:
I call this meeting to order.
Welcome to meeting number 112 of the House of Commons Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development.
Before we begin, I'd like to ask all members and other in-person participants to consult the cards on their table for guidelines to prevent audio feedback incidents. Use only the black approved earpiece. Keep your earpiece away from the microphones at all times. When you are not using your earpiece, place it face down on the sticker placed on the table for this purpose.
Today's meeting is taking place in a hybrid format. In accordance with the committee's routine motion concerning connection tests for witnesses, I'd like to inform all the members that thanks to the clerk, all witnesses have completed the required connection tests in advance of the meeting.
Pursuant to Standing Order 108(2) and the motion adopted by the committee on Monday, January 29, 2024, the committee will commence its study of the appointment of Carolyn Bennett as Canada's ambassador to the Kingdom of Denmark.
Dr. Bennett, Your Excellency, welcome. It's great to have you back here. Thank you for having made it possible. I understand that you have another commitment. You were very firm on trying to get out of here by 5:45, but you have graciously agreed to stay until 5:55. Am I correct?
[English]
Thank you for the invitation to appear before the committee here on the traditional and unceded territory of the Algonquin people, especially today, on the celebration of Constitution Day in Denmark.
I'm pleased to be here to answer any of your questions.
I'm joined by Robert Sinclair, the director general for Europe, Eurasia and the Arctic and the senior Arctic official for Canada.
I have to say that I was truly honoured when appointed me ambassador to the Kingdom of Denmark in January, but especially humbled as I presented my credentials to His Majesty King Frederik X in Copenhagen on May 24.
Representing Canada at this time in history is especially crucial, and I will do everything I can to advance Canada's foreign policy priorities with the Kingdom of Denmark and our focus on Arctic issues.
Canada highly values its long-standing friendship and effective co-operation with the Kingdom of Denmark, which, as you know, comprises Denmark, Greenland and the Faroe Islands. More than 196,000 people in Canada claim Danish origins, and the Inuit in Canada and Greenland also have a shared history, culture and similar language, including family ties going back generations.
We have closely collaborated with Denmark and other like-minded nations in support of Ukraine's defence, recovery and reconstruction, and Denmark has joined the international coalition for the return of Ukrainian children, the global carbon pricing challenge and the NATO climate change and security centre of excellence.
It has been two years since Canada and the Kingdom of Denmark signed the boundary agreement resolving the 50-year-old dispute over Lincoln Sea and Hans Island—Tartupaluk—establishing a boundary on the continental shelf in the Labrador Sea. I know that important work is being done to realize the promised achievement of this agreement, including the issue of Inuit mobility. The manner in which we resolved that dispute speaks to our shared commitment to the rule of law and the rules-based international order, as well as meaningful engagement with the Inuit.
The Arctic represents a strategic and particularly compelling area of collaboration between Canada and the Kingdom of Denmark. In October of last year, a letter of intent for co-operation on Pikialasorsuaq was signed by Canada and Greenland on the margins of the Arctic Circle Assembly in Iceland. This is an important step toward ensuring responsible management of one of the most biologically productive regions north of the Arctic Circle.
Like Canada, the Kingdom of Denmark is firmly committed to the enduring value of the Arctic Council, particularly as the Kingdom of Denmark is preparing to take over the chairship of the council in 2025.
In February, Greenland released its foreign affairs, defence and security policy, “nothing about us without us”, with chapter 6 focused squarely on Canada, its closest neighbour.
[Translation]
Canada and Denmark are strong NATO allies and active participants in alliance operations. The Canadian Armed Forces' joint task force north works closely in the Arctic with the joint command of the Danish armed forces in Greenland.
Denmark is a prosperous trading nation and a strong supporter of the Canada‑European Union Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement, which was ratified in June 2017. Bilateral trade has increased by over 30% since its entry into force. Canadian North and Air Greenland have teamed up to provide a new seasonal service between Iqaluit and Nuuk starting in June 2024. Denmark has set some of the world's most ambitious climate change targets, creating trade opportunities for Canadian companies when it comes to multilateral co‑operation.
[English]
Canada has much to gain from an enhanced relationship with the Kingdom of Denmark. It is my role to ensure that those gains are realized. I will continue doing that job to the best of my abilities.
Merci. Thank you. Tak. Qujanak.
Welcome, Your Excellency.
I think that we share a lot with Denmark, so it's interesting to see you taking this position. Denmark, as you well know, is a co-founder of NATO, with Canada. Also, Denmark is in the OSCE, and Denmark is as committed as Canada is to Ukraine and committed to helping Ukraine win that war against Russia. That's the first part of my statement, and it's leading to the question I'm going to ask you.
The second part is that Denmark has managed to be able to look, with Canada, towards the security of the Arctic. With Russia amassing massive military ships in the Arctic, I think we all need to be concerned about security in the Arctic. Have you been discussing this with Denmark? Is there a way in which Canada and Denmark can work more closely together with regard to Ukraine and with regard to Arctic security?
:
Absolutely. I think we learned a lot in the meeting when we were in Nuuk with Major-General Søren Andersen about the kinds of exercises that we're taking together and about that plan, as the Arctic and northern policy framework really articulated.
I think you're quite right, Hedy. Since the illegal invasion by Russia into Ukraine, all of the Nordics are very much focused on what we can do together on security particularly in the Arctic. I think, even being in the Faroe Islands last week, knowing really how the Americans want to help, everybody is worried.
Placing those wreaths on the anniversary of the liberation of Denmark, Canada was very much part of that, and the U.S., the U.K. and Poland. This is a country that has been occupied, and they're focused on Ukraine, focused on helping Ukraine and focused on being able to give everything they can to really support Ukraine with its reconstruction.
It was also interesting—Hedy, you would be interested—that when I was at the WHO Europe, which again, are the multilaterals that are in our area in Copenhagen, it is actually dealing with the Canadian funding for the mental health support in Ukraine. There are lots of connections there.
I hope that my speaking time will be as generous as Ms. Fry's time.
Your Excellency, thank you for joining us and for giving us more than the hour that you originally agreed to. We really appreciate it.
You no doubt know that the foreign affairs and international development committee held hearings on Canadian diplomacy over a number of weeks. Witnesses repeatedly pointed out the need to limit political appointments to a certain extent.
At one time, prime ministers rewarded loyal service by appointing people to the Senate. The current has chosen to put an end to this. However, the Prime Minister has developed a new tendency to appoint former members of Parliament or ministers to diplomatic positions. Examples include Bob Rae, who was appointed ambassador and permanent representative to the United Nations in New York, and Stéphane Dion, who is now Canada's ambassador to France. Marc Garneau was offered the position of ambassador to France. David Lametti was offered the position of ambassador to Spain. You were offered the position of ambassador to the Kingdom of Denmark.
You're taking over from Denis Robert, a career diplomat who served from 2020 to 2024. He joined the Department of External Affairs in 1989. He was also Canada's ambassador to Belgium from 2012 to 2016.
You aren't a career diplomat. I had the opportunity to sit with you for a long time, both in my first life as a parliamentarian and in my second life as a parliamentarian. I hold in high esteem what you achieved during your long and prolific career, both as a family doctor and as a parliamentarian.
In addition to having held positions that put you in contact with the first nations, what specifically prepared you for the position of Canada's ambassador to the Kingdom of Denmark?
:
You're asking almost the same question as Mr. Hoback.
I think that it's about wisdom and an understanding of Arctic issues and the collaboration between the two countries. The Prime Minister must also appoint people such as Tom Clark or John Horgan. Members of Parliament aren't necessarily the only ones appointed.
[English]
Robert Sinclair has a view of how the diversity of the public service and the foreign service has been very helpful, I think, over the years in just bringing different perspectives into what is an ascension through the ranks, and—maybe I shouldn't say it—a refreshing breeze. I am trying to do my best to bring what I have learned, particularly on the panel in Greenland. There it was about engagement with citizens. They asked me to present on what meaningful engagement with indigenous people means, and as you've heard me say before, Stéphane, it shouldn't be scary. I think Canada has a role to play in really moving forward on the issues of reconciliation or, as Willie Littlechild said, “reconciliaction”. I really look forward to that and also, of course, to the relationship between the Inuit and the Inuit Circumpolar Council.
I'm very much enjoying this role and the fact that I am surrounded by career public servants who really are fantastic. I think over my time even as a doctor, I would say that you know what you know; you know what you don't know, and you know who to go to for help and when to do that. That's, I think, the approach I'm taking to this new job.
:
Thanks for that. We're at 50% women ambassadors, actually, or heads of missions, so we're pretty excited by that.
In terms of what we've been trying to do in Denmark, we have set up four meetings on Arctic perspectives. We were pleased at the one we held last month. Natan Obed was one of the panellists, as was Cynthia Wesley-Esquimaux, who chairs the National Centre for Truth and Reconciliation as the chair in reconciliation at Lakehead University. They were very, very well received.
I think this becomes very important, as Canada is able to set an example and particularly focus on the relationship with Inuit, and on Inuit mobility. Hopefully, with the new flight that will go from Nuuk to Iqaluit and then down, and then hopefully over to northern Quebec in Kuujjuaq, there's a real example of “nothing about us without us”, and being able to show that we know that it's a journey, not a destination, and it's not scary. These relationships are ones in which we learn a great deal.
I know that with the Arctic parliamentary meeting recently in the Nordics, your colleague was a bit worried about the way things were being framed in terms of indigenous rights. I think as parliamentarians we all need to come together and work with that kind of reconciliation across the world, and also know that those indigenous peoples that you've identified in Canada, and their working nation to nation, will be hugely important as we put forward their voices.
:
Welcome back, everyone.
Pursuant to Standing Order 108(2) and the motion adopted by the committee on Thursday, February 16, 2023, the committee will resume its study of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and the current situation in Iran.
I would now like to welcome our three distinguished witnesses. We have here, in person, Professor Noomane Raboudi from the University of Ottawa. We also have, here in person, Mr. Shahram Kholdi from Kiaxar Inc., who is a Middle East specialist. Virtually, we have joining us, from the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, Mr. Behnam Taleblu, who is a senior fellow.
After we've heard from all three of the witnesses, again because of time constraints, there will be five-minute rounds of questioning—five minutes only—so we can get out of here by approximately 6:35.
We will start with Professor Raboudi.
The floor is yours. You have five minutes.
Thank you for your invitation.
I'll start with a brief introduction. When I speak about the Middle East, it's often—as you know—about controversial topics. This can convey an image that isn't mine. I want to make it clear from the start that I have absolutely no sympathy for the Iranian regime, let alone for the violent Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, or IRGC. However, I'm also fully aware that I'll likely say some things that go against the grain. Of course, I won't do so for ideological reasons, but for the benefit of Canada and—since I've been invited as a professor—of the people here who want to make the most of my expertise.
I want to say that five minutes isn't enough time to talk about everything. I'll simply talk about the issue of placing the IRGC on the list of terrorist entities. Let me be clear about this. Under the current circumstances, this isn't a good idea. I'll tell you why.
First, this discussion must take place in a non‑ideological context. The international news over the past 30 years has provided clear evidence of the devastating impact of building international and foreign policy choices on predetermined ideologies that lack any connection with the reality of the international situation. This is particularly true for the Middle East, which has both contradicted these ideologies and challenged them. The Islamic State terrorist group was the direct result of this logic, which must be avoided at all costs.
We need to learn from history and avoid repeating the mistakes of the past. The IRGC is certainly one destabilizing force in the Middle East. However, it's only one of many and no less dangerous. This type of selective decision will certainly undermine the relatively neutral and moderate position that Canada seeks and, in my opinion, should maintain in the Middle East. It could certainly prevent Canada from playing a mediating role in the endless conflicts taking place in this region, particularly given the total failure of American policies. In the opinion of most experts in this region, including American experts, these policies have been thoroughly discredited.
You need an idea of the risk. You need to determine the potential danger of manipulating such a dangerous topic for political gain. We're fully aware that ideological tendencies in our political life seek to align Canadian foreign policies in the Middle East with the American policies. It seems that this choice is purely ideological and devoid of any strategic vision. Moreover, it poses a real danger to our interests in the world and to our national security.
In doing so, we'll be taking sides in deeply rooted identity conflicts. These conflicts are compounded by historical, colonial, political, religious, denominational and territorial disputes that remain virtually unresolvable. The extreme complexity of these conflicts makes it difficult to take a fair and balanced stance, at an equal distance from all the antagonists involved.
In addition to pointlessly intervening in these conflicts, we're also likely to invite them here. This type of invitation could significantly affect our social peace and internal security. The terrible tragedy currently unfolding in Gaza confirms that Canadian society is deeply and uniquely divided on the issues in the Middle East. Governments often adopt definitions of terrorism that enable them to serve their interests; enforce their vision; take unpopular or even freedom‑destroying measures at times; delegitimize the actions of their enemies; and impose measures that depend on the circumstances faced.
For example, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service defines terrorism as the threat or perpetration of serious acts of violence to compel the Canadian government to act in a certain way—
:
Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.
Honourable members of the committee, I would like to thank the committee for this opportunity and for your hard work on this critical matter over the past two years.
For your purview, I've enclosed in my submission notes several of my written analytical pieces on Iran International in English that discuss the activities of the IRGC. My submission today is divided into historical background, recent developments and summation.
From the 1960s onwards, Shia fanatical Iranian urban guerrillas plotted and staged several successful terror attacks against the Iranian imperial state officials. These guerrillas received training in urban warfare and assassination from armed Palestinian organizations, with the financial backing of Nasser's Egypt, the Baathist regimes of Iraq and Syria, and Gaddafi of Libya. They also worked with security services of several Soviet bloc states, including communist East Germany and Maoist China.
Most importantly, this network trafficked arms and hard currency and collaborated with armed insurgents from Southeast Asia to the Irish Republican Army in that period. After the fall of the Pahlavi dynasty in 1979, the very members of these guerrillas founded the IRGC, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.
In the interest of time, I will be skipping some paragraphs of my brief.
I studied law in Iran. I would be grateful to bring it to your attention that per article 150 of the Islamic Republic of Iran's constitution, the IRGC is officially enshrined. It is not accountable before anyone but the supreme leader of the Islamic Republic. It is unimpeachable by the ostensibly elected parliament of the Islamic Republic.
In the 1980s, the IRGC was integral in the brutal suppression of Iranian political dissidents. It actually staged several coup attempts against Persian Gulf monarchies in that region. The opportunity for it to create the first Iranian armed proxy, and perhaps the foremost one, was the Hezbollah of Lebanon in the aftermath of the Israeli occupation of Lebanon in the same period.
Per recent developments, since the 1990s, the IRGC has been a major force in Iran's postwar economy. It has evolved into a large construction racket, whose Khatam al-Anbiya headquarters and its consulting engineering companies were assigned multi-billion dollar dam, petrochemical and transportation projects. IRGC's special Quds Force has been instrumental in the military-calibre brutal suppression of the Iranian people's recurring uprisings over the past 15 years, chiefly the suppression of the autumn 2022 Women, Life, Freedom uprising.
Since 2015 the IRGC has built up a criminal network in collaboration with Mexican and South American drug cartels, and has been very active in the dark web, cryptocurrency transactions and other international money-laundering operations that use various front enterprises from the gulf region and Southeast Asia to Latin America, the U.S. and here, Canada.
Since 2022 IRGC's military industrial complex has supplied the Russian war machine with tens of thousands of technologically sophisticated, and some not-so-sophisticated, projectiles of various types.
I will again skip some paragraphs.
The IRGC has been instrumental in creating the present state of instability in the Middle East by creating the Houthis of Yemen à la Hezbollah framework. I cannot adequately underscore the involvement of the IRGC in international criminal activity and the threat it poses to all Canadians, especially Iranian Canadians.
I also cannot sufficiently emphasize the involvement of the IRGC, directly or indirectly, in recruiting the Hezbollah of Lebanon, Canadian Hells Angels and other transnational gangster networks to plot attacks against Jewish religious and cultural centres as well as Iranian dissidents across the world.
I must add here, as a note, that the IRGC is also implicated in crimes against humanity against half a million civilian Syrians, basically massacring them, and the displacement of about two million Syrians in conjunction and confederation with the Hezbollah during the civil war in defence of the Baathist regime of Bashar al-Assad.
It has been claimed that listing the IRGC as a terrorist entity is fraught with various legal and political problems. Even Josep Borrell, the outgoing EU foreign policy chief, has stated as much: that without judicially valid evidence, one cannot risk listing IRGC as a terrorist organization. I beg to differ. Historical evidence, contemporary occurrences as well as several occurrences of terrorist activities dating back over the past 30 years, as established by European courts, confirm that IRGC is a sponsor of terrorism in the west, and it's a threat toward peace and Canada's security as well as to our transatlantic alliance.
Thank you very much for this opportunity.
:
Chairman, vice-chairmen and distinguished members of the committee, thank you for providing me the opportunity to testify virtually before you today and to share my analysis.
My comments today begin broad and then zoom in and come at a particularly turbulent time in Iran that may be hard to understand for external observers and non-Iran watchers.
Recently the country’s president, Ebrahim Raisi, died in a helicopter crash in northwestern Iran. Despite Iranian drones now being found in conflict zones in at least four continents, it was reportedly a Turkish drone that found the crash site first. Elsewhere, in normal countries, an accident of this scale would elicit national mourning and popular sorrow. Yet in Iran and across Persian-language social media, news of the president’s passing was treated with felicitation, jubilation and even jokes by large swaths of society.
Indeed, there is nothing normal about the massive chasm that exists today between state and society in Iran. That's because the Islamic Republic of Iran is an Islamist and authoritarian regime that sits atop and represses a secular nationalist and democracy-seeking people.
While snap “elections” or more aptly put, “selections” are scheduled for later this June, those are expected to be boycotted en masse, just as parliamentary elections were a few months ago. Since the outbreak of nationwide anti-regime protests beginning in 2017, rising protests have meant record-setting low turnouts, even when we look at official regime statistics.
Indeed for a regime with as little social legitimacy as the Islamic Republic, exogenous shocks like snap elections or accidents involving major political figures can be ill afforded given that the Iranian population has used nearly every opportunity, including crises, whether they are social, economic, environmental or even related to foreign policy, as opportunities to protest and to make their case that the state does not represent the street and that they are done with incremental reform and are seeking wholesale political change.
This desire for wholesale political change caught the eyes and ears of members of this distinguished body from 2022-23 during the height of the “Woman, Life, Freedom.” or “Zan. Zendegi. Azadi.” movement, at the peak of which anti-regime protests rocked over 150 different cities, towns and villages across all of Iran’s 30 provinces.
One of the elements in the cocktail of security forces instrumental in repressing those protests was the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. The IRGC is a parallel ideological military created in the early days of the Islamic Revolution as a check against the national military. Tasked with defending the integrity of the “revolution,” this force and its veterans, affiliates and supporters now constitute the single most important institution in contemporary Iran. It is the tip of the spear of the world’s foremost state sponsor of terrorism today and the hub and its spoke of transnational terrorism and repression.
For almost two decades now, the dominant trend in the discourse among regime elites in Iran who support the IRGC has been to frame its network abroad as an anti-status quo “axis of resistance”, constituting proxies and partners around the Middle East who were either created, like the Badr in Iraq or Hezbollah in Lebanon, or co-opted, like the Houthis in Yemen or Hamas in Gaza.
Nonetheless, the IRGC trains, equips, supports and underwrites these terror militias in its axis with state-level capabilities, as has been the case with the Houthis in Yemen since 2015.
This group, which is the latest to join the axis of resistance, is now in possession of medium-range ballistic missiles and anti-ship ballistic missiles. To date, it is the only proxy of Iran to have paraded and used these capabilities. Elsewhere it helps to work with those proxies to indigenously produce weapons, as has been the case with Iran and Hamas since 2014.
Since the Iran-backed terrorist attack against Israel by Hamas on October 7, the IRGC has been bringing more of its terrorist apparatus online, employing a “ring of fire” strategy so as to escalate the Gaza war into a regional conflict and prevent a member of its axis from being militarily taken off the chessboard.
While these proxies in the region have traditionally been used by the IRGC to mask its hand in foreign conflicts, today they are calling cards or tells of the regime’s regional enmeshment and growing capabilities and risk tolerance.
While the IRGC has helped Tehran engage in internal suppression and external aggression, its increasing role offers the distinguished members of this body, North American policy-makers and, in reality, all Five Eyes nations, the opportunity to course-correct their Iran policies.
In my view, every single Five Eyes country ought to, under their own national counterterrorist authorities, be designating the IRGC a terrorist organization in its entirety. I'd be happy to explain why, along with the benefits of this approach, in the Q and A.
Every single Five Eyes country also ought to be using this time to push for anti-corruption or Magnitsky-style penalties against the supreme leader of Iran and his inner circle and taking the opportunity to align other sovereign sanctions regimes, whether they be nuclear, missile, drone, Russia, or human rights related.
After all, the IRGC is proliferating drones to Russia for use in Ukraine, escalating Iran's nuclear program, engaging in more overt ballistic missile activity to include strikes and attacks in four nations during the first four months of 2024 alone, and stepping up its internal crackdown against dissidents inside the country. The predicate for more multilateral action today exists.
:
Yes, sir. I wholeheartedly agree with that statement.
Thank you for the honorary promotion to doctor, but alas, I don't have a Ph.D.
In essence, yes, if Canada is not going to use legal authorities like a proscription, and political authorities like a proscription, to begin to contest the illicit presence of this global terrorist organization on its own soil, then it really leaves a huge capabilities gap and renders one, pushes one, into a worse footing to deal with transnational repression, terrorism, drug smuggling, arms proliferation and everything else that Canadian officials have been concerned about.
The Chair: You have 20 seconds.
:
Politically, yes, for sure. However, even though it's legitimate and justifiable, I don't think that it's a good idea right now to include the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, or IRGC, on the list of terrorist entities.
Will this stop the IRGC from doing what it's doing? I don't know. I don't have the legal expertise to comment on this. However, we can always initiate all possible procedures and take all possible steps, without necessarily making a political decision that will have an ideological, geostrategic and geopolitical impact in the Middle East. This impact could tarnish Canada's image and continue to create this void. At this time, no one can act as an intermediary in all this anarchy affecting the Middle East.
Canada has a certain reputation over there. This country is known for its neutrality and for not being too Islamophobic, in comparison with other countries such as France or the United States. If Canada decides to designate the IRGC as a terrorist organization now, under the current circumstances, it will first and foremost simply destroy this image.
Second, in both Shiite and Sunni circles throughout the Muslim world, Canada will unfortunately be associated with the mass slaughter now taking place in Gaza. My point is that the drawbacks of this decision far outweigh the benefits. Moreover, as I said, the IRGC members aren't choirboys. They're killers. That much is certain. However, this is the wrong time to make this type of decision.
I want to thank my colleague, Heather McPherson. The NDP was the first.... Heather herself, MP McPherson, proposed this study over a year ago. I'm really pleased. We're glad to see it coming to the table now. Unfortunately, it should have been done more than a year ago, but here we are.
I want to bring it back to British Columbia and my riding of Port Moody—Coquitlam.
I'm going to ask Mr. Kholdi a question.
Thousands of Iranian Canadians live in my riding. Many are afraid to see the news when they wake up in the morning around what's happening with “Women, Life, Freedom”. The fact is they do not feel like they're living free in Canada. They are under surveillance here, and they are afraid, sometimes, to go home or they can't go home. They lose family members in Iran. They can't go home. They're living in fear. They're seeing senior members of the regime in and around Vancouver.
I want to talk about how listing the IRGC as a terrorist organization could help Iranian Canadians live freely in this country.
:
I thank the honourable member for the question.
Whenever anyone invokes selectivism, my question is. If the Italian police over the past 60 years were not able to fight the Mafia, did it stop the prosecutors of Milan who were assassinated by the Mafia from fighting the Mafia? If there are certain countries that are not respecting...and they are our allies, and we cannot stand up to them—like Turkey—does it justify our not acting against other countries and then it would be a free-for-all? This is fascinating, this kind of relativism. It is, in fact, a fallacy, and I absolutely dispute and contest such a fallacy, not just as a matter of moral principle but as a matter of practicality.
Are we waiting for someone in Port Coquitlam—or me—to be assassinated by the agents of the IRGC? Every now and then I receive all sorts of threats from the goons of the Islamic Republic not only in this country, but also when I was teaching at the University of Manchester, where I did my Ph.D. Are we waiting until then?
Madam, I believe it is time to act and to act with all the resources that we have. At least we could say that we tried to act and failed, and not that we did not try to act and we failed.