:
Good morning, everyone. I call the meeting to order.
Welcome to meeting number 81 of the Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs.
The committee is meeting today to study the question of privilege related to the member for Wellington—Halton Hills and other members.
I will remind you to not have your earpiece near the microphone, to use your earpiece and not somebody else's. Ideally what I'm realizing, because I am returning to my mission for interpreters and fighting for them, is IT will know when it's your turn to speak, so you don't need to push the button to turn it on or off. That way we make sure one person is speaking at a time, and we let these great people do their work. So just lean in and they'll know it's your turn. I'm confident we can do this very well. As always, we will maintain a consolidated speaking list.
Today we have with us Mr. Vincent Rigby, visiting professor, Max Bell School of Public Policy, McGill University.
Welcome to PROC. I understand that you've shared your comments with interpreters.
With that, I will pass the floor over to you for up to five minutes.
:
Thank you very much, Madam Chair. It's greatly appreciated, and I greatly appreciate hearing that I have five minutes. I thought I only had four. I have lots of time.
I served as national security and intelligence adviser from January 2020 to June 2021. This term came at the end of a 30-year career in which I held senior positions in a variety of security departments, including National Defence, the Privy Council Office, Global Affairs and Public Safety. In all these positions, I was either a producer or a consumer of intelligence. Security intelligence was at the heart of my public service career.
I am pleased that Canada is finally having a public debate about national security and intelligence. However, this is not the way to go about it.
I condemn the individual or individuals who have leaked highly classified intelligence. These leaks undermine our national security, and they potentially put lives at risk. They also present an incomplete and potentially misleading picture of national security concerns. Providing a few examples of isolated intelligence without any context does not make for informed discussions; it is akin to proudly displaying a complicated jigsaw puzzle with most of the pieces missing.
The men and women of our intelligence community are highly trained and dedicated professionals, but is that community without flaws? Unequivocally, no. Since I left government, I have spoken publicly about these flaws.
I co-authored a report last year with Thomas Juneau from the University of Ottawa, who I think was a witness before this committee last week. It was supported by retired senior security officials with close to 300 years of collective experience. It identified systemic weaknesses in our national security system, with everything from a lack of security culture and strategy to shortfalls in information sharing, governance and transparency. All of these played out, not only during the foreign interference controversy, but during the “freedom convoy” as well. I have commented publicly about that.
I was once part of that system, and I accept my share of responsibility for those failings, but my point is that even before the current storm over foreign interference, informed commentators were stating that our national security system was in peril and called for a review of related policies, governance and tools to help confront the very dangerous world in which we live. We have had no such review in nearly 20 years.
A highly politicized debate over one specific area of intelligence, however important, seemingly aimed at assigning individual blame is not the solution.
While I was national intelligence and security adviser, the pandemic and other issues consumed much of my time. I discussed foreign interference with the on at least one occasion formally, and I read intelligence reports on the topic and discussed them with colleagues. I fully understood that it was a serious long-standing and growing problem in Canada.
The July 2021 report on the targeting of and other individual MPs was produced and distributed after my departure, but I am not surprised that this intelligence was not raised to the political level. This is where the system is particularly weak. The intelligence community produces thousands of reports a month, many of which I read over the course of my term. I would estimate that I read probably between 5,000 and 7,000 intelligence reports in my 18-month stint, but we did not have a formal system to flag important pieces of intelligence. What we had was ad hoc, and it was inconsistent.
I knew there was a problem. In response, I created a new DM intelligence committee, the DMIC, which put a greater premium on operational-level intelligence. I was concerned that important and actionable intelligence was not being appropriately flagged or followed up on. This committee was a step in the right direction, but it was still a work in progress when I departed in the summer of 2021.
Finally, I am aware that more steps are being taken to strengthen information sharing, but it should not be just for foreign interference. It should be for all intelligence. Reforms should include, first, a stronger intelligence capability at the centre to flag and fuse important intelligence to the and to other ministers. The government, in my view, should explore creating a position within PCO similar to the director of national intelligence, or the DNI, in the United States and separate from the NSIA.
Second, create a cabinet committee on national security, chaired by the PM, that meets regularly to receive intelligence briefings and discuss appropriate responses.
Last, promote greater transparency. Government should, among other things, produce annual public threat assessments, respond to NSICOP reports, publish intelligence priorities and share more intelligence outside the executive, including with members of Parliament. These are issues that have been discussed in government but have still not been implemented.
I'd be happy to discuss any of these issues in greater detail, especially those moving forward. I am here today as a witness because I care about this issue and I would like to see our national security be improved.
Thank you, Madam Chair.
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Mr. Cooper, resist. Mr. Cooper, resist. Resist, Mr. Cooper.
When I hit seven minutes, I provide the courtesy that I have now been known to provide, and then, Mr. Cooper, for some reason, you don't notice that courtesy. I think it takes away from what we're trying to do here. I let you finish your question. You got to six minutes and 32 seconds. I let Mr. Rigby comment back, because it was appropriate. I time this stuff. Maybe I take it too seriously, but I think when it comes to our democratic institutions, we all should.
It's early in the game. I'm letting you know how it operates. I'm asking the mike tech to make sure that only one mike is on at a time. That way we will ensure that what interpreters are hearing.... This is a resource that is very limited right now.
I don't want to live in a world where my ears can't hear. It's a blessing to have, and I'm not going to have these people who do this for a living and provide us with our two official languages continue having to have this battle. I will battle for them, and I hope every single member stands with me on it.
Thank you, Mr. Rigby.
Mr. Turnbull, the floor is yours.
:
Thank you, Madam Chair.
Thank you, Mr. Rigby, for being here today.
I want to acknowledge your 30 years of service and say how much we value your expertise and that you can lend some valuable insight into what we need to do in order to continue to evolve our response to the threat environment that we know is changing in terms of foreign interference.
I want to ask you a question. It's something I've been wondering about for a while, and I thought, just based on your experience, that you might be a good person to enlighten us on this.
I know that the government's response has been changing. Certainly, I think we've heard from Mr. Johnston that there are shortcomings we need to address. I think we can all acknowledge that, but what I'm interested in is that it seems to me—and you can tell me whether you would consider this an accurate characterization of the evolution—that we've gone from kind of a siloed approach within a few different departments in terms of foreign interference and perhaps in past governments to what Rosenberg called an electoral ecosystem approach and the four pillar plan to protect Canadian democracy, which was, I think, a change.
It looks to me like it's more a systems approach. Maybe a whole-of-government approach would be a good way to describe it, and I think maybe we're even moving to a whole-of-society approach where we're thinking about engaging citizens and having more of a public dialogue about this so that people are aware.
Do you agree with that assessment, first of all? Do you agree with the general sentiments I'm laying out here that there is this evolution in terms of a more systemic approach to combatting foreign interference?
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Well, a cultural change has to take place within the public service but also at the political level. Again, this is operating at two different levels. Within the public service and within the government writ large, yes, absolutely; I think the S and I community, the core agencies of PCO, CSIS and CSE, take this very, very seriously. We may not have it perfectly right....
I'm sorry. I keep referring to “we”. I'm retired now.
Certainly, best efforts have been made to improve that culture. The problem is more across the public service writ large and trying to bring other government departments into the intelligence picture, making sure that, again, this intelligence gets outside not just the core 10 or 12 S and I departments but to other spaces in between. I think the political level, in many respects, is the most important level. You can get the best intelligence in the world up the chain and it can go to the political level, but you need someplace to actually receive that intelligence and discuss it.
One of the problems I've had for a long time is the fact that you really don't have anywhere for this intel to go right now. The NSIA briefs the prime minister. Other deputies brief their ministers, such as the minister of public safety. The CSE chief briefs the minister of national defence. You have occasional briefings to cabinet committees. I gave a lot of those briefings. Once in a blue moon there was a presentation to full cabinet.
I think it would have been really useful here to have the prime minister with key ministers sitting around the table in a cabinet committee on national security talking about this stuff on a regular basis so that we wouldn't get to crisis mode. You'd be getting regular intel briefs. The PM would be able to talk about it with his ministers.
We've never truly had that in this country. We've made a few attempts, but that's what we're missing. I think that would have helped in this situation.
I'm sorry to go over time, Madam Chair.
:
Thank you, Madam Chair, for the question. I think it's a very important question.
There were two reports that came out a year ago, 18 months ago. The first report was done by CIGI. It was co-authored by Wesley Wark, who I think you know well, and Aaron Shull. That came out in December 2021. Then the Ottawa U report, co-chaired by Thomas Juneau and me, came out in May 2022, if I am not mistaken.
I remember talking to CIGI and talking to my colleagues at the time and thinking, boy, what a one-two punch this is going to be for these two reports to come out, because they came to almost identical conclusions and almost identical recommendations: that (a) the national security structure in Canada was in peril, and (b) massive, massive changes needed to take place. We thought, “Boy, this is going to get some headlines, and this is going to get some action.”
I'll be perfectly honest: I was disappointed in the response.
There was some media that did pick it up—a lot of interviews. The media was actually quite good, but I don't believe there has been a lot of pickup at the political level. But I could be wrong. I don't know what goes on behind closed doors right now, and maybe some of those recommendations I'm talking about, like a cabinet committee, are now being explored.
I do find it interesting that almost all of the recommendations with respect to foreign interference and information sharing and governance played out during whatever you want to call it—the storm right now over foreign interference—and a lot of the recommendations and material that we had in there about information sharing played out also during the convoy. We talked a lot about sharing information better with the provinces, with the territories, with the municipalities, and it all played out.
I take no credit for having a crystal ball or being a clairvoyant, but I just found it very interesting that this stuff has been out there. Everybody is now walking around going, “Oh, my God, I'm so surprised. I can't believe this is happening. I can't believe we have these kinds of issues in our national security system.” They were actually laid out in two major, major reports in the space of six months.
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I suggested three or four recommendations at the end of my opening statement. I honestly believe we do need to fuse the intelligence better and flag it better. I think that my successor has taken some steps in that direction.
As I've said, I made some early attempts with the creation of this DM intelligence committee, which had always focused on strategic level foreign intelligence assessments. I wanted to focus a little bit more on domestic stuff that was happening inside Canada, intelligence that was actually actionable. When you do a very strategic foreign intelligence assessment that say is looking at what is country X doing in region Y, it's not necessarily immediately actionable. But I and a number of colleagues, including David Vigneault, the director of CSIS, said there's stuff coming out that we're not necessarily looking at and thinking about what we need to do in terms of follow-up. So I created that committee.
I think it's a legacy issue. I think it had been there for a long time. I created the deputy minister intelligence assessment committee when I was the head of the international assessment secretariat from 2008 to 2010. I think it was a gap and that's why I created a different committee with a focus both on the strategic assessments and the operational level intelligence.
Does that answer the question that's probably coming as to did anything with respect to Mr. or other targeted MPs come before that committee? No, it didn't. That committee was having teething problems as well.
I'd love to come back and talk about some other ideas. Maybe I'll get another chance.
:
Thank you. That is helpful for me.
You said very clearly that you have some concerns about the process and that when you were in the role you put some things together, and there are some other ideas that you have.
One of the things that I think you were saying in the last questioning was about the committee of intelligence and that you were looking at what was happening internationally and that foreign aspect but also within the country.
I'm wondering if you could talk a little bit about what you were seeing within the domestic actions. If you can't talk specifically, I understand that. What were the processes you were looking at and how were you trying to make that information clearer so that when it was delivered to the it could be understood in a way that action could be taken?
:
I think the deputy minister of the intelligence assessment committee, which was in place before.... Again, there were very high-level foreign intelligence strategic assessments looking at the big picture—geostrategic issues, functional issues, etc. I wanted a greater focus on domestic issues, because of hostile-state activities, so I looked at the environment. Whether it was China, Russia, Iran, North Korea, whatever the case may be, or violent domestic extremism threats inside the country, all those kinds of issues—technology, nefarious attempts at investment by foreign actors—I wanted a little bit more of a window into some of that intelligence. If they weren't actual strategic assessments, I even wanted to look at single-source reporting, intelligence reports that were not necessarily analyzed, but we all looked as them and went, wow, that's kind of important. Let's talk about it. What are we going to do about it, but then where do we need to send it? Do we need to send it up to the political level?
When I was in the job, this was very nascent. That committee was up and running for six months. I don't know where that committee is now, how often it meets. It was meeting every two weeks, and there was a standard agenda. The first agenda item was strategic international assessments, the second item was actionable intelligence that we needed to discuss, and the third item was broader coordination issues across the community.
I think that reflects my attempt to try to get on top of this in early days; and then I had my 30 years, and I left at the end of June. I would have loved to worked on that a little bit more if I had stayed in the job longer.
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I'm sorry. I have to be careful here, because I can't get into specific advice that I gave to the and the conversations that happened.
I mentioned to you at the end of my opening remarks some of the things that I think we need to do a little bit better in terms of transparency. Certainly there were discussions about giving briefings to all members of Parliament with respect to foreign interference, a general sense to all MPs of the dangers of foreign interference, not just in the context of elections, but more broadly other attempts at coercive foreign interference efforts. There had been a little bit of a talk about that.
Certainly there was a lot of talk about the security of ministers in particular and MPs more broadly. That's not specifically foreign interference, but it could move into the realm of foreign interference on a certain level. All that is to say that there was a great deal of talk about members of Parliament and their roles, including NSICOP, including their possible access to intelligence, talk about giving intelligence clearances, classified clearances, to leaders of the opposition, things like that.
:
Thank you, Madam Chair.
Thank you, Mr. Rigby, for being here today and for your years of service to Canada.
I want to go back to this international assessment secretariat. They were ultimately responsible, you said, for producing the weekly briefing that the got, which is the only one that you've assured us that the Prime Minister actually sees, so this obviously is the focal document according to your testimony.
What process did that take? Who signed off on that assessment secretariat? Did that go up the chain through the NSIA? Where did it go through the PCO? Where was the hand-off to the political level? Can you give us a sense of where that document chain would go?
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In terms of the leaks, categorically and unequivocally it's wrong. It's against the law. It undermines our national security in terms of potentially exposing to hostile state actors where our strengths and weaknesses are. It potentially exposes human sources to retribution. It literally puts lives at risk. This is not the way to go about this.
I know there are a lot of people out there saying the whistle-blower is a Canadian hero—not in my books. Not a Canadian hero and not a whistle-blower: There's been no explicit wrongdoing in terms of laws of being broken, malfeasance or anything like that. You can certainly be upset that the government did not respond in certain ways to some intelligence, if that's the way you feel, but if you start having public servants releasing—illegally—highly, highly classified intelligence, then you are trending in the direction of chaos.
In addition to undermining all of our national security interests and so on, it sets a bad examples for others who are then going to start leaking documents. Every time somebody is a little bit upset that they're not being listened to and they feel that...“I'm going to go directly to the Canadian public.” You're going to have everybody in every department going, “Oh, well, look at all the exposure we got on foreign interference, so why don't I try that?”
That's not the way a parliamentary democracy works. The government—ministers—are accountable to the public. Public servants report to the government. There was an excellent article in The Globe and Mail a while ago by Jim Mitchell and a former clerk of the Privy Council to this effect in terms of how our system works. This is not the way it works.
Did some good come of it? Well, as I said earlier, if people had read those two reports.... Honestly, I'm not going on about these reports because my name is on the cover. I just think they're pretty solid reports. If people had read those reports, they would have realized that there's a lot happening here and we could have started to try to fix the system that is broken.
But for people to do this, it's categorically wrong, in my view.
I'm curious about something you said at the beginning of your testimony. You talked about some needs for systemic change within the system and about how some of the processes in place were not necessarily as effective, and how you were working really hard to see what you could do to clean those up.
We did have Ms. Thomas in. She talked about the process of intelligence information sharing with the government and how she had corrected that process, and how she believed there would be no further problems. Even based on the questions that I asked the last time around, one of the things we see is that when information comes sometimes it gets lost. Ms. Thomas talked about being away for a month and then not going back to that information. It seems a little concerning.
I'm wondering if you could talk about whether you think the process Ms. Thomas outlined will address the issue. Is there anything else you think is important for us to address, especially when it comes to this point of privilege? To me the biggest issue here is, in this particular context, how do we make sure that MPs have the appropriate information at the appropriate time so they can respond in a way that is effective?
I heard from you, I believe, and from as well. Mr. Chong talked about receiving a briefing, just a general briefing on what foreign interference looks like. He felt that it was very helpful, but he knew that only a small number of the members of Parliament actually got it.
There are two separate questions. With regard to the process, has it been addressed? Are there gaps that you in your role see and would want to point out and draw to the attention of the committee? How do we make sure that the information is clear so that members of Parliament, and in fact all parliamentarians, are getting information that will assist them in having a point of view with more wisdom in terms of foreign interference?
Thank you.
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With regard to the changes that the national security intelligence adviser has introduced, I think they're a great start; I really do. I have tremendous respect for my successor, Jody. She's a really great Canadian.
I think the idea of setting up a committee, which I think she mentioned before this committee, to focus on actionable intelligence, especially with respect to foreign interference, is really great. Again, I tried to set that up within the DMIC. If she's created it as a separate new committee, that's great. Have deputies sit down, talk about this kind of intel and move it up.
I'm a little nervous about suddenly sending up every single piece of intelligence about foreign interference and potential threats to members of Parliament. The reason I'm a little bit concerned is that you could possibly go from famine to feast in the sense that every single piece of intel, whether it's corroborated or credible or not, goes up to the top. That could potentially gum up the system.
Can I make one quick last point? Getting it right at the deputy level is really important, but it still has to go somewhere when it gets to the political level. You need that central, functional body to have those discussions. That comes back to the idea of having some kind of a committee, chaired by the PM, to actually talk through the intel and the response.
Our next panel has arrived, and we're excited for it. We'll be going slightly over.
[Translation]
First, I will give the floor to Mr. Berthold for five minutes. Then, it will be Mr. Fergus's turn, also for five minutes.
Time required for interpretation will not be counted during speaking time.
I ask you to speak according to the rules so that the interpreters can do their job.
Mr. Berthold, you have five minutes.
:
So, what I understand is that you don't remember him talking to you about it.
It seems that Mr. Johnston didn't really want to go look for the causes in that file, and that he was more interested in the second part of his study.
Mr. Rigby, in your report from May of last year, you made the following observation:
Many Canadians today mistrust government. This has major implications for national security.
Unfortunately, despite this report and despite everything you flagged, this does not seem to resonate much on the government side.
Do you think that the current situation is worse than when you tabled your report in May 2022, in terms of the trust Canadians have in their government on national security?
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Mr. Rigby, I'm a little surprised to hear that, before coming here, you did not familiarize yourself with all the newspaper articles and information saying that people do indeed trust the government less and less. If the people are demanding an independent public inquiry, it's not because they trust the government, it's because they want to shed light on the national security file.
In your testimony, I was very disappointed to hear that in all the documents and reports you read, and all the memos sent to you, a subject like funding a network of candidates in an election campaign did not attract more of your attention. I understand that one can read a lot of information, but when it comes to a direct attack on democracy, I don't understand why it didn't raise certain questions, why the situation wasn't dealt with on a political level and why we aren't sounding the alarm.
You yourself said you had direct access to the when you asked for it. Why did you fail to do so with this file, Mr. Rigby?
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Thank you very much, Madam Chair.
I also thank Mr. Rigby for his 30 years of service to our country. We are very grateful to him for it.
[English]
Mr. Rigby, being a local MP I have the privilege of running into former retired deputy ministers from time to time and engaging them in informal conversations.
One of the conclusions that I've gleaned is that there is, I would call it, a cultural reluctance sometimes for deputy ministers to share routine intelligence issues with their ministers with no possibility for resolution. The time with the minister is limited, and they always want to make sure that it's used most effectively. In other words, this is sort of the intelligence to evidence problem. Does my interpretation rhyme with your experience?
:
Madam Chair, I think those are two different issues in terms of intel to evidence, which speaks to courts of law, criminal prosecution, etc. So that's one basket.
The other basket with respect to deputy ministers and what they tell their ministers.... I think deputy ministers make a thousand judgment calls a day in terms of what they put before their minister. As you said, ministers are incredibly busy people, and deputy ministers are incredibly busy people, so a lot of judgment goes into deciding what to put before a minister on any given day. Sometimes it's just situational awareness, “Minister, you should know about this important context; it may come down and bite you at some point at a later date.” Then there's the stuff, “I need to speak to you now, Minister, because this is very important.” You're always as a deputy, I think, sensitive to the fact that you don't want to gum up the system. You don't want to fire too much at the minister. You don't want to fire too much at the .
I remember with the seeing stuff all the time and trying to decide: Do I fire this off to the PMO; do I fire this off to the PM; do I ask for time right away knowing how busy he is? If it's a really important issue, of course that's what you have to do, but you have to make that judgment. It's a tough call every single day for deputy ministers, but it's why they're paid the big bucks.
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We are the only Five Eyes country that doesn't have that type of body. The United States has a national security council, which is actually in legislation. The other three Five Eyes countries, I believe—I don't know if all of my information is up to date—have cabinet committees with their prime minister heading that up.
What I'd love to see is a cabinet committee that is chaired by the prime minister with key national security ministers—the minister of public safety, the minister of national defence, the deputy prime minister and the minister of foreign affairs—meeting regularly, every couple of weeks. Don't wait for the crisis to happen to call an incident response group meeting. They are great, but they're always trying to catch up.
If the and his ministers together were being briefed on the intelligence on a regular basis—every couple of weeks—and then having discussions about what that intelligence means, asking questions of the directors of CSIS, CSE, Public Safety or DND, and then talking about responses.... To me, especially given the security environment that we live in, with Russia, China, pandemics and climate change—all of these are national security concerns—it is just so logical to create that kind of body at this time in our history.
:
Madam Chair, I would totally agree with that.
That's why I'm a strong advocate of doing a full-scale national security review. Whether you do a public inquiry focused narrowly on foreign interference in elections, which is kind of a burning tree, or you look at the whole forest, where there are lots of burning trees.... If you were to do a full-up review with full-up public consultations, that is the government showing leadership and helping to inform Canadians.
Governments will often say, “It's not a big concern for my constituents.” You have to educate your constituents about the state of the world and the things that the government needs to do. That's why I think what Mr. Johnston is recommending, or a full-scale national security review launched by the government, is not a bad idea at all.
As the chair, I don't really get to have an exchange with Mr. Rigby. I feel like it's been a lot of time.
The thing I really appreciated was the reference to reports and the importance of reading them in their entirety. I know, as somebody who's going through Mr. Johnston's report, that it's a pretty good read. It would be really important to see how Canadians communicate and how it is resonating, because sometimes the work you do is tough, and if you're not in that national security space, it's very foreign to those of us who have confidence in the people in those roles, because we know you do your best.
I want to say, on behalf of PROC members, thank you for your time today. Thank you for responding to us and being able to be present. If there's anything else that you find you would like to share with us, just send it to the clerk and we'll have it translated and shared around.
With that, we wish you the best.
We're going to suspend for a few minutes, as our next panel is here.
Thank you.
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I call the meeting back to order.
For our next panel, we have with us, Mr. Eric Janse, acting clerk of the House of Commons, Monsieur Michel Bédard, interim law clerk and parliamentary counsel, Jeffrey LeBlanc, acting deputy clerk of procedure, and Patrick McDonell, Sergeant-at-Arms and corporate security secretary.
I understand that, combined, you are bringing readings. Mr. Janse, five minutes go to you.
:
Thank you very much, Madam Chair.
Thank you for inviting me and my colleagues to appear today on the question of privilege concerning alleged acts of intimidation towards the member for and other members.
[Translation]
To begin my remarks, I would like to inform the committee that I do not have first-hand or specific knowledge of the circumstances surrounding this incident. I leave it to other witnesses to clarify those circumstances.
The contribution I believe I can make, for the committee's study today, is in providing high-level observations on the central role that parliamentary privilege plays in the proceedings of Parliament. In addition, I hope to also be able to offer insights into the role the committee can play in examining this question of privilege.
Parliamentary privilege refers to the rights and immunities that have been deemed necessary to allow the House of Commons and its members to carry out their parliamentary duties, free from undue influence.
[English]
In the 30th Parliament, the Special Committee on Rights and Immunities of Members, chaired by then speaker James Jerome, succinctly enunciated the reason for parliamentary privilege in its first report, presented to the House on July 12, 1976. It stated:
The purpose of parliamentary privilege is to allow Members of the House of Commons to carry out their duties as representatives of the electorate without undue interference.
The Speaker is entrusted with the responsibility to ensure that the House and its members can go about their work freely, without interference or threats. In his ruling of May 8, 2023, the Speaker emphasized this point:
The Chair has no higher responsibility than to ensure that the rights and privileges of the members, and of the House, are respected. I considered the gravity of the information that has been put before the House, the origins of the information and the potential impact on our parliamentary duties.
On May 10, 2023, following the Speaker's ruling, the House decided to refer the prima facie case of privilege to this committee. As the Speaker pointed out in his ruling, his role is not to make a finding of fact. It is, rather, to determine whether, on the face of it, the matter appeared to affect members' privileges in a way that was serious enough to warrant priority consideration by the House.
In adopting an order of reference to this committee, the House has determined that this matter required further investigation and that this committee is the most appropriate vehicle to achieve this objective.
[Translation]
Generally, in examining a question of privilege, a committee will seek first to establish the facts of what occurred. It can then consider whether the events in question do indeed, in its view, represent a breach of members privileges or a contempt of the House. Finally, it can look at what remedy, if any, it would propose in the circumstances and make recommendations, either to the House or to the government, of ways to prevent such events from occurring in the future.
All the usual powers of the committee are available, including the calling of witnesses and the ordering of the production of documents it deems necessary to further its study. It can meet in public, or in camera if it feels some discussions should be kept confidential.
If the committee chooses to make a report to the House, I would urge members to phrase their recommendations carefully. Where the House itself is expected to take action, recommendations should be phrased as orders which could be executed, should they be concurred in by the House. In the case of recommendations to House Administration or the government, they should be phrased in such a way as to be actionable, and should fall squarely within the committee's mandate.
[English]
This committee likely has never been called upon to consider a question of privilege that arose from the intimidation of a member by a foreign government. In a ruling on October 29, 1980, at page 4214 of the Debates, Speaker Sauvé made an insightful statement:
When new ways are found to interfere with our proceedings, so too will the House, in appropriate cases, be able to find that a contempt of the House has occurred.
I am confident that this committee and the House have the capacity to effectively respond to this new threat.
In conclusion, I would like to reiterate the support of the House administration in helping the committee address such threats. With that, I would like to thank you again for having invited me to appear at the committee. My colleagues and I will be happy to answer any questions you might have.
:
Thank you, Madam Chair.
Through you, thank you to our witnesses for joining us this morning.
I'm frankly quite surprised that we don't have the same volume of media here for your testimony as we had earlier in the week. I'm a little disappointed by that, but I'm sure everyone's tuning in from elsewhere.
I'll begin by talking a little bit about the production of papers. Mr. Janse, you mentioned that in your comments, and Monsieur Bédard, you were with us earlier this week at the OGGO committee. At that committee, it was unfortunate, I think, that some departments, including PCO, perhaps didn't fully understand the powers of Parliament, including its committees, to compel the provision of documents.
I was hoping that either you, Mr. Janse, or Mr. Bédard could confirm for this committee our power to compel the production of documents and its authority superseding all other government rules or non-constitutional measures.
:
Among the parliamentary privileges that the House and its committees have, there is the right to send for records and papers. Parliamentary privileges, in general, are rooted in the Constitution and have constitutional status, so they will prevail over ordinary legislation that would provide that information is to be kept confidential or secret unless there's an explicit provision to the contrary.
Documents that could be sought and obtained by committee include solicitor-client privilege, documents dealing with national security....
Now, if there is some concern about the production of documents, there could be a dialogue between the committee and the government or the other party that is in possession of the documents. The committee could decide to put measures in place to protect the confidentiality of the documents, could insist on its original request, or could decide not to ask for the production of the documents.
Ultimately, it's for the committee to decide.
I'll move on. This question is for Mr. Janse.
Last month, our committee invited Beijing's ambassador to appear before this committee. Obviously, we have a few questions we hope to be able to ask him. To my knowledge, he has not yet responded. Committees have, in the past, heard from diplomats voluntarily.
Should this committee decide that it must hear from the ambassador, instead of just letting his silence speak volumes, does this committee have the authority to compel his attendance?
:
Thank you, Madam Chair.
I thank the witnesses. It's always an honour to have them.
I'd like to better understand the present and look into the future. Having had the opportunity to meet with the United Kingdom's legislative assembly—I know you did too—, I'd like to draw a parallel between our practices and theirs so we can talk about them in the report.
You may be aware that in January 2022, the British MI5, which is responsible for domestic security, sent a note to all members of Parliament reporting a threat against a woman lawyer. This information came from a security intelligence agency. That's like the Canadian Security Intelligence Service flagging a threat to the official presidency, and then sending that warning out to all elected officials.
How does it work here in Canada?
:
It's a hypothetical question, so I'll do my best to answer it.
CSIS is responsible for the first communication with an individual MP. If they have a concern regarding foreign interference, for example, with that MP, that MP's office, that MP's staff, that would be CSIS reaching out to the MP first. They wouldn't go through a third party, which would be us. We would become aware of it at some point, depending on the circumstances of the interference.
My job, my primary role, is to do my best, and my folks do their best, to ensure the physical security of members of Parliament and their staff and this place. That's our primary role. Foreign interference is something new on our plate, in the last few months.
Thank you to those who are testifying today. I want to start off by saying how much I appreciate all the work that you do for this place. It is incredibly difficult and challenging, and I appreciate the non-partisan people who get the work done while we do our political work, so I want to thank you all for that first.
What I'm trying to wrap my head around is this. We know that foreign interference is ever-changing and it is a considerable issue, and we need to figure out the best pathway forward.
We heard from Mr. Chong. He raised a powerful question of privilege, and he has suggested that maybe CSIS should tell the Speaker about any sort of threat activities and then have the Speaker inform members at will. He used the example from the U.K. Parliament to illustrate the process that is taking place in other countries.
I'd like to ask all of you for your thoughts on that process. Knowing that there's something fundamentally broken in the system, we need to find a way to make sure that members of Parliament and parliamentarians are made aware of any threat that's coming toward them, and what that means for them in taking the next steps to protect themselves.
Also, one of the things I've left this process with is an understanding of what's coming at us and being able to observe the world, perhaps, in a different way so that we can better see what is coming. We can reiterate that back to all the relevant departments to make sure that we're all collectively working together to make sure there is no foreign interference.
I'll leave it to you, Mr. Janse, to start us off. Do you feel there's a key role in the office and the work that you do that we could be exploring? Are there other countries that are doing a good job that we should be looking at? Of course, if any of your colleagues are willing to answer that question, I would deeply appreciate it.
:
Thank you very much, Ms. Blaney, for the question. I'll start, and then I'll turn it over to the Sergeant-at-Arms.
As it was just mentioned, obviously, yes, this is an important issue, which is why, in part, there has been a memorandum of understanding signed between the House and CSIS. As it was just explained, the details of how to operationalize that agreement are still being determined now, so any recommendations from this committee, of course, would be very timely.
I'll turn it over to Pat to provide a few more details on timelines as well.
:
Thank you. I really appreciate that response.
I am just trying to figure out, too, what department.
To come back to the Sergeant-at-Arms, I understand you've signed this agreement and I understand that you're in the process of unfolding what this is going to look like in the future.
One of the things we have also heard from is that there was an orientation for him about what foreign interference looks like. That information was extremely helpful for him in being able to assess and see things that may have been a threat. He said that before that training he may not have noticed those particular nuances.
I am wondering if there are any discussions at that level that you're working in about making sure that members of Parliament have better awareness and understanding so that we can assess what might be a threat, and alert the appropriate people. How will you be working with CSIS to perhaps implement that into the future?
I think my next question would be for Mr. Bédard.
I appreciate some of the questions you were answering earlier and the work you're doing around exploring what you might be able to do in terms of having top secret information. I think it was very helpful for me to hear that at this point this is not something you've done.
In the capacity of the work you do, how do you assess issues of national security? If you were provided a request to do something that would have you looking at that information—and I understand your assessment level is at that space—how would you assess your ability to do that, and the impacts it might have with other Five Eyes partners, for example?
:
In the work of the law clerk's office, if we are asked to redact documents, our marching orders will come from the committee. We'll look at what the committee has asked of us.
As I indicated, it is proposed that if there is any mandate to our office to redact national security information or top secret information, that would be provided with proposed redactions so that we could assess and have context and, I trust, a line of communication with the department or the provider of the document or the information.
In some cases if there is a tough call, I will err on the side of caution and inform the committee accordingly, but that is what we will do to ensure that we are not compromising national security.
I'm not going to ask you to comment on what I'm about to say, but that was as a result of the fact that the government blocked the production of those documents, took the Speaker to court, shut down Parliament, and then the called an unnecessary election, illustrating the lengths to which this government will go to cover up. It also demonstrates the utter contempt this Prime Minister and this government have for parliamentary committees and for Parliament as a whole.
I would further add that what Mr. Bédard described as PCO undertaking proposed redactions of classified documents, and then having the opportunity to review that, erring, as he said, on the side of caution as to how he would approach things, is precisely the process we have put forward in the way of several motions that have come before this committee.
Thank you, Madam Chair.
:
Thank you, Madam Chair.
I want to go back to you, Mr. Bédard, regarding the said intelligence that you might be receiving.
We've heard from many witnesses here before that those who are experts in the intelligence community find that it takes them a lot of experience and a lot of time to differentiate between what type of intelligence is actually evidence or has more weight, or what the context of the intelligence might be. Raw intelligence is often incorrect or misleading and requires that specific context to properly be understood.
Does your Office of the Law Clerk have the necessary expertise? You've already testified here today that this would be the first time you would be doing this. I would take it that the expertise is not necessarily there. If it's not there at this time, how would you gain that expertise in time? How would you understand the context that's needed to ensure that the proper elements of those documents are redacted?
:
Thank you for the question.
Through you, Madam Chair, there are two parts to the question. The first is the capacity of the office. I heard you referring to the interpretation of intelligence and being able to draw conclusions. This is not part of our mandate. We do not have a capacity to develop it. This is a specific skill that is beyond the mandate of the Office of the Law Clerk.
Now, in order to make redactions to what information could be particularly sensitive, as I mentioned earlier, there are two means in particular:put those redactions, and also the ability to talk with the provider of the documents to assess the context of the proposed redactions.
I don't know if my colleague, the Sergeant-at-Arms, wants to add anything about the interpretation of intelligence.
Mr. Patrick McDonell: No.
:
Thank you, Madam Chair.
I'm learning quite a bit, and I want to learn more. Something that came up a lot in everything we've heard so far is that foreign interference is happening more and more and that it's important to be cautious about who has all the necessary expertise to receive material classified as secret.
We are talking a lot about national security and foreign interference.
I'd like you to talk more about that, because I'm not sure I fully understand something. We're being told that we have to be cautious when it comes to national security, but that foreign interference is on the rise.
Can you enlighten me on that? You have a solid minute to answer my question.
:
Thank you, Madam Chair.
I think I will go back to the law clerk.
Thank you, Mr. Bédard, for your patience with me. If I understand this correctly, from what I've heard from the other testimony, you could receive the information. You feel you have the security clearance. I guess what I'm trying to get clarity on is this: How would you identify what is appropriate to redact? Have you done any research on how other countries that we receive information on do this? Is this a practice?
One concern I have is that if we're doing a practice that doesn't make sense to our partners, it may limit their feelings of comfort to share information with us. That is a significant challenge around national security. When I'm making decisions, I really try, especially on these issues, to not be partisan but to be very mindful of the role that we all take to support the well-being and health of all Canadians. As we move through this process, I am just trying to understand that.
If you could answer that question, it would really support me in understanding what thoughtfulness I need to take as things come before me.
:
Thank you for the question.
In terms of practices in other jurisdictions, I'm not aware of any similar practices where the law clerk's office or its equivalent is asked to make redactions. That said, as I mentioned earlier, this practice of having the administration, be it the law clerk or the clerk of the committee, redact documents is a new practice in the Canadian Parliament. We didn't have the opportunity to do deep research in other jurisdictions to see if there are other jurisdictions that have a similar mandate.
In terms of how we would proceed with the redactions, as I indicated, we will rely on proposed redactions, provided that any order for the production of documents includes also the requirement to propose redactions as well as the ability to speak with the providers of the documents so that we can get the proper context to assess the sensitive nature of the information—and also, in case of doubt, err on the side of caution.
:
Mr. Cooper, you don't have the floor. When I give you the floor, you have the floor. We know how this works.
I'm glad you're smiling and finding it entertaining. I don't.
Regarding the people who run the House of Commons, do we need them here for this or can they get back to doing what they need to do?
This is a regular occurrence. We invite witnesses. People have questions lined up, and then.... I don't even know what it is you think you are doing, Mr. Cooper, because we can function. These are democratic institutions, for goodness' sake, people. This is not a different—
I have the floor, Mr. Cooper. We don't push the button, as I've said, because of interpretation and the people who provide us with both official languages.
Ms. Blaney, do you have it now?
:
I appreciate that. You didn't disrupt the process.
I'm going to give the floor back to Mr. Cooper.
Mr. Turnbull, I know that you have questions, and I will do my best.
I also will just note that we're not new here. We know that resources are limited. We know that we don't have extra resources today. I went around, and I said the first panel is going to go over by five minutes. We're going to keep everyone here tight. We gave everyone who is helping us function that information, and then there's just this whatever happening.
Go ahead on a point of order, Ms. Blaney.
:
If it makes you feel better, Mr. Berthold, sure, but I'm just saying that, when it comes to putting words in the member's mouth, it's happened before.
I asked if Mr. Cooper had any more questions, because then what I could suggest is that, if he doesn't, I would go to Mr. Turnbull and then give him back the floor to continue with his motion, as we have done in the past.
I think we would be able to get agreement from the Bloc and the NDP to finish this, release the witnesses, and then give Mr. Cooper back the floor to finish this. I feel this is a plausible way forward.
Is that a plausible way forward?
:
Thank you very much, Madam Chair.
From the moment the 's so-called special rapporteur was appointed, there have been serious questions about conflict of interest around Mr. Johnston, given the fact that he was a long-standing friend of the Prime Minister's father, the fact that he has had a relationship with the Prime Minister for decades and the fact that he, up until his appointment as so-called special rapporteur, was a member of the Beijing-financed and Beijing-compromised Trudeau Foundation.
Since Mr. Johnston's appointment, new conflicts have emerged. It turns out that not only is he a friend of the and was a member of the Trudeau Foundation—which, on both counts, disqualify him from being appointed to such a role to investigate Beijing's interference on matters that implicate the Prime Minister over what he did or failed to do to respond to Beijing's interference, where part of Beijing's strategy, of course, was to benefit the Liberal Party—but it has now been revealed that Mr. Johnston selected as the lead counsel for his supposedly independent investigation none other than Sheila Block. She is a major Liberal donor who has, over the last several years, donated nearly $7,000 to the Liberal Party of Canada and who was rubbing shoulders with the Prime Minister and the , at least virtually, at a recent Liberal Party fundraiser.
He hired another Liberal, Valérie Gervais, who is a former ministerial staffer, as a communications adviser. We now learn that he's taking advice from Don Guy, who is another Liberal and former chief of staff to Dalton McGuinty, as well as Brian Topp, who was a chief of staff to an NDP government.
In light of that, what we have are conflicts everywhere around this so-called special rapporteur. On that basis, it's appropriate that these witnesses come to answer questions before this committee.
I'm not sure where the chair is, but thank you, Madam Chair.
:
Thank you so much, Chair.
I thank Mr. Cooper for bringing this forward.
I am going to offer an amendment to remove paragraph c. I'm not averse to having the conversation, but I'm not prepared to make that decision. I know that the people in paragraph c are not receiving any compensation. I think that's something I could explore at a later date, but today, just to get things done quickly, I think that would be the best way to move forward.
Madam Chair, I am officially asking for that to amend the motion. I hope to see paragraph c removed.
The rest of it I can support, just for clarity.
:
Madam Chair, I appreciate the amendment or the suggestion by Madam Blaney. I also appreciate that Mr. Cooper is willing to remove paragraph c. However, I do have some problems with this motion as it stands, and I would like to make a modification.
I think we've gotten into a bad habit, Madam Chair, of detailing who comes and for how long before committee. I think it's been very good that we've been able to do this, but now we're getting into the short strokes before the summer. I would like to suggest that we maintain paragraphs a and b, but we remove the times that are added to their appearances.
Of course, we'll ask the chair to please schedule this, respecting the times within the next 10 days for these folks to come, and just allow the chair and the clerk to determine for how long these folks would appear before committee.
:
Madam Chair, I am obviously a little disappointed that I didn't get my round of questions in, but I've let that go at this point. Looking at this motion, I don't really comprehend how this has to do with the question of privilege that we're undertaking a study on here. I can only speculate as to what the real motivations of calling these particular witnesses are, but based on what we've seen from the Conservatives in terms of dragging people's good names through the mud, I have concerns that this is just another way to attack people who don't really deserve to be brought into this.
I don't have any problem with them in particular being witnesses. At the same time, I just don't understand the motives of Mr. Cooper. How does this pertain to the question of privilege? To me, that's what we're doing the study on. We realize that this may now include several other members of Parliament—we'll see—but as a study that we're doing....
What we're trying to get to the bottom of is whether 's privileges were infringed upon by a threat of intimidation or interference that never materialized, which has been documented multiple times by national security experts, including previous witnesses.
National security and intelligence adviser Jody Thomas said that there was no actual threat. There is confirmation from Mr. Johnston's report as well.
That's not to say it isn't a serious matter and that we don't take this seriously because we do, but I don't understand the motive here. I think it's to bring additional people into this to then drag them through the mud for political gain, and if that's what the Conservative Party's motivations are, which seems to be the case based on the experiences that I have had on this committee, then I can't support this motion. I would suggest that maybe we should consider some amendments to it. While I'm not opposed to what Ms. Blaney has said, I'm just looking at what value this motion would bring to our current work, and I don't see it. I don't see the value of it, let alone the amount of time that's been specified here, which I think is a lot of the committee's time for witnesses whom I don't see as being relevant to the particular study.
They are another example of trying to create suspicion out of someone who has integrity and credibility, who has been cited by the Conservative Party because they need to attack the person and discredit Mr. Johnston because they don't like the conclusions in his report that are based on facts and evidence.
When you're desperate and you don't have truth on your side, what you do is attack the person, which is a well-known tactic that's been used in rhetoric since time immemorial. It's attack the person—
:
Thank you, Madam Chair.
As it stands now, if I'm correct, we have paragraphs a and b. We've eliminated paragraph c. I'm just verifying this. We've removed the reference to the number of hours from both paragraphs a and b. Is that correct? Thank you, Madam Chair.
I still have, I think, similar concerns that I was expressing earlier in relation to this motion. I really don't see how Ms. Block and Ms. Gervais are going to contribute to the work we're doing.
I think the appointment of the special rapporteur, Mr. Johnston.... We had him come before the committee for over three hours. It was about three hours and 15 minutes, if I'm not mistaken, which is almost unheard of in terms of the amount of time a witness would appear. I thought he was very forthcoming and gave us lots of clear responses and really spoke well, I think, to the detailed work he's undertaken as the special rapporteur.
I know that the committee has benefited greatly from his testimony, and I'm not sure why.... I think what we witnessed, certainly from the Conservative Party, was an attempt, which they're not even doing subtly at this point, to drag Mr. Johnston's good name through the mud. Personally, I think it's disgusting. I apologized to Mr. Johnston, in a way, on their behalf, even though I have no right to do so in a sense.
I just feel horrible for how he's been treated, someone who was appointed by Stephen Harper, whom sang praises about for numerous years—as we all did—as a pre-eminent Canadian who served this country so well as the Governor General. To have his reputation be tarnished for political gain just seems to me to be beyond the pale. It makes me feel really badly for him. I really do feel for him. I'm not saying that he deserves, necessarily, to be protected or that he needs it, per se, but I really think it's not merited in his case.
I don't understand why and how these two witnesses will give us more testimony that's really useful for the important work we're undertaking. There are so many witnesses we could be hearing from who I think have an ability to look forward and say how we can improve our response on foreign interference, or witnesses we could have just heard from, if Mr. Cooper hadn't used his opportunity to move a motion like this in the middle of a meeting where we had scheduled witnesses, who were really relevant to a question of privilege.
When we have a question of privilege, and we have the law clerk, the clerk of the House of Commons and the Sergeant-at-Arms here, we have important work to be done on the actual question of privilege. I had clarification questions for them and, I think, very important questions as to how we can understand the potential infringement of one of our MPs' parliamentary privilege.
The Speaker ruled that there was a prima facie case here, and that's why it was referred to this committee. That's why we're undertaking this work, but it seems a little strange to me that we wouldn't have the opportunity to fully utilize the expertise in the room.
really just don't see the value of these witnesses for the current study. I've stated that and given you some of my reasons.
Thank you, Madam Chair.
:
Madam Chair, I wanted to state my frustration or bewilderment with the last four committee meetings we've had. Perhaps my count is off. I don't even know how many meetings we've had on the question of privilege so far. It doesn't seem any different from the foreign interference study. It's all blending into one.
I've been on this committee for quite some time. We've had other questions of privilege. It's a constitutional and legal matter, like we've heard here today.
I believe the witnesses who were before us today were extremely valuable, and I think they would be beneficial in our getting down to the definition of intimidation. What we've heard from them today about this type of foreign action never having been looked at.... We're sitting on something that is precedent-setting and I think it's quite exciting for us to explore how we adapt and evolve with these given threats in the coming time.
My bewilderment and confusion come from an area...we aren't even exploring that. We've already heard from testimony that threats were made. We've already heard that. We're coming from a place of knowledge where we know foreign interference exists. We know that in terms of election interference, the last two elections may have had attempts, but the elections were decided by Canadians and Canadians alone. We know that.
What we should be deciding at this committee now is whether the level of threat or the type of threat, or if in the absence of knowledge of a threat...whether we would now make a precedent-setting decision as to this being a privilege matter. That is before us.
We haven't even begun to explore the actual issue. The witnesses who have been put before us today are not going to get us any closer to making that determination.
What is the point of our going in circles just for the circus that serves the CPC's political intentions and motivations? That's exactly what it is. It's all political tactics to see how far they can take this game of leading Canadians down this road of mistrust in our democracy, and how they can destroy and maybe burn down our institutions. That is the goal of the CPC, and that's all I can really make of all of this, because we're not getting down to what we should be doing to protect our institutions.
Yes, we already know certain things exist, so we need to now move forward from those. We know a colleague of ours, who happens to be a member of the CPC.... I feel bad for what has happened. Now we need to figure out how to solve that problem.
One thing that's already happened—and we've heard this—is a directive has been given by the to make sure that any incidents of intimidation or foreign interference involving parliamentarians are quickly elevated and brought to the attention of our security agencies and, ultimately, the This is important. This is a good outcome, I would say, as I was questioning some of the witnesses here today.
Although it's taken us getting through a lot of mud and unnecessary stuff, we're getting to some good conclusions, but I don't believe having this meeting with these witnesses is getting us any closer to answering the question of whether this is a matter of privilege or not.
These witnesses would not be coming here with any knowledge of whether this is a matter of privilege or not in this House of Commons. What is the point?
The point is to distract and to create mistrust. That's all we've seen in 's campaign so far. There are no solutions and no ideas. It's just, “Let's tear this place down. Let's see how angry we can get people. Let's cause confusion and chaos where we can cause them.”
That's exactly what these witnesses are being brought here in an attempt to do. I'm sure the witnesses will be wonderful and great, because they're eminent top professionals in their areas, but what's the point of this? It's definitely not to get to the answers that this committee has been mandated to look into by the Speaker of the House of Commons.
It is not our mandate to drag other people's names through the mud unnecessarily or to attack them about what they did 30 years ago. This is becoming normal, I guess, in politics in the last couple of years, but it's disgusting, quite frankly. It's absolutely disgusting.
I don't think any knowledgeable, eminent person is going to want to advise parliamentarians anymore, which is going to be a real shame because we respect professionals in their fields and require their guidance and their advisement at times like this when we are going through unprecedented situations—that we have their service at our disposal. However, no one is going to come forward anymore.
Quite frankly, I don't even think anyone's going to want to become a parliamentarian in the near future if we keep going in this direction, at least nobody who has a reputation that they care about.
All I can say is that I'm a little frustrated by the joke that we're creating out of this whole situation. Even what we saw in the House of Commons yesterday, running out there so the budget could not come to a vote—running out and hiding in the lobby, voting on your phones and saying that you're having technical difficulties when, quite frankly, it's evident that no one's having technical difficulties.... It's just to delay and waste time.
This is another tactic to delay, to waste time, to confuse matters, and I don't agree with it. I don't intend to vote if you cannot explain to me what your intention is and what type of evidence you think you will be garnering from bringing such witnesses that will help us in the question of privilege that is before this committee now.
Thank you, Madam Chair.
My list is exhausted, so I would like to call the question. Is that suitable?
I am just going to make a comment really quickly.
Today is Thursday. With regard to Tuesday, the notice is out for Duheme for one hour, as was requested by this committee, and Morrison for two hours. That evening, as was requested by this committee, is Vigneault for two hours. On Thursday, as was requested by this committee, is appearing. Then we have two of the people who were on that list of witnesses we had asked.
The 10 days will be pending a deviation request, which the clerk has already put through. Otherwise, it will probably be 10 business days. We will try to swap around, but cancelling people doesn't get us further ahead, so just be mindful that we will do our best to have them here within 10 days. Should a deviation request not happen, it will be the 20th where we'll try to put them in, unless something changes.
[Translation]
Did you have something to add, Mr. Savard-Tremblay?