FAAE Committee Meeting

     Good afternoon everyone. Welcome to meeting number 25 of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development.

    Mr. Chair, I'd like to raise a point of order regarding the scheduling for this committee. I will say at the outset that I'm very disappointed by what we're seeing. This is an important issue, and I hope we can proceed in a collaborative way.

    The committee held a meeting on July 15 and agreed to summer hearings. The committee wished to hear from ministers before July 22. That didn't happen. The committee met once on August 4. It has now been over a month since the committee last met.

    In the context of this meeting, we received a notice for a three-hour meeting to hear from witnesses, according to a schedule. Members made plans, prepared questions and provided your office with rounds of questions to be asked, and you, by all indication, unilaterally changed that agenda and shortened the meeting with less than an hour to go prior to the beginning of the meeting. If you proceed with this plan, it will significantly limit our ability to engage with important experts in accordance with the notice that was provided to the committee.

     We also requested that there be some time for committee business, so that we could discuss the committee's agenda. You have shortened the committee's agenda, but you have provided no additional opportunity for committee business to talk about the forthcoming agenda and to try to reach some kind of consensus. Of course, in cases on which consensus had been reached in the past, such as having summer hearings, that consensus wasn't honoured by your office.

    It's very frustrating and disappointing to see a chair operating in the manner that you have with respect to the schedule, Mr. Chair. I am disappointed and frustrated. This is not what the committee saw in the past from Mr. Spengemann or Mr. Levitt, other chairs who were able to set aside their partisan affiliation and deal respectfully with all members regarding the agenda.

    Can you provide an explanation for your conduct, Mr. Chair? Why have you not allowed the committee to meet for over a month? Why did you suddenly shorten this meeting with less than an hour's notice to members? Why are you behaving in such a fashion? Do you think this is an appropriate or respectful way for a chair to operate?

    If you would consider appeals from the committee to go back to the agenda that was originally proposed, which was a three-hour meeting, we could hear for three hours from witnesses. Perhaps we could also set aside some time for committee business in the near future, so that we can agree on an agenda and move forward.

    Thank you.

    Mr. Genuis, thank you for your comments.

    First of all, you have raised a number of different issues. I can assure you that in consultation with the clerk and other members, we have tried our utmost to ensure that these committee hearings proceed.

    The reason it was delayed initially was that, as you will recall, members indicated that they wanted to hear from nine witnesses over the course of three hours. Unfortunately, despite the efforts of the clerk and other members, only three people made themselves available several weeks ago, so it was decided that it was best not to proceed at that time and to redouble our efforts to have the opportunity to hear from as many witnesses as possible. That was one reason.

    Another reason is that Parliament had a network maintenance week—as you're fully aware, Mr. Genuis—which meant that no committee had access to virtual meetings. Despite that, as soon as it was over, we again endeavoured to invite as many witnesses as the committee members wanted to hear from, but again, as you know full well, unfortunately, quite a few of those witnesses indicated that they were not available.

    Several hours ago, on advice of the clerk, who had spoken to various members, it was agreed, given that there were only four witnesses appearing before us today, that we have two panels. That is generally in the regular course of business, but if you'd like, after this meeting is over, I'd be more than happy to contact you and provide you with any information that may be of interest to you.

    Mr. Chair, on the point of order.... Maybe Mr. Bergeron can go first.

    I would like to clarify my point of order, because I don't think it's been addressed, but Mr. Bergeron is welcome to go ahead of me.

    Thank you, Mr. Chair. I will try to be brief.

    While I consider Mr. Genius's concerns to be entirely legitimate, it would be inappropriate to assume bad faith on anyone's part in this matter from the outset.

    Let me explain. The last meeting was indeed cancelled because, given the very short notice, unfortunately only three witnesses had been confirmed. Since we wanted to have three hours of debate with nine witnesses, more notice should have been given. Despite the advance notice, clearly it wasn't possible for us to welcome more than four witnesses today. It seemed to me that it would be altogether inappropriate to spend three hours asking questions to four witnesses when we had planned to spend three hours on nine witnesses. The chair respected the wishes of committee members to hear from the Ukrainian Canadian Congress again, spending one hour on that alone, then to hear from a second group of three witnesses.

    Now, that leaves us with the matter of the third hour. Would it have been appropriate to use the hour to discuss the committee's future business, as the committee members have said? That's a legitimate question. However, perhaps it would also be worthwhile to let the dust settle once we've heard from the witnesses, so that we can make more timely interventions as to how we will proceed.

    Therefore, if we must have a meeting about the committee's future business, I'd like to see it happen as soon as possible. I'm not sure we have enough time to do it in the third hour today, since we will still need to digest the information the witnesses have provided. However, while Mr. Genuis's questions are entirely legitimate, I feel that, under the circumstances, the clerk and the chair acted in the best possible manner and with the best intentions. I therefore support the chair's decision to cut today's proceedings short in order to consolidate our panels and make the discussion even more illuminating. By the way, this was not a unilateral decision. Other members, including myself, were consulted.

    That's what I wanted to add, Mr. Chair.

     Mr. Chair, on the point of order, first of all it's been said a number of times that you conducted consultations with other members. I don't doubt that you conducted consultations with some other members, but I think it would be useful if you told the committee which members from which parties you consulted. I certainly know that no Conservative members were consulted about the last-minute change made to the schedule this morning, for example.

    Mr. Sameer Zuberi (Pierrefonds—Dollard, Lib.): I have a point of order, Mr. Chair.

    Mr. Garnett Genuis: I'm raising a point of order.

    This is not a point of order; this is a debate. I have a precious two hours, which is now an hour and 45 minutes, in which to hear our witnesses. As a Liberal member, I would love to engage with the witnesses. We're all convened here to actually have testimony, to have questions and answers.

    You're eating into the time for those witnesses to testify and for us to have a meaningful meeting right now. I hope this is not an attempt to filibuster the meeting on this very important issue, which we all want to get to.

    Thank you, Mr. Zuberi.

    May I raise my point of order, Mr. Chair? Thank you.

    As was indicated, Mr. Genuis, it's not a point of order. You have asked questions, and I have responded to those questions. Mr. Bergeron has kindly waited and clarified the issues that you raised as well. If you would like, after this meeting is over and after we have heard from all of the witnesses, I would be more than happy to make myself available, and I assure you that I did undertake consultations with members from all parties.

     Mr. Chair, I have a point of order to raise. I hope you'll respect my right as a committee member to raise these points. I will be brief. Since we have a three-hour time slot available, I think we can certainly accommodate the concerns of Mr. Zuberi.

    My comments, briefly, are these. Mr. Chair, you said you consulted with other members. Which members did you consult with before making a last-minute change to the schedule? You said there was a one-week network outage, but we have had six weeks since the July 15 meeting, and compared to your predecessor, you seem to be uniquely unable to schedule witnesses or to find times when they are available. I don't want to presume bad faith, but that is concerning. Previous chairs didn't, on sensitive subjects, suddenly find themselves unable to schedule times that worked for the witnesses.

    Again, I want to ask: Would you set aside time at the end of this meeting for committee business, given that we have a three-hour time slot?

    Mr. Genuis, allow me to simply say this: You say that you're not presuming bad faith, but you actually are presuming bad faith.

    I think you've shown a lot of bad faith, Mr. Chair. I honestly do, respectfully.

    You're entitled to your opinion, but—

    Your first act as chair was to rule out of order a motion that your predecessor had ruled in order and that we were already debating.

    Mr. Genuis, you're engaging in debate. I would ask that you extend some courtesy to the witnesses who are making themselves available today. We can discuss this later, and I can assure you that everything has been in order. The clerk has—

    Mr. Garnett Genuis: No, it hasn't.

    The Chair: Mr. Genuis, this is debate at this point.

    Mr. Garnett Genuis: I'm happy to proceed, Mr. Chair. This is not helpful to you, but I look forward to hearing from the witnesses.

    Thank you.

    The Chair: Thank you.

    If we may now resume the meeting, I'd like to welcome all the members to meeting number 25 of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development.

    Pursuant to the motion adopted on July 15, 2022, the committee is meeting on its study of the export of Russian Gazprom turbines.

    As always, interpretation is available by clicking on the globe icon at the bottom of your screen.

    I would like to take this opportunity to remind all participants that taking screenshots or photos of your screen is not permitted.

    I would ask that before speaking you wait until I recognize you by name. When speaking, please speak slowly and clearly. When you are not speaking, your mike should be on mute. I remind everyone that all comments by members and witnesses should be addressed through the chair.

    Before I welcome our witnesses, I'd also like to welcome a new clerk who has been assigned to our committee. We are very fortunate to have with us today a new clerk who has indicated that she will be here as soon as Parliament resumes. She has made quite a few efforts to make today's committee hearing possible.

    Thank you for that.

    I'd like to welcome our first panel for the day.

    We will be hearing from two witnesses who are from the Ukrainian Canadian Congress. We are truly privileged to have with us today Mr. Ihor Michalchyshyn, executive director and chief executive officer of the Ukrainian Canadian Congress. Also, we have Mr. Orest Zakydalsky, senior policy adviser with the Ukrainian Canadian Congress.

    I would like to remind the witnesses that you each have five minutes for your opening remarks, after which the members will have the opportunity for the remainder of the hour to ask you questions.

    Welcome.

     Thank you, Mr. Chair.

    I will be providing opening remarks and then we'll be happy to move to questions. On behalf of the Ukrainian Canadian Congress, it's a pleasure to be here and to have had the invitation to appear before you today. Alexandra Chyczij, our president, spoke with you several weeks ago. We're here to continue to share the views of the Congress.

     I hope that members of the committee had a good summer. We've been in touch with many of you and appreciate the work you've been doing over the summer.

    Since it's September 7, I want to wish you a happy Ukrainian Canadian Heritage Day. Ukrainian Canadians have been here in Canada for 130 years. It's a day that's recognized in several provinces, and we're working to recognize it nationally. I wanted to note that for the record.

    On today's topic, on June 15, the UCC wrote to foreign minister Joly, expressing our concern that the Canadian government was considering waiving the sanctions. On July 6, we wrote to Prime Minister Trudeau. We said about this turbine matter that it would be “a test of the resolve of the Government of Canada to maintain sanctions and to continue to isolate Russia.” Our feeling was that any waiver of Canadian sanctions would be viewed as “a capitulation to Russian blackmail [demands] and energy terrorism,” serving to “embolden the Russian terrorist state, with far-reaching and negative consequences not only for Ukraine or the European Union, but for Canadian security as well.”

    Unfortunately, the Canadian government neither heard nor heeded our concerns, which were shared by the Ukrainian government, and the waiver was granted.

     We see that the Russian government has predictably been very emboldened in demanding further concessions. Despite Canada’s and Germany’s capitulation to the Russian demands, Russia has, in fact, shut off the Nord Stream 1 pipeline entirely. No gas is currently flowing. There's a continuing escalation of stories about the reasons the Russian gas supply isn't working this particular week, or that particular week.

    Kremlin spokesperson Peskov said on September 5 that Russian gas supplies will not resume until western sanctions are lifted, using the false pretext that sanctions are preventing the servicing of Russian pipelines. This, of course, is not factual, but that is not the point. The Kremlin lies brazenly and as a matter of regular policy. What matters, as we've said many times, is that the turbine issue here has never been about the turbines. It was about the sanctions.

    Now, Canada and Germany continue to have a choice: whether to continue to play this game with Russian blackmail demands or simply to cancel the sanctions exemption and show Russia that we will not be intimidated in the face of its threats.

    We understand that the Russian regime responds to strength. The UCC believes it's past time for Canada and their allies to show this strength in the face of increasing Russian aggression and pressure.

    We call on the committee to do the following. First, urge the Government of Canada to revoke the permits issued on July 9, 2022, by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, which allow for the repair and transport of six Siemens Nord Stream 1 turbines over a period of two years to the Russian state gas monopoly, Gazprom.

    Second, support the designation of the Russian Federation as a state sponsor of terrorism.

    Third, support the expulsion from Canada of the ambassador of the Russian Federation and the Russian diplomatic mission.

    Fourth, support the suspension of the issuing of travel visas by Canada to all citizens of the Russian Federation.

    Finally, and most importantly, we believe the tide of Russia’s genocidal war against Ukraine is being turned on the battlefield by the Ukrainian people's heroic defence of their country. We know that the Government of Canada can continue to play a leadership role in ensuring that the Ukrainian people have the equipment, weapons and means with which to finish the fight and ensure the victory of freedom over tyranny.

    There was $500 million allocated in budget 2022 for military and security support to Ukraine. Those funds have been spent and exhausted, so we urge this committee to support us in reviewing the ways that Canada can substantially increase its military assistance to Ukraine going forward.

     We look forward to your questions and to discussing Canada’s support for Ukraine. I would also note that the committee may wish to consider in the future a working visit to Ukraine, as we've seen legislatures from many countries visit Kyiv and Ukraine to talk to their Ukrainian counterparts and get a sense of the matters on the ground.

    With that, I will close my remarks. We're open to questions.

    Thank you, Mr. Chair.

    Thank you, Mr. Michalchyshyn.

    We will now hear from Mr. Zakydalsky for five minutes. Please go ahead, sir.

     I don't have opening remarks. We're more than ready and we welcome any questions from the members of the committee.

     Thank you very much for that.

    Now we will start off our rounds of questioning. The first round will consist of six minutes of questions.

    Mr. Genuis, the floor is yours.

    Thank you, Mr. Chair.

    It is great to see the Ukrainian Canadian Congress, UCC, back after so long. I have a couple of questions about other matters related to Ukraine before we get to turbines.

    To your knowledge, is there a fully operational Canadian embassy in Kyiv right now?

     I can answer what we know publicly.

    We know that the Prime Minister, Minister Joly and Minister Freeland were in Kyiv on May 8 for a ceremony to open the embassy. We know that Ambassador Galadza is in Kyiv and working. The media coverage that we've seen notes that services at the embassy are still suspended due to the security situation, and that people have been directed to other locations across Ukraine or Europe for visa assistance. That's what we're aware of.

    Thank you very much. That's important information.

    Canada has been behind our allies in imposing consequences on Russian diplomats. Are you satisfied with the approach that the Government of Canada has taken on this, and why has the government, in your view, not been more aggressive on this front?

    I'll let my colleague respond to that one.

    I'm not sure why the government hasn't responded to those calls. We've seen several countries in Europe expel numerous Russian diplomats. We've not seen Canada expel any Russian diplomats since February.

    Added to that, there was a fairly disturbing incident about a month ago, which was reported publicly. In Ottawa, at the embassy, people got out of what appeared to be a Russian diplomatic car and vandalized a blue and yellow painted bike that was placed outside the embassy, on public property. The bike was spray-painted and destroyed by what appeared to be people who emerged from a car that was later seen on the property of the Russian embassy.

    There has not been any response to this that I have knowledge of. It is our position that the Russian embassy is a security threat to Canadians and that our government should be forceful in responding to that threat.

    Thank you.

    Is it fair to say you're disappointed with the lack of response from the government so far?

    That's fair to say, yes.

    With respect to the turbine issue, we've seen three different explanations from government officials on this. First they said it was about German energy security. That turned out not to be true. Then they said it was about calling Putin's bluff. That, of course, doesn't make any sense in light of new events, as the government continues to plan to export turbines in spite of the fact that gas has been cut off anyway.

    We saw a third explanation from the Minister of Foreign Affairs in court filings in response to the Ukrainian World Congress. In that explanation, the government was essentially showing that this decision was about trying to protect jobs in Montreal, speaking about jobs at a Siemens facility that is in fact relatively close to Minister Joly's own riding. This raises questions about whether the government was trying to take into consideration constituency politics in granting a sanctions waiver.

    What was your reaction to the information in those filings, that the minister was taking into consideration jobs close to home in the decision to grant this waiver?

    The UCC isn't part of the court filings process, so this is new information for me.

    As you mentioned, we've certainly seen a number of attempts to explain this, which we think is a poor decision. We keep offering our views on the opportunity to correct the situation. During the German chancellor's visit, we thought there was an ideal opportunity for both countries, with Ukrainian support, to make amends and bring some clarity to the situation.

    The documents you've reported on have not been reported publicly. I've never heard any situation of Siemens responding that it would be going out of business if it didn't have this particular contract. It is a large multinational company with many processes under way, I'm sure. I'll let the documents speak for themselves, obviously, in court, in terms of how the government is responding.

     Okay. Thank you very much for that.

    Related to questions of Siemens' relationship to the government and these considerations, we did a search of the lobby registry and found that on April 13 of this year, representatives from Siemens met with David Morrison, the deputy minister for international trade in Global Affairs Canada, and John Hannaford, another deputy minister.

    Do you have any indication as to what Siemens was discussing when it was lobbying the government back in April, and how lobbying by Siemens might have played a role in this decision that is very much contrary to Ukraine's interest but might be in Siemens' own commercial interest?

    You have 30 seconds, please.

    Obviously I haven't seen those documents. Siemens has not met with us. Siemens has a lot of interests in Russia and other places, and I'm sure it's trying to understand the government's approach on those interests.

    Perhaps I'll make a comment for the benefit of this committee, that it would be useful to hear from Siemens at some point, if the chair is able to find time to schedule them.

    Thank you.

    Thank you for that.

    Next we'll go to Mr. Zuberi. Mr. Zuberi, you have six minutes.

    Thank you, Mr. Chair.

    Thank you to the witnesses from the Ukrainian Canadian Congress for being here and for all of your advocacy.

    As we all know, we in Canada are steadfast with the Ukrainian people.

    In your opening remarks, you mentioned a number of points. One was that you are advocating that Russia be added to a list of state sponsors of terrorism. In 2017, Mr. Zakydalsky, you also testified to the same point, saying that the Russian Federation should be added as a state sponsor of terrorism. In the end, President Biden recently decided not to designate Russia in this way.

    What do you make of Biden's decision not to do that?

    That is a decision that we hope the President will review and take another look at.

    In the U.S. Congress there is wide support for this designation. A Senate resolution passed unanimously. We all know our friends down south; the U.S. Senate doesn't pass anything unanimously, but this passed unanimously. This was a resolution introduced by Senator Graham and Senator Blumenthal, calling on the administration to in fact designate Russia as a state sponsor of terrorism.

    We also know that the Speaker of the House of Representatives, Ms. Pelosi, is a strong supporter of this position. She is, of course, from the President's party. We hope that both the Senate and the House will encourage the President to revisit that decision. We certainly look to you to encourage American legislators in your interactions with the U.S. administration, and to encourage us together to list Russia. In the U.S. it's called a “state sponsor”; here it's called a “state supporter” of terrorism, but the designation means the same thing.

    Certainly this designation is long overdue. The shooting down of flight MH17 was in July of 2014, and certainly a country that shoots down civilian airliners is engaging in terrorism.

    I want to switch gears for a moment and talk about the German ambassador's testimony recently, in August, around the disinformation war that is being waged by Russia. I think we can all agree that this is what Russia does.

    With respect to the turbines, we know that Russia has put forth that it's because of sanctions that gas and oil cannot be delivered to Germany. We proved in the end that this is not the case. Russia said that the turbine was needed so that energy could flow to Germany, yet it was not the case that this turbine in question was absolutely essential for that. Russia is now actually refusing to utilize this turbine.

    Do you think that the disinformation war would have been amped up by Russia if Germany did not have this turbine in hand?

     I don't know what Russia would have done if we hadn't waived the sanctions. I presume that had we not waived the sanctions on Russia, Russia still would not be delivering gas to Germany, so we're at the same place we were, except that we've waived sanctions on Russia. We've gained nothing, but lost sanctions that we had on Russia.

    I think that's the problem. By undertaking this capitulation, we have done nothing except placate Russia. Obviously, as we can see, the return is further Russian obstinance and further Russian pressure, which is what we said would happen when the government took this decision and why we tried to convince the government not to take it.

    Would you agree that we've taken arguments away from Russia in terms of the disinformation war?

    They can make up whatever they want. If the point is to take away arguments from the Russian disinformation war, then I don't want to know where that ends, because they're just going to make more stuff up.

    Thank you.

    I honestly don't really understand the reasoning.

    Thanks for your time.

    Thank you, Mr. Zuberi.

    We now go to Mr. Bergeron.

    Mr. Bergeron, you have six minutes.

    Thank you, Mr. Chair.

    Gentlemen, thank you for being with us today. Your testimony is certainly most relevant to this committee's work.

    Great care has also been taken to ensure that the waiver can be revoked. At the meeting where we heard from ministers Wilkinson and Joly, I asked what the grounds would be for revoking the waiver. Unfortunately, due to time constraints, Minister Joly was unable to answer the question.

    Therefore, I'd like to look further into this issue with you. In an August 21 interview with Radio-Canada, Minister Wilkinson said that he believes Russia's scheme has been exposed, but he's still hopeful that the turbine will be returned to Gazprom and that it can be put into service.

    On August 24, the Minister of Foreign Affairs told CBC News that she did not plan to reverse her decision even though Gazprom is refusing to accept the first turbine.

    Now that Russia's blackmail has been exposed, why bother maintaining the waiver?

    I have to say I agree with what you said in your question, that it is unclear several weeks or months later why there would be no revocation of this waiver. The Russian weaponization of energy has become emboldened—more dramatic, I would say, day by day—despite the efforts of the Germans to go along with the various conditions and demands and deadlines that were being imposed initially, such as the turbine and other matters.

    I agree with you that it is not clear why we would continue to allow this waiver to be extended. It allows two more years of Gazprom making profits, which we know ultimately fuel the Russian ability to fund the war against Ukraine, a war that we all hope will be wrapped up with a Ukrainian victory in the near future as opposed to being financed and fuelled, literally, for years to come.

    Even before the Canadian government made the decision, there was some doubt as to the point of lifting the sanction on turbines, particularly because some people believe that Russia has a stockpile of turbines. Moreover, even Siemens believes that the pipeline can function regardless of the turbines.

    The ministers made those statements on August 21 and 24, before Dmitry Peskov announced on September 5 that supply would only resume if sanctions were lifted. This was quite clearly blatant blackmail by Russia, and it shows that the waiver needs to be cancelled, even more so because the German ambassador mentioned the cancellation scenario when she appeared before this committee. Neither minister has issued any new statements since Mr. Peskov's on September 5, but I can't understand why we're maintaining the waiver when Russia's blackmail has been so obviously exposed.

    The last time the Ukrainian Canadian Congress appeared, alternative solutions were on the table, including the pipeline Gazprom is operating in Ukrainian territory. Based on what you said, that pipeline could have completely taken up Nord Stream 1's capacity. That pipeline is currently operating at under 40% of its capacity.

    Now that we know that Nord Stream 1 is no longer working, my question is this: Has supply to the pipeline running through Ukraine been interrupted, or is gas still being supplied in Ukraine through that pipeline?

     To clarify, the pipeline that goes through Ukraine is not owned by Gazprom. It's owned by the Ukrainian government and the Ukrainian transit systems. That is one of the advantages of it: The ability to manipulate it the way Gazprom manipulates Nord Stream 1 is not quite as apparent. Now, Russia can, of course, shut gas on and off at the border as it pleases.

    As we speak, has supply through that pipeline been interrupted, or is it still running?

    My understanding—and I will check on this and get back to you—is that that pipeline is also not delivering gas, as part of Peskov's statement.

    I have to check on that. I don't know what the state of it is today. I don't want to say something that's not accurate. I will find that and email your office after this meeting.

    Thank you.

    Mr. Chair, that information could be sent to the clerk so that the entire committee can benefit from the answer to this question.

    Thank you, Mr. Chair.

    Absolutely.

    Thank you for that, Mr. Bergeron. We'll definitely do so.

    We will now go to Ms. McPherson. You have six minutes.

     Thank you, Mr. Chair.

    Like all of my colleagues, I would like to thank the members from the UCC for being here today.

    I'd also like to take a moment and acknowledge the generosity that they have shown with regard to their time throughout this entire period. I know that many of us request information from them and are informed by them on a very regular basis. Orest and Ihor, thank you very much for that.

    I would be remiss as well if I didn't acknowledge the UCC-Alberta Provincial Council and what an amazing job it is doing in my province.

    I want to start today with the waiver question; that's ultimately why we are here. Similar to my colleague, Mr. Bergeron, I just don't understand why at this point the government has not been willing to revoke that waiver.

    When this first came up and we were first hearing that this was something the government was considering, similar to many of the people in this room, I wondered why on earth we would trust that Putin would do what he said; he's never done what he has said. He's clearly weaponizing energy and food; he's weaponizing all kinds of those things, so why would we put trust in this? He has made it very clear, and his government has made it clear, that they will not be shipping gas to Germany. I cannot get my head around why the government fails to revoke that waiver.

    When Ambassador Kovaliv was in front of our committee, she talked about this being a “dangerous precedent”. I'd love to hear from both of you why you think this is a dangerous precedent and what examples you've seen of how this has proven to be a dangerous precedent.

    Ihor, I think you mentioned that the Russians have asked for “further concessions”. Any more clarity you can give on that would be very welcome.

    Thank you for your warm remarks.

    I'll pass along our best to the UCC-Alberta Provincial Council. It is working incredibly hard to support the Ukrainian refugees who have arrived in the province.

    As you said, we believe it's a precedent we've seen, particularly on some sectors. For example, in terms of the tariffs on fertilizer there has been a lot of impact on the pricing of fertilizer due to the Canadian tariffs; obviously with an impact on the agricultural producers in Canada. We've seen public pressure on the government to move on these tariffs, to reduce them and to exempt them. That's the most public example we can give you of where we've been urging the government to remain strong and consistent on this issue.

    We don't think it's helpful. We actually think it's the goal of the Russian Federation to poke holes in both Canadian sanctions policy and, generally, western sanctions policy. They understand that consistency and coordination are critical.

    I don't think they particularly care what they poke holes into. The more they can poke holes in the sanctions regimes, find differences between jurisdictions and build inconsistencies between our governments that are largely on the same page on this issue.... We believe that is their overall goal. It is part of their goal of disinformation to say that the west is inconsistent and incoherent in applying this kind of pressure.

    Orest, do you have anything to add to that point?

    No. I think you've covered it.

    Knowing that this is an attempt to poke holes in the sanctions regime or the cohesiveness with our allies, which nobody wants to see, do you think that this waiver has impacted, and continues to impact, Canada's credibility around the world? If so, what are the implications of that?

    I think it's become the most high-profile international issue that involves NATO allies and Ukrainian allies and has continued to propel itself forward now for several months without resolution. It has caused the kind of discussion in Canadian parliaments, other parliaments and the media that requires tough questions and tough answers.

    As has been pointed out, I can't give you clear answers on the Canadian government's position. You've heard from the German government's representative about its position, which we certainly have questions about as well.

    This example can be wrapped up, as you said, with a review of this waiver, with a review of the facts and the situation on the ground, and with an undertaking to work with the Government of Ukraine as it had pledged through its ambassador and its government in its previous and initial reaction to the suspension.

    We believe there continue to be many better options than the current situation. We are surprised by the entrenchment of the positions and the reluctance to listen to alternatives.

     I was also surprised at Minister Joly's not agreeing to look at that. This committee should be looking at that as we go forward.

    Thank you, Ms. McPherson. That concludes the first round of questioning. We will now move to the second one.

    Regrettably, we are going to have to adjust the time a bit. Each member will be provided with four minutes.

    We will start with Mr. McLean.

    Mr. McLean, welcome. The floor is yours for four minutes.

    Thank you, Mr. Chair.

    I would like to extend a welcome to Mr. Michalchyshyn and Mr. Zakydalsky. Thank you for coming here today.

    Allow me to reiterate our support for the people of Ukraine in their valiant fight against an aggressive and hostile invading army.

    Canada should be doing all it can to assist the democratic and free Ukrainian people in upholding their sovereignty and their right to live as free people in their own country. In my opinion, this includes maintaining sanctions on all trade with Russia.

    As recently as August 22, Canada's Prime Minister stated that Canada “will be there to support Ukraine and Ukrainian people with what they need for as long as it takes.” These are words in the air, without substance, after the government's decision in July to grant a two-year exemption to federal sanctions and allow a Canadian company to return repaired turbines from a Russian-German natural gas pipeline. This was a decision that Ukraine's president, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, called “a manifestation of weakness”, and I agree. No sooner had the Canadian government capitulated than Russia constrained the supply of natural gas to Europe.

    The narrative quickly changed to saying that we called Russia's bluff because we didn't want to be blamed for the shutdown of Russian energy delivery to Europe.

    Mr. Michalchyshyn, is it your opinion that there was any bluff to call, or is this just another pivoting narrative from a government with diminishing relevance in international affairs?

    As our president said several weeks ago and as we're saying today, we don't think that meeting Russian deadlines, which we would call bending to Russian blackmail, to cancel these sanctions and to enact exemptions as per the desire of the Russian Federation would be a wise move. We support Canada working as a strong Ukrainian partner, as is Germany and as are many countries that are meeting to decide their future support, but we can't overlook this. This has become a major international matter. It is part of the Russian disinformation flow, as has been said. They continue to find an oil leak a week to find reasons they are not going to provide more energy to Europe, so we respectfully call on the government to reconsider.

    Thank you.

    Let's explore energy security and the notion of weaponizing energy, which one of my colleagues previously referred to.

    In 2009, Ukraine underwent its own natural gas supply conflict with Russia. In that sense, Russia showed a clear resolve to weaponize its energy supply to Europe. In spite of this, many European countries ignored the obvious and doubled down on the supply of Russian gas. If Nord Stream 2 had been finalized, fully 80% of Germany's natural gas would have come from Russia.

    Can you comment on the naïveté of European countries that are doubling down on energy supply from a hostile provider for the sake of relatively cheap energy, versus the obvious outcome of the energy insecurity that was going to ensue?

    I would say, first of all, that Nord Stream 2 was completed. Many people said at the time that its completion would make a larger Russian invasion of Ukraine far more likely, which is what transpired. Weeks after the completion of Nord Stream 2, the full-out invasion was launched. Thankfully, the German government has, for now, cancelled the certification of the pipeline.

    Through the last decade or more, a lot of voices in Europe and in North America were making it quite clear to European partners that the policy they were pursuing was not conducive to European security. Nord Stream 2 was strongly opposed by the American government, but it decided to let Germany pursue this policy despite American misgivings. The result is what we see now.

    Thankfully, after the full-out Russian invasion of Ukraine, a lot of European countries are revisiting the wisdom of their policy and are changing. It is no comfort to the Ukrainian people or to us that this happened after a Russian invasion in which tens of thousands of people have already been killed and thousands more will be killed.

     Point taken, Mr. Zakydalsky. Let me intervene. I have only so much time here. That's a point I also raised with the German ambassador a year and a half ago.

    Mr. McLean, I'm afraid you're way over time, so we're going to have to go to the next member, Mr. Sarai.

    Mr. Sarai, you have four minutes.

     Thank you, Chair, and thank you to both witnesses.

    We've been hearing a lot about this topic and about the invasion of Ukraine by Russia in general. It's important to everyone's heart here in Canada. I want to let you know that we take this very seriously.

    What we've noticed is that unity in the response to Russia's invasion has been key, and Putin's goal clearly remains to try to divide NATO and the European Union countries. One of the successes has been the fact that the response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine has been negated or has been strongly opposed by European countries, specifically NATO, and they've been unified in their response, whether that's giving military aid, whether that's giving aid in general, or whether that's giving support at the United Nations or elsewhere.

    How important do you see the maintenance of the European Union support for Ukraine being as this war unfortunately drags on, Mr. Michalchyshyn?

    We know that tomorrow about 40 countries that support Ukraine with defensive weapons are meeting to review what they can do to support Ukraine. As I think was mentioned at the previous meeting, it's quite clear that within Europe there are differences of opinion on this issue. The EU members that border Russia—the Baltic states and the central and eastern European states—have views and an understanding, given their history and experience of dependency on Russia, that I think are quite different from those of Germany and some of the other countries that have this reliance on Russian gas. Obviously the unity of Ukrainian allies is important, which is why the Ukrainian government took the unprecedented step of making a statement in this case, speaking to both Germany and Canada as allies of its war effort and in its humanitarian appeals as well. We definitely believe that this unity must continue. That's why we think the path back to this unity of purpose and unity of messaging and actions is to review this decision.

    I just want to be clear. Currently there's permission for only these Siemens turbines. There's no other relaxation of sanctions. As we've noticed, they're not being used, but if we impose the sanctions, they still won't be used or they may be used. Regardless, that wouldn't have any significant impact that I can see one way or the other, except that the German people would know that Canada didn't do anything to block their energy needs. I just want to be clear that no other sanctions were lifted based on this exemption for the Siemens turbine to be serviced.

    Again, as far as we know at this point, the exemption, as you know and as we know, is for these six turbines for two years, which is actually far broader than the initial story about one particular turbine. That has continued to evolve, and I think with the attention of this committee and with the attention of the public, we have not yet seen any other changes to any other sanctions policies.

    I'm afraid you have just 10 seconds, Mr. Sarai.

    It's all good. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

    Thank you for that.

    Next we'll go to Mr. Bergeron for two minutes.

    Thank you, Mr. Chair.

    When the government decided to allow this waiver, the Bloc Québécois felt that it was certainly a difficult decision, and that the Canadian government had been caught between a rock and a hard place and forced to choose between cholera and malaria, so to speak. So it was an extremely difficult decision. We felt that the government must have had very good reasons for making that decision at the time.

    On the other hand, we immediately said that this would surely lead to a new round of sanctions and Canada providing more military support to Ukraine. However, we've seen few additional sanctions since then. Where military support is concerned, we note that, other than announcing the extension of Operation UNIFIER, the “Canadian military support to Ukraine” page on the government website has made no announcements regarding the provision of military equipment to Ukraine, which it urgently needs, as the Ukrainian ambassador reminded us when she appeared more than two months ago. The ambassador insisted that it was imperative that these supplies reach Ukraine this summer.

    On the one hand, how would you assess the reasons ministers Wilkinson and Joly gave us for making this difficult decision?

    On the other, how would you assess Canada's contribution to Ukraine since then? In your opinion, is it meeting the needs expressed by the Ukrainians?

     I'll ask that you limit your response to 30 seconds, please.

    Very quickly—

    On a point of order, Mr. Chair.

    Didn't you say we had four minutes?

    No. I'm afraid you had two minutes—

    That wasn't specified.

    —as I indicated.

    I didn't hear that.

    Go ahead, gentlemen.

    Very quickly, with regard to your earlier question about the pipeline, the Ukrainian pipeline is working at the same 40% capacity that it was.

    With regard to your question about Minister Joly and Minister Wilkinson's reasoning, we respectfully disagree.

    With regard to your question about the supply of weapons to Ukraine, we have just written to Minister Anand, calling for the government to make another substantial announcement of weapons deliveries, following up on the announcement in budget 2022.

    We look forward to a response from the department of defence and from the Canadian government on further deliveries of weapons.

    Thank you.

    Thank you.

    Now we'll go to Ms. McPherson. You have two minutes.

    Thank you, Mr. Chair.

    This whole conversation is around the sanctions regime. I have found it incredibly difficult to get information about the sanctions. It's the details of what's been seized and the details of the sanctions. It's not who has been sanctioned, but how much and what.

    I would like to take a moment, if I could. Please bear with me to read into the record a motion that I brought forward on May 31, 2022:

    I would like the subcommittee to have an opportunity to discuss this. I think we've heard from our witnesses from the UCC that our sanctions regime needs to be re-examined very carefully. We've heard that the waiver has fundamentally damaged our sanctions regime and fundamentally damaged the credibility of Canada. It is imperative that this committee undertake a study as soon as possible.

    I will end at that point because I know I'm very close to my two minutes.

    Orest and Ihor, I would like to thank you both very much for being here. Thank you for sharing your wisdom with us again.

     Thank you, Ms. McPherson.

    We'll now go to Mr. Aboultaif for four minutes.

    Mr. Chair, I don't believe Mr. Aboultaif is on it. Either I or Mr. Chong could take the round. I will defer to Mr. Chong if he wants to, but otherwise I'm happy to proceed.

     I guess the limitation of a hybrid meeting is that we can't whisper to each other as we normally would.

    You may as well proceed, Mr. Genuis.

    I will proceed. That's excellent.

    Thank you, Mr. Chair.

    Could one or both of you comment on the impact that this turbine decision has had on Canada-Ukraine relations?

    President Zelenskyy chose to speak personally to this issue. I know from friends and contacts I have spoken to in Ukraine that there's a lot of disappointment. There's a sense of betrayal. There's a long history of close relations between Canada and Ukraine, but in this very dark time for Ukraine, what was the significance of this decision for Ukraine?

    Also, maybe related to that, the government talks about standing with our allies. Germany and the U.S., our allies, have said this was okay. Ukraine is also supposed to be an ally, yet the government speaks of standing with our allies with no acknowledgement of the response to this decision from Ukraine.

    Thank you.

    As you've heard in the President's statements and the ambassador's statement—I don't need to repeat those—we believe that the path forward is going to involve more direct co-operation between Canada, Germany and Ukraine to find a solution that everybody is pleased with and comfortable with. Ukraine has counted on Canada as a key ally in the last 30 years of building this democracy, and particularly now at this moment of greatest need with the Russian invasion, but it isn't a great moment. It isn't a great moment to have allies arguing with each other about this.

    We do know that the Ukrainian people have the support of Canada and the Canadian people and we look forward to moving past this conversation and moving past this specific topic to return to a strong sanctions regime and to focus on the future in which there is more discussion of what Canada can do next.

    Thank you.

    Thank you, Mr. Chair.

    Personally, I think the study that Ms. McPherson spoke about, a study on the effectiveness of our sanctions regime, would be very important and worthwhile in order to build on the work that we're doing in the context of this discussion.

    As a follow-up to Mr. Bergeron's point, some of us took the position right at the beginning that this was a terrible decision. That was where we as the Conservative Party were at. I think there were others who were maybe a little bit more sympathetic to the government's decision initially, and then since more facts have become clear, since Gazprom hasn't taken the first turbine and Russia is seeking further concessions, more and more people are coming over to the point of view that surely even if the decision was justifiable in the first instance, there's no reason to continue the waiver now.

    Have you had ongoing engagement with the government, even in the last couple of days, since the most recent announcements from the Kremlin? What is the government saying now? Are they saying the same things? Are they saying different things compared to what they were saying at the beginning?

    I will answer quickly.

    A week or more ago we wrote again to Minister Joly to make the point that now is the time to cancel this waiver. We have not yet heard back from the office of the Minister of Foreign Affairs. We will follow up. Should we hear something, we will of course be happy to share that.

    Thank you.

    I'm assuming you would welcome the opportunity for further engagement with the minister. We would welcome the opportunity to have her back as some of these new revelations have come out. Are you seeking opportunities for further engagement with the minister to get clarity on what the government's position is now in light of the new information?

    We are, definitely. We continue to reach out to her office and we look for public statements and have been open to hearing any developments from their perspective.

    Further, following up on Mr. Zuberi's comments, one of the principal arguments for—

    I'm afraid you're out of time, Mr. Genuis. We now go to Ms. Bendayan for four minutes.

    Thank you, Mr. Chair.

    Before I ask my questions, I'd like to briefly come back to what my colleague Mr. Bergeron touched on, which is the statement or rather the blackmail by Mr. Peskov with respect to the Nord Stream 1 pipeline. As I understand it, this pipeline that runs through Ukraine and enters the European Union through Slovakia is indeed in service, and volumes are stable. Again, as I understand it, this pipeline and the TurkStream pipeline are the only two remaining land routes for importing Russian gas into Europe.

    Of course, I have questions for both witnesses.

     In the discussion we are having with you today, you mentioned in your opening statement that you encouraged our committee to travel to Ukraine. As you know, we had travel plans that were vetoed in the House of Commons by the Conservative Party.

    Are you aware, gentlemen, of why that travel was vetoed?

    We're not privy to the discussions of the committee in terms of travel, but we certainly encouraged our parliamentarians and government officials to travel to Ukraine at the safest and earliest opportunity.

    Thank you.

    I also note that in your introduction you encouraged Canada to continue supporting Ukraine militarily. My understanding is that one of the things Ukraine needs most right now is armoured vehicles. We know how crucial armoured vehicles are to the operation that is ongoing at the moment in the hope that Ukraine will be able to retake some of its territory.

    Canada has already sent some armoured vehicles to Ukraine. I note that one country that has large stocks of these vehicles but seems to be unwilling to send them to Ukraine is Germany. Do you have any information about Germany's refusal to provide these vehicles? How can we make sure to get more armoured vehicles to Ukraine quickly?

    Germany is providing weapons to Ukraine. It is providing them at a pace that is not the pace we would like to see. Any of your engagements with your German counterparts in the Bundestag that would get them to put pressure on the German government to speed up these deliveries would be most welcomed by us.

    Very good.

    We are about to enter winter and we're hearing a lot about the challenging winter ahead for Europe, but I believe the winter will also be challenging for Ukraine, given how snow and cold might affect your military operations.

    How do you see the coming months on the ground in Ukraine, and how can we make sure you have the best possible tools over the course of the coming months?

    From an immediate civilian survival perspective, we have, through our humanitarian appeal, begun to talk about winterization. We know that there are substantial funds that the Government of Canada has yet to spend. I believe there is about $75 million that could be spent on winterization, which means everything from providing heating to basic repairs for people in all of these devastated villages that we've seen on our screens, where roofs, doors and windows are gone and people are left cooking over, basically, campfire stoves. Civilian winterization is essential to enable people to survive.

    As we said, the next steps on military and security support mean identifying, together with our allies, whether Canada has more light armoured vehicles or missiles or communications systems that would be effective for the Ukrainian army so that it can continue its offensive and be victorious in this war in the shortest time.

    What I'm hearing from you gentlemen—

    Ms. Bendayan, I'm afraid you're out of time.

    Thank you, Mr. Chair.

    Thank you.

    On that note, allow me to thank Mr. Michalchyshyn and Mr. Zakydalsky for once again having made themselves available to all of the members. I know I speak on behalf of all of us when I thank you for your tremendous advocacy and for always being the fount of knowledge on all issues related to Ukraine. Thank you for your time.

    Members, we'll suspend the meeting briefly to allow our witnesses to leave. We will of course continue for the second hour with three new witnesses.

    Thank you.

     Colleagues, allow me to now commence the second hour of our committee hearing on the issue of turbines to be exported to Europe.

    We are very privileged to have three distinguished witnesses with us for this hour. We have Dr. Devlen, who is with the Macdonald-Laurier Institute; Dr. Kolga, who is also with the Macdonald-Laurier Institute; and Dr. Schmitt, who is a research associate with the Harvard and Smithsonian Center for Astrophysics and the Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute at Harvard.

    Let me say that we are very sorry and we thank you for being patient. Our first panel ran about 15 minutes over, so we are very grateful that you have made yourselves available.

    Each of you will have five minutes for your opening remarks. We will begin with Dr. Devlen. The floor is yours for five minutes.

     Thank you very much for this opportunity to contribute to the committee's deliberations.

    My comments are aimed at shedding light on what I see as the central question in the debate about the gas turbines today: Should Canada revoke the permit allowing the maintenance of the now-infamous gas turbines? The answer to this question is a resounding yes.

    Doing otherwise—continuing with the sanctions exemption—does not advance Canada’s interests, does not help our European allies with their energy problems, and continues to provide the Russian dictator Vladimir Putin with opportunities for blackmail and leverage against the west.

    Let me briefly elaborate in the five minutes that I have.

    It is clear to all that the technical issues have nothing to do with Russia’s decision to first reduce and then completely shut down gas flows to Europe via Nord Stream 1. Russia’s actions over the years, and particularly in the last few months, made this very clear. There is no need to again go over the familiar terrain that has been covered in the deliberations of this committee. It's a political decision aimed at blackmailing and forcing Europe to ease or break the sanctions imposed on Russia as a result of its brutal and unprovoked invasion of Ukraine.

    Kremlin spokesperson Peskov said as much with great clarity on Monday, and Putin repeated the same thing today in his remarks. This fact is clearly recognized by the German and European public, as polling consistently indicates. It would be giving too little credit to the European public’s political sophistication to argue that they will buy into Russian excuses and blame Canada for the difficulties.

    Therefore, it is clear that Canada’s decision to continue to provide an exemption for the gas turbines will have no role in determining whether Russia will resume gas flows to Europe or not, nor will revoking the permit lead to a backlash against Canada from the Europeans.

    What it does, however, is provide an ongoing point of leverage for the Kremlin to create friction and discord between allies and enable the Kremlin to develop a narrative of western weakness and disunity by pointing out the carve-outs within the sanctions regime.

    In other words, the Kremlin turns to other countries and says, “Look: Canada, Germany and other western powers immediately violate their own sanctions regime and carve out exemptions when their domestic interests are threatened. Why would you go along with this and pay the price when they are not interested in doing the same?” Putin is basically repeating the same line today in his talk.

    Continuing with the exemption also does not help our European allies with their energy needs. What would help is to get Canadian LNG to them, as they have been asking for publicly and very clearly. Not only has Chancellor Scholz voiced his desire for more Canadian LNG, but other allies, such as Poland and Latvia, have been calling for more Canadian gas to Europe for a while. Clearing the obstacles in front of this real and tangible support for Canada’s allies is urgently needed. That is what a good ally would do.

    Lastly, it is important to keep in mind the broader geopolitical context in which this issue needs to be considered. The strategic goal for Canada must be Ukrainian victory in this war. Supporting Ukraine is not charity but enlightened self-interest. What is at stake for Canada is not only the security and prosperity of our European allies but also the future of the rules-based international order that has benefited Canada and Canadians immensely. The country—Russia—that launched this brutal attack on that international order is not far to the east of us; it is an immediate neighbour to the north in the Arctic. Policies that provide leverage and opportunity for Russia are not in the interests of Canada.

    To recapitulate, whatever the initial merits of the decision to provide an exemption, there are no strategic, political or economic reasons now to continue to provide Russia with potential leverage for the next two years. It neither advances Canada's interests nor alleviates our allies' suffering. The permit should be revoked and Canada should look for ways to get its LNG to European markets as fast as it can.

    Thank you very much for this opportunity to talk to you today.

    Thank you very much, Dr. Devlen. We will next go to Dr. Kolga.

    Welcome. You have five minutes for your opening remarks.

     Thank you, Mr. Chair.

    I am simply Mr. Marcus Kolga, not Dr. Marcus Kolga.

    Thanks to you and the members of the committee for this opportunity to appear before you today.

    Over the past months, Russia has threatened to starve vulnerable nations around the world by blockading millions of tonnes of Ukrainian grain while shelling and bombing critical Ukrainian agricultural infrastructure to induce a global grain shortage. At the same time, Russia has falsely blamed western and Canadian sanctions for causing this food crisis, despite the fact that our sanctions do not affect any Ukrainian agricultural infrastructure or the transport of grain and food to those nations that rely on it.

    Russia's weaponization of hunger is matched in cruelty by its use of energy to freeze Russia's neighbours. Many Europeans experienced this first-hand when Russia cut all gas supplies transiting Ukraine in January of 2009. Canadians only recently became aware of Putin's energy warfare after Global Affairs granted Gazprom a sanctions exemption to permit the repair in Canada of turbines that compress gas exported from Russia through the Nord Stream pipeline to Europe.

    However, the Kremlin's use of energy as a point of geopolitical leverage did not emerge out of a vacuum. The former vice-president of Gazprombank, Igor Volobuev, told a Polish newspaper in May how he was instructed by Gazprom executives to develop anti-Ukrainian narratives in 2005 when Ukraine's political trajectory shifted toward Europe. He also created anti-Georgian narratives in 2008 when Russia invaded South Ossetia and Abkhazia. According to Volobuev, all decisions within Gazprom are made inside the Russian presidential administration.

    If Canada's decision to grant Gazprom a sanctions waiver was intended to call Putin's bluff, that mission has been accomplished. It is now clear that our sanctions did not impair Gazprom's ability to pump gas through the Nord Stream pipeline. As we've heard from previous witnesses today, they never did.

    Underscoring the false nature of Russia's accusations, a recent report published by the BBC exposed massive gas flares at Gazprom's Portovaya compression station near the Russian starting point of the Nord Stream pipeline. Flaring is a process by which gas producers burn off large quantities of gas for sustained periods of time. According to that report, $10 million worth of gas is being burned off by Gazprom each day. That is gas that would otherwise be pumped through Nord Stream to Germany and Europe or through existing pipelines that transit Ukraine and Poland.

    Indeed, as other witnesses have pointed out, the Kremlin has now explicitly stated that gas will only start flowing through Nord Stream once Canadian and western sanctions have been lifted. This is blackmail.

    Vladimir Putin's intent is to weaponize gas in order to erode western support for Ukraine and undermine Canadian and allied democracies by blaming us for rising inflation and energy costs through disinformation. This is happening right now. This morning, in fact, in Vladivostok, Vladimir Putin doubled down on his accusations about western sanctions and even claimed, “we did not start anything in terms of military actions; we are trying to end it.” At the same time, Putin made it very clear that the polarization of the democratic world that his regime is actively contributing to will greatly benefit Russia.

    We're currently witnessing Russian state media and proauthoritarian groups promoting these exact narratives. Protests that were organized by Kremlin-aligned Communists and populist neo-fascists in Europe this past weekend will be exploited by Russian propagandists to build on them and destabilize western democracies. We cannot rule out that these false narratives will not inspire similar protests among Canadian far-right and far-left extremist groups.

    In Putin's own words, the sole beneficiary of this polarization is his regime. Now that Putin's bluff has been called, the sanctions waiver issued by Global Affairs should be revoked and the integrity of Canada's sanctions regime should be restored. Sanctions work when they are applied, sustained and enforced.

    Finally, Canada should prioritize the development of infrastructure to export Canadian gas to Europe, as many of our allies have asked us to do. Canadian small nuclear reactor technology can also help our allies take control of their own supply of electricity. In fact, Estonia recently signed an agreement to do just that. Canada can provide a mutually beneficial contribution to European energy security that will lead to greater overall European stability if we only commit to it.

    Thank you, Mr. Chair. I look forward to your questions.

     Thank you, Mr. Kolga.

    We'll next go to Dr. Schmitt.

    Dr. Schmitt, you have the floor for five minutes.

     Hello and bonjour, Chair Ehsassi, Vice-Chair Bergeron and distinguished members of the Canadian Parliament. Thank you and merci for the opportunity to speak today about supporting Europe’s energy security.

    My name is Benjamin L. Schmitt. I'm an astrophysics researcher at Harvard.

    I'm a former European energy security adviser from the U.S. Department of State. Currently, I’m a research associate at the Harvard-Smithsonian Center for Astrophysics and Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute, a senior fellow at the Center for European Policy Analysis, and a Rethinking Diplomacy fellow at Duke University.

    We meet today nearly seven months after Moscow unleashed its horrific campaign of chaos in Ukraine, but let’s be clear: Just as Putin’s military aggression against Ukraine didn’t start with its February large-scale invasion, the Kremlin’s wider hybrid aggression against global democracies, including weaponized energy, is nothing new either.

    With this in mind, we can look back on three critical lessons.

    First, energy and critical infrastructure proposals advanced by Putin’s authoritarian regime are not just commercial deals.

    Nord Stream is more than just a commercial deal.

    Second, sanctions have been an effective tool to slow and stop Kremlin malign energy activities over the years.

    Third, technology export controls remain vital to throttle the Kremlin’s ability to acquire systems and components needed to both wage and fund its horrific war.

    Given the total state control of authoritarian nations like Russia, nearly every sector of society can be weaponized to advance geopolitical aims, from cyberspace to supply chains to space assets and, of course, energy for political blackmail. Knowing this, undermining sanctions unity on the Nord Stream 1 turbines simply to “call Putin’s bluff” is only justifiable in a world where Russia hasn’t been weaponizing energy for years—but it has. For context, we can look at Putin’s Nord Stream 2 pipeline.

    Nord Stream 2 was a long-running geostrategic anchor that Germany openly clung to as Russia created a gas crisis last year. In 2021 the Kremlin intentionally limited natural gas volumes destined for European storages, most of which were owned by Gazprom. Despite this reality, Berlin convinced the United States government to waive its own mandatory bipartisan sanctions aimed at stopping Nord Stream 2, with Berlin agreeing to seek EU sanctions in the case that Russia took further steps to weaponize its energy resources. Even though Putin did just that, Berlin failed to seek those sanctions, emboldening Putin’s confidence that energy pressure could limit the latitude of foreign policy responses to Russia's horrific war against Ukraine.

     Thankfully, Washington finally sanctioned Nord Stream 2 AG and its corporate officers just hours before Putin's large-scale invasion began, ending the project for good, hopefully. But distressingly, even with this fresh lesson in mind, history seems to be repeating itself here in Canada.

    For months, Gazprom has cut flows to at least a dozen EU member states, including via its Nord Stream 1 pipeline, and since mid-June has cut by 60%, 80% and now 100%. Multiple technical assessments from German ministries and officials stated that Russia’s explanation for these cuts—supposed technical issues that could only be solved by receiving stranded Siemens turbines near Montreal—were nothing more than pretext for another political energy cut.

    That’s why it’s so baffling that Berlin simultaneously pressured Ottawa to undermine its own technology sanctions against Russia. Even if Gazprom’s dubious technical justifications had merit—and they do not have merit—the Kremlin could easily restore gas deliveries to Europe right now via other routes where it's limiting flows. That it refuses to do so speaks volumes about Putin's malign intent.

    Berlin pressuring Ottawa to undermine sanctions unity through the turbine waiver sets a worrying precedent from which the Kremlin will learn a troubling lesson—that weaponizing energy dependence can be effective at breaking western consensus on the very technology export controls that are curbing Russia’s military potential and economic engine.

    Russia’s refusal this summer to take custody of the first of the turbines transferred to Germany raises questions about Ottawa’s subsequent decision to stand by its waiver after the visit of German Chancellor Scholz in late August, when news reports say that it authorized the transfer of five additional Siemens turbines.

    To cap off the saga, this week Kremlin spokesperson Peskov stated out loud what the world knew for months, that the turbine story was a cover for energy weaponization, declaring that the cuts will continue until sanctions are dropped, and that “Other reasons that would cause problems with the pumping [simply] don’t exist.”

    In closing, I will leave you with three very brief recommendations.

    One, Canada should reverse the turbine sanctions waiver as soon as possible, backed by political endorsements from Germany and the United States.

    Two, Canada should expand sanctions on the Putin regime and increase LNG export capacity, incentivizing exports to European partners and allies.

    Three, Canada should pass legislation to curb Kremlin strategic corruption in western democracies, just like what I proposed to U.S. Congress, called the “stop helping America’s malign enemies, SHAME, act”.

     In our dire struggle against Russia's criminal onslaught against Ukraine, Putin and his authoritarian cronies need to see a wall of strength from democracies unwilling to waiver in their resolve to hold the Kremlin to account. Then there will be only one nation forced to change its foreign policy in order to avoid “Ukraine fatigue”, and that would be Putin's Russia.

    Thank you for your attention.

    I look forward to your questions today.

    Thank you, Mr. Schmitt.

    We now go to questions by the members.

    The first member is Mr. Chong.

    Mr. Chong, you have the floor for six minutes.

    Thank you, Mr. Chair.

    Before I direct my questions to the witnesses, I'm wondering if you invited the foreign affairs minister of Ukraine to appear in front of this committee, and, if so, what was the response?

    Mr. Chong, I can assure you that I've been advised by the clerk that the foreign minister of Ukraine was invited, an invitation was extended, but regrettably, he was not available.

    Thank you, Mr. Chair.

    I'd like to direct my question to Dr. Schmitt.

    According to the Finnish Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air, Russia has raked in €158 billion since the war began in Ukraine from the sale of oil and gas exports, more than half of which have been to the European Union. In fact, this Finnish research centre has indicated in its report that €43 billion has been added to the Russian budget from the sale of these exports to the European Union.

    Canada could displace Russian gas in western Europe. We are the fifth-largest natural gas producer in the world and we have the longest coastline in the world. According to my back-of-the-napkin calculation, a simple 15% increase in Canadian natural gas production could displace more than a third of all Russian gas in western Europe.

    Recently, Chancellor Scholz was here in Canada, and he said:

    He further added comments:

    The Canadian Prime Minister rejected the German request to work with Germany to export more Canadian LNG to Europe.

    I'd like your comments on that.

    I think Canada can play a major role here. Obviously increasing the amount of export infrastructure on Canada's Atlantic coast is incredibly important as well as using the St. Lawrence Seaway to the greatest extent possible potentially to bring LNG through the Great Lakes. Again, I defer to Canadian experts on the various routes, but it can be done.

    With that in mind, we also have to look at the extent to which Canada and other western allies can help the EU take a war-time level of effort to build out the energy import infrastructure as quickly as possible to increase the bandwidth of LNG that can be brought in to displace Russian natural gas.

    Of course, we want to move to renewables as quickly as possible and of course we need to address the climate crisis but in a war-time contingency we need a one-for-one swap with these volumes.

     On that last point, Dr. Schmitt, the current government has indicated it takes five to 10 years to build an LNG facility here in Canada, but Germany is about to construct two new LNG terminals in the Baltic Sea within about 12 months. Germany is not a major energy producer, yet it is able to construct these two new terminals in the Baltic Sea in just over 12 months. That's what the German economic minister has recently said. They announced the construction of these two new terminals just shortly after the war began on February 24, and yet we as an energy producer—the fifth-largest natural gas producer in the world with an immense capability to engineer, design and build energy infrastructure—has a government that says it's going to take five to 10 years to construct. I want to finish on this point and allow you to comment on it.

    The Prime Minister said during Chancellor Scholz's visit that there has “never been a strong business case“ for LNG facilities on the east coast and yet Timothy Egan who is president of the Canadian Gas Association essentially said the Prime Minister was wrong. He said that “the biggest obstacle” is not that there isn't a business case, but “regulatory uncertainty” from the federal government. He said that there's “an incredible business case if the regulatory framework is clear. Are the environmental approval processes going to be fast enough and clear enough? How is it that this can happen so quickly in the United States and it can't happen as quickly in Canada?”

    I would like your comment on our inability to be a willing partner in the NATO alliance, to step up to the plate to export natural gas to Europe to displace Russian gas, which is funding Putin's war regime.

    Like a lot of the G7 members that are producers, including the United States and others, Canada needs to make sure that global democracies are making our energy resources available to Europe as quickly as possible.

    I do want to point out on the German side that they're doing a number of things. Two floating storage and regasification units in Brunsbuettel and Wilhelmshaven, Germany are being built, but there also is a need to build out floating storage and regasification units, or floating LNG import terminals, at locations that are strategic and have existing infrastructure. There's been some talk in the media about potential companies that are thinking about this at Lubmin, Germany, but Lubmin is the point of contact where Nord Stream 2 comes onshore. In June the economic ministry in Berlin came out and said that they were considering a plan to expropriate the Nord Stream 2 pipelines in German waters, physically cut and sever them away from the Nord Stream 2 pipeline, which is currently unused due to U.S. sanctions, and attach them to floating storage and regasification units to bring non-Russian LNG through those systems and through the Lubmin gas hub and the EUGAL pipeline onshore.

    This would basically be a war-time level of effort and speed to leverage existing infrastructure. That still hasn't happened yet. We need more signals from Berlin that that's going to happen. That's got to happen infrastructure-wise on both sides of the Atlantic, and we need to do it awfully quickly.

    I have no further questions, Mr. Chair.

    Thank you, Mr. Chong.

    Mr. Sidhu, you have the floor for six minutes.

    Thank you, Mr. Chair.

    I would like to thank the witnesses for joining us this afternoon.

    My first question is for Mr. Kolga. You have previously spoken to the opportunities for trade and stronger relations between Canada and the Baltic states. I was hoping you could speak to the importance of building these ties in the context of Russia's aggression in the region, and why it's key for Canada to expand its diplomatic and military presence in the region.

    There certainly is demand in the Baltic states, and there has been, for quite some time, for the export of Canadian energy. As I mentioned in my opening remarks, Canada and Estonia have just recently signed an agreement to develop a program to build small-scale nuclear reactors in Estonia to wean that country off Russian electrical supplies. Lithuania, about three or four years ago, built an offshore LNG terminal, and officials in all three Baltic states have clearly stated that they would welcome Canadian gas in those countries.

    There are opportunities for Canada to begin exporting gas quickly. There was previously a question about the timelines to build some of this infrastructure. In the United States, there is technology available right now to build offshore export LNG terminals off the coast of Canada. These could be built within 12 months, and we could start exporting LNG to the Baltic states and other European countries quite quickly.

    There are other trade opportunities, of course, in the IT sector. Estonia is a leader in developing e-government technologies and such. They've recently set up shop here in Canada, and I think that Canada could greatly benefit from working with Estonia to develop our own technologies here.

    So there are plenty of opportunities, and the fact that Canada has established and has announced that it will establish full embassies in all three Baltic states is certainly a positive sign.

    Thank you for those insights, Mr. Kolga.

    Dr. Devlen, you have written about the threat posed by President Lukashenko and his grey-zone aggression against NATO and the EU. Are you able to speak to his role in the current conflict and how you see Belarus's role evolving as this conflict continues?

    Effectively speaking, Belarus is a de facto colony of Russia right now under Lukashenko's rule. It has been and it continues to be a staging ground for Russian forces. During the first phase of the war, they did invade from Belarus as well. They continue to carry out missile strikes from Belarus. The Russian planes and air force continue to attack Ukraine through Belarus, and Belarusian ammunition-deposed missiles and artillery shells, etc. are being basically transported and used by Russia in this war.

    Perhaps the only silver lining is that, partly because of the resistance of the Belarusian people, Lukashenko could not enter the war in full force on the side of Russia knowing that there is huge resistance, a significant resistance, to such a clear, open intervention, but that does not necessarily mean that it will not happen in the future. Particularly if the Ukrainian counteroffensive in the south goes well, Russia might end up using the available strategic resources, particularly long-range missiles and others, in Belarus to threaten and attack Kyiv more, not necessarily with ground troops but with missiles and artillery shells and the air force. That might bring Belarus in to fight more, but we have to treat this and assume that Belarus, under Lukashenko, continues to pose a threat to European peace and stability.

    Thank you, Dr. Devlen.

    I have a minute left. What do you see as the next critical phase of this war? What should we be watching for that would suggest positive or negative momentum for Ukraine?

    That's open to all panellists.

    I'm happy to jump in.

    This will be a long war. I think one of the biggest threats today is to resist the attempts by Russia to freeze the existing status quo when and if the Ukrainian counteroffensive is successful and Russia tries to freeze the current battle lines instead of withdrawing. I see that as one of the biggest threats in the next three to six months.

     I'll say just one line. One of the biggest threats outside of Ukraine and outside of the conflict directly is losing western support, which we absolutely can't do. We have to make sure that western support is maintained so that Ukraine is supported with all of the weapons and all of the sanctions that are needed to make sure that the Putin regime cannot succeed in Ukraine.

    As we're going into this energy crisis—it's been a crisis for almost two years now—we absolutely need to make sure that Putin cannot weaponize energy in order to diminish western resolve to defeat the Russian Federation, and we need to make sure that Ukraine is victorious.

    Thank you, Mr. Chair.

    Thank you, Mr. Sidhu.

    Next, we'll go to Mr. Bergeron. You have six minutes.

    Thank you, Mr. Chair.

    I'd like to thank the witnesses for being with us and enlightening us with their words.

    Mr. Schmitt, I found it refreshing, to say the least, to hear a few words in French from a friend who is from south of the border. It was ironic at the very least. Thank you very much for that short interlude in French.

    My question is for Mr. Kolga. If the two other witnesses would like to comment, of course, they are welcome to do so.

    Two former U.S. generals, David Petraeus and Wesley Clark, praised the Canadian government's decision to return the turbines to Germany so as not to threaten NATO cohesion and unity. Canada's former chief of defence staff Rick Hillier has argued that the decision would be seen as a signal that sanctions on Russia will weaken.

    Didn't we get the worst of both worlds, having perhaps undermined cohesion between the allies, while also opening the door to weakening sanctions on Russia?

    I completely agree that we have the worst of both worlds. We've arrived at a lose-lose situation.

    The fact that we have compromised on these sanctions opens the door to other allies doing the same. They can justify that action by pointing to our decision to provide that exemption to Gazprom. That is problematic.

    Publicly, our NATO allies are going to be supportive of any decision that we take. We worked with the Germans on this issue. Privately—certainly among our eastern European NATO allies and in the Baltic states, Poland and beyond—our decision raised eyebrows. This decision also raised eyebrows among Russian opposition leaders. They all understand that what Putin is very much hoping for is a return to business as usual. The erosion of sanctions, as he clearly mentioned today in Vladivostok, is one of his primary goals at the moment.

    I think that Canada still has an opportunity to correct that decision by cancelling that permit to Gazprom and rebuilding confidence in our sanctions regime. That's vital today to maintain that cohesion among our allies, but also to maintain trust in our own defence policy, foreign policy and sanctions policy.

    Thank you very much.

    I'd like to ask Mr. Schmitt a question.

    Germany has reportedly already achieved 75% of its winter storage objective, and you said on Twitter that Germany's continued momentum could help counter Russia's weaponization of energy.

    Do you have any concerns, given the decision announced by Mr. Peskov that they are going to permanently cut off supply until sanctions are lifted?

    Do you fear that they can't keep up with storage at the anticipated rate?

    That's an incredibly prescient question. It's something we'll have to monitor over the next several weeks and months.

    The bottom line is it's one thing to have storage—you absolutely need to have this storage built up as high as possible before the winter—but there also have to be latent LNG imports or natural gas flows backing that up throughout the winter. It's not just “fill it up to 100% and then you're good for the winter”; you really need to have additional flows of that resource going on.

    That means if you can't increase the flows very much because Russia is actively cutting off gas flows, you also have to do a lot for energy efficiency. That's exactly what the German government and German people are doing right now. It will have to continue and it will have to continue across Europe. Partners and allies need to supply as many energy resources to Europe as possible, especially in the next few months, to make sure that they get through the winter.

    Several experts reject the idea that Siemens turbines are absolutely needed to operate Nord Stream 1. Other models could well have done the job. It seems that Russia may have more stockpiled.

    In your opinion, are these assessments credible?

     No, they're not. The bottom line is we have to have policies that are based on science and technology that undergird our decision-making. Simply to set up this scenario in which we're pushing back on disinformation to call someone's bluff...the fact of the matter is that the German government several times pointed out that this was not backed up by technical reality—the Bundesnetzagentur, the Wirtschaftsministerium, etc. Siemens just this week said about this purported oil leak that “such leaks do not normally affect the operation of a turbine and can be sealed on site. It is a routine procedure within the scope of maintenance work.... In the past...the occurrence of this type of leak has not led to a shutdown of operations.

    The bottom line is we need to turn back these waivers to restore sanctions unity because Putin will enact as much as possible energy weaponization to open up where he's really being hurt right now, which is in technology-calibrated sanctions that are undermining his ability to get systems that can drive his economy, energy technologies and things of this nature, and also dual-use weapons technologies—things like semiconductors. There have been any number of reports of Ukrainian military personnel opening up captured Russian military equipment and, lo and behold, inside are commercial semiconductor products that are stripped out of products like washing machines and dishwashers and things like this. That means our technology sanctions are working. That's why we can't allow energy weaponization to push back on this technology-calibrated sanctions approach. That's why, as global democracies, we collectively have to have foreign policy that is driven by technical reality.

    Thank you.

    Thank you for that.

    We'll now go from Mr. Bergeron to Madam McPherson.

    Ms. McPherson, the floor is yours for six minutes.

    Thank you, Mr. Chair.

    I would like to thank our witnesses today. It's been very enlightening. Before I start I just want to take a moment. One of the biggest issues for me has been the efficacy, the transparency and the ability of Canadians to understand how our sanctions regime is working. I think that probably some of you saw that I brought forward a motion in the previous session, but I think it's important to note.

    Mr. Kolga, you were one of the key witnesses for the 2017 study, but we also had another witness who testified for this committee. Vladimir Kara-Murza was one of the witnesses. He was arrested in Russia in April and he's facing 10 years. Today is his birthday. I just want to take a moment to acknowledge that he has testified for this committee and that he is in a very difficult place looking at 10 years in prison for criticizing the war in Ukraine. I am sorry, Mr. Kolga, and those who know Mr. Kara-Murza.

    I would like to start with you, Mr. Kolga. You were a key witness in 2017. You have talked about how this particular waiver has harmed our sanctions regime. There were recommendations that came out of the study of the sanctions regime in 2017 that have not been acted upon. Can you talk a little bit about how we could strengthen our sanctions regime and how we should be making it more transparent, more accountable and easier to understand for Canadians?

    I think there's a lot that Canada could be doing to make our own sanctions regime more effective.

    First and foremost is working with our allies to harmonize our policies and legislation with the United States, the EU and the U.K. We should be stepping up the enforcement of our sanctions policy. To date, since the start of the war, the RCMP has seized $122.3 million worth of Russian assets. We know for a fact that Russian oligarchs have billions of dollars of assets hidden well in plain sight in this country. We need to be doing a heck of a lot more. If we intend to use our sanctions policy as a consequence and a cost for these foreign regimes, we need to make sure we're using that legislation properly.

    During the past six months, the Canadian government enacted new legislation and an amendment to the Special Economic Measures Act that would also allow our government to repurpose some of those assets that have been frozen. We need to start using that legislation. We need to start repurposing some of those billions of dollars that are hidden in this country. We could use some of those funds to help support Ukraine in its struggle to push Russia back past the February 24 border, to reclaim Crimea and to rebuild the country.

    We could also be introducing a measure of transparency to the entire process of how those sanctions are imposed, who they're being imposed on and what sorts of assets these targeted individuals have. There should be some accountability through regular reporting.

    I would also suggest that this committee be given the power to nominate candidates for our sanctions list. You are experts in Parliament. You've heard from experts and you know who these human rights abusers are, those who threaten the stability of western democracies even in their own countries. You know who these people are. Giving this committee more power to designate individuals and entities for our sanctions list is also important.

    One of the most important things that you could do is have that review of our sanctions legislation as you've proposed. I and, I think, a lot of other human rights activists in Canada and elsewhere would very much support this as, I'm sure, Vladimir Kara-Murza would.

    Thank you.

    You talk about transparency and accountability. I've asked about it multiple times in the House of Commons and I've put in Order Paper questions through access to information, and I cannot get the answers I need. In fact, I've been told that because they can't give a pure or 100% accurate answer, they won't give me an answer at all.

    We asked to have representatives from the CBSA and the RCMP attend this committee so that we could get a better understanding of that. I fully agree with you when you talk about the need for us to do that.

    In terms of that review and the Magnitsky sanctions, are there other people who should be added to those lists? Is there more that should be done using that tool? We know that some are being used, but is there more that should be done using the Magnitsky tools?

    Certainly. There are several thousand political prisoners in Russia today since the war began. In the first few months of the war, thousands of Russians took to the streets to protest this war. They were all brutally arrested. The entire Russian opposition, the ones who remained in Russia, have been detained. That includes Vladimir Kara-Murza, Ilya Yashin and others. They are likely going to be in prison, as you mentioned, for 10 years or possibly more.

    We should be looking at those individuals and those Russian officials who ordered their arrest from the Kremlin, all the way down to those officials who were involved in putting them into jail. We should be looking at all of those individuals and placing sanctions on them.

    There's a lot more that we can do with our Magnitsky legislation which, of course, targets specific human rights abusers in regimes like those in Russia.

    Thank you very much, Mr. Kolga.

    Mr. Chair, I believe that's my time.

    Thank you, Ms. McPherson.

    We will now go to the second round.

    Mr. Genuis, you have four minutes.

    Thank you, Mr. Chair.

    This is really high quality testimony we're receiving from all three of you. Given your thoughtful and biting critique, I now find it no surprise that the Liberal chair made a last-minute change to the agenda that limits the time we have with you, though it is unfortunate.

    Mr. Kolga, you mentioned the ability of committees to be able to nominate people for sanctions.

    I want to note, for your information and for the record, that Bill C-281, tabled by my colleague, Philip Lawrence, the international human rights act, contains some of those provisions. We will be debating that bill in Parliament this fall. Hopefully it will be coming to us here at this committee soon.

    It's been reported recently, as well, by CBC that the value of frozen sanctions in Canada has dropped in recent months to suggest the possibility that some people have been allowed to sell off assets.

    Do you have any reflections or information about how it is that the value of frozen assets under sanction would somehow be dropping?

     That's a very good question. I saw that same report.

    According to that report, by August 9 the RCMP had initially reported that $289-million worth of Russian assets had been frozen. They then revised that number to $122.3 million. I'm not sure what would account for that sort of drop. It could be the shares in stocks. Certainly, there's one rather large steel company that is owned by a prominent Putin-linked oligarch and that has found itself in quite a bit of hot water since the war started. It's entirely possible that the value of that company, because of the sanctions, because of the war, has dropped. It could be that other assets may have fallen in value because of that war as well. It could be because of that.

    I'm not sure how to account for that.

    Okay. It's something that maybe the committee should seek further information on.

    This question is for all of the witnesses. The Canadian Press reported recently that the Government of Canada was considering the domestic economy, jobs and inflation in making their decision on granting the sanctions waiver. The fact that they were considering domestic economic factors was a big surprise, given that it was discordant with the explanations previously given. We know that the government was lobbied recently by Siemens, but we don't know on which subjects. It seems that the minister has waived sanctions on Russia, rejecting concerns raised by Ukraine, in part to protect the interests of a large company that operates fairly close to her riding.

    I wonder what kind of precedent is set when the government is saying that they are granting an exemption like this not because of geopolitical factors but because of domestic economic factors.

    Philosophers call that a moral hazard. That is, it creates conditions under which your actions with a narrow definition of interest led further down to unintended consequences that actually harm both your own interests and others'. As I said in my opening remarks, once you start carving out exemptions for domestic political reasons, everyone else starts asking the same, and therefore you create a Swiss cheese of sanctions. Everyone starts jumping from one part to another. It thus undermines the sanctions.

    Sanctions work in the long term when they are united and they are consistently applied. You're not going to be accused of hypocrisy when you're asking other countries in, say, the global south to sanction or to join the sanctions against Russia at the same time that you're providing carve-outs for your domestic political or economic interests.

    So it significantly undermines credibility as well as the sanctions regime.

    Thank you.

    Are there any other...?

    A voice: If I may, I'd like to—

    Mr. Genuis, I'm afraid you're way over time. We will have to go to the next member.

    Mr. Zuberi, you have four minutes.

    Thank you to all the witnesses for being here.

    I'd like to start off with Dr. Schmitt.

    In terms of weaponizing energy, you mentioned that Russia has been doing that for years, well before this current conflict in Ukraine. Could you share what other conflicts Russia has done this in? Was it done during the wars in Chechnya from 1994 to 1996 and 1999 to 2009; in Georgia in 2008; the war in the Donbass in 2017; and in Syria in 2015?

    Can you comment on that, please?

     Thanks so much. That's an excellent question.

    The bottom line is that Russia has been weaponizing energy for many years. This has a wide definition. First of all, there are the overt gas cuts that we can see have happened dozens of times over the years. I can supply the committee with a list of every one that I am aware of, but I know it's long, with at least 20 or 30 of these sorts of instances.

    This doesn't necessarily mirror military conflicts that the Russian Federation has been in, because the Russian Federation under Vladimir Putin has been in a hybrid war at the same time during many of the conflicts you mentioned, at least since the mid-2000s through now, with the west, and has been using energy in one way or another to either create market uncertainty and energy insecurity by actual energy cuts or by doing what I'm really concerned about as well, which is using energy as a means of strategic corruption, to enact energy deals and things like this and then allow for elite capture around this.

    We saw this in 2005-06 when former German chancellor Gerhard Schroeder stepped out of office. At the end of his tenure in office, he was supporting Nord Stream 1 and was basically pushing that project forward. He stepped down and was chairman of Nord Stream AG. We saw this go on with Nord Stream 2 and things around Nord Stream 2. Former Austrian economy minister Hans Jörg Schelling became Nord Stream AG's senior adviser after stepping out of office. Former Austrian foreign minister Karin Kneissl stepped out of office. Of course, she was famously covered in the press for having Putin at her wedding and dancing with Putin at her wedding. She stepped out of office after supporting Nord Stream 2 and other pro-Russian policies while in office, and was appointed a board member of Russian state-owned oil company Rosneft. Former French prime minister François Fillon was nominated to not one but two Russian state-owned oil and gas trading companies.

    So this really is a concern, and this is what I'm constantly calling for in the United States, which is to start this norm-setting process. The United States should pass an act called the “stop helping America's maligned enemies, SHAME, act”. When small-case shame doesn't work, you need large-case shame. It doesn't have to be called that here in Canada, but Canada can join in this effort. There should be a Magnitsky-level anti-elite capture and anti-strategic corruption effort legislatively throughout global democracies to make sure that former officials cannot leave the public trust and then work for authoritarian state-owned enterprises.

    It shouldn't be controversial. This is something that this Parliament can do today, if it would like to, or at least put out a statement saying that it's the sense of Parliament that this sort of practice can no longer happen, because it's still legal in too many jurisdictions.

    Just to conclude, you said that in the conflicts I mentioned, Russia has been using this same sort of approach of weaponizing energy.

    Yes.

    Thank you.

    We now go to Mr. Bergeron.

    Mr. Bergeron, you have four minutes.

    I have four minutes?

    Yes.

    Thank you, Mr. Chair.

    First, I'd like to quote the German ambassador. When she appeared before this committee, she said, “I think our point of view was that we would have lost significantly in the disinformation war if that turbine had not been able to be delivered.”

    My question is for Mr. Kolga.

    In your view, what would we have lost in the disinformation war had it not been possible to deliver the turbine?

    That information war would have simply continued. Now that we have returned that turbine, we see it continue. The Russian government has continuously made excuses to reduce the flow of gas through Nord Stream 1. Now that it's stopped that flow completely, it has continuously blamed various different types of paperwork and insufficient repairs. It is continuing to blame Canadian sanctions, not just for.... Again, it's energy warfare right now, but even for the food crisis it is causing, it is continuing to blame us.

    So I'm not sure that maintaining those sanctions would have made the information warfare any more intense, or whether it's reduced it. I think Vladimir Putin will continue using disinformation to spread lies and create conspiracies in order to undermine our geopolitical position, and use the same issues that I mentioned in my opening remarks to try to destabilize and polarize Canadian society and societies in other western democracies.

    We see that the sanctions are having negative effects on the economies of the countries that have imposed them, so much so that a certain fatigue, even hostility, is setting in with regard to the sanctions. Politicians in Europe, particularly in France, are denouncing the sanctions and claiming that they are not effective and Russia has never made so much money from oil and gas sales to support its war effort in Ukraine.

    However, doesn't Mr. Peskov stating that they are going to turn off the tap until sanctions are lifted contradict these claims and show that the sanctions are indeed having an impact on the Russian economy?

     Well, yes, I think it demonstrates that Vladimir Putin is very much in a bit of a panic mode about the sanctions. Dr. Schmitt mentioned earlier that Russia is no longer able to repair any of its military equipment. It's using parts from household appliances to patch up various different weapons. There have been reports that Aeroflot is cannibalizing its own aircraft for parts in order to carry out repairs.

    A majority of Russians polled recently said that they are deeply concerned about the effect of sanctions. A recently leaked Russian cabinet document report suggests that there is deep concern about brain drain caused by the sanctions. It's been estimated by the Russian government itself that by 2025, 200,000 IT professionals will leave Russia; that there will be an 8% to 11% contraction of the Russia economy within the next 24 months; and that it will take a decade for Russia to recover its economy to pre-war levels.

    So sanctions are working. Sanctions aren't the silver bullet. Like medicine, they take time to work. They need to be sustained. Carving out exceptions for various different Russian entities doesn't work. We need to sustain them in order for them to work. I think Vladimir Putin with his reaction and Dmitry Peskov's reaction demonstrate exactly that: Western sanctions, when unified, are indeed working.

    Thank you, Mr. Kolga.

    Thank you, Mr. Bergeron.

    We'll go now to Ms. McPherson.

    You have two minutes, Ms. McPherson.

    I'm sorry, Mr. Chair. I have two minutes and Mr. Bergeron had four?

    Yes. That was an oversight on my part. I miscalculated insofar as Mr. Bergeron was concerned. My apologies for that.

    It would be all right with me if you miscalculated again; just a heads-up.

    Voices: Oh, oh!

    Ms. Heather McPherson: Thank you. I'll be very, very quick, then.

    I believe all of our witnesses today spoke about the weaponization of energy, but we also have some deep concerns, of course, about the weaponization of food and the impacts that will have around the world; the weaponization of climate; and the weaponization of nuclear power. I am somebody who is very deeply afraid of what we're seeing happening in the nuclear plant in Ukraine. I'm deeply concerned about what we're hearing from the UN observers who are there.

    I'm wondering if I could just very quickly ask all three of our witnesses—perhaps, Mr. Kolga, I can start with you—what Canada can be doing more to help with regard to the grain weaponization and with regard to other aspects like the weaponization of nuclear.

    Thank you for that very important question. You may not like this answer, but I think we need to send more weapons to the Ukrainians, certainly Harpoon missiles, to deter Russian attacks on vessels leaving Odessa with that grain, the grain that is so desperately needed in so many parts of north Africa and Asia.

    Vladimir Putin stated very clearly again this morning that Ukraine is somehow reneging on its deal to export that grain and that the western sanctions are preventing grain from being exported. This is nonsense. Those shipments are being made from Odessa. We need to simply assume, quite frankly, that Vladimir Putin will renege on that deal. He may consider attacking some of those ships or causing some sort of problems. He's already attacked agricultural infrastructure in Odessa after signing that agreement.

    That's one concern. As far as the nuclear blackmail is concerned, which he may very well be engaging in very soon, I think we need to insist that those International Atomic Energy Agency officials remain in Zaporizhzhia and that those numbers are increased to keep an eye on what's going on there, and demand that they have access to areas of that plant where Russia has placed its weapons system.

    That's another thing that Canada could be doing immediately.

     Thank you, Mr. Kolga.

    Would either of our guests from the chamber also be interested in answering that?

    One of the other things that Canada can and should do as a food superpower is to make sure that Canadian agricultural products get to world markets. Given the distances and so forth, they may not necessarily go to one of the most affected regions, but they can easily replace other grain that can then go to countries in North Africa, the Middle East, Asia and elsewhere.

    We need to be able to provide our farmers with the ability and the resources to rapidly and radically increase food production and get those products to world markets when we are clearly facing and will face food shortages.

    Thank you.

    Mr. Schmitt.

    I would say that Canada should continue to lead the charge on increasing sanctions. I will come back to energy and say that other areas that need to increase are ship-to-ship transfer technology sanctions. There is a significant amount of oil transfer that's going on several hundred miles off the coast of Portugal. That needs to end through technology sanctions on firms, which will allow that to happen.

    Of course, coming back to what we're here about today, there is reversing the turbine waiver decision. I have pages of examples from officials, experts and Siemens itself, pointing out that there is no technical rationale. There wasn't before the decision was made and there certainly isn't now. I'll be submitting that to this parliamentary committee for the record.

    This shows exactly that we need to have a technology-guided approach for our foreign policy decision-making, and that's why this decision needs to be reversed as quickly as possible.

    That's an excellent place to end. Thank you very much.

    Thank you, Ms. McPherson.

    You'll be happy to know that your two minutes were stretched to over four minutes, so you're effectively in the same position as Mr. Bergeron.

    Mr. McLean, you have four minutes.

    Thank you, Mr. Chair.

    Mr. Schmitt, you talked about the energy delivery from Russia to Germany. Let's talk about fund flow and the choking back of natural gas delivery. There is one pool of natural gas delivery to foreign entities in the world, and it gets balanced back and forth.

    The pricing of natural gas in Europe now is about 11 times higher than North American benchmark pricing. Russia can afford to cut back summarily its natural gas production and its supply to the world and still benefit economically and use that money to continue the war machine.

    Do you have any comment on the algorithms they must be using in order to maximize their own fund flow here?

    We have to look back at the broader sanctions regime on both oil and gas. When you look at gas, in particular, one of the arguments is that, just like oil, they could just sell this elsewhere, right? Well, no. Gas is not as fungible globally as oil, at least not yet, although there is LNG, which increases its fungibility.

    That's why what Mr. Kolga said is so important. Again, it's another technical driver that's showing proof of what's going on at Portovaya, which is gas flaring. A significant amount of the resource that Russia would be sending through Nord Stream 1 is instead going up and being burned. It is creating all sorts of problems, not only for the localized environment, but for the climate, especially in the Arctic region, where increasing the amount of soot that's going onto the Arctic tundra is changing the albedo of the surface of the Arctic region. It is only increasing—

    If I can interrupt, Mr. Schmitt, that's exactly the case.

    The issue is that Canada, at the same point in time, is not supplying its energy to the world because we've been constrained in production to the point where we're actually getting negative numbers for our natural gas in North American delivery, versus the 11 times the U.S. benchmark that we were receiving.

    Mr. Chair, I'm going to turn the rest of my time over to Mr. Genuis, please.

     Thank you, Mr. Chair; thank you, Mr. McLean, and thank you to the witnesses again.

    Just to avoid further shenanigans and delays, I think it's important to move the following motion. My motion is as follows:

    That motion has been moved; the clerk has it in both official languages and can distribute it to members.

    In light of the fact that it's been a month since the committee met, in light of the last-minute changes we've seen to the agenda, and in light of some of the issues we've had, I think it is important that the committee provide clear direction to the chair, in the form of a discussion on committee business, that programs our path forward. That is why I am moving this motion. It's very reasonable that we would, within seven days, meet, do committee business, and be able to define an agenda so that we don't have some of the things that have happened from the chair's office happening again, and so that we can establish some clarity going forward.

    That's the motion. It's been distributed. Thank you very much.

    If I could just clarify for the members, as is routinely the case with this committee, at the start of the parliamentary session, the subcommittee on agenda, which is composed of members from all parties, actually does have the first meeting, to provide the chair with direction as to where the committee would like to go, and that, of course, would have been the case in this instance as well. I just want to—

    On a point of order, Mr. Chair, I just want to clarify. Are you engaging in debate on my motion or...?

    No. I'm providing clarification.

    Thank you for the clarification. I guess my motion to be debated—

    It seems, Mr. Genuis, you're not familiar with the fundamentals of how this committee has run in the past, and so I thought I would—

    Certainly how it's being run under you, Mr. Chair, I'm not familiar with at all.

    Thank you.

    I just thought I would share that for the benefit of all members.

    Is there anyone else who would like to speak to this?

    Mr. Sidhu.

    Thank you, Mr. Chair.

    Mr. Chair, you have a very valid point there. I believe that ministers and relevant ambassadors have appeared before our committee and have made it clear that while it was a difficult decision, it was one that was necessary to take. As our minister stated, they discussed the matter with all parties, including Ukraine, in advance of the decision being taken. The decision was supported not just by the Germans but also by our allies in the European Union and our allies to the south, the United States, and it in no way reduces our support for Ukraine and, of course, its people.

    I also find it very difficult to believe that had another party been in government and been faced with the clear and urgent request from a close ally such as Germany, it would have decided any other way. Given the circumstances, it was a necessary decision, and I cannot support a motion that would suggest otherwise.

    Thank you, Mr. Chair.

    Would anyone else...?

     Mr. Bergeron.

    Thank you, Mr. Chair.

    First, I am very surprised to see Mr. Sidhu repeat the government's lines as if we haven't had any hearings and we haven't heard from witnesses, and as if the committee has already made a decision on these hearings. I find that not only astonishing, but concerning at the very least.

    In addition, the motion before us from Mr. Genuis seems quite reasonable to me, and it's consistent with the discussions we have had with the chair about having a meeting on future business at the end of this meeting. When we've had that discussion, we will decide together if we are to continue this study. As members of this committee, let's give ourselves the opportunity to discuss what we have heard. Have we heard enough to propose anything to the government? The purpose is not simply to repeat what the ministers told us, as Mr. Sidhu has just done, but to report on what we've heard as part of this study, or, if appropriate, go further in terms of the hearings.

    I therefore find what Mr. Genuis is proposing to be entirely reasonable, and I see no reason why we shouldn't have the opportunity to meet to discuss this committee's future business, as we had discussed with the two vice-chairs and the chair.

    So I am announcing that I will be voting in favour of this motion.

     Thank you, Mr. Bergeron.

    Go ahead, Ms. McPherson.

    Thank you, Mr. Chair.

    I'm wondering whether or not it would be appropriate to let our guests leave while the committee has this discussion. It seems that we asked them to come, they [Technical difficulty—Editor] their schedules and we've made them sit through longer testimony than we had originally planned for.

    Perhaps the next step would be to allow them to depart and thank them very much for their testimony today.

    I think that's a very prudent observation, Ms. McPherson.

    Allow me, on behalf of all of the members of this committee, to thank—

    I have a point of order, Mr. Chair.

    Before we thank our witnesses, doesn't the Liberal Party have one more round? Unless our colleagues in the Liberal Party want to—

    I would have loved to ask some questions.

    Yes, I think we need to keep the government party's turn to speak.

    On the point of order, Mr. Chair, I would suggest that we vote on the motion and then proceed to give the Liberals their round. I'm prepared to vote if others are.

    I understand.

    The next person who would like to speak to the motion is Mr. Zuberi.

    Thanks, Mr. Chair.

    We have all heard the motion. We have it. Thank you, Garnett, for that.

    With respect to next week, I'd like to flag for everybody's attention that we, as the Liberal Party, have our national caucus retreat taking place. I don't know what the schedules are of other parties, but that's our schedule. It would make it hard for us to all participate in a fulsome way.

    That being said, before we vote, we should all consider the schedules of colleagues around the table, no matter what party they're from. I think that we'll all do that in order to move ahead on important business.

    Thank you, Mr. Zuberi.

    Go ahead, Mr. Genuis.

    Thank you, Mr. Chair.

    If we can allow this briefly, Sameer, on what day, or days, is your caucus retreat?

    I think there's a speaking order, so—

    Do you mind just saying the day? That will help us move this forward.

    Yes, Mr. Zuberi. Could you clarify that, please?

    Sure. Next week until Wednesday, we'll be in meetings. People will be travelling from there as of Wednesday, so Thursday will probably also be taken up.

    The full day—

    There is a speaking order.

    I'm sorry. Is it the full day on Monday, Tuesday and Wednesday that you're in meetings?

    Mr. Chair, I don't believe that Mr. Genuis has the floor.

    Sure. We're not in for the full day Wednesday....

    Go ahead, please, Mr. Genuis.

    We also have a caucus retreat...I had the floor, so I'll finish my comment.

    We also have a caucus retreat in the next seven days. I think it would be good for the chair and the clerk, in scheduling this meeting, to take into consideration potential conflicts with caucus retreats. However, a seven-day window is a pretty wide window. We could meet on Friday; we could meet.... Someone could propose an amendment to move it to eight days or nine days, but I'm really sick of the delays. We were sitting on our hands for a full month.

    I think this motion is very reasonable. We should work around caucus schedules, but I somehow highly doubt that any caucus is meeting solidly for the next seven days from dawn until dusk. We can probably find a window that works.

    Go ahead, Madam Bendayan.

    Thank you, Mr. Chair.

    Given that we just heard that amendments will be necessary to this motion, and given that our witnesses are here and that this is a matter we would like to fully flesh out with the witnesses, I move to adjourn debate.

    As I understand it, that adjourns the committee.

    No, it doesn't. It's a dilatory motion and we go to a vote, Mr. Chair, on Ms. Bendayan's motion to adjourn debate.

    Thank you.

    Absolutely. I'm sorry. You have my apologies for that.

    Madam Clerk, we'll go to a vote on this.

     Yes, Mr. Chair.

    The vote will be on adjourning debate on the motion of Garnett Genuis.

    (Motion negatived: nays 6; yeas 5)

    As I understand it, we revert to the motion proposed by Mr. Genuis.

    Mr. Bergeron.

    Mr. Chair, I think our colleague Mr. Zuberi has raised an extremely valid point. Our party will hold a caucus meeting on Wednesday and Thursday, if memory serves. Yes, I think caucus meetings should be taken into account. Therefore, I believe we're going to need to amend Mr. Genuis's motion.

    I move that we write “in the days following”.

    Thank you for that amendment, Mr. Bergeron.

    We will now go to Mr. Zuberi.

    I'm sorry, Mr. Chair, but just on a point of order, there's an amendment on the floor, but I don't quite understand the specific language of that amendment. Maybe there's a translation issue, but just which words are being removed and which words are being added? Could that be clarified?

    Yes. We will ask the clerk to provide us with the specific wording.

    Yes, of course. Mr. Bergeron can correct me because it's his amendment.

    Here's what I understood: “That the committee meet in public within a few days of the adoption of this motion for a discussion of committee business related to the study of the Export of Russian Gazprom Turbines”.

    The motion would therefore be amended by substituting the words “within seven days” with the words “in the days following”.

    Thank you.

    Now we will go to Mr. Zuberi.

    Thank you.

    I'd like to propose a subamendment or whatever the procedure says. Essentially, I like the idea that Mr. Bergeron is mentioning.

    However, I would like us to specify the number of days.

    That is really to pick up on the spirit of what Garnett is mentioning. I would suggest that it be within the next 14 days, given that next week will be taken up by caucus meetings of various parties. That will allow us to keep the intent of Mr. Genuis's motion, which is to have it within seven working days that we actually have free. That's what I would suggest.

    Your subamendment is that it be within 14 days, Mr. Zuberi?

    Yes.

    Does anyone want to speak to this issue? Seeing none, we will put the subamendment to a vote now.

    Madam Clerk, could you, just for clarity's sake, kindly provide the language for the subamendment as well?

    The vote would be on the subamendment, which reads as follows:

    (Subamendment agreed to: yeas 11; nays 0)

    Mr. Chair, I have a point of order.

    To save time, I suspect you'd find unanimous consent to deem the amendment and the motion adopted, rather than have us go through the votes again.

    Is everyone okay with that?

    (Amendment as amended agreed to)

    (Motion as amended agreed to [See Minutes of Proceedings])

    The Chair: Excellent.

    The subamendment has been adopted, so we will be meeting in the next 14 days on that particular note.

    There is only one time slot left to question our witnesses, who have been patiently waiting.

    Ms. Bendayan, you have four minutes.

    Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

    I thank the witnesses very much. I'm sorry to have kept them waiting.

    I'm particularly interested in comments that you made in your testimony, Mr. Schmitt. You talked about the importance of our unity, as allies, in our response to Russia.

    To me, that is fundamental, and I'd like to hear what you have to say about it. In light of recent developments on the political scene, can you talk about how important it is to you that unity be maintained? I'm thinking in particular of what happened in Italy, but also of the discussions that took place earlier this summer in Germany. Mr. Putin is clearly trying to divide us at all costs. He's trying to divide NATO, the European Union and the G7. Can you tell us how important unity among the allies is to you?

    Feel free to answer in English, Mr. Schmitt.

    Thank you, Ms. Bendayan.

    I think your question is absolutely spot-on, and it's incredibly important that we maintain unity.

    Obviously, as I said earlier, the success that Ukraine will need to have in order to win the war and restore full territorial integrity and sovereignty over its territory.... It's paramount that all democracies stand united against Russian aggression, both in Ukraine and in hybrid warfare, whether that aggression is in cyber-attacks, disinformation, propaganda, energy weaponization or using space assets in ways that are concerning to global security.

    What we have to do is make sure that sanctions stay united. When we have these sorts of situations where, over the years, Russia has basically built energy infrastructure and used it to split allies, we have to look at where the unity was on projects like Nord Stream 2. Over the years, all of NATO's eastern flank at one point or another opposed and called for this project to be stopped. The United States—both Democrats and Republicans, both administrations and on Capital Hill—called for this project to be stopped. When I was in my role as European energy security adviser at State, I visited Ottawa in 2018. Global Affairs Canada had also come out as opposed to Nord Stream 2. The United Kingdom and France, at times, have opposed Nord Stream 2, as have a number of countries throughout the Nordic region. Basically, the only countries that supported Nord Stream 2 were Germany, Austria and, of course, Russia.

    When you have examples where the European Parliament, on a nearly unanimous basis, or at least with extreme majorities, on at least three occasions called for this project to be stopped over the years.... For that to continue to go forward and for Germany to pressure the United States to suspend its sanctions and then pressure Canada to suspend its sanctions.... That's a slightly different situation, but in this case, on the Nord Stream 1 turbines, those are the sorts of actions that we need to avoid as global democracies.

    We need to continue to mount as much pressure as possible on the Putin regime, so that democratic norms and sovereignty will be restored in Ukraine. It will become more resilient, going forward, in standing up to authoritarian aggression, whether it comes from Russia, China or elsewhere.

    Merci.

     I have only a few seconds left, Dr. Schmitt.

    It's been reported that Russia acquired attack drones from Iran and now is looking to buy artillery ammunition from North Korea. In the time we have left, can you briefly comment on what this might suggest? Is Russia running out of ammunition?

    This suggests that the technology-calibrated sanctions that have been put in place against dual-use technologies are working. Russia is now having to look to other authoritarian nations—Tehran and Pyongyang, among others—to backfill its military equipment. This is why we need to continue to have this united approach, to maintain sanctions and to not have more sanction waivers. Increasing sanctions on a weekly, if not daily basis has to continue in order to make sure Ukraine succeeds.

    Does it suggest to you that sanctions are working?

    Yes, it absolutely does.

    Thank you, Mr. Chair.

    Thank you very much, Dr. Schmitt and all the witnesses.

    Allow me to thank all of our three witnesses, who have been incredibly gracious with their time, their knowledge and their expertise.

    We obviously started later than had originally been scheduled. We stayed on longer than anyone would have anticipated. Thank you very much. You have certainly provided each member of this committee with a lot of food for thought. Thank you for your time.

    As I understand it, we're going to the budget. Is that correct, Madam Clerk?

    You can do the budget, but you can also do it at the next meeting.

    Mr. Chair, I move the adoption of the budget.

    Is there unanimous consent for that?

    Some hon. members: Agreed.

    The Chair: That has been adopted and it is off the table. Allow me to thank everyone. I'm looking forward to seeing everyone very soon indeed.

    The meeting stands adjourned.