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House of Commons Emblem

Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development


NUMBER 116 
l
1st SESSION 
l
44th PARLIAMENT 

EVIDENCE

Thursday, September 26, 2024

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

(1535)

[English]

    I call the meeting to order.
    Welcome to meeting 116 of the House of Commons Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development.
    Before we begin, I'd like to ask all in-person participants to read the guidelines written on the updated cards on their table.
    Today's meeting is taking place in a hybrid format. All witnesses have completed the required connection tests in advance of the meeting.
    I'd also like to remind all members of the following points. Please wait until I recognize you by name before you speak. Please do raise your hand if you wish to speak, whether you're participating in person or via Zoom.
    Pursuant to Standing Order 108(2), the committee will now commence its study of the current situation in Sudan.
    I'd like to take this opportunity to welcome our three witnesses.
    We're grateful to have with us today Ms. Julie Desloges, the acting director of the international humanitarian assistance division, and Ms. Caroline Delany, the director general of southern and eastern Africa bureau. Last, but certainly not least, we're also very grateful to have Ambassador Jacqueline O'Neill, who is our ambassador for women, peace and security.
    I understand that there will only be one opening statement and it will be by Ms. Delany.
    You have 10 minutes, after which we will open the floor to questions by members. Once we get very close to the 10 minutes, I will be putting up a sign, so you can just kindly start wrapping things up when you see it. That applies not only to your opening remarks, but also to your responses to questions by the members.
    With all of that having been explained, welcome.
    The floor is yours, Ms. Delany.
    Thank you to the committee members for this opportunity to discuss the situation in Sudan.
    While the conflict there may seem very far away from Canada, it has important ramifications for Canadian interests in the world. The scale of human suffering, the significant human rights abuses and the potential for broader destabilization in the region make this conflict an important issue for Canadian engagement.

[Translation]

    I would like to begin by reminding committee members of the sources of the conflict that is wreaking havoc in Sudan.
    Following a military coup in 1989, Omar al‑Bashir seized power. During his 30-year reign, his regime concentrated the vast majority of investment and development efforts in the capital region, to the detriment of the outlying areas.
    This has caused grievances among the population living in regions far from Khartoum. Long-standing subnational conflicts in the south led to the separation of South Sudan. At the same time, a conflict erupted in the early 2000s in Darfur that had a significant impact on the civilian population. The situation prompted the International Criminal Court to issue arrest warrants for crimes against humanity and genocide for Omar al‑Bashir.
    In 2019, Sudanese men and women demonstrated against the ruling regime and demanded that a civilian-led democratic government be formed. The protests brought about the fall of President Omar al‑Bashir's regime. At the time of the revolution, Sudan was a very poor and fragile country that had suffered from underdevelopment and economic mismanagement for decades. Nevertheless, the international community, including Canada, supported a transition to democracy. Unfortunately, in October 2021, the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces, a paramilitary group, joined forces to illegally overthrow Sudan's civilian transitional government.
    After the overthrow, the international community's efforts focused on setting up negotiations between civilian players, political parties, the SAF and the RSF. These efforts gave rise to several months of negotiations between stakeholders to re-establish civilian rule. One of the most controversial issues was the integration of the RSF into the SAF to form a united national army.
    Despite these initiatives, negotiations failed to restore civilian, democratic governance after a military confrontation between the SAF and the RSF began on April 15, 2023. It is not yet clear who started the conflict, but fighting in the capital rapidly intensified and spread to other parts of the country. The conflict began 18 months ago. Over time, the situation has become more complex due to the high number of Sudanese and regional players seeking to protect their interests.
(1540)

[English]

     Let me now address the current conditions in Sudan.
    Efforts at mediation continue but have not yielded results. Fighting continues across Sudan between the Sudanese Armed Forces, the SAF, and the Rapid Support Forces, the RSF, without any signs of abating.
    At the outbreak of the conflict, the SAF quickly relocated government and military operations to Port Sudan on the Red Sea in the eastern part of the country. They maintain control in this region along with the north.
    The RSF have consolidated control over most of the Darfur region and earlier this year began pushing south and east toward SAF territory. The RSF still controls much of the capital city and its surrounding areas, although the SAF have recently reclaimed some parts.
    As a result, the conditions for civilians in Sudan are among the most dire found in any current conflict. Overall, in Sudan, a country with an estimated population of 48.1 million, over 8.3 million people are internally displaced and more than 2.1 million have fled to neighbouring countries. This makes Sudan the world's largest displacement crisis.
     Recent UNICEF estimates also suggest that 17 million children are not in school.
    In August, it was confirmed that famine was present in North Darfur, including in the Zamzam camp for internally displaced people south of the capital, El Fasher. The camp is currently hosting at least 500,000 people who have been displaced from other parts of the country.
    Sudan is facing the worst levels of food insecurity in its history, with more than half of its population, 26.5 million people, suffering from acute hunger.
    Credible reports, including from the UN, have documented widespread violations of international human rights and humanitarian law by all parties to the conflict, including indiscriminate attacks against civilians, ethnically motivated violence and conflict-related sexual violence.

[Translation]

    I will now provide an overview of Canada's response to the crisis.
    Canada continues to work with its partners in a number of areas. First, Canada provides humanitarian and development assistance that meets the needs of the people affected by the conflict. Since January 2024, Canada has provided over $100 million in humanitarian assistance to Sudan and neighbouring countries.
    In addition, Canada has provided $31.5 million in development assistance to Sudan and neighbouring countries for projects aimed at addressing sexual and gender-based violence, as well as for education in emergency situations.
(1545)

[English]

    Second, Canada has maintained a high level of diplomatic engagement on the crisis at different levels and through different fora. For example, Canadian ministers regularly raise the conflict in Sudan in bilateral engagements and with countries in the region as well as in multilateral fora such as at the UN and the G7.
    Further, Canada actively engages on Sudan at the UN Human Rights Council, for example, co-sponsoring the resolution in 2023 that created the independent, international fact-finding mission for Sudan, which is mandated to document violations of international human rights and humanitarian law in the interest of pursuing possible measures for accountability and ending impunity.
    With the temporary suspension of operations of Canada's embassy to Sudan in Khartoum last April, Canada has shifted its engagement on Sudan to our diplomatic mission in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. This includes deploying new personnel dedicated to Sudan last month.

[Translation]

    Third, Minister Joly announced new sanctions under the Special Economic Measures Act in April to address the conflict. Canada has imposed sanctions on six individuals and entities for their direct or indirect involvement in activities undermining peace, security and stability in Sudan, as well as for human rights violations.
    Canada continues to closely monitor the situation in Sudan to identify more targets for future action, if required.

[English]

    Finally, Canada is working actively to support the foundations of any future peace to be inclusive and democratic. Canada recognizes that there can be no durable peace without the meaningful inclusion of civilians, including women and youth, in mediation efforts.
    Canada is also supporting Sudanese civilians and civil society organizations to engage in political dialogue efforts, to mitigate the effects of conflicts on civilians at a local level and to protect human rights defenders and women peace builders.
     Further, Canada's ambassador for women, peace and security, Jacqueline O'Neill, who is with us today, was in Geneva in August to support U.S.-led efforts to include Sudanese women in the current ceasefire talks.
    In conclusion, the situation in Sudan is unlikely to improve in the short term. The longer the fighting lasts, the greater likelihood of increased engagement by other armed groups and by regional players. This is likely to further entrench the conflict and worsen the humanitarian crisis.

[Translation]

    As I said, Canada continues to monitor the situation closely.
    We continue to find openings for Canada to carry out its actions and use the tools available to mitigate the impact of the conflict on civilians and encourage a path toward peace and stability.
    Thank you for your attention.

[English]

     Thank you very much, Ms. Delany.
    We now open it up to questions by members.
    The first member up is MP Chong.
    You have five minutes.

[Translation]

    Thank you to all the witnesses for their testimony. I would also like to thank them for being with us.
    You mentioned that the government has suspended our mission in Khartoum. I have a couple of questions about that.

[English]

    Do we have any consular or diplomatic officials on the ground in Sudan?
    No, we do not.
    Okay. Do we have any locally engaged staff who are still engaged in Sudan, or are they all on suspension as well?
    Mr. Chair, as the member mentioned, we did suspend operations of the mission in Khartoum. We do not employ anyone through that mission now. There are two Canadian staff working out of the embassy in Addis Ababa, and we are in process of hiring locally engaged staff there who will also work on Sudan.
    Thank you. I appreciate that.
    Of the other missions of G7 countries—the United States, the U.K., France, Germany, Italy and Japan—are any presently in operation in Sudan, or are they also all suspended as well?
(1550)
     No, from our like-minded groups, there are no open missions in Sudan.
     Okay. Are those missions of our closest partners and allies also operating out of Ethiopia?
     There are a fair number. There is a critical mass of missions and ambassadors to Sudan who are based in Addis Ababa, which is one of the reasons we decided to do the same—but not all. I don't have a list here.
     That's okay. I just wanted to get a sense of things. Do you have any sense of when our mission in Sudan will recommence?
     No. It's difficult to say at this point. I would say not in the short to medium term.
     Okay.
    The other question I have more broadly is what other assets on the ground does Canada have, not just in Sudan, but in the broader region—military assets, other assets—that could be brought to bear to help, along with our partners and allies, to resolve this crisis?
     Mr. Chair, the question with regard to military assets is outside my remit. I won't be able to answer that, so I would refer you to DND.
    In terms of Canada's approach, Minister Hussen announced in April approximately $130-million worth of Canadian assistance. This is around $100 million in humanitarian aid and $30-million worth of development financing.
    Okay.
    When is that money going to flow, over the course of several years or immediately? What's the time frame on the delivery of those monies?
     The $100 million in humanitarian aid is for this year. The $30 million in development assistance is over multiple years. In 2022-23, all of Canada's international assistance in the country averaged around $60 million. On the bilateral development side, in terms of the program that directly targets Sudan, we spend about $9.5 million a year.
    On the humanitarian assistance that has been allocated for Sudan in the future, can you tell us which entities that will be flowing through?
     Sure.
    I'll turn it over to my colleague, Ms. Desloges.
    We work through experienced partners. Some have been identified that are members. We have a mix of NGO partners, and UN organizations such as the World Food Programme and the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. We also have UNHCR—given the levels of displacement in Sudan—as well as Red Cross partners.
    There was an article in this week's New York Times by Nicholas Kristof about the severe famine that could be taking place in Sudan. Specifically, he mentioned the work the World Food Programme is doing there.
    Can you tell us how much of that money is going to be apportioned for the World Food Programme?
     I would have to return with those specific numbers.
    That would be helpful. Thank you.
    Mr. Chair, those are all my questions. Thanks.
     Thank you very much, Mr. Chong.
    We now go to MP Chatel.

[Translation]

    Thank you, Mr. Chair.
    I would like to welcome our witnesses who have come to talk to us about an absolutely catastrophic situation. Women and children are often the first victims of these horrendous wars.
    Ms. O'Neill, can you tell us about the work you are doing to defend women and improve their extremely precarious situation?
    I'd be happy to talk about that.

[English]

    Certainly. I'd be very happy to share this, and I really thank the committee for focusing on Sudan.
    I can speak very specifically to some of the work that has been going on over the last month or month and a half, as well as the work that many have done over the last 20, 30 or 40 years, unfortunately.
    I'll share what I can. I want to be respectful, of course, of the safety of the women who've been involved in the mediation effort, as it's an extremely dangerous thing to be involved in. I also don't want to betray their confidences and jeopardize their access to future rounds of talks, but there's certainly much we can say.
    I can give a snapshot of the talks that happened in Switzerland, and please cut me off if this is too much context. Very briefly, the U.S. mediation effort gathered people in Sudan. The co-hosts were Switzerland and Saudi Arabia. Observers included the U.A.E., Egypt, the African Union and the UN. The goal was to bring together the two parties, the RSF and the Sudanese Armed Forces, or SAF, and agree on three narrow issues: a ceasefire, increased humanitarian access and monitoring and evaluation mechanisms for an agreement that was reached.
    The SAF did not come to the talks. The mediators kept the invitation open and stayed in virtual contact with them. They said it was contact diplomacy, and there were various other ways to be in touch. Those who stayed in Switzerland ended up focusing primarily on humanitarian issues.
    The U.S. mediator wanted to ensure that Sudanese women, particularly civilian women, were able to influence the process, so my loose counterpart in the U.S., the Ambassador-at-Large for Global Women's Issues at the state department, convened a group of about 15 Sudanese women, including several young women from diverse locations like those representing Darfur, who came to Geneva—not to the exact site of the talks—for multiple weeks, and they had a number of contacts meeting directly with the special envoy and his team, as well as with the broader group.
    The talks unfortunately didn't reach the goal that they intended—specifically, a ceasefire—but there were some specific outcomes that resulted, including the opening of two humanitarian access points to get desperately needed aid into various areas. The women who came together identified shared priorities based around those three narrow talks, and everyone was very specific that this ceasefire negotiation was not meant to replace a broader political and inclusive civilian-led process that has to address the root causes of the issue. It can't just replicate the same power dynamics that led to this conflict in the first place. They provided a lot of very specific points.
    If I have time, in one minute I can share a couple of them. Briefly, they influenced the dynamics and the content of the talks themselves—this has been substantiated publicly by the mediator, and Secretary Blinken of the U.S. made the same comments—and they did so in a couple of ways.
    They spoke very frankly about the immense trauma and horrors of the horrific situation that they're dealing with. They talked about sexual violence. They talked about people they know, because everyone knows someone who has been raped by either the RSF or the SAF, and they really brought a sense of urgency to the talks.
    They talked about the cessation of hostilities, wanting to ensure that sexual violence would be included in any ceasefire agreement as a violation and explicitly named. They talked about the issue of the two armed groups at different checkpoints demanding sex in exchange for passage, access or food, and that being a crisis and a situation that commanders needed to address.
    They asked whether, if humanitarian passages are opened, the corpses of people could be returned through those humanitarian access passageways, because there's so much trauma in communities among people who don't know whether their loved ones are dead or aren't able to give them proper burials. They wanted to include that in talks.
    They tried to ensure that humanitarian assistance, which Canada often supports, includes dignity kits for women with sanitary products and access to various medical services and supplies that they need.
(1555)
     They also talked about future talks and future negotiations. They were very clear that they want to ensure women are directly included, and they got that assurance from all of the groups that were there in the final declaration from all of the actors.
     Thank you for your question.
     Thank you.
     We now go to MP Bergeron. You have five minutes.

[Translation]

    Thank you, Mr. Chair.
    Thank you, witnesses, for your opening remarks and your answers to our questions.
    I think we need to take stock of the catastrophic situation that is unfolding in that part of the world. I note that we have three women with us to enlighten us on what is going on there. That seems particularly fitting to me. Thank you.
    As part of the committee's study on Canada's approach to Africa, members have been informed of the entirely predictable nature of the conflict in Sudan.
    Since the conflict was entirely predictable, what role did the Government of Canada play in trying to prevent it before the violence broke out in April 2023?
(1600)

[English]

     Thank you.
    That's the toughest question, I think.
    Many times, in hindsight, these conflicts were visible in advance. As for the signals they saw coming, it's hard at the time to know exactly what the trigger will be.
    Canada had a mission and a long-standing engagement in Sudan for quite some time prior to this particular conflict. At the time of the revolution, in 2019, we upgraded the chargé d'affaires to an ambassador in recognition of the toppling of al-Bashir, the president who had had control of the country for 30 years, in order to be able to provide support for that transition to a democratic Sudan. That included reopening the development program that had previously been closed in Sudan, as well as working with IFIs to support the institutions in Sudan to be able to reform and respond to the opportunity that was presented with the end of the al-Bashir regime and the introduction of a civilian-led government.
    Unfortunately, what happened subsequently was that the leaders of the RSF and SAF undertook a coup and toppled Prime Minister Hamdok and the civilian-led government, and decided to take power for themselves.
     There was a UN mission there at the time, called UNITAMS. Our ambassador was very closely involved in supporting that mission's efforts—as well as like-minded nations, like the U.S., the U.K. and Norway—engaging with the SAF and RSF and encouraging them to return to a process of a civilian-led government.
    Ultimately, what has proven to be the case is these are two organizations looking to control Sudan themselves that have decided to solve their disputes through military means. As we are discovering through the very challenging mediation process, the opportunities to encourage them to come to a constructive and peaceful solution are really quite limited.

[Translation]

    Yesterday at the United Nations General Assembly, the United States, the European Union, France and Germany also called for an immediate ceasefire and expressed concern about foreign interference in this internal conflict.
    Why did Canada not join those countries in speaking out yesterday?

[English]

     The Government of Canada has issued a number of statements—at least a dozen, if not more—and social media statements, in particular, calling for a ceasefire or—

[Translation]

    I'm sorry to interrupt. I understand very well what you are saying. However, yesterday, a number of countries with which we are usually very closely aligned made a statement.
    Why did Canada not join that statement? Were we involved in the discussions that led to the statement by our allies?

[English]

     I suspect this is the meeting that took place at the UN General Assembly yesterday. I can't comment on specific participation on the part of the Canadian government at that meeting, except to say that the UNGA, the UN General Assembly, has a very charged set of days, and there are often a lot of competing priorities that take our representatives to a lot of different locations.

[Translation]

    Okay.
    Ms. Desloges, you spoke just now about work you have done with UN agencies and NGOs.
    Which NGOs have you worked with specifically?
    I am asking you because, on several occasions, the members of this committee have expressed the wish that our international aid be distributed not only through UN agencies and large NGOs, but also through small and medium-sized non-governmental agencies that often have a better foothold on the ground.
    What about in Sudan?
    Right now we're working with CARE Canada, which is our organization on the ground.

[English]

     I'm sorry, Ms. Desloges, but we're overtime. Perhaps you could spend about 30 seconds responding. Thank you.

[Translation]

    Okay.
    We work with CARE Canada. I just want to mention that the situation in Sudan has been extremely complex from an operational standpoint for smaller organizations. We have continued to support them. We expect that our support may continue to increase, now that there is a slightly more established presence.
    In addition, our partners, even those from UN agencies, are working with local organizations there to support them in the implementation of humanitarian aid.
(1605)

[English]

    Thank you very much.
    We next go to MP McPherson. You have five minutes.
    Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.
    Thank you all for being here. This is such an important study for us to be doing in this committee. I know we have colleagues here and Canadian Sudanese people in the audience who are listening. I know that many are watching online and are deeply concerned about their loved ones, their family members and their friends.
    I guess my very first question is this. In talking about what Canada has done in addressing the failures of the humanitarian visa program for Sudan, so far, if I understand correctly, not a single individual has come through under that program. Not a single person has been able to come, in contrast with the 200,000-plus Ukrainians. I'm just wondering why. Where is the gap there? Could you speak to that at all?
     Mr. Chair, this unfortunately is outside my remit. I would have to refer the question to IRCC.
     Okay.
    Obviously for so many Canadians hoping to get their family out, they see how quickly the response is happening in other jurisdictions and how that is not the case in this one.
    I've also been hearing quite a lot from humanitarians, certainly organizations that are working there that are acknowledging the complexity of the region and the difficulty that we have there. There is also a massive diplomacy gap from their perspective. They've told me about humanitarian access, targeting of civilians, the looting of humanitarian aid and administrative blockages. These are all problems that require a concerted diplomatic effort, and it is unclear to many people in Canada, many people within the humanitarian community, what Canada is doing to make sure those diplomatic efforts are being put forward.
    I'll give you a couple of questions there, and I'll pass it over to you. Knowing that this is potentially the largest humanitarian crisis that is happening, knowing that this is a government that has said we certainly have a feminist international assistance policy, and we've been told there is a feminist foreign policy, can you also tell us how many people are working on this crisis from each department, and how many people have been allocated to this? Knowing the size, knowing the scope, we'd just like to get a sense of the importance that the Canadian government is putting on this crisis.
     Mr. Chair, I can't comment on other government departments, but I can say we've increased our presence in Addis in recognition of the seriousness and the importance of having people in the region who are specifically working on Sudan. We have two Canadian-based staff, CBS, in the region as well, and a locally engaged employee will be hired as well.
    I'm sorry. To clarify, there are two now, and there will be four?
    There are two Canadians who are working there now specifically on Sudan, as well as supported, of course, by other members of that embassy, but they're the two who are dedicated to Sudan. Then one locally engaged staff will be hired as well.
    In terms of here in headquarters, it's difficult for me to give precise numbers, because it's not just individuals. It's often full-time employees who are working, in part, on these files, but there are also folks working in my bureau, in the bilateral relations bureau, in our development team, as well as in our foreign policy team. Our peace and stabilization operations program also works on projects in Sudan, as well as, of course, on humanitarian assistance. Then others work on issues like sanctions, advocacy, policy and communications.
    What I'm hearing is that on the ground there are the two, and two to come, and potentially a number of different part-time roles that are being played within Global Affairs Canada. How would that compare to, say, our response to Ukraine, which is a conflict that is also very complicated and deserves as much attention as possible? What would be the comparison there?
    To ensure there's clarity with regard to the embassy in Ethiopia and the representation on Sudan, it's two Canadians—not two to come. So there are two Canadians and one locally engaged staff to be hired. Then it's outside my remit. I don't have the numbers here with regard to the comparison with other parts of the department.
     Thank you.
    In March, I wrote to Minister Joly, Minister Miller and Minister Hussen about the crisis in Sudan. I flagged a number of things that were very concerning to me about the Canadian response. I did hear back from Minister Miller and I'm grateful for his response. However, I did not ever hear back from Minister Joly or Minister Hussen.
    One of the questions I asked of the government was that it was supposed to be shaming those states that were arming the Sudanese government and the paramilitary forces. They should be working to end the illegal trade in weapons that contributes to the crisis.
    I also participated in a press conference with the Raoul Wallenberg Centre three months ago in which we also raised these concerns about the United Arab Emirates' role.
(1610)
    I'm sorry, Madam McPherson. You're overtime.
    We'll just provide 30 seconds for them to respond, please.
    The government of Canada does call on all actors to respect international human rights and humanitarian law. It encourages all parties in the region and elsewhere to ensure that all actions lead to as swift a resolution of the conflict in Sudan as possible.
     Thank you very much.
    Now we go to the second round, which is also five minutes each.
    We'll go to MP Epp.
    You have five minutes.
    Thank you, Mr. Chair, and thank you to the witnesses for being here.
    Twenty-six and a half million people are facing hunger, along with the other atrocities that we're hearing about. That is certainly sobering.
    I do, however, want to begin with a bit of a different tack. That is more about the Canadians that are in Sudan.
    It's reported that about 1,800 Canadians are in Sudan itself. My information comes from a news report from end of April, so these numbers could be slightly off, but 700 requested assistance to get out.
    The minister was reported to say that she was surprised by the eruption of the crisis, yet that same news report said that Canada was warned for weeks in advance. This was April. Ms. McPherson was just alluding to the fact that she herself was warning and asking our government.
    Why would the government be surprised by the eruption of this conflict, given the seeming warnings in advance?
     Thank you.
    I think what was quite clear about the eruption of this conflict was that it was a surprise to a lot of countries.
    In particular, I can share that I was there about three days before the conflict erupted. I met with the UN special envoy at the time. I met with representatives of the U.K., the U.S., as well as a number of other like-mindeds. No one suggested that a conflict was three days away of the scale of what erupted.
    What's also quite different about this conflict from previous conflicts is that while Sudan is no stranger to violent conflict, it is very unusual to have civil war in the capital. It hasn't been seen before. The eruption in the capital and the threat that it posed as a result to the Canadian embassy, for example, was extremely unusual in the history of Sudan and one that wasn't being predicted on the ground at the time.
     I'll continue with that a little bit.
    The same news report went on to say that Canada and our armed forces did have a relationship through their liaison with the U.S. Africa Command and they were receiving warnings that the situation was becoming dire.
    If I can probe a little bit more, is there a bit of a silo issue between our armed forces and Global Affairs in that those warnings aren't getting through for some of that preparation and some of that pre-positioning of assets?
    If I can follow up on that, do you know how many...?
    My information shows that 170 people of the 700 that requested assistance have been evacuated.
    Do you know what the number would be today?
     I don't have the number here of people who were evacuated. As you know, there was quite a significant lift in the immediate onset of the crisis.
    Canada and other like-mindeds were put in a very difficult situation in April 2023 when the crisis hit. In order to evacuate a significant number of citizens, we worked with like-mindeds and others to get people on planes. Canadians also helped some of the citizens from other countries to be evacuated on Canadian Armed Forces planes as well.
    I don't have the numbers on hand here with regard to the number that have been supported to leave. It's relatively small, but I'm told that our consular officials are in contact with those who have requested support. There are about two dozen active consular cases of all types of Canadians who are still believed to be in Sudan.
    In addition, based on my own experience working on fragile and conflict-affected states, I would say that the things that trigger a violent conflict are very difficult to predict. It's not unusual to be in a situation like we saw in Sudan in 2023 when the events leading up to it are obvious in hindsight, but it's hard to know the exact moment it's going to happen.
(1615)
     While I can appreciate that, our like-mindeds, as you referenced, were able to position their assets in such a way that they could help their citizens. As you said, they were also able to ferry some of our own Canadians out. If the U.S. and other like-mindeds were also surprised, how were they able to get their assets in such a position? My understanding from news reporting is that there were two C-130s in the region as well. Were we not able to secure landing rights?
     I'm just trying to understand why the lag if there was such a surprise that was more widespread.
     I'm afraid I'm not in a position to comment on the positioning of CAF assets.
    Okay. I'll switch gears a little bit.
    Can you talk about the externalities toward the peace process from nations outside of Sudan? The United Arab Emirates and Egypt are alleged to have picked sides. Where are China and Russia and the Wagner group?
    My time is limited, but can you touch on those externalities of the process right now?
    Absolutely.
    Obviously, with regard to Russia, they aren't a positive actor in the country. I think their interests are probably much more for chaos as opposed to stability in the country. Historically, they were quite aligned through Wagner to the RSF. Their interests there were in having access to the gold mines that were controlled by the RSF. Obviously, things have changed quite a bit with regard to Wagner and the death of Prigozhin, but the Russians are still transitioning their approach with respect to using other means to be able to influence and engage with the Government of Sudan. Their interests are particularly in having access to gold in the country and to a port on the Red Sea.
    China's interests are quite a bit different. We assess that they are likely more interested in stability than instability as a result of their significant investments in the oil sector in South Sudan. Only one pipeline runs out of South Sudan, and it runs through Sudan. There have been real issues with the stability of that pipeline as a result of the violent conflict in the country. From the Chinese perspective, the continuation of this war is likely a threat to their access with regard to the oil there.
    For any country in the region, this war is of particular concern. There are significant migration issues related to this, with refugee flows in particular to the Central African Republic, South Sudan and Chad. These create significant challenges for those countries. There are also often ethnic ties that cross borders and that influence the stability or how this particular war plays out in those countries as well.
     Canada's position is very much encouraging all actors to refrain from supporting the belligerents and recognizing that doing so is not in the interest of international human rights law or international humanitarian law.
    Thank you, Mr. Chair.
    Thank you, Mr. Epp.
     We next go to Dr. Fry.
     Dr. Fry, you have five minutes.
    Thank you very much, Chair.
     I want to follow up on some of the questions that were asked earlier by my colleague Sophie.
    It's obvious that we are supporting United Nations Resolution 1325. It's obvious that we're putting our money where our mouth is in some of these meetings. That is helping women. Now, giving women hygiene products is not really a way to deal with women who have been raped and sexually violated. What are we doing to help those women have access to abortion or to sexual and reproductive health products, etc., to help them? I would like to know what we're doing about that.
    Second, it's great to listen to women coming in and talking about what is going on and giving you examples of what's happening, but what are we doing to move forward on the whole Resolution 1325, which is the prevention of conflict, negotiations during conflict and of course post-conflict rebuilding? What are we doing to encourage that and to give women a real say at the table on those issues, not just hear what they are telling you on the sidelines? Are we doing anything about that?
     I'm going to start with the development program and then turn to my colleagues. Certainly the ambassador will have a fair amount to share, and then also Ms. Desloges will have some comments with regard to how we support these issues on the humanitarian side.
    The Government of Canada mobilized $6 million worth of emergency funding in 2023, and the purpose of that was to recognize specifically that there were going to be new challenges that women and children, particularly girls, would face as a result of the onset of the crisis. We decided to allocate this fund specifically to education and emergencies, as well as for the prevention and response to sexual and gender-based violence.
     I can share some of the concrete examples of what that money did. We supported 134 service points—these are mobile clinics as well as safe spaces for women and children—in response to people who are experiencing sexual and gender-based violence: 100,000 people received mental health supports as a result of that funding, and there were 80,000 consultations for sexual and reproductive health. I think these are significant ways of recognizing the unique ways in which women experience conflict, and of mobilizing development funds to respond to that.
    At the same time, of course, women are also very much involved in needing to support their families in the context of this food security crisis, and so one of the things we have done is to adjust the existing food security programming in agriculture to be responsive in areas where it's actually still possible to work, and to create more resilience in communities by ensuring that they can continue to plant, grow and have access to seeds. As we know, a lot of smallholder farmers are women, and so these projects work directly with women to help them be better able to support their families.
(1620)
    I would just like you to elaborate on access to abortion after rape.
    I'm sorry. It's not to you. I am asking Ms. O'Neill.
    I'm not able to speak to that topic.
    You're not able to....
    Are you able to speak to that?
    Abortion is illegal in Sudan, so we do not support those services in countries where they're illegal.
    However, it's not legal in places like Poland, where there are refugees coming from Ukraine, but we are working to ensure that women have access to that, so I don't know why we can't do that in Sudan.
    I am afraid I don't have an answer for that. I can't compare with other countries.
    I can speak, if the chair permits, related to the topic of women being directly at the table. I sense in the member's tone what I also sense from a number of Sudanese women as well, namely, “Enough of listening to us, enough of our being on the sidelines outside the door.” That's very much the tone that every single Sudanese woman brings to any political discussion.
    To be clear, in Switzerland they did meet with all of the parties that were gathered within the group of internationals who were there. They did not meet with the RSF because the SAF did not come. They did not want to be perceived as favouring or meeting with only one side. They did meet with...what table there was. They were not permanent members, however, and they talked about that as something that was deeply frustrating. That's one reason that Canada supported this effort by the U.S. to bring women physically to the location to talk, as much as possible, and to have someone there with a the fancy title of “ambassador”, who somehow helps get closer to the table—that's very much where we were going.
    Perhaps this is also, in part, an answer to the other member's question about whether we are supporting and how we get funds and assistance directly to smaller organizations. Canada has also been funding networks and organizations of women-led civil society organizations in Sudan to focus on prevention, essentially, and to get women involved in all sorts of conflict resolution and mediation at local levels, in local disputes; on training women—although none of them at this point need to be trained—to get access and advocate; and on giving space and opportunity to advocate for themselves. The focus is not just an interesting side story: It's getting to the centre.
     I'm glad to hear that because I think Resolution 1325's very essence is about getting women there...at the table, being part of the prevention and negotiation. I think that's important.
    Dr. Fry, I'm afraid we're out of time.
    We now go to Mr. Bergeron. Mr. Bergeron, you have five minutes.... No, it's two and a half minutes.
     I was about to say, “Yay! Five minutes.”

[Translation]

    Thank you.
    Near the end of an article published last March in Le Monde diplomatique, historian Gérard Prunier asked what I see as an extremely important and relevant question. In his words, “The critical question is: Does Sudan still exist as a state?”
    What do you think is left of the Sudanese state?
    Is there actually a Sudanese state?
    Who are the Canadian government's partners in what is left of the Sudanese state?
(1625)

[English]

     This feels like a complex question, so I don't mind the interruption here. Canada does recognize the state of Sudan. It's obvious that the activity and the situation there has created a significant amount of fragility and there is a real risk of fracturing in the country. At this point, what we're hoping not to see is further destabilization into its constituent parts.
    The RSF and SAF do control parts of the country at this time, but even that border continues to change and move. The longer this goes on, the more difficult it is to see how that resolution will come to pass in terms of recognizing bringing the country back together again.

[Translation]

    In your opinion, what are the basic conditions for ensuring a bit of stability in the country relatively soon?

[English]

     I think we all wish we had the answer to that question. One of the things we really do think is quite fundamental and is one of the areas of advantage in Canada's role is the question of how to engage with civilians and to give civil society and civilian actors an opportunity to influence this. This conflict is really a fight between two militaries who are interested in controlling power, access and the resources they can access in the country. They don't have an interest in having a government that will work for all citizens.
    What is most important is to have ways of working through and supporting civilian actors to be a counterpoint to that and to not look at this conflict as one that needs to be solved by those two belligerents, but actually needs to be solved through the participation of all citizens. That means women, as the ambassador said. It also means youth. This is one of the reasons that Canada is working with civil society actors, in particular on a platform called Taqaddum. This is led by the former prime minister, who was ousted by the two belligerents in this particular conflict in a coup in 2021. Former Prime Minister Hamdok is leading Taqaddum as a broad coalition of civilians to be a counterpoint to these two militaries.
    That is really our view, and it is the process that is going to have the most sustainable outcome. The evidence shows that the broader the participation is in determining the way forward and the more participation you have from women and youth, the greater the likelihood of success.

[Translation]

    Thank you.

[English]

     Thank you. We next go to MP McPherson.
    You have two and a half minutes.
     Thank you for saying those things.
    Based on what we have heard from some of the people on the ground with MSF, which is releasing a report on the number of maternal deaths, it's just horrific what's happening on the ground, particularly to women.
    I am going to go back to the questions I was asking about the United Arab Emirates' role in arming the RSF. Has Canada addressed the serious issue of the U.A.E. arming and financing the RSF and the most recent allegations that it has shipped arms into Sudan under cover of the symbol of the Red Crescent—it is legally protected—which is actually a violation of international humanitarian law?
    We are aware of the reports. Canada continues to work with its regional and international partners to determine how best to engage with the various actors who may have influence over the warring parties to help encourage a cessation of hostilities and a meaningful commitment to mediation efforts.
    On the question of arms exports, we continue to conduct thorough risk assessments of relevant export permits for controlled goods and technologies destined for export with the aim of mitigating the risk of illegal transfer or diversion of Canadian exports to the conflict in Sudan.
     We have a role to play in terms of diplomacy on that as well. Of course, over the years, UN experts, as you will know, have several times flagged the use of the Streit Group for manufacturing armoured vehicles in Darfur in contravention of the UN arms embargo. Under the Arms Trade Treaty, which is the law of Canada, Canada is obliged to take action in the case of brokerage.
    What action is planned in the case of Canadian-owned Streit?
    We'll have to come back to you on that. We don't have specific information on that company.
     It would be great if you could, mostly because we've been raising this issue for many years. The NDP has seen the issues with this for a very long time. Thank you.
    I have one last question for you. When you listed the people who are on the Canada sanctions list, there are six, I understand, from Sudan who are listed. To me, that seems like a very low number, considering what we are seeing happening on the ground in Sudan.
    Is there a plan to include more people on that sanctions list and ensure that it is more comprehensive?
(1630)
     We're always reviewing the options with regard to additional sanctions. These processes have quite rigorous due diligence in considering and evaluating the particular circumstances that might warrant the use of sanctions and, as I mentioned, we'll continue to monitor the situation closely in Sudan.
    One of the things that's most useful in the cases of Sudan is coordination with like-mindeds to ensure effectiveness. We also take into consideration strategic considerations and a staggered approach.
    Thank you.
    We next go to MP Aboultaif.
    You have five minutes, sir.
     Thank you for the five minutes, Chair.
     I speak to my community members, my constituents from the Sudanese community, and one of the issues is the critical humanitarian access inside the country where there is a large number of displaced people as a result of this ugly war. The negotiation in Switzerland led by the U.S. emphasized this issue.
     How successful was that negotiation and did that improve the situation at all?
     Thank you.
    The negotiations in Switzerland were successful in that there was a recognition of an agreement to open border access with regard to humanitarian access, but that was largely the only accomplishment. I think we're fairly disappointed in the absence of an actual ceasefire and the continued fighting, of course, by the belligerents.
    I might turn it over to the ambassador in case she has anything else to add, because she was there.
    Thank you.
    To add a little specificity to that, they got agreement to open two humanitarian supply routes. One is the Adre Crossing, which is on the border with Darfur, between Chad and Darfur, and the other in the Dabbah Road, which gives access to the north and west from Port Sudan. They got guarantees from both parties to secure safe and unhindered humanitarian access.
    I think it's fair to say that parties still have a ways to go in delivering on that commitment, and we've seen both parties hinder the development, or the delivery and access of aid.
    Are you aware of any incidents where people who are supposed to exit to a safe place, or to a place they can find to flee to, were getting killed, or of other trafficking that took place while this is happening?
     I think I'll maybe refer you to the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan. This was started as a result of a resolution by the UN Human Rights Council. Canada was a co-sponsor. It's mandated to monitor and investigate human rights violations and violations of international humanitarian law.
    They released a report in September. The findings and the evidence is significant with regard to the kinds of actions that you're describing. There have been reports of humanitarian workers being killed.
     The report itself found that both SAF and the RSF, and allies, are responsible for large-scale violations, many of which amount to war crimes. This includes things like air strikes, destruction of civilian infrastructure, ethnic-based attacks, rape, SGBV. The list is really quite horrendous in terms of the kinds of violations that they're seeing, including against children in terms of the recruitment of children as child soldiers.
     It goes a little bit farther as well with regard to the RSF, and suggests that there are reasonable grounds to suggest that the RSF and its allies committed war crimes and crimes against humanity.
    Thank you.
    I have a question about the Zamzam camp. Have any of you visited the camp, or have any of the Canadian members of the delegation visited the camp?
    I'm going to turn it over to Ms. Desloges on the Zamzam camp. I have not visited myself and I can't comment on past visits by diplomats.
    I have not visited the Zamzam camp either. I do not have the current number—sorry, the current estimate is that 500,000 people are in the Zamzam camp.
    Is there any Canadian organization you are aware of that is working, or helping that you know of, and has reported anything from that camp?
     I do not. We can look into that, but not not off the top of our—
(1635)
     I'm interested to know what role exactly Canadian organizations have taken in the camp. I visited camps in Cox's Bazar in Bangladesh and about 105 different organizations were there, some Canadian, some, of course, from the rest of the world, so I'm interested to know if there's any idea how many Canadian organizations were on the ground or are still on the ground in the camp.
     I can speak to what we are doing to support people in the camp. WFP, the World Food Programme, is our largest humanitarian partner. They are scaling up right now to respond to over 180,000 people who have not been receiving assistance, or very limited assistance, given the very challenging access situation in that camp.
    Is it safe to assume that Canada's focus in this specific mission is probably food, as famine is a big issue in the camp?
    Answer very briefly, please.
    Yes, food is one of the largest sectors that we support. We also provide support sector activities under water and sanitation, hygiene services, nutrition and shelters. These are all of the largest needs that we are seeing across the country.
    Thank you.
    Thank you very much, Mr. Aboultaif.
    We now turn to MP Oliphant. You have five minutes.
    Thank you, Mr. Chair.
    Thank you to our guests today. Thank you for your work.
    Even though it's been over a year, I would just begin by asking you to express our thanks to members of the mission who were evacuated and who continue to work.
    In those days following the April 15 eruption of hostilities, I was following hour by hour what was happening in the breach of our mission, which was in a convenient place close to the airport. However, it was also in the worst place, being close to the airport. They were very precarious days, and they were very courageous. I hope you pass that on.
    I'm a little less bleak about the future situation than Mr. Bergeron is. I think that my visits to Sudan have shown me the resilience, particularly of the women of Sudan and civil society organizations coming out of al-Bashir's tyranny. I think there was a tremendous resurgence of democratic hopefulness that was a threat to at least two people and their cohorts. I am hopeful.
    I want to follow up a little bit on Mr. Epp's comments and questions, because he was getting to an important part.
    Within the country there are about 10 million displaced people. There are about eight million internally displaced people and about two million refugees. Folks, that's literally the size of half of the countries of our world. Fifty per cent of the countries have more than 10 million and 50% have fewer than 10 million.
    I want to think about the effects on Chad; Central African Republic; Ethiopia in particular; and a little bit on South Sudan, with family connections. I wonder what our capacity is to help the migrating people.
     I've been to Al-Fāshir. It's not going to be easy to get in there with aid, because conflict continues. Four hours ago there was a major set of attacks in Sudan with the SAF coming back against the RSF.
    What about the other countries? Where are we at, and how can Canadians help?
    Yes, the situation in the neighbouring countries is quite severe. The largest recipients with regard to refugees across the borders are the Central African Republic, Chad and South Sudan.
    One of the challenges for South Sudan is that there were a significant number of South Sudanese, who were living in Sudan, and so in fact it's people who are returning. In all of these cases, what we're also seeing is that the level of resilience of the people who are coming across the border is not as high as we would like to see with people migrating in this fashion. If you look at the folks returning to South Sudan, you see they often don't have homes to go home to. They've been gone for many decades. They might be the descendants of people who were refugees across the border during the conflict in South Sudan.
    What we're seeing in all three of those countries is that the ability of host governments and the international community to be able to support them is really severely constrained.
    I'll turn it over to my colleague to talk a little bit about the humanitarian response, but I will indicate the level of seriousness that exists there in terms of the number of displaced individuals and the capacity to support them.
(1640)
     We are providing assistance across the region in all of the countries that we have mentioned. As a reminder, these countries are experiencing their own pre-existing humanitarian crises with very vulnerable populations.
    People are arriving from Sudan in these border areas that are extremely difficult to access. It is the rainy season as well. On top of everything right now, there's flooding across the region. Beyond the conflict, the number of people arriving is very challenging for humanitarian partners to access, but they are delivering assistance. We are supporting several partners, whether in Chad, South Sudan or in Ethiopia in these border regions.
    As I mentioned, some of the concerns that we are seeing involve the logistics, but also the increased cost this is causing in a context of very limited funding overall for partners. There is the spread of communicable diseases as well in these not always the most salubrious situations for folks to be in.
     Sudan is an exporter of food or has been an exporter of food. Do you know where most of the food that it exports goes?
    Answer very briefly, please.
    I do not.
    Thank you.
    We now go to the third round.
     For the third round, it's four minutes for the Liberals and the Conservatives, and two minutes for the Bloc and the NDP.
    We'll start off with MP Epp.
     Thank you.
    It's the fourth round, but who's counting?
    Madam Delany, in your opening round, you talked about and used the term meaningful peace.
    Can you expand on that?
     I think I'll also be turning that over to my colleague, the ambassador.
     I think a meaningful peace is one that is a peace for everybody. It's a positive peace. It's a peace in which everyone has the opportunity to participate in the decisions that their government and their country are making. It's where services are provided to everyone. It's where, no matter where they live, what their gender is or what their ethnicity is, they have the opportunity to participate in the governance of their country and to access services.
    That has not been the case in many decades, or ever, in Sudan. First, it was a result of the approach that President Bashir took during his time, where he really concentrated the benefits of the resources in the centre, in Khartoum, and neglected the periphery. We saw the results there with regard to the civil war with South Sudan and then later with Darfur, and the ultimate decision on the part of the South Sudanese, through a referendum, to separate from the country.
    If I understand correctly, you're talking about an internal process.
    Is there an external party that could be a peace broker, like the AU or something along those lines, which is respected by all those parties?
     The challenge in this context is that there are a number of different avenues through which it might be possible to broker a peace and there are many different actors.
    The African Union is involved. They have hosted events, including with civilians, in order to discuss what a peace might look like in the country.
    Then we have also regional actors like Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia hosted talks with the U.S. in Jeddah in the initial months of the conflict to try to come to an agreement between the RSF and the SAF.
    We saw also the most recent Geneva talks hosted by Switzerland and led by the Americans, with participation from Saudi Arabia as well.
     Thank you.
    I'm going to turn the rest of my time over to my colleague, Ziad.
    Thank you, colleague.
    I did ask a question about the exact role or the most significant role of the Canadian government or Canadian organizations. I mean, you're not going to give us answers now, but if possible, if we can get an answer in writing from you, that would be very helpful to the committee.
    For my next question, over 18,800 people were killed since August 2023 in Sudan, based on reports we have. It seems like it's going in all different directions. It's not just between the people that the army is fighting. It's beyond.... Civilians, children and women are victims and are the ones paying the highest price.
    Does the Canadian government believe that crimes and crimes against humanity have been committed in Sudan?
     Yes, we do.
    What are we doing? Is this against individuals or organizations or both?
    As Canada, how are we approaching this?
    Going back a little, I want to underscore the support that Canada is providing to the civilian platform, Taqaddum. This is one of the broadest coalitions of civilian actors in Sudan. Of the participants at the founding conference that took place recently in Addis, 40% were women and a similar number were youth.
    In terms of a Canadian role and finding a way forward, we are working through this option of supporting civilian voices to be a counterpoint to the belligerence.
    In terms of the advocacy we're undertaking, Canada was one of the co-sponsors of the resolution of the fact-finding mission that has gathered the evidence and suggests that there have been war crimes and crimes against humanity.
(1645)
    Am I done, Mr. Chair?
     You have four minutes, MP McKay.
     What's the geopolitical significance of this conflict?
    On the geopolitical significance of this conflict, I would say a couple of things.
    First is its location in north Africa. It's a region that experiences its own instability for a variety of reasons. Another country experiencing this kind of de-stabilizing effect has the potential for it to spill over into its neighbours, which are often experiencing their own challenges with regard to resilience.
    What happens then, of course, is that these mass movements of individuals create significant humanitarian concerns and significant migrant issues. I think our like-minded countries in Europe might be quite concerned about migration issues into Europe.
    Further, any ungoverned spaces are bad for countries like Canada. Ungoverned spaces are places where terrorists and criminals can thrive. What we're seeing in Sudan is a vast area with no effective government.
    From the continuation of this conflict?
    It's difficult for me to handle an answer because very few people, I think, benefit from the continuation of this conflict.
     Well, Mr. Epp was raising the question of Chinese and Russian involvement. It seems to me, just based on your answer, that the Chinese would benefit from stability and that the Russians would benefit from instability. Is that fair? Is that a fair analysis?
     Yes, the analysis that I offered was of Russia's interest, and the way that they've been operating is one that foments chaos. They have their own interests. For example, they very much want and are engaged in discussions to have access to a port on the Red Sea. They want access to the gold in the country. Oftentimes a degree of instability can create those opportunities, particularly with regard to access to gold in the country.
     Is there a difference between Russia as a state and the Wagner group, or is the Wagner group the sole operator there?
     There's only a certain amount that I'll be able to talk about in this venue, but there is a difference. There's also a significant difference with regard to how Wagner can or can't operate now. There's been a real shift since the death of Prigozhin with the movement of the Russian ministry of defence to take over much more control with respect to how these private military contractors work.
    I don't understand why you'd be limited to talk in this venue about the changes in Russian attitude in Sudan.
    It's just in terms of what we can discuss in an open setting like this.
    Certainly at this point, Russia's engagement is more driven by the government as opposed to Wagner.
    Is there a conflict between Russia and China over port access?
    I can't comment on that. It's not something I know enough about to be able to speculate in this venue.
     My friend Mr. Oliphant was talking about the export of food, and an extraordinary amount of food seems to go to the UAE, I assume to the detriment of the people of Sudan. Is the UAE a beneficiary of this conflict?
     Answer very briefly, please.
     I can't comment on the export. That's not information that I have. As I mentioned earlier, I am not aware of where food exports go from Sudan.
    Thank you.
     Mr. Bergeron, you have two minutes.

[Translation]

    Thank you, Mr. Chair.
    Ms. Delany, on a number of occasions, you have told us that several countries have chosen to set up their mission for Sudan in Ethiopia, which is also home to the African Union headquarters. The AU has called for an immediate end to the fighting and has said it is concerned about the security situation in the Sudanese provinces.
    In Canada's view, what role can the African Union play in resolving this conflict?
(1650)

[English]

     As the members are likely aware, Canada now has a representative to the African Union, in recognition of the significant and important role that the African Union plays on the continent, including in peace and security. The challenge in Sudan, though, is that there are so many actors who are seeking ways forward with these particular belligerents and others in terms of a ceasefire.
    Canada does support the African Union efforts at supporting dialogue, particularly ones that they've hosted where they are broad and inclusive with regard to civilian actors; but, like the other parties there, they are also having trouble finding a way forward.

[Translation]

    Given that there is no shortage of challenging situations in Africa, what could help the African Union play a more active and effective role, one that is likely to be more successful?

[English]

     I wish I had it on hand, and maybe we can submit something in writing on how Canada engages with the African Union on peace and security, because there is quite direct engagement and support for their capacity, including to engage in mediation and other activities.
    On this particular issue, we have engaged, we've asked and we've offered Canadian support, so they know that we're there if they need it. We can come back to you in writing on how we engage with them more generally on peace and security.

[Translation]

    Thank you, Ms. Delany.
    Thank you, Mr. Chair.

[English]

     Thank you, Mr. Bergeron.
    Madam McPherson, you have two minutes.
     Thank you very much.
    This is a question for you, Ambassador. I'd like to go back to the report we saw from MSF, which states:
This is a crisis unlike any other I have seen in my career. Multiple health emergencies are happening simultaneously with almost no international response from the UN and others. Newborn babies, pregnant women, and new mothers are dying in shocking numbers. And so many of these deaths are due to preventable conditions, but almost everything has broken down.
    They further say that for this crisis to be addressed, the United Nations “must act decisively” and “must accelerate” the return of staff. As well, more resources must be made available.
    What other things can we do to alleviate this crisis that is clearly targeting women, Ambassador?
     Thank you for that. I read the same report. I think it said that the majority of deaths were caused by sepsis, which is exceptionally preventable in both newborns and their mothers.
    We need more money committed overall. This was a core appeal from everyone who was around the table in Switzerland and who had been advocating for this for a long time. We talked about Canada fulfilling its commitments made at the Paris conference, effectively a pledging and donor conference. Many of those commitments have not been delivered upon. Many people talk about the importance of encouraging all our partners to deliver on the commitments they have made and to increase the commitments they have made.
    Ultimately, the full addressing of the issue requires peace. There's only a degree to which even increased UN presence in supplies can be functional without a functioning or stable health care system, and with no regular aerial attacks on those delivering assistance. It's about continuing to pressure parties to the talks and pressure humanitarian pause, access or anything that will enable the service itself to get delivered.
    And increased resources, of course.
    Always; always.
    That's my two minutes.
    Thank you, Madam McPherson.
    We now go to Mr. Chong.
    Mr. Chong, you have three minutes.
     Thank you.
    Often in these conflicts, what fuels the conflict is the ability to get U.S. dollars. One of Sudan's top exports, as mentioned, is agriculture and oilseeds, but the top export is gold. Gold exports have not diminished at all throughout this conflict. Our understanding is that a lot of that ends up getting smuggled out of the country. I'm sure it's in return for U.S. dollars. That in turn fuels the purchase of military kit and equipment.
    What is the Government of Canada doing to ensure that none of those illicit proceeds are being laundered through our financial system? I ask that in the context of the recent $3-billion provision that TD Bank has set aside and the recent resignation of the TD Bank CEO in light of money-laundering operations that have been conducted through the bank in the United States. There were FINTRAC fines levelled against big Canadian banks late last year and early this year for failing to comply with anti-money laundering legislation. Other fines have been levied against Canadian banks by the U.S. authorities.
    What are we doing to ensure that no monies are being laundered through our financial system with respect to what's happening in Sudan?
(1655)
    Mr. Chair, I think the comments about the challenge of the export of gold and the degree to which it funds the two belligerents in this are really pertinent. It's a real and significant challenge for the international community, with Canada being part of that, to tackle this in terms of finding a way to cut off the financing to these belligerents and their ability to buy weapons.
    Unfortunately, I can't comment on how our financial institutions can prevent that. We can look into it and see if there's a way to come back in writing, but it is somewhat outside my remit.
     I ask it because the minister imposed sanctions, I believe earlier this year, on individuals and entities in Sudan. The enforcement of those sanctions is now important. The federal government is in the process of implementing a beneficial ownership registry for federally incorporated entities under the Canada Business Corporations Act. It's undertaking other measures to combat money laundering.
    I'm curious to know what GAC's role is in all of this, as the lead on sanctions. Sanctions enforcement is to prevent any illicit monies going through our system that fuel conflicts like the one in Sudan.
     Answer very briefly, please.
    The member makes a good point, which is we do have a role in determining sanctions. In terms of the six sanctions that were announced, several of them are organizations that are known for having logistical operations, links to gold, exports and financing networks for the RSF and the SAF.
    Thank you.
     We next go to MP Chatel.
    You have three minutes.

[Translation]

    Thank you, Mr. Chair.
    The United Nations is proposing a number of avenues and actions. It is trying to engage the international community, whether in terms of a ceasefire, access to humanitarian aid, negotiations or the protection of civilians. I think it has suggested that the African Union and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, among others, should play a role and be more involved. There's also, of course, the matter of supporting a democratic transition.
    Can you tell us more about the concrete measures the UN is taking to restore peace? The situation is clearly catastrophic. Agencies can deliver humanitarian aid and try to protect civilians from the heinous crimes being committed, but at the end of the day, peace must be restored in a sustainable way.
    Can you tell us a little more about what the UN is doing in this regard and how Canada could support these measures?

[English]

    This is a really good question and one of the biggest challenges with regards to how we and others engage in Sudan. The context there is one of the most difficult ones we're facing. This is perhaps why it's difficult to articulate solutions.
    What we see here are two belligerents using food as a weapon of war. The room to navigate here is pretty limited. That doesn't mean there aren't things we can do or things we can support the UN in doing. There is significant advocacy undertaken by Canada and like-minded states in the UN calling on the two belligerents to adhere to human rights law and international humanitarian law. As we've seen, there have been negotiations, including putting pressure on the two sides to ensure humanitarian access and to do things like open the border with Chad, which is a staging ground for the humanitarian response.
    As we have discussed, funding is a huge part of this. Certainly, Canada, in terms of our announcement of $100 million in funding this year to the humanitarian response, is providing a portion of that response.
    Then, of course, on our side, we are ensuring that response is as inclusive as it possibly can be in terms of reaching the poorest and most vulnerable, and we are calling out the belligerents for the actions they are undertaking and the degree to which they're using food as a weapon of war and restricting access to humanitarian assistance for their own interests and military gain.
(1700)
    That's your time, MP Chatel.
    That concludes questions from members. I would like to ask a couple of follow-up questions.
     First, thank you very much, Ms. Delany, for undertaking to follow up in writing on a few of the questions that the members asked.
     It is very disappointing to hear that no Sudanese have come here despite the fact that there is a family reunification program. I was looking in The Globe and Mail in February 2024, and there was a headline that said, “Canada prepares to welcome thousands of Sudanese”, but we heard that none have arrived under the family reunification program. I appreciate full well this is not in your remit, but if we could have some follow-up information as to what the challenges have been for the immigration department, if you could kindly liaise with them, that would be very much welcome.
     My second question is for any of the witnesses. We heard about a number of different issues. I understand that cholera is a big challenge in Sudan as well, but it did not come up in any of the responses. Is there anything that Canada can do on that particular front? Could someone tell me if there is any initiative afoot for Canada to respond to cholera in Sudan?
     Absolutely. Mr. Chair, on the question of the humanitarian visa program, I didn't speak to it at all. I don't have any information on it, so I can't comment on it. We will engage with it and ensure that IRCC has an opportunity to engage on that issue.
    You're right; we didn't bring up cholera. We also didn't bring up malaria. It's the rainy season in Sudan. There are increased cases of cholera and malaria as a result. We also, of course, know that it is the most vulnerable, in particular children, who are most affected by these diseases, and the degree to which health facilities and hospitals have been targeted in this conflict is significant. I think the numbers are quite staggering with regard to the destruction that has been seen.
    It's one of the comments that I maybe didn't make as explicitly as I could have. What also marks this conflict as being a bit different from what we've seen in other places or in Sudan before is the really significant degree of intent of the belligerents to destroy infrastructure, and we've seen that in the health sector as well.
    I'll check to see if Ms. Desloges has anything to add on the humanitarian side.
    We can certainly add from the humanitarian perspective, because the challenges are so numerous. Cholera did not come up, but it is also on our minds. It is a major concern in the context of the displacement and the crowded areas that we see. The biggest needs to responding to cholera are water, sanitation and hygiene programming as well as health services. As Ms. Delaney said, the health infrastructure in Sudan has been severely damaged.
    Through our ongoing funding, we do support the health sector via the International Committee of the Red Cross. We are also supporting water and sanitation programming, and one of the funds that we support in Sudan is the Sudan Humanitarian Fund that is managed by OCHA. It helps to pre-position funding for these kinds of outbreaks and emerging needs so that, when there's a cholera outbreak, they can work with local organizations, and they can work with international organizations to get funding out rapidly to address it. We have funding in place for this.
    Ambassador O'Neill, you have the floor.
     Very briefly, there are a lot of things we didn't have time to talk to. One that is extremely important and that is unique to this conflict is the extent to which online disinformation is playing a key role. This is one of the conflicts that I've seen that has both the most attempts at transparency by mediators of all types and also the greatest amount of disinformation, including hate speech, by a range of actors. I would not be surprised if many of the countries that we mentioned have connections today. There's a dramatic amount of online hate speech and disinformation that is set to disrupt talks, so getting out proactive information and clear information is extremely important.
    This is the first round of talks that I know of that has been undertaken when there's generative artificial intelligence, for example, and we're already seeing fake videos, fabricated accounts of attacks, massacres, etc. I think as parliamentarians and as people watching this, we have to be exceptionally aware of the amount of disinformation that is circulating around this conflict and the complexity of managing it, primarily for the Sudanese people.
(1705)
    Thank you very much for that.
    We're very grateful for this briefing. Ms. Delaney, Ms. Desloges and Ambassador O'Neill, I should say that we're all very grateful because, as you will recall, the last unanimous consent motion that we adopted the day we adjourned for the summer was on the situation in Sudan. I can assure you that this is of grave concern to every member of this committee. Thank you very much for all your efforts and for being here with us today.
    Before we go in camera for committee business, I'll just suspend for three minutes to allow us to send out a link.
    Thank you.
    [Proceedings continue in camera]
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