:
I call this meeting to order.
Good afternoon, everyone, and happy Monday.
Welcome to meeting No. 54 of the House of Commons Standing Committee on Industry and Technology.
Pursuant to Standing Order 108(2) and the motion adopted by the committee on Monday, December 12, 2022, the committee is meeting today to study a contract awarded to Sinclair Technologies.
Today's meeting is taking place in a hybrid format, pursuant to the House order of June 23, 2022.
During the first hour, we have the pleasure of welcoming the Honourable Marco Mendicino, Minister of Public Safety, whom I thank for joining us.
We are also welcoming two officials from the Royal Canadian Mounted Police: Bryan Larkin, Deputy Commissioner, Specialized Policing Services; and Samantha Hazen, Chief Financial Officer.
I thank all three of you for being with us.
Without further ado, Minister Mendicino, I give you the floor for five minutes.
:
Thank you very much, Mr. Chair. I am very happy to see you.
I also hope that all the committee members spent some quality time with their families and loved ones over the winter holidays.
[English]
Colleagues, it is a pleasure and a privilege to come before you today to say a few words and answer your questions about the nature of this study regarding certain questions around equipment that was procured by the RCMP vis-à-vis Sinclair Technologies.
At the very outset, I would like to state a few things up front.
First, national security and protecting Canadians are my top priorities. Our eyes are wide open when it comes to foreign threats, which is why we have rigorous screening procedures in place when we procure equipment and services to support our public safety agencies.
Second, the RCMP has conducted a review of the procurement, installation and maintenance of equipment in this matter and concluded that, at all times, they followed the applicable policies and protocols.
Third, the RCMP further assessed there were no breaches of security as a result of the equipment in question, and that the risks, at the time of procurement, were—and remain—low.
[Translation]
Fourth, the RCMP has suspended the use of the standing offer, and all other contracting and transactions with Sinclair Technologies and Norsat International until further notice.
[English]
Fifth, and finally, I have instructed all agencies within my portfolio to apply national security screening protocols to all procurement contracts with the strictest of diligence, so as to ensure the ongoing integrity and protection of all public safety-related critical infrastructure.
I will now highlight a few key facts to inform your study.
The current standing offer completed by Public Services and Procurement Canada—I will refer to them as PSPC—for radio-frequency filtering equipment was issued to Sinclair Technologies Incorporated on October 6, 2021, for a period of three years, until March 31, 2024. There are two one-year option periods to extend the use of the standing offer until March 31, 2026. The total value of the standing offer is $549,637. To date, the RCMP has issued only three call-ups against the standing offer, totalling $55,073.
Further, a separate standing offer for antennas was completed by PSPC and used by the RCMP between December 2013 and December 19, 2018. Under this standing offer, there were 11 call-ups, and these were issued payments totalling $188,982 for antennas, radio shelters and radio-frequency filtration equipment to Sinclair Technologies.
In addition to the above standing offers, there were also 11 contracts for various antennas, radio shelters and radio-frequency filtration equipment totalling $234,606. Thus, for the RCMP, the total call-ups and contracts with Norsat, operating as Sinclair Technologies, are 25. They are valued at $478,661.
In addition to these contracts, there were 144 low dollar-value payments between the RCMP and Sinclair totalling $461,184 for radio communications equipment, repair parts and other related products.
[Translation]
Radio frequency filters allow radio users, including RCMP officers, to communicate more clearly by preventing interference and background noise.
The equipment procured by the RCMP under this standing offer is basically unpowered assemblies of tin cans, metal rods and cables that filter out unwanted signals and interference to help optimize radio performance.
[English]
Given these characteristics, I want to be clear that the equipment in question does not have the technical capability to access RCMP radio communications. Moreover, RCMP radio communications are protected with end-to-end encryption, using the Canadian centre for cybersecurity's encryption standard.
While the radio frequency filtration equipment procured from Sinclair Technologies poses no security concerns given its specific function, the use of the current standing offer was suspended on December 9, 2022, and a stop-work order for undelivered goods was issued as well, on the same date. Further reviews are being conducted by the RCMP's independent audit unit.
Again, there is no reason to believe that Canada's national security was under threat at any time during this process. Regardless, there is no shortage of real threats.
[Translation]
That is why we are continually striving to ensure the integrity of our democracy and the protection of national security.
We are making investments to provide all the tools that law enforcement and public safety officials need to protect Canadians and our institutions, including the critical infrastructure that supports the RCMP.
These efforts are ongoing and part of our broader goals to protect national security.
[English]
Combatting foreign interference is a complex challenge, particularly in today's geopolitical environment. That is why we are attacking it from all angles, continually re-evaluating our approach, making new investments in public safety tools and reinforcing our already rigorous protocols to safeguard our national security.
Thank you.
:
That's great. Thank you.
You are aware that China's National People's Congress passed a national intelligence law in 2017 to compel all Chinese nationals, at home and abroad, to collaborate with agents of the Chinese state, on request, to further Chinese state interests.
Specifically, article 7 says, “All organizations and citizens shall support, assist, and cooperate with national intelligence agencies in accordance with [the] law, and shall protect national intelligence”. Article 10 goes on to say, “As necessary for their work, national intelligence work institutions are to use the necessary means, tactics, and channels to carry out intelligence...domestically and abroad.”
You are aware of that.
[English]
The radio filtration system does not transmit communications. It's designed to filter out any interference. When frequencies are crossing over each other, it's designed to optimize the frequency that the front line or the operations of the RCMP are using.
What I can tell you, though, is that as a result of the information that came to light there are two reviews happening. There's a due diligence review, which is being done by our independent internal audit unit, and a technical review.
We have taken a Sinclair radio filtration device, which is a piece of equipment, off a radio tower in Ontario. Our team has deconstructed it to look at any opportunities, whether it was compromised and whether there were any sorts of devices. I can report back and say absolutely not. The device was the equipment that would be designed for use in a filtration system.
We're also doing other random spot audits across the country. The next one will be in British Columbia, and we can come back to the committee with that information in writing at a later time as we progress across the nation.
That was the technical review, but it is simply.... The easiest way to explain it is that there is no communication that goes through the radio filtration system. It's designed to push out other frequencies. The system that we use for radio communication is two-way, push-to-talk. It's totally encrypted and totally managed by our RCMP radio systems. As well, it meets the standards of the Canadian cybersecurity establishment, so we're confident in the technology that we are using to ensure national security for our organization.
:
I'm confident, on the basis of the review that was conducted by the RCMP, that the answer to the question in this matter is no, but that having been said, I do embrace the study.
I embrace the questions that have been posed by members of this committee, because it is important that we are exhausting every possible effort with due diligence and rigorous screening when it comes to the procurement of equipment, of technology and of services that are acquired in support of our critical infrastructure and that are there to make sure we can keep Canadians safe.
It is, I would add, a very complex geopolitical environment. There are hostile actors who would seek to undermine the Canadian interests, and those hostile actors do look for vectors, for entry points into which they can exploit their interests through foreign interference, but I'm confident that we have protocols in place and procedures in place.
Certainly, when it comes to the procurement of the equipment here, there were no breaches of security, as you've heard the RCMP indicate.
My questioning is along the same lines as what was just asked.
Concerning our allies in the United States, the FCC did list Hytera, and it has a list of its banned equipment to the extent that it's used for the purpose of public safety, security, government facilities, physical security, surveillance of critical infrastructure and other national security purposes. I understand clearly that the equipment in this particular case came nowhere near our secure communications, and that was confirmed and verified by the RCMP.
That being said, the RCMP does work very closely with United States' law enforcement agencies. Would our business contract with Sinclair, which is owned by Norsat and then by Hytera, have ever given them any sort of pause or was any kind of concern ever raised?
The United States probably has a vested interest in making sure that our national security is up to par. I understand that you've defended that, and I do agree that it does work, but have there ever been concerns raised cross-border because of the collaboration that exists between our two countries?
First, Bryan, it's nice to see you. The last time we interacted was when you were in a different role, so I appreciate your being here today.
My core question is.... All we've heard today is that this particular contract, ultimately, didn't involve sensitive material, but the concern was driven initially by this concern. It's a fair concern that the RCMP was going to use equipment that could have potentially presented a public safety risk.
When it comes to the RCMP's procurement process and who it does business with, is there ever a moment when you compare our practices with, say, our American allies?
The Biden administration, just as an example, has taken strides, to my understanding, such that they won't do business with a list of certain organizations that don't meet minimum standards in relation to human rights. Do we take a similar approach here in Canada? Does the RCMP take a similar approach?
:
Through you, Mr. Chair, thank you for that. I'll also turn it over to my colleague.
When we do procurement of technology, there are the subject matter experts who provide feedback. They work in partnership with our CFO's team around procurement. They also work with our chief security officer on setting those standards.
In this particular case, there's an assessment made. Obviously, we're looking forward to the due diligence review, what recommendations come forward and what conversations we have with other security and intelligence agencies, because we do work across the whole of government. That would ensure that national security is at the forefront.
Again, it's low risk, although there are always lessons learned in these processes. For example, the area that I lead includes technology. It's working more closely with procurement and enhancing discussions with departmental security—which is another area that I oversee—around ensuring that we maintain the trust and confidence in our systems and institutions such as our organization.
Ms. Hazen may have further conversation around that process.
I just have some thoughts to share with you.
I represent a riding where over 30% of the population declare themselves as Chinese Canadians. The most recent census shows that over 5% of the Canadian population self-identify as Chinese Canadians.
To me, being a member of Parliament, I try really hard to differentiate the policies or politics between Canada and China, and the issues that happen that are sometimes very problematic within our Canadian Chinese community here. I just want to make sure that, while we are maintaining a high alert on foreign interference or bad actors, if you will, on our soil, there is a huge number of Chinese Canadians and Chinese Canadian entrepreneurs who are contributing to our economy, our supply chain and so forth.
I don't imagine that incidents like this will cast a shadow on Chinese Canadian entrepreneurs, because they're Canadian first. They're doing business. I don't want any of these studies—I'm sure my colleagues will probably feel the same way—to in any way diminish Canadian companies that may or may not be owned by a Chinese Canadian and their chance to supply their goods and services to our government.
That's just a thought.