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Thank you, honourable Chair and honourable members of the committee. Thank you for the opportunity to address you today.
I'm addressing you from Kyiv, Ukraine, where just an hour ago there was another alarm. Sirens were loud in many regions of the country. Today we faced a big cyber-attack on the biggest mobile operator. That's why millions of people in the country have no access to their cell phones and no Internet connection. As I will brief you today, Russia's attacks are not only on the battlefield. It is a hybrid war, a propaganda war. There are also cyber-attacks on critical infrastructure.
According to the general staff of our armed forces, the Russian Federation continues to wage a war of aggression despite significant losses. From the beginning of the full-scale Russian invasion up to today, Russia has already lost over 339,000 personnel, 5,600 tanks, 10,500 APVs, 8,000 artillery systems, 324 aircraft, 324 helicopters, 6,000 UAVs and 1,500 cruise missiles, but this does not stop Russia from continuing the war.
Today, the heaviest fights are in the east, near Avdiivka, near Lyman and near Kupyansk.
Despite the heavy losses and the average losses of Russian troops—in one day in November losses exceeded 800 people—Russia continues to use the tactics they used near Bakhmut, just throwing people into the fight and not taking into account the losses.
Also, Russia continues to attack critical infrastructure. Just yesterday, eight ballistic missiles were launched by Russia over the Kyiv region. Thank you, Canada, for providing us with air defence systems. All of these eight ballistic missiles were intercepted.
In the night of December 11, Russia also launched 18 Shahed drones, trying to use the same strategy it did last winter, attacking critical infrastructure and trying to deprive people of electricity and mobile connection. With the level of the UAVs Russia is using, it has now launched over 3,000 Shahed-type drones over Ukrainian critical infrastructure, 300 cruise missiles, 23 ballistic missiles and, just for Kyiv, 400 Shahed drones.
We see that Russia does not stop its attempts. As we understand it and as we estimate, Putin wants, for his own propaganda inside the country, to show any small achievements, so Russia is putting in enormous efforts and suffering huge losses trying to claim either some small community or some metres of steps forward. It does not count any losses, either of equipment or of personnel.
We are holding the line. In some regions, we are advancing. Of course, it requires artillery, artillery shells, air defence systems and armoured vehicles. I would like to thank Canada for being a partner in all of the major coalitions that we've had, together with our partners. Today we have 54 countries that are members of the so-called Ramstein coordination platform, with all of the NATO countries plus non-NATO countries.
I would like to thank you for all of the military support that Canada has provided for the training of Ukrainian soldiers. It's crucially important.
For us now, the top five priority needs for Ukraine as we move to winter air defence are, first of all, to protect civilian objects and to protect the cities.
Ammunition is needed on a big scale, and ammunition is something that we need on a daily basis. This is one of the top five priorities for us.
Armoured vehicles...we thank Canada for announcing its support in the form of the further supply of armoured vehicles. We really appreciate that they can be sent to Ukraine and delivered in the near future.
Another important thing for us is the UAVs, because now, on the front lines, a lot of UAVs, as well as the electronic warfare system to protect our soldiers and our army on the front lines against the Russian UAVs.... The new system of electronic warfare is a high priority.
What we're also doing on our side is putting a lot of attention into the strengthening of the Ukrainian defence sector. On September 29, we launched in Kyiv a big defence capability forum, in which 250 major players from countries all over the world participated. We are now building partnerships with the defence sector companies of Ukraine and our partners, including Canada, and we look forward to these partnerships being one of the ways to build defence capabilities and defence production with those companies in Ukraine.
Thank you for having me. I will be ready to answer all of your questions.
Indeed, the top priorities that I've mentioned are the ones that we are also discussing with the Canadian government. Of course, these are the armoured vehicles, artillery shells, drones and the electronic warfare system.
Also very important, and part of the support that we are really grateful for, are the training programs. We appreciate the training programs that we have, and their continuation, because they also help us put those new conscripts.... Specifically, when we are talking about medical evacuation personnel, demining and engineering, all of this training is of importance. It will also be important to continue the Operation Unifier program and the training for the future.
Ambassador, welcome to the committee. Our thoughts and prayers are with you, your family and everyone who is in harm's way where you are this evening.
My first question is around Russia. You mentioned Russia's propaganda efforts in your opening statement. Of course, they continue to spread disinformation, not just in Russia, but in all parts of Ukraine. That disinformation has now, obviously, been spread to different parts of the world to try to undermine support for Ukraine and its people in its war effort.
It's working in some sectors, not just with the general population, but with governments. We're seeing that right now. I'm watching very closely your president's visit to the U.S. and his efforts to try to get at some of the conservative Republican members who seem to have bought into that misinformation and disinformation that Russia is spreading across the world.
What can parliamentarians do and what can the Government of Canada do to assist in your efforts to combat that disinformation that's being spread by Putin?
Indeed, the Russian war machine is conducting numerous disinformation campaigns. Just for example, I will tell you about one that we recently saw in Ukraine. There was special messaging, especially through social media, addressed to Ukrainian soldiers to just put away their arms and go on the Russian side. They are specifically able to target people. Of course, it failed, but the Russian disinformation is spreading the word in Ukraine to disunite people, to spread fatigue, and we also see it in many countries and in our partners.
They especially use social media. They use these so-called “trolls”, so numerous thousands of accounts are spreading this disinformation and sharing this Russian narrative just to disunite people, to bring war fatigue and to try to undermine support for Ukraine.
I believe Russia understands that, first of all, they already failed with their so-called “special operation”. The only way that Russia can somehow at least hold the line and not be kicked out of Ukraine is to try to decrease support for Ukraine. That's why they are conducting these disinformation campaigns in all the countries and among our partners.
However, you need to also realize that in parallel, Russia just adopted a new budget for 2024. They have record-high defence spending, which increased from the previous year by 30%. Around 39% of all the budget spending in Russia for the next year will go to the military, the defence sector and law enforcement. Russia is putting in huge, huge amounts of money for its defence and law enforcement, over approximately $200 billion Canadian.
In parallel, if they use this disinformation, what we all can do is spread the message of unity. All the steps to support Ukraine, all of the statements, are now very important for the people of Ukraine, because for them, understanding that there is strong backing for Ukraine from our partners is important. It is also to explain to people that in Ukraine, we are not only fighting for our territory but also protecting the eastern flank of NATO. The security of Canada and all of the NATO alliance is on its unity and collective security. We are now protecting one of the borders of NATO.
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Indeed, Russia is trying to use some intermediaries, meaning companies or neighbouring countries, to circumvent the sanctions. We have already seen several cases, and I would say more. Even today, the U.S. government imposed sanctions, including on the companies that were engaged in circumventing the sanctions. These controls need to be strengthened. I think it's in all our interests that defence technologies are not being transferred to Russia. Russia's ability to produce more weapons needs to be reduced.
There are still loopholes. First of all, proper investigations need to be done on cases of reported sanctions circumventions, and there needs to be specific work on looking at the companies that served as intermediaries. Depending on where those companies are, if they're in third countries, they also need to be exposed to sanctions for specific actions supporting Russia's getting those technologies that are not in line with the sanctions legislation and regulation.
In terms of specific actions, I would also like to mention the important decision of the Canadian government to be the first to impose restrictions on Russian-produced diamonds and jewellery products. Russia is the biggest producer of diamonds in the world, and that part of Russian exports significantly fuelled the Russian economy and its ability to wage the war.
The third thing is, if we come back to Russia's military budget for the next year, Russia is still predicting an increase in revenues in the year 2024, and one of the biggest increases forecasted is additional revenue from oil exports. There are many tools for working on that, but I think joint efforts need to be made to decrease Russia's ability to fuel the war from its oil and gas revenues.
Canada and 11 other countries are the members of, as we call it, the fighter jets coalition, which is the coordination group working together on helping us with our needs in terms of building our capability in the air. As you see, since February 24, 2022, Ukraine does not have superiority in the air. For our ground forces to quickly move further to liberate territories, as many other NATO countries would do according to military tactics, they need support from the air. The transfer to Ukraine of the F-16 fighter jets will be important to secure air superiority or air control and air support for the ground troops.
Of course, it requires training the top pilots, which is going on. I think I'm not able to share publicly many of the details, but as the Canadian ministry of defence, as a general staff that's a member of this capability, a member of the fighter jets coalition, there are discussions between all of the members of the coalition on what could be supported—of course, the training and many other things including the fighter jet itself. We know that we have political signals from our partners that they are ready to provide us and transfer F-16 fighter jets to Ukraine as soon as our pilots and infrastructure are ready.
We are making a lot of effort to make it quicker.
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Indeed, the damage to the economy is huge. Last year the Ukrainian economy shrank 30%, and the World Bank estimated that the needed funds for recovery would exceed $400 billion. Each day, as Russia launches missiles and drones, there is damage to both the critical infrastructure and the housing. Lots of people have moved from the eastern regions closer to the front line, to Kyiv and to the other cities, but many of them are living in temporary shelters for residents who have lost their homes.
We all understand that the amount of financing that will be needed for rebuilding is huge. That's why one important pillar or source of this funding is the Russian sovereign assets that are frozen in many western democracies.
I would like to thank you for supporting the legislation, as Canada was the first to introduce legislation for the seizure of Russian assets. The procedure of the seizure of Russian sovereign assets could also be expedited, so that they can also be one of the ways to finance post-war rebuilding.
Also, as I am here in Kyiv and talking with many people, including business associations, many of the Ukrainian companies and foreign companies that never moved from Ukraine even during the wartime continue to invest in Ukraine. They continue to work there. They continue to enlarge, build new facilities, move their facilities from the eastern regions to the western regions.
First, Ukrainian companies are continuing to work. In the post-war recovery, of course, we will need more technology, more equipment for that rebuilding, and we would—
Ambassador, thank you for appearing today. I hope that you're staying safe, knowing how dangerous things can be even in Kyiv. Pat and I have been there and heard the air sirens and seen the damage that has been done in the city, never mind outside the city.
First of all, on behalf of the Conservatives, we thank all those Ukrainian heroes who originally took to the streets of the Maidan, and then went to the front line in Donbas, and who now are fighting for the very existence of Ukraine and, as you said, are protecting Canadians here at home as you deal with the Russian invasion and protecting NATO's eastern flank.
Conservatives support Ukraine. We support Operation Unifier. We started Operation Unifier. We support the delivery of weapons and military kit. We started that process back in 2015. We've been calling for the government to send lethal weapons since 2018, which didn't happen until the hot war and full-scale invasion happened in 2022. We know there's probably more that we can do, including providing more munitions, more sniper rifles, made right here in Canada, both by Colt and by PGW in Winnipeg.
I know both organizations have already supplied sniper rifles and machine guns. We also know that we have surplus kit here that we can use. I know Ukraine is getting armoured ambulances from Canada that are being built at GDLS in London, but that will be done after the Canadian armoured ambulances are finished off and supplied to the Canadian Armed Forces. This means that our existing fleet of armoured ambulances, which are LAVs that are still in running condition, should be donated to Ukraine.
Would you agree that that would be a welcome donation to support the Ukrainian armed forces?
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Ambassador Kovaliv, it's very nice to see you again. I wish it were under better circumstances for you. The conditions you're experiencing in Kyiv right now are bringing the war into very strong focus for us all here. It's wonderful to have you today. Please do us the great favour of staying safe.
Ambassador, we know, and you've in fact referenced, that the sale of Russian oil is helping to fund the Russian war machine. You and I have spoken before, on various occasions, including at the Halifax International Security Forum, about Canada's readiness to provide and even export renewable energy options into Europe to help Europe get off Russian oil.
I want to declare that Canada is absolutely committed to working with our European partners and the Ukraine to achieve our shared goals on energy security. So far, this has included the Canada-Germany and Canada-EU hydrogen alliance. It's included Bill , which will modernize the Atlantic accords to allow the development of offshore green hydrogen for export to Europe and to Ukraine. There's also a recent deal between Canada and Romania to build new CANDU reactors, which will also shut off the need for coal and Russian oil and gas.
Ambassador, I wonder if you could just speak to the shared priorities between Canada and Ukraine when it comes to Europe's long-term energy security.
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Since February 21, Europe has made a significant step forward in energy diversification and getting rid of dependency on Russian oil and gas. Of course, diversification of the energy flow is important. Europe is increasing renewables shared with Ukraine. We also see its rebuilding and maintaining the mixture of energy sources and the development of clean energy.
I would also like to say that we are already building strong co-operation with Canada in the energy sector. Just this year, the Canadian company Cameco and the Ukrainian operator of all of our nuclear power stations signed a 10-year contract for the supply of uranium, and Canada is helping us. Before, pre-wartime—by which I mean before 2014—Ukraine was buying most of this nuclear power fuel from Russia. Now we are buying it from the Canadian-owned company Westinghouse, and Cameco will provide uranium as a source for production of this nuclear fuel, so we really appreciate the strategic partnership that has started. The contracts were signed this year.
We also signed an MOU with our hydro power operator and another Canadian infrastructure company to help us to build hydro power facilities in Ukraine, because, in the Ukrainian strategy for rebuilding, Ukraine sees itself as the energy hub for Europe, having one of the most developed energy infrastructures in electricity, oil and gas. We have the biggest gas storage capability on the European continent, which is, even during the war, widely used by all of the European gas traders, so Ukraine will, of course, put a lot of effort into rebuilding the energy sector and into building more capacity in gas production, renewable energy and nuclear, which, as of today, is 50% of Ukrainian electricity production. We see here big opportunities for co-operation with Canadian companies.
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Thank you. It's really important.
One, as I've told you, we are protecting the eastern flank of NATO. You mentioned the other situation, Russian troops near the Polish border. It seems as if it would mean that all of the NATO countries, instead of supporting the welfare of their citizens, would need to invest more in their military to defend themselves.
The second thing is security in the Arctic region. As we are now fighting with Russia and destroying their equipment, we are decreasing the Russian military capability in the Arctic. That is of significant importance for many countries that have a presence in the Arctic. Actually, Ukraine is also protecting the Arctic.
The third thing is democracy itself. None of the leaders of democratic countries could ever wage a war with such a high level of losses. Russia does not care, because Russia does not have any democracy. When we look to the future, for many emerging economies, countries are now choosing their path, whether to become a democracy and build strong institutions or to look to the way of the Russian dictatorship, and they are closely watching what is happening in Ukraine, the support for Ukraine.
The victory of Ukraine in this war will set, for a decade, the pattern for many developing countries in terms of how they develop themselves. Either they will choose human rights, democracy and the international order, or they will choose Russia's pattern.
I think it's in all our hands to make the right choice now.
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Thank you. It's a very timely question, because even pre-war, Ukraine faced significant cyber-attacks. It included attacks on our critical infrastructure, electricity grid, banking sector, government institutions and so on.
We managed to strengthen our digital infrastructure. When the invasion started, there was not one single day when our banking system was not working or when our government was not able to work. This is including the fact that Ukraine has very well-developed digital governance so that people, including over six million people who left Ukraine and another seven million IDPs, were getting many of their government services online with the special government application. It's working, because we are able to protect all this critical infrastructure.
Of course, we appreciate the support we are getting from our NATO partners. We have very close co-operation on cybersecurity with both NATO country members and NATO itself, but Russia is becoming more sophisticated. The significant cyber-attack we are facing today on our mobile operator will also stimulate us to invest more in cybersecurity, learn the lessons and improve it.
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I would say that there are two stages of the program Unifier. One was before the full-scale invasion, when 30,000 Ukrainian troops were trained. All of them, when the war started, were ready. They had been trained, and that helped. That was one of the important milestones in helping our resistance within the very first days of Russia's full-scale invasion.
Then, in terms of the joint training happening in many countries, Unifier is part of the bigger training program that is happening. The core base is the U.K. Interflex program, but there is also a lot of specific training, including of engineers and sappers and the training that covers the usage of new equipment. It is important because, in most of the training of newly conscripted soldiers, we have a totally different strategy from what Russia is doing. First, we train people; then, we equip them with everything they need, and then they go to the front line. That is important, because it helps.
I think what is also important is that, during this program, there is sharing of knowledge and sharing of experiences. Ukrainian soldiers share their knowledge from the real battlefield, from real military strategy, about what is happening and how it works during real war with their Canadian colleagues.
The feedback that I got from many of those who are part of the Unifier program is that this feedback is very important, because it helps to exchange knowledge, and it will definitely increase the readiness of the commanders of both of our countries.
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I call the meeting back to order.
We have with us today Mr. Howard Shatz from the RAND Corporation, by video conference. Thank you, sir.
From the Ukrainian Canadian Congress, we have Ihor Michalchyshyn, who is the executive director. He isn't feeling terribly well, so he's at home. We also have Orest Zakydalsky, senior policy adviser, who is here and who, I assume, is going to make the five-minute presentation.
We also have, somewhere in the building, Mr. Perry. Colleagues will note that Mr. Perry was originally not scheduled. There he is. Mr. Perry is here with his Christmas tie on. He has the socks on too. We'll check that out.
I just want to thank Mr. Perry for filling in at the last second. Up until about half an hour prior to the meeting, or maybe even 15 minutes before, it was not at all sure that we were going to be able to get the ambassador. Fortunately, she was able to make a connection and we were able to put in a full hour, but I want thank Mr. Perry for potentially bailing us out.
Again, thank you to all of you.
I'm going to start with Mr. Shatz. Sir, if you could open with a five-minute statement, that would helpful.
Thank you.
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Thank you, and I thank the members of the Standing Committee on National Defence for inviting me to participate.
My comments stem from work recently completed with colleagues at the RAND Corporation. When we started this work on Ukrainian reconstruction, my senior colleague, Ambassador James Dobbins, who had worked in a variety of crisis situations, noticed that two elements were missing from other analysis.
One of those was that the relevant comparison cases for Ukraine reconstruction are those of European reconstruction throughout the 20th century and 21st centuries. There was too much discussion of Iraq and Afghanistan. The second issue was that discussion of security was missing, and without security, reconstruction will not succeed. They go hand in hand.
I'll focus my five minutes on reconstruction. I welcome discussion of security co-operation and security issues in the Q and A.
We looked at a variety of reconstruction events, including natural disasters and Japan after World War II, but we focused on western Europe after World War II, eastern and central Europe after the Cold War, and the western Balkan six after the violent breakup of Yugoslavia. There were a number of useful lessons from the cases for Ukraine.
We found that in all cases, successful reconstruction efforts have involved strong linkages for international trade and international investment, so links to the international economy. They also involved reforms to the domestic business environment to attract investment.
This issue relates to financing. Aid is going to be important. Aid encourages other sources of finance, and it often can cover the highest-risk aspects of reconstruction. Grants or equity injections are far preferred to loans. Historically, aid has provided only a small portion of total funding. Private investment that Ukraine mobilizes from new and existing foreign investors, residents and even—or especially—the Ukrainian diaspora will be essential to successful reconstruction.
Russian assets, both international reserves and private assets frozen in the west, could be an important source of funding. There is a robust debate about that in numerous jurisdictions. However, legal authorities for using them are not on firm ground so far, and there could be consequences for the international financial system. This doesn't mean that they shouldn't be used, but care needs to be taken in how they are used and how they are seized.
The amount of aid provided is only one issue. Donor coordination will be a challenge. It could burden Ukraine and slow reconstruction. Donors should adopt a structure, building off the multi-donor coordination platform that controls donor freelancing. Given the enormity of the task, each major donor should have a full-time, empowered senior coordinator, as well as a senior representative on the ground in daily contact with the Ukrainian government. Periodic donor conferences will not be sufficient.
Finally, in the area of reconstruction, Ukraine's task is as much about reform as it is reconstruction. This is Ukraine's opportunity to reverse 30 years of unsatisfactory economic and political development.
In other cases, reforms were in part driven by donor conditionalities. This will be true here. Conditionalities may include punishments and rewards. The attraction of EU membership should be the prime driver, but not the only driver, of these essential conditionalities.
This effort will take years, if not decades. Waste, fraud, abuse and corruption could erode western support. Ukraine should have, and donors should insist on, a strong inspector general and effective monitoring and evaluation, with data sharing with donors.
Ukraine also is very technologically advanced. Ukraine has the capability, and Canada, the U.S. and other donors should encourage the adoption of end-to-end, real-time monitoring of flows of assistance to the extent possible. An inspector general provides after-the-fact analysis. Real-time monitoring is possible and better ensures that the money is used properly.
The only thing I'll say about security now is that durable security arrangements, supported by the west, will help Ukraine deter and defend against future Russian attacks. However, they'll do more than that. Historically, we have seen that such arrangements give investors the confidence to take risks and make long-term commitments.
Let me move to policy recommendations.
First, Ukraine's supporters, in this case led by the United States, will need to define arrangements for Ukrainian security and credible deterrence. Allies of the United States and Canada can and should play a role in this.
Specific reconstruction needs have yet to be determined, but countries can organize for reconstruction, such as by passing enabling legislation or appointing a senior coordinator. The effort to explain and build support for longer-term policy needs to be carried out jointly across the political spectrum. We often focus on the Marshall plan when looking at previous reconstruction cases. The Marshall plan was not guaranteed to pass Congress. It passed because of a very aggressive bilateral effort in the United States. Such an effort will be needed now.
Steps are needed to maintain the Ukrainian economy to set the stage for a longer-term recovery. Prime among these steps is keeping export pathways open. Partnerships with Ukraine's defence industries may be valuable for NATO and for the Ukrainian economy. There are still significant corporate governance issues to be settled.
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I still have my voice left, a little bit.
Thank you for the invitation. I apologize for not being there in person today.
The last time Orest and I were there was in April, some eight months ago. At that time, we had just finished marking the first anniversary of Russia's full-scale genocidal war against Ukraine. Today we are appearing as a second year of war is ending. We will soon be beginning our third.
As the winter approaches, Ukrainian cities and towns are once again facing sustained Russian rocket, missile and air attacks. As we heard from the ambassador, the goal is to knock out Ukrainian civilian infrastructure, power stations and electricity, to freeze and starve Ukrainian people. Unable to conquer Ukraine, Russia will keep trying to make Ukraine unlivable.
In what will be another difficult winter for the Ukrainian people, it's alarming to see reductions in aid to Ukraine. For example, the Kiel Institute for the World Economy reported last week that the global dynamics of support to Ukraine have been slowing. Newly committed aid reached a new low between August and October 2023. This is the lowest level of aid since January 2022, before Russian launched a full-scale invasion.
Of course, I'm sure we're all watching the dramatic developments taking place today in Washington, south of the border, as President Zelenskyy visits with President Biden and the Congress at a time of increased volatility and key questions on the future of American commitment to aiding Ukraine's defence. As Olena Zelenska, the first lady of Ukraine, said just a few days ago, “We really need the help...we cannot get tired of this situation, because if we do, we die.”
Our message to this committee and to all Canadians is this. Do not get tired. We must all guard against the normalization of Russia's war and the normalization of the daily horrors and atrocities that Russia inflicts upon Ukraine and its people.
Your colleagues at the foreign affairs committee recently heard from children rescued from Russian captivity by Ukrainian non-governmental organizations. These stories are excruciating, and their experience is harrowing, but the experience of Ukrainian children tells us that more must be done to increase aid to Ukraine. This will not be happening through negotiations or peace. The result would be the murder of more Ukrainians and further destruction of Ukraine.
I will turn it over to my colleague to complete our remarks.
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Although support for Ukraine and Ukraine's defence remains robust among Canadians, there are warning signs that there is a small but vocal minority here in Canada that wants Russia to win. This is unfortunate, but it is the reality. In order to fight against it, we must all make the case more forcefully that the least costly way to defend our own country is to provide Ukraine with the weapons and economic aid it needs to win.
In April, when we were last here, we appeared alongside Ambassador Kerry Buck, who stated at the time, “We aren't keeping up our end of the NATO defence spending bargain...and we need to do more.” This remains true today.
The global supply chain of weaponry that's accessible to democratic nations is woefully low. We must produce more in Canada and provide manufacturers with long-term commitments to enable them to do so. We must remember that Ukraine will need to defend itself even after it wins the war. We must also encourage our NATO allies to do the same. We must help the Ukrainians, through partnerships and joint ventures, to produce their own weapons. We need to do more to deliver the equipment the Ukrainians desperately need, and we need to do it more quickly.
We echo President Zelenskyy's words from yesterday: “Ukraine will fight, Ukraine will stand. I’m confident that freedom must always prevail when challenged.”
In April we made three main policy recommendations that we asked this committee to support. These were, first, to substantially increase the delivery of heavy weapons to Ukraine; second, to work with allies to increase the provision of fighter aircraft to Ukraine; and third, to contract with the defence industry to substantially increase production and procurement of armaments and materiel.
These recommendations remain our key asks of this committee today.
Thank you.
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Thank you very much, Mr. Chair and members of the committee, for the opportunity to appear today.
I'm going to build on some of the comments my colleague just made and focus on the respective ability of the two sides of this war to get the materiel equipment they need to keep prosecuting the conflict.
As we've seen and the committee has heard, the Russians have taken very significant losses, both in personnel and in terms of equipment. Unfortunately, it's becoming increasingly clear that they've been able to compensate for this quite effectively for a few different reasons.
We underestimated, I think, the Russians' abilities to pull significant quantities and materiel out of their stockpiles to a significant degree. That's something we should potentially reflect upon if this type of conflict is likely in the future. The way we've approached stocking and having very minimal stockpiles needs to change.
More broadly, despite the very broad and extensive set of sanctions that the Russians had imposed upon them, they've been able to further acquire materiel through two means: donations from friendly countries—where again I think we underestimated their ability to absorb and be supplied—and their ability to ramp up their productive capacity despite an extensive sanctions regime. This has led to a situation in which, in a couple of key supplies, the Russians' ability at the moment is potentially outstripping what the west is able to help supply Ukraine with. That would relate to some types of ammunition, including artillery ammunition; some types of drones; and electronic warfare systems.
All this would place a premium on the west's ability collectively to continue supplying Ukraine, and on the onus on Canada, given some of the challenges amongst other western members of that coalition, to increase their own supply to the furthest extent that they can.
I was happy to read some of the recent comments made to the committee that there seems to have been some progress made on this in Canada, although the details of this remain a bit unclear, at least to me, in terms of our additional support moving forward on programs of donations of armoured vehicles and ammunition.
Particularly since this is still opaque and will likely be an important issue to continue evolving, furthering Canada's ability to contribute, I encourage the committee to keep up its inquiry on this subject matter and potentially consider looking at three different avenues, specifically when it comes to Canada's ability to continue making material contributions to Ukraine.
First, it's not clear to me what material, if any at all, has been replaced that Canada donated out of its own military stocks. I think that's worth examining, if for no other reason than I'm sure at this point it's starting to impinge on some of the considerations the Canadian military would be willing to take when it comes to further donating from its own stockpiles, their not having been replaced with the donations to date.
Secondly, in September the government announced the commitment of multi-year funding for our material assistance to Ukraine, which is a step in the right direction. However, it's not yet clear that there's any short- or medium-term plan for executing that in a way that would help align industry capacity with government intent.
Thirdly, and related to the second point, I think it would be useful to better understand how it is that we're only just at the point now—22 months, give or take, into this war—where we are making more meaningful donations of equipment and ramping up some of our own productive capacity on items like ammunition, which it has been clear for some time that Ukraine has needed—since roughly February 2022.
With that, I'll thank you. I look forward to your questions.
I'm going to ask Mr. Perry to continue in that vein, talking about the replenishment of supplies and specifically the artillery shells. We've had quite a bit of testimony at this committee about artillery shell production. We've had an announcement from the government about ordering more. We've had talk of being able to go from 3,000 a month to 5,000.
Five thousand shells a month is not as many as it sounds like. It's less than a week's worth of firing supplies for Ukrainian forces. It's not going to get Canada caught up to having the level of stockpile that we need.
Can you tell the committee how to make this happen? How do we ramp up production to what would be an acceptable war footing, given the acute need of both the Canadian Forces and our ability to support Ukraine?
It seems to me there's been a lack of urgency and focus on this issue. Notwithstanding the technical expertise involved in this, in the scheme of things, artillery shells are not complicated compared to air defence systems and many of the other pieces of equipment that Ukraine needs. They've been around for some period of time, so if we're having difficulty and are struggling to ramp up production with this, I have serious concerns about our ability to scale up on anything that's more complicated, which would be virtually the entire range of other war-related materiel.
The other piece to this is that we have a standing offer and supply arrangement of long standing with Canadian companies that produce this materiel. Not only is it relatively simple in the scheme of things, but we have long-standing commercial relationships, which we should be able to activate relatively quickly, but we have been struggling to do so up until, I guess, about last week, with the mentions you had before committee.
The third thing we should look for as we're looking forward.... I don't think there's any likelihood that the demand in Ukraine specifically is going to attenuate for this materiel. I think the conflict has shown us quite clearly that Canada needs to have significantly more of our own stock, as well as a significantly enhanced ability to ramp up production if this is likely to be the type of conflict we see in the future.
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Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.
I want to thank all our witnesses for being here. David, thanks for filling in at the last minute; we see you a lot at this committee, and it's always great to have you and your matching tie and socks combination here. Merry early Christmas.
Ihor, it's nice to see you. I'm going to direct my first question to you and then ask the rest of the panellists if they wish to comment. So far, Canada has provided over $2.4 billion in aid for Ukraine since the war started in February 2022. Of course, there is a lot of funding there for Operation Unifier, for ammunition, for tanks, for some of the equipment that we talk about in this committee all the time and for the things that the Ukrainian army officials have told us very clearly that they need urgently.
I'm sure we're all aware of the 30-hour voting session that we had last week, in which we were fortunate enough to pass a vote for $500 million in support for Ukraine. That again included money for Operation Unifier, to train the Ukrainian soldiers and supply the army with the tools and equipment they need to win this war. They have to win this war.
We heard very clearly in the last hour from the ambassador that the support for training and for Unifier is so important.
I would ask you—Ihor, if you want to start—to talk about the importance of this funding and the need to continue to support Ukraine at this absolutely critical juncture.
:
Certainly, as we hear that we're entering the second winter of a trench warfare situation, the brave men and women of the Ukrainian armed forces are literally freezing in the trenches in what is one of the most heavily land-mined countries in the world—among the top five now.
This is all part of what Ukraine needs to win, which is the combination of financial and military support, equipment and training. What we're really seeing and hearing from the Ukrainians, frankly, is that they are not receiving things from all the allies as quickly as they need them. Even if an announcement is made, it takes months to implement. We've heard that they have to translate manuals; they have to learn how to repair things; they have to train on these things. In particular, a great Leopard tank coalition takes months and months to implement, and it's the same thing with the fighter jets as well.
The combination of all the aid that Canada can muster with our allies is critical, because I think....
I don't like saying the words, “Ukraine cannot lose,” but if Ukraine loses this war, it is almost an unimaginable scenario for global security and for us as Canadians, so I think that is a dire reason that we need to keep supporting Ukraine.
:
I think Ukraine has done a commendable job.
We've seen, in the last six months, a bit of a mismatch. There's a desire to see some western concepts and some fairly complex ways of employing combined arms military equipment on sort of a western mould that I don't know is really well suited to the composition of the Ukrainian armed forces, which is now a mobilization army; whereas in the west, in most cases, we've built our concept for employing military force on fully professional armed forces. Notwithstanding the aptitude and the skill of Ukrainian soldiers, I think there's a mismatch in training lead times, which has been problematic.
I hope that going forward, collectively, the west is more nuanced about meeting the Ukrainian forces where they are in terms of what can be practically implemented in short order, and for the types of equipment that they're asking for and that fit their way of conducting operations.
:
There's reluctance to use anything from sovereign assets, because the legal authorities are not clear. There are some very strong arguments that say these assets can be used. Ultimately, this is going to come down to either new legislation in different jurisdictions, some kind of court procedure, or some other procedure that will make all asset holders comfortable with using sovereign assets. This is a big step for them to take.
In terms of assistance to Ukraine, I think the bigger concern from Europe is the slowdown of the 50 billion to 60 billion euros that they promised. They are having big discussions about their budget. They had budgeted, I think, 55 billion euros or so over four years in grants and loans. That is stalled right now. We should be concerned about that. We should be concerned about what's happening in the United States, though what's happening in the United States should be resolved soon one way or the other.
From the last question, I would like to make a point, as well, about assistance. I said that aid will recede in importance. Right now, aid for something as simple as budget support is extremely important for Ukraine. They need money for payroll. They need money to repair infrastructure that is going to get bombed by missiles. The immediate need is budget support. There are concerns, and some of them should be resolved, but it might take some time.
:
That's a great question.
It's not easy. It is very possible and very likely that without real coordination, donors are going to have all kinds of requirements generated by their parliaments and their aid agencies.
We talk about the Marshall plan. The Marshall plan was one country to many. This is many countries to one. Ukraine will not be able to fulfill all of the requirements of all 30 members of the OECD development assistance committee. That is why we say that ultimately the priorities should be set by Ukraine.
Now, there should certainly be traceability. Countries will not carte blanche give Ukraine the right to use any assistance as they wish. We recognize this, and Ukraine should recognize it. That's where the inspector general comes in. That's where donor meetings among senior coordinators come in. Compromises could be made in a room with Ukrainian officials. That's also where tracing of the finances comes in.
We haven't really had a situation like this before, and we're going to have to stumble our way through it. In the end, there should be significant deference to Ukraine's priorities, especially if they draw on recent advances that they've made in the last 10 years on decentralization, and especially if we hear about priorities from localities in the different regions of Ukraine in terms of what would best help them redevelop and reconstruct.
:
I'd say a couple of things.
I think we're seeing the importance now of multi-year funding and commitments, and sustainable, predictable support with that.
I think we're also seeing the consequences of not having that in the past in terms of investing in our own armed forces over multiple years, decades and governments, which has directly impacted what they've been able to donate directly. We're seeing the impact of having, I think, far too lean a structure, with very limited ability to donate.
I'm also concerned by what was in the fall economic statement about additional budget cuts. We don't have details yet about the impact on National Defence, but I don't think it's at all inconceivable that it could potentially impact some of the programs, like the munitions supply program, as well as the maintenance of existing military equipment. That might have an impact down the road on our ability to make donations to Ukraine in the future.
:
Thanks very much for that.
First of all, I want to highlight that the funding from the Government of Canada for Operation Unifier and for military aid for Ukraine in various forms continues to increase. I want to get that on the record.
I also want to ask about this. A comment was made by Mr. Zakydalsky at the beginning, if I heard him correctly, that there are people in Canada who don't support Ukraine and who don't want Ukraine to win. We've seen Russia, really in a dedicated way over the past number of years, using misinformation campaigns to influence people's perceptions around the world. We've seen it in the United States. We've seen it here, I believe.
I'm wondering if our representative from the RAND Corporation wants to comment on what we are seeing in terms of the weakening of support for Ukraine in some small but vocal circles.
Is this the result or consequence of those misinformation campaigns by Russia?
:
Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.
I know I have only a few minutes, so bear with me.
Last week we saw, from the , somewhat of a temper tantrum—that's what I would call it as a mom—where we had to vote for 30 hours in the House, and I was very pleased to be here in the House of Commons.
There was a certain aspect where most Canadians usually, as we go to vote on the supplementary estimates, wouldn't know what's important or not.
During this marathon, there was an aspect where I would like to hear whether you think that what we've been proposing as a government is important for Ukraine.
Part of the supplementary estimates was $500 million of funding for military aid to Ukraine. Would you say it is relevant, significant and important for the Canadian government to continue supporting Ukraine, yes or no?