fundamentally, that there are institutions in Canada that can independently look at this information in as transparent a way as possible, that have both the physical means to do so in terms of safe, secure rooms as well as the technology to do so.
I have yet to experience that level of security for highly classified documents when it comes to this place, I'm sorry to say. I'm happy to be proven wrong, but again, in terms of my job, which was always managing risk, I think that, in terms of protection of the information, it is too high a risk.
Again, I think an inquiry that has the individuals and the facilities to appropriately handle the information is the right way to go. I understand that lots of committees are looking at it, but my preference, from a security perspective, is that inquiry process, because it has the means to manage that information.
There are a lot of things that I—and none of us—control. As you know, our resources are very limited. As you know, PROC is to meet for four hours a week. As you know, we're meeting for a lot more than that. We're also juggling who has committed and who has not.
The motion that was presented to this committee did not provide me a lot of leniency. I respect that. We did get Jody Thomas to commit to her two hours. Because we got an extra hour, was able to give us an hour. We can always work on getting them back and so on forth.
I'm working at trying to put puzzle pieces in a schedule that's challenging. I'm sure some might know that perhaps in the House of Commons right now there's someone standing on a question of privilege, which will come to this committee. I'm trying to manage what our focus and our priority is every single day because it's continually changing. For us, it's difficult. I hear you. I read in both official languages the letters you write to me and I always enjoy reading them. You don't have to send so many, but when you do I hold them close to my heart.
Right now, we have the national security intelligence adviser, who we want doing important work in keeping our country safe, appearing for two hours. We have appearing for one hour. You want him for a second hour. We will try to do our best to make that happen.
's office has responded back to confirm where we can make his schedule work with our schedule. has also been doing that. We're just kind of in this multiring circus. Rest assured and be reassured, Mr. Cooper, that I take your requests very seriously and I'll do whatever I can.
With that, Mr. Stanton and Mr. Wilczynski, we really appreciated your insights today—at least I did. I've been watching you at other committees. I like this duo you have going on. It might go really far. I also noticed that you—
An hon. member: Take it on the road.
An hon. member: The CSE and CSIS together.
The Chair: “The CSE and the CSIS: Things that happen after retirement that might not happen when we're serving”—maybe it will be contagious.
You mentioned certain documents and additional insights. If you could share those with the clerk, we will have them put in both official languages and shared with everything else. If later on tonight you think, “Oh, I wish I had said that” or “I should have added this”, do not hesitate to send it to us tomorrow or the next day. We welcome any insights you have. If you ever want to come back to PROC, just make a request. We might beat you to it.
With that, we wish you a really good day.
Our next panel has one person who's on video conference, so we'll do a sound check.
I'm suspending really quick and starting back in two minutes.
Thank you so much.
:
Thank you, Madam Chair.
Good afternoon.
Three weeks ago, I reluctantly appeared before this committee to try to say something of value that might help you and Canadians navigate reports about Chinese interference—a matter that I once spent a lot of time reporting about as an investigative journalist. I came here reluctantly because, as I suspected, while members of this committee listened to what I had to say, I came away convinced that several of you didn't hear what I had to say. That's an important distinction.
I know that you listen to what witnesses like me have to say through the prism of politics and then decide if it has any political currency or not. I get it. Politics is what you do.
I like to think that, as an investigative reporter, getting at the truth is what I do, so please, hear me out.
The last time I was here, I said several things that I believe are relevant to the serious matter at hand, which requires serious people to do serious thinking about—not posturing, but thinking.
First, I reminded the committee, Canadians and my colleagues in the fourth estate—many of whom have suddenly fallen deeply and madly in love with an intelligence service they know nothing about—that, beyond the ineptness and the racism inside CSIS, intelligence officers make big mistakes all the time about a lot of important stuff.
These are, as well, the same invisible intelligence officers who a Federal Court judge slammed in 2020 for having “a degree of institutional disregard for—or, at the very least, a cavalier institutional approach to—the duty of candour and regrettably the rule of law.” In other words, CSIS doesn't always tell the truth, and it breaks the law. That fact, I suspect, might be news to most of you, and to too many starry-eyed reporters, editors and columnists, who don't have a clue about how CSIS operates.
With that caveat in mind, I urge the committee, Canadians and my colleagues to treat cautiously and skeptically the drip-by-drip bits of information being leaked by what likely amounts to a handful of members of Canada's largely unaccountable security intelligence structure.
I also reminded the committee that so-called intelligence, which is just an eye-catching word for information, is neither evidence or proof. That information has to be considered in context. It has to be corroborated so that it can be embellished and edited to fit a narrative that can bear little resemblance to the truth, particularly when it is leaked by intelligence officers who, dare I say, may have an agenda, and who know, one, that top secret information can be spun to their parochial benefit and, two, that they can leverage reporters to be spun and who, in turn, can torque their stories to make a bigger splash to the delight of those intelligence officers.
Still, perhaps the most important point I made was that the leaks have caused deep harm to some of our fellow Canadians by raising spurious questions about their loyalty to the maple leaf.
These few intelligence officers, who prefer to do their handiwork in the comfortable shadows, know they will get away with the damage they have done to Canadians of Chinese descent who love this country, too. Why? Because they always get away with it.
Last week, in his report, the special rapporteur confirmed the main thrust of what I told you three weeks ago. David Johnston is not my pal. I don't live near him. I am not a member of any foundation he is a member of. In fact, I am not a member of any foundation at all. Also, anyone familiar with my writing about the current would never confuse me with being a Liberal lackey.
Mr. Johnston was right when he wrote that a lot of reporting fuelled by these selective leaks involved “unsubstantiated speculation”, “limited intelligence”, a “lack of...context” and finally, “When information about foreign interference is provided without care or context, it can cause the public narrative to turn on...communities.”
Ask about the damage that can be done when this happens. A television news outlet tarred as, in effect, a traitor. Mr. Johnston found that egregious, life-altering charge was absolutely categorically and emphatically false.
We are witnessing “Maher Arar: The sequel”.
This sinister stuff has a familiar ring. A former CSIS director and national security adviser to another prime minister publicly peddled the same insinuations in 2010.
It's ironic that, in an editorial at the time, The Globe and Mail denounced these remarks as “reckless” and “foolish”. The same could be said today about the newspaper itself.
Thank you for your time.
:
Thank you very much, Madam Chair.
I am going to direct my questions to Mr. Wernick, through you, Madam Chair.
Mr. Wernick, you served as Clerk of the Privy Council and, having been in that role, were you surprised that the national security adviser confirmed that the PCO had received a CSIS memo regarding the Beijing intimidation campaign targeting in July of 2021 and that Michael Chong was never informed about it and learned about it through The Globe and Mail?
Secondly, were you surprised that the apparently—at least according to his word—had no idea about it and also learned about it through the media?
:
It may have been given to an AI chatbot now. I have no idea how it works now.
However, what we did in the Privy Council Office was keep track of what we were sending, and I know that the Prime Minister's Office kept track of what it was receiving. There also were people in the Privy Council Office, attached to the clerk's office, who did a lot of what we called “chasing”. They would keep track of documents. They had dates. They had numbers. There was a log.
Basically, there were two kinds of information passed downstairs. Some of it was for information, and you were not seeking a decision. Some of it was for a decision and it went to the Prime Minister. Those were the ones that we spent the most time chasing and trying to get what's called “a PM return”—the Prime Minister's decision of yes, no, maybe or “I want to see more work”, that kind of thing.
There were people in the clerk's office and there were people in the Prime Minister's Office who were document chasers.
:
Thank you, Madam Chair.
I guess I'll start with Mr. Wernick first, since he's in the room, and then I'll move on to the next witness.
My first question is around the issue of the leaks that are happening from—we suspect—CSIS, but of course, that question is still open and is yet to be resolved. We also heard from the other witness here today that there could be an agenda that is being pursued, perhaps, by the leaker.
I also want to know whether, from your perspective, you think there could be an agenda of a foreign state involved in this whole matter before us right now. Do you think there is a greater agenda to disrupt our democracy that might be in place, and if so, what are your comments and maybe some suggestions around that?
:
Thank you for the question. I think it's important.
The first thing I would recommend to you is to show less deference to security officials who appear before you at parliamentary committees like this.
I was particularly shocked by the Bloc Québécois deference to security officials, because if they had any understanding of the history of Canada's security services, they would know that there was a McDonald commission of inquiry struck that showed that, in Quebec, the former RCMP security service was responsible for a slew of illegal activities that resulted in the creation of CSIS itself.
The other recommendation I would suggest to committee members is to begin to learn about the history of the very institutions you are probing. I made a point in my statement of noting that a Federal Court judge found, in 2020—not in 1960, not in 1980, but in 2020—that CSIS routinely lies and breaks the law. He is not the only Federal Court judge to have found that CSIS acts in this manner.
I would also suggest that you read my book, for future reference, to get a more intimate understanding of how intelligence services in Canada operate. You'd be much less deferential to them and less inclined to bow before their expertise.
I'll leave it at that.
:
Thank you so much, Chair
Thank you to both our witnesses for being here.
Mr. Wernick, thank you for coming back so soon. It's good to see you again.
This is really about addressing the point of privilege, which I think is incredibly important, and what we've heard very clearly from multiple sources is that Mr. Chong was not made aware of issues soon enough. That's an important component of this.
We also know that the process to get that information to Mr. Chong seemed to get stuck somewhere in top secret email world and all of these different challenges.
I know you speak a lot about legislation and those types of changes. When you look at this system that we have in place, which is currently failing us in the way that it builds a sense of distrust not only with Canadians, as you said, but potentially with our Five Eyes partners, could you talk about the work you've done? Do you have any process or any legislative ideas around how this information should get to the people who need it in a timely way, while also honouring the reality that it has to be substantive enough, before anything else, to be shared?
I'll leave you to that.
:
It's a tough one. I cover this a little bit in my book, if you don't mind the plug for that.
The problem, if you go at the very top, if you're the Prime Minister of Canada, the chief of staff to the Prime Minister or the Clerk of the Privy Council, is that you are at the end of a funnel of so many issues running in parallel. Your job is constant multi-tasking. You cannot read everything. You can't meet everybody. You can't see everybody. There are choices about time management and choices about what gets sent to the Prime Minister, what the Prime Minister has time to read—the several roles a prime minister plays and so on. That's an accountability of the clerk and the public service side, and it's an accountability of the chief of staff on the political side.
You will not be able to just apply some rule book or algorithm that will sort it for you and get it right every time. There will be lapses of judgment because you cannot see in advance that this thing turned out to be as important as it did, and you may be sending stuff that turns out to be trivial and unimportant.
The point about intelligence services is that they're constantly exercising judgment about information. I think I heard the tail end of that conversation. What's reliable? What's important? There are 200 countries in the world. Are we going to follow every single one of them in detail? No, there are some that are more important than others.
That's why people get these jobs of national security adviser or clerk or chief of staff to the Prime Minister: to exercise those kinds of judgments and put processes in place that reduce the risk of gaps in error. We have learned from this exercise that there are gaps that need to be addressed.
:
There are 338 of you, and there is also the Senate, so there would be decisions about how wide that would need to be and at what level. It is a question of design on which you can come to some agreement among the parties as to how far to go.
Of course, there would have to be training. With the accountability comes a possibility of sanctions. I don't have those clearances anymore, but they came with an accountability in that, if I divulged secrets that I had read or seen, I could have gone to jail. I could have been fined. I could have lost my job. I could have lost my security clearance.
In the public service, if you lose your security clearance, it's tantamount to being fired, because you can't do the work anymore. That's a tricky area. What would be the sanctions on a rogue parliamentarian who decided to leak? That happens in the States and that happens in the U.K., so there is a lot to work through there, but limiting it as narrowly as we're doing now isn't working for us anymore.
:
There is an art to driving inquiries to conclusion. There's an organizational skill in getting the work done for sure. I think that's one reason that people like judges: They're used to running courtrooms.
In this particular instance, I think that if you don't have some familiarity, life experience or background in the world of security and intelligence, you might not really know the right questions to ask and the right lines to pursue. That's a part.
My colleague might want to comment on that. The problem, if you go to people who are deeply inside the security and intelligence community, is this: Do they have the objectivity about those institutions they grew up and work in. It's not easy to find somebody who has enough knowledge but enough distance to do a good job, which is why I'm kind of inclined to go to Canberra to find the national security adviser to the Australian government. I'm only being semi-facetious there. It's not easy to find that skill set.
Each inquiry has its own subject area and its own purpose. Why I go to Australia and the U.K. is that they use the British Westminster system of government and the accountability of ministers and prime ministers is very familiar territory to anybody who works in the U.K. or Australia. If you go to Americans, the French or Germans, they have completely different software.