AGRI Committee Meeting

     I call this meeting to order.

    Colleagues, welcome to meeting number 77 of the Standing Committee on Agriculture and Agri-Food.

    I'll start with a few reminders.

    Today's meeting is taking place in a hybrid format. The proceedings will be made available on the House of Commons website. Just so you are aware, the webcast will always show the person speaking, rather than the entire committee.

    Screenshots or taking photos of your screen is not permitted.

    Pursuant to Standing Order 108(2) and the motion adopted by the committee on Monday, April 17, 2023, the committee will resume consideration of animal biosecurity preparedness measures.

    I would now like to welcome the first panel of witnesses.

     From the Canadian Federation of Agriculture, we have, in the room, Pierre Lampron, second vice-president. Welcome, Mr. Lampron. You're no stranger to this committee. It's great to have you here. Joining us by video conference, we also have Brodie Berrigan, director, government relations and farm policy.

    We also welcome Mr. Damien Joly, chief executive officer of the Canadian Wildlife Health Cooperative.

    From Lockwood Farms, we have Cammy Lockwood, co-owner and operator.

    I understand we're having a bit of technical difficulty, but I know our technical teams are working with you to try to get your headsets going for translation.

    Colleagues, we'll navigate that as we go, and hopefully we can make it work.

    We're going to allow five minutes for opening statements. We are a bit delayed, so I'll try to keep it compressed. I'm going to start with the Canadian Federation of Agriculture.

    Mr. Lampron, you have the floor for five minutes.

    Good afternoon.

    Thank you for giving me the opportunity to speak to you today. As has been said, my name is Pierre Lampron and I'm the second vice-president of the Canadian Federation of Agriculture. We met not too long ago to discuss Bill C‑275.

     The Canadian Federation of Agriculture is Canada’s largest general farm organization. We represent over 190,000 farmers and farm families across Canada that are the heart of a Canadian agri-food system generating $134.9 billion of Canada's gross domestic product.

     As a dairy farmer myself, I fully appreciate the critical importance of animal emergency preparedness and ensuring that strong biosecurity measures are in place to protect our animals, our livelihood as farmers, as well as our economy. Generally speaking, from our perspective the most effective strategy to deal with biosecurity threats is prevention. Here in Canada, across all livestock sectors, farmers have put strict biosecurity protocols in place to ensure the health and safety of their animals.

    I am most familiar with the National Standard on Biosecurity for Canadian Dairy Farms which was developed by the Dairy Farmers of Canada working with the Canadian Food Inspection Agency. The national standard for dairy farms focuses on four biosecurity control areas that result in a significant reduction in disease and human food safety risks and include: restricting visitors' access to animals; ensuring the farm is well maintained, clean and sanitary; ensuring that there is a herd health plan in place that includes responding proactively to disease risk; and keeping new animals separate from existing animals until they represent no disease risk.

    On top of that, the dairy sector has integrated biosecurity into its proAction certification program which offers proof to customers that the sector is ensuring quality and safety, animal health and welfare as well as environmental stewardship. This is just one example, but every livestock commodity has their own biosecurity standards.

    Another important facet of this issue is facilitating communication and coordination nationally and across other jurisdictions. Animal diseases don’t recognize borders and we’re all better served by fostering clear communication and sharing best practices.

    In Canada, we have seen good progress in establishing collaborative protocols that clearly define critical tasks and delineate responsibilities to ensure a coordinated and timely response. While this work has been under way in one fashion or another for some time, we have seen recent progress made through the Animal Health Emergency Management Project, overseen by Animal Health Canada, which supports the collaborative development of resources to minimize the incidence of disease.

    Animal Health Canada is a national organization bringing together industry, federal, provincial and territorial governments to provide collaborative guidance on animal health and welfare systems in Canada. The success of this model is that it enables a comprehensive approach jointly developed by industry and government, supporting increased awareness, response capacity, and confidence through the development of protocols supported by clear guidance and training.

    The last point I want to touch on is international trade. The integrated nature of our markets has long made clear the importance of animal health and animal biosecurity as key priorities. An outbreak of an infectious disease in any sector has disastrous effects, including but not limited to closing our borders to trade, lost trade opportunities, and increases in production costs. That’s one of the reasons why traceability systems are absolutely critical to facilitate both efficiency and stable growth. These systems need to be developed through extensive industry leadership and engagement and be supported with education and outreach.

    Thank you for your attention. I would be happy to answer any questions you may have.

    Thank you very much, Mr. Lampron. You have respected your speaking time.

    Mr. Joly, it's now your turn and you have the floor for five minutes.

     Mr. Chair and members of the committee, thank you very much for this invitation to speak today. We really appreciate this opportunity, and we really hope we're going to be of some use today.

    My name is Dr. Damien Joly. I'm the CEO of the Canadian Wildlife Health Cooperative. Before I start, I just want to acknowledge that I'm grateful to be a guest on the unceded territory of the Anishinabe Algonquin nation. I, myself, live, work and play on the traditional territory of the Snuneymuxw First Nation on Vancouver Island.

    The focus of my presentation today is on disease threats that are shared between domestic animals and wildlife. I hope to make the case that our domestic animals share many diseases with wildlife and that surveillance for diseases in wildlife is a critical component of animal biosecurity.

    For example, there are 31 federally listed reportable diseases in Canada. These diseases include foot-and-mouth disease, African swine fever, avian influenza and 28 other diseases. Of these 31 reportable diseases, 22 can potentially affect wildlife in Canada, so that's 70% of federally reportable diseases that can pass between wildlife and domestic animals. Clearly, wildlife are an important part of the biosecurity equation.

    To further make this point, consider the current epizootic of highly pathogenic avian influenza in Canada. From the first cases in November and December of 2021 in Newfoundland until the end of September of 2023, 7.7 million domestic birds in Canada have been impacted in 320 facilities across the country, in all provinces but for P.E.I. This is a virus that was introduced to Canada from wild birds.

    There's no way of really knowing how many wild birds or wild mammals have died of this virus in Canada, but we know it numbers in the many thousands of animals. We do know that the virus has been isolated from over 90 species of wild birds in Canada and 14 wild mammals, including red foxes, skunks, several marine mammals and black bears.

    Highly pathogenic avian influenza illustrates my point. This virus is quite capable of jumping back and forth between wildlife and domestic animals, and avian influenza isn't the only pathogen we're worried about. It's this fact that makes surveillance for diseases in wildlife so important to protecting the health of Canadians and our animals.

    This is what we do at the Canadian Wildlife Health Cooperative. We are a collaboration of the five vet schools in Canada, as well as the B.C. Animal Health Centre run by the B.C. Ministry of Agriculture and Food. With the support of our federal, provincial and territorial partners, such as Environment and Climate Change Canada, the Department of Fisheries and Oceans, the Canadian Food Inspection Agency, Parks Canada and the Public Health Agency of Canada, for over 30 years we've done our best to monitor the health of wildlife populations across Canada to identify, assess and mitigate disease risks.

    For example, in fiscal year 2022-23, we conducted disease investigations on over 8,000 wild animals from across Canada, testing for a battery of diseases including avian influenza, bovine tuberculosis and Newcastle disease.

    For much of Canada, if a wild animal is found dead and reported, it usually ends up at one of our labs. In collaboration with our federal, provincial and territorial partners, we form an essential component of Canada's wildlife health surveillance system.

    Our strength results from this collaborative and decentralized approach. By working together, we can confront issues that are bigger than any one of us could attack alone. By working locally and regionally, we can provide local and regional solutions to local and regional problems but have national coordination.

    When you give a presentation, you always want the audience to come away with something—something they can remember. If there's one thing I hope you remember walking out of this talk, it's that it's really important to conduct surveillance of wildlife populations if we want to maintain biosecurity in Canada. We're talking about the same diseases here, and these diseases really don't care which side of the fence an animal is on.

    Thank you very much for this opportunity, and I look forward to your questions.

     Thank you very much, Mr. Joly. We appreciate your being here, and we appreciate your testimony.

    We're going to turn it over to Ms. Lockwood.

    I know that you rebooted your computer and you've worked on the technical side, so it's over to you for up to five minutes.

     Thank you for having me today.

     I hope the technical issues are okay. I believe it's with the translation, so I will do my best to speak slowly and clearly.

    I just want to acknowledge that I'm on the territory of the Halkomelem-speaking peoples here on Vancouver Island.

    I will just have to stop you. I apologize, Ms. Lockwood. I'm being told by one of our members that there isn't translation.

    Let me just pause for a second here. I'll stop the clock.

     Ms. Lockwood, do you have at least your opening remarks, perhaps in a digital format, or were you just going off-the-cuff today for us? We might be able to help you a little bit in that regard.

    I was just planning on cuffing it. I do have some notes, but they're minimal.

    Maybe we'll try one more time. I don't know what the issue might be. I suspect it's not with you. It could just be a technical problem, and we could always work to try to have you come back or find another way to get your evidence.

    I'm going to turn it over to you. We'll just try it one more time and see if we can make this work.

    Thank you.

    My name is Cammy Lockwood and I'm a farmer on Vancouver Island.

    My husband and I farm about five acres of land, and we have 6,000 laying hens. We're part of Canada's supply-managed system. We came to that through the new producer program in 2015.

    I'm hoping I can provide you with some perspective of what biosecurity looks like for us on the ground.

    Ms. Lockwood, the interpreters are asking if you could move your mike up slightly closer to your mouth. We'll try that. It was working up until then.

    I'm sorry about this interruption.

     No worries.

    Biosecurity on our farm, especially as we have a number of different animals, we are very often changing our boots and using boot dips. We have secured access zones and locks, as well as very robust rodent-control and pest-control programs. We are very aware of the biosecurity risks, having lived through the AI crisis of 2023 and 2022. We learned a lot. We take it very seriously, so much so that it affects our children's pet choices as well. We don't allow budgies or parrots in the house. It's a major concern for us.

    Certainly, the impacts of avian influenza last year were quite extensive. For ourselves, we found it was a lot of extra work to go through all the regular biosecurity procedures, as well as being under higher media scrutiny as the event was unfolding. Of course, it died down from the media side as it went on.

    We also had a significant amount of difficulty constantly educating people around us. We come from a very agricultural area with a lot of backyard flocks. My husband and I were often having conversations with people we knew—or people we didn't even know—about their responsibilities as chicken owners.

    In the B.C. industry, of course, the egg supply dipped down so much that a lot of the grading staff had to be laid off, and a lot of truck drivers. It definitely had some major impacts on jobs in the larger sector. There's definitely strain on all aspects of the supply chain. It's difficult to replace a flock. Usually, we plan flocks about three years out in order to know how many birds we're going to need and to allow time for them to be properly grown.

    I also need to mention that there are deep impacts on farmer mental health, especially in the Lower Mainland area. It's such a huge food-producing area. The Lower Mainland farmers went through COVID, then the heat domes, then the floods of 2022 and then straight into the AI outbreak. It's been very difficult for them to continue to rebuild.

    Moving forward, I always like to look at what can be done to change.

    I would like for you to consider hearing from the emergency operations committee in B.C. They did a phenomenal job of liaising between the poultry board producers and the CFIA.

    Also, improve relationships between the CFIA and farmers. There was, I think, a lot of tension between farmers and government in trying to manage the disease and the outbreaks. Definitely have some training for CFIA staff on how to work with farmers, and also for farmers on how to work with the CFIA. A lot of very practical things came up. Farmers and CFIA staff took very different perspectives, which caused a lot of tension in the industry.

    Moving forward, don't villainize farmers who have endured an outbreak. Ensure a continuity for farmers. If they have a case manager, don't reassign the case manager the next day. Be quick with funding and make the funding more comprehensive for farmers who have endured losses.

    Also, consider alternatives for depopulating a flock. When farmers have to wait for the CFIA to come and take care of depopulation.... We saw flocks that were still there for five to seven days after they had been diagnosed. That's a very difficult position for farmers, as they have to, firstly, keep those birds alive. The feed to do so is very expensive. It also increases spread, if that's the case. Consider different alternatives.

    In terms of AI, moving forward, animal improvements are very important. We're essentially monocropping with hens. Having different strains of breeds and different varieties would be helpful. Encourage some breeders in that direction and allow for vaccines.

     It's my understanding that Canada has just decided to follow in the steps of the United States in terms of vaccine regulations. I believe that some of the vaccine regulations in America are more based on different trade regulations, so if Canada's able to come up with our own decisions there to allow for more robust vaccines, that would also be very helpful for farmers.

    Ms. Lockwood, I apologize. We're getting close to time on the five minutes. I know we had to delay you a bit. If you can wrap up quickly, we'll get to questions.

    I'd also like to [Technical difficulty—Editor] the community relationship improvements and having stronger education for backyard flocks. That's something that we saw a lot during this event; it was spread through backyard flocks. We would encourage wild bird mortality reporting, based on what some of your other witnesses have said, and also discourage animal activists of breaking and entering into properties. That's a huge biosecurity threat for all of us.

    I look forward to your questions.

    Thank you very much.

    Thank you very much, Ms. Lockwood.

    We were just studying that legislation, but I'm going to get to questions.

    We're going to turn it over to Mr. Barlow for up to six minutes.

    It was an interesting last comment there from Ms. Lockwood. I appreciated that.

    Ms. Lockwood, did your flock test positive for AI during the outbreak in 2023 or 2022?

    No, we did not.

    That is very good. I'm glad to hear that. I just wanted to make sure from what your comments were.

    On that, you were mentioning other opportunities or alternatives for depopulation. You had mentioned the mental health impact this had on producers who were having to euthanize entire flocks. We were hearing similar stories where, if a case of AI was found on a farm, CFIA was supposed to be there within 48 hours. In many cases it was days, if not weeks, putting a lot of stress and mental health issues on the producer with those birds.

    What would be some alternatives to depopulating? Have you spoken with your other producers in terms of maybe giving the farmer the authority to depopulate in some way, rather than having to wait for CFIA?

    Yes, there are different ways to manage it. There are many issues around sourcing the CO2 material to be able to depopulate a full barn, but certainly, the electric shock truck is mobile and is capable of doing it. It does require people to be in the barns handling all the hens during that time, but those would also be other favourable methods of depopulation.

    You made a good point there. We were also hearing that CFIA did not have sufficient stores of CO2 on hand.

    Maybe I'll ask you, as well as Mr. Lampron and Mr. Berrigan from CFA. Has that been resolved? It seems to me we're talking about biosecurity preparedness and ensuring that CFIA has the resources on hand to address these types of outbreaks when they occur. That would be priority number one. Is there any information in terms of CFIA improving that situation?

    I'll go to Mr. Lampron, who may have a larger view of this.

    I would ask Mr. Berrigan if he has more information. I don't have enough expertise in this field.

     That's a good question, Mr. Barlow. I don't have a direct line of sight in terms of the resource reallocation within CFIA for this specific issue. My understanding is that the delays were substantial in a few instances but not across the board. In some cases, it can take quite a while, but my understanding is that's more the exception than the rule.

    Having said that, it's an important question around the overall health and well-being of animals. I'm sure Cammy would say the same thing. Nobody wants to see their livestock suffering, so we need to ensure that, whether it's through CFIA or if producers are involved in that process, the right information and tools are in their hands so that they can do it effectively, efficiently and humanely.

    Thank you very much.

    Ms. Lockwood, I have a bit of time left here, so I'm going to go to my last question.

    You mentioned the importance of preventing unwanted guests and protesters from coming onto your farm. We just passed Bill C-275 in this committee, which will put substantial fines on people who would come onto private property and protest on your farm or in your barn.

    Do you think it's an important tool to have those deterrents to protect biosecurity and the mental health of you as a producer?

     Absolutely. I know it's been frustrating for the pork farm in the Lower Mainland. A busload of trespassers came in 2019 and went directly into their barn.

    It's always a concern for us, as producers.

     Mr. Berrigan, I'll turn again to you and the CFA.

    How important is a tool such as Bill C-275 in helping to ensure the biosecurity and the protection of our food supply on Canadian farms? How important is it to see this go through third reading and royal assent? We're close, but we're not there yet.

    How important a tool is this?

    Thank you for the question.

    As you would have heard us say a few weeks ago when we testified before this committee on that bill, it is extremely important for our members. It's something we've heard about on a regular basis. We need to be putting resources into supporting biosecurity on farm. We need to support the mental health of farmers. There are significant trade implications associated with biosecurity. We are very much in support of that bill and hope to see it pass as quickly as possible.

    Thank you, Mr. Berrigan.

    Thank you, Mr. Barlow. That's your time.

    I will now turn it over to Ms. Taylor Roy.

    Mr. Chair, I'm just going to take a couple of minutes first to make a statement with regard to the availability of CO2.

    I want to thank Ms. Lockwood for appearing before this committee. I know many of her colleagues in B.C. would have had some issues with access to CO2 within the first 72 hours.

    I did meet with Mark Siemens, who is the president of the B.C. Poultry Association, and I met with the B.C. Turkey Marketing Board, the B.C. Chicken Marketing Board, the B.C. Broiler Hatching Egg Commission and the B.C. Egg Marketing Board back in January. We agreed.... I know the CFIA regional director was out there meeting, just to see how we could improve things.

    AAFC had found a supplier in Alberta and was bringing in CO2 and storing it at its facilities, because broilers are so close by in your area, as you would know. I'm thankful to hear that you haven't been impacted. Obviously, you're doing the right thing and implementing the right measures.

    I just didn't want to leave this committee with the impression that there's still a lack of access to CO2, as I know that issue had been solved. It was solved at the time, when I was there in January, but I know that better is always possible. That's the agreement the CFIA has done to continue working together.

    You've made some comments about having a better interaction with CFIA employees and farmers. Those are great comments for this committee. I want thank you for appearing before this committee and for your comments.

    I'll pass it over to you, Ms. Taylor Roy.

    Thank you, Chair.

    I just want to follow up with the issue of the backyard flocks that you were talking about, Ms. Lockwood.

    You mentioned that disease had been transmitted through those backyard flocks. Is that correct?

    Yes.

    It never came onto your farm. You never had a problem with it.

    No. I'm actually on Vancouver Island. We are isolated here, but we had a number of cases of high path AI due to backyard flocks. A number in very small and very remote communities came up.

    Thank you.

    Have you ever heard of or had any of the avian influenza passed on to your flocks, or others that you've heard of, from trespassers?

    We haven't had that from trespassers.

    Consider what we go through ourselves to just enter our barn on a daily basis. We change our boots at the front of the barn and we wear our barn slippers. Then from our anteroom, we have access to two different flocks. We have separate boot changes for each flock as well as a separate pair of coveralls. We wash our hands regularly in between.

    You adhere to very high security measures, but you've never had an instance or heard of an instance when trespassers have actually brought any of these diseases into the farm.

    No, I haven't heard of an instance like that, but it can be very difficult to know how you contracted avian influenza.

    I want to go to Mr. Joly for a minute.

    It sounds like a lot of the avian influenza does come from wild birds.

    How do you think the research work you're doing in coordination with the provinces—I know they have jurisdiction over a lot of this—is helping to curb that?

     That's an excellent question. Thank you very much for that question.

     We work really closely with all the provinces and the territories, and our role is a support role. Ultimately, we all know there's a constitutional mandate for provinces, the federal government and indigenous nations for wildlife and wildlife health. The support we provide is really tailored to what's needed.

     For example, in British Columbia, they have a very active program. We're involved to a lesser degree in British Columbia because of the way it's put together, but across the country our work allows essentially.... I don't want to say “real-time early warning”, but it allows early warning, because we are going to see high path avian influenza in wild birds before it shows up in farms. We'll see birds dying out on the landscape. By identifying them on the landscape, we can alert the authorities and alert farms in a particular area and say, “Hey, avian influenza is in this area.”

     You should always make the assumption that it's there, but actually knowing that it's in the region is I think helpful, because it's really hard to maintain that super high-level biosecurity all the time. I'm not a farmer, but I understand. It's very difficult and it's expensive. Maintaining that biosecurity at such a high level all the time is very difficult, but if you know the virus is in the region, then you can adjust as necessary. I think even that simple fact of knowing where the virus is helps.

    Do you work with CFIA as well when you detect an outbreak?

    Absolutely. The way the system works is that we'll get a call about a dead animal. A dead goose or a dead skunk will be reported. It will come to one of our labs. We'll do the preliminary screening test and then send samples to the lab in Winnipeg for confirmation. We can't actually say, “That's high path avian influenza.” That's CFIA's role. We work very closely with CFIA on an ongoing basis.

    We'll have to leave it at that, Ms. Taylor Roy. Thank you so much.

    Mr. Perron, you have the floor for six minutes.

    Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

    Madam and gentlemen witnesses, I'd like to thank you for joining us today. We are very grateful for your availability.

    Mr. Lampron, in your statement, you talked about the importance of a traceability system. You know the dairy industry better than most. To your knowledge, are our traceability measures generally sufficient in Quebec and Canada? Are there improvements to be made in this respect?

    A lot of work has been done in recent years in this regard, especially for beef production. Obviously, the dairy and beef sectors are treated somewhat separately in the regulations. However, we should still recognize the work that has been done in terms of traceability...

    I'm sorry to interrupt, but there may be an interpretation issue. English is coming through on the French channel and vice versa.

    I will therefore continue on in French until this is sorted out.

    Okay. There you go.

    You may resume, Mr. Perron.

    We're now experiencing what I go through every day, Mr. Chair.

    Mr. Lampron, let's continue, shall we? I was asking you if you felt that traceability was sufficient in the dairy industry and in general.

    We must recognize all the work that's been done on traceability, because there's been a lot of focus on it, I believe. That needs to continue.

    As I said earlier, we need to improve cooperation. Producers are making a huge effort, but in my opinion, traceability measures need to be put in place in concert with the government and the Canadian Food Inspection Agency.

    Okay, thank you. Other than doing more, do you have a specific recommendation for the committee on this?

    I would simply say that more needs to be done. Thank you.

    I have another question about traceability, more specifically about what you do on your farm.

    I know that your farm, in particular, has been looking at local markets and you tried to make a high-quality product that you unfortunately had to discontinue recently. That's precisely why you're well placed to talk about this with the committee.

    If our regional processing capacity could be improved, through better government support among other things, could animal security also be improved? Fewer animals would need to travel long distances, like the ones that must be driven to Pennsylvania before they're slaughtered. If we had processing facilities closer to home, do you feel that would improve the situation?

    Thank you for the question.

    The answer is yes, and this takes me back to your first question, which is important.

    Traceability could also be improved with respect to diseases. In addition, regarding trade, we lack full traceability from stable to table, in my opinion. We producers establish all our animal traceability in terms of biosecurity, and I think we do a good job. However, for trade, there's a lot of room for improvement. For example, it would be good to know where the animal came from and how it was raised, right up to the moment it's sold to the consumer. This would also be good for the regional economy.

    All right, thank you.

    You're saying something is missing. Do you mean that traceability is lost from the moment the animal is slaughtered, for example? Is that what you're telling me?

    Yes. Traceability is regulated up to the slaughterhouse, but after that, it's no longer regulated. Some things are done voluntarily, but there are no longer any regulations so that the consumer can know where the animal came from.

    That's another good reason to support more regional processing and encourage the improvement of short circuits, without necessarily closing down large processors and longer circuits.

    I'm sure there's enough room for both.

    Okay, thank you.

    Several witnesses have said that when farm animals get hit with a disease, the Canadian Food Inspection Agency provides adequate support, but it can take a long time and the resources are sometimes lacking. What do you have to say about that?

    I think there is good will. We need resources at the border, but we also need to react quickly when an outbreak occurs.

    As we said earlier, there is already a great deal of co‑operation between the provinces and the federal government, but it takes resources, for example with regard to vaccination banks. Things have improved in that regard, but those companies need the vaccines, which is very important.

    Is there enough support for vaccine development in Quebec and in Canada?

    Progress has been made in recent years, but there is still a lot of room for improvement. Vaccines are a good way to control diseases, and vaccine banks are necessary. It's a step in the right direction, but more needs to be done.

    Currently, certain diseases are threatening to affect animals, such as avian influenza and swine fever. Do you think Canada is prepared for a crisis of this magnitude? Are there gaps in vaccine capacity?

    It's not a question of being ready. These diseases must not come into our country. That's why biosecurity is so important. We have to check wildlife and animals coming across the border. We have to be on our guard all the time and do as much as we can—

    I understand from your answer that we aren't ready and that it would take more resources and vaccine banks. Would you agree with that?

    I agree.

    Thank you very much.

    Thank you, Mr. Chair.

    Thank you very much, Mr. Perron.

    Now Mr. MacGregor has the floor for six minutes.

     Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

    I'd like to thank all of our witnesses for being here today.

    Ms. Lockwood, I'd like to start with you. Welcome back to our committee. It's wonderful to see you here, providing an important perspective from Vancouver Island.

    I really appreciated your talking about how, in relations between farmers and the CFIA, there is room for improvement. I also appreciated how, in your opening statement, you detailed the multiple crises that farmers, particularly in British Columbia, have gone through with the heat dome and the atmospheric river, followed by avian influenza. It seems like the hits keep on coming.

    You had to do a lot of learning as you were in the middle of those crises. They may not have directly impacted your farm, but the danger was always there, hanging over your head like a sword of Damocles. We know with other outbreaks—we don't even have the names yet—it's not a question of if but when.

     What I'd like to know from you is what you would appreciate, as a farmer, from the CFIA in being proactive. Would you prefer more bulletins or more up-to-date awareness of what the potential threats are? Is there anything you can add in that specific area?

     I believe preparedness is the key, and we want to equip our farmers to be ready for any eventuality that might come and affect our regions.

     I think it is actually more just a good working relationship and understanding between the two groups. Farmers are very practical and just jump in and get things done. It seems that CFIA was more about everything following the rules to the letter, and that had some major implications. It was the difference between the two that seemed to rub people on both sides the wrong way.

    Definitely having some more information and truly understanding the process of what happens when there is an AI outbreak on a farm would be very helpful, because even for us, we're not 100% sure of who to call. We know we'd start somewhere and then we'd work down the list of how to notify people.

    It's also about retesting and having enough testing facilities. I do know that the Lower Mainland lab was severely affected by the floods, and that impacted our salmonella testing for two years after the event. Having regular testing and also being able to retest a flock that isn't showing any symptoms means we won't be accidentally or intentionally depopulating healthy flocks.

    I think a few things like that would go a long way in working with CFIA.

    That's wonderful. Thank you very much for that.

    Dr. Joly, I'd like to turn to you.

    I think we've taken away the message that surveillance of wild populations is critical. Have you or any of your colleagues noticed, with climate change and how it is severely impacting the northern hemisphere in some pretty profound ways, that some of those unintended consequences or unintended impacts are different migration patterns of species that are not native to our areas?

    Is that having any kind of impact on disease spread? Are you noticing any patterns, something that we as a committee or the federal government should keep its eye on with the changing climate and the different species that may be coming as a result of that?

    We have absolutely. Thank you for the question.

    Science is difficult. We're not able to actually draw a line and say that, if it weren't for climate change, we wouldn't see this disease, but we certainly are seeing different migration patterns. Even in the example of avian influenza, highly pathogenic avian influenza, this H5N1 strain, has been in Asia since 2005 or 2006. It's only now, in the last two years, that it has shown up. It came not only over the Atlantic but also over the Pacific. For 15 or 20 years there was nothing, and then we have it jump both oceans twice in one year.

    One could infer that climate change is definitely having an impact. Theoretically we can predict that climate change will continue to have impacts on the spread of disease and potentially bring new pathogens that we haven't seen before. For example, malaria could come back to Canada as temperatures warm and so on and so forth, so that is very much the case.

    I appreciate that. Thank you very much.

    I have just a final question for the CFA.

    It's good to see you here, Monsieur Lampron. We have had a lot of conversations before this committee on voluntary biosecurity guidelines. We have seen that some of the worst outbreaks have happened on farms and have been transmitted by people who have been authorized to be on one farm and they have carried it accidentally to another one.

    I am just wondering. When we have these outbreaks and they are the result of biosecurity measures not being enforced—if that turns out to be the result of the investigation—do you think there might be a stronger role for the federal government to get involved in the voluntary aspect of these biosecurity guidelines, if we really want to make sure we're nailing these down before they become full-blown crises?

    Unfortunately you're going to have to take note of that, Mr. Lampron, because Mr. MacGregor tried to go over time and got right to six minutes on his question. He has two and a half minutes coming up, and I'll turn that over to you at that time.

    Mr. Steinley, you're going to go first, but we have only five minutes for you, so use it wisely.

    Thank you very much. I appreciate that, Mr. Chair. That's good solid advice.

    I do have one question and it's for Mr. Berrigan.

    In an upcoming study, this committee is going to be looking at animal transport regulations and the use of ELDs. I'm just wondering, when it comes to biodiversity, if you think the government has inadvertently allowed some more intermingling of animals. For example, if someone gets not quite to their destination and they have to unload and then reload livestock at a facility, could that have an adverse effect in terms of some of the biosecurity concerns we have around animals?

    We could look at changing some of the animal transport regulations. They might not have to unload and reload, and they could get to their point of destination within the desired timeline. Is that something CFIA has thought about, and is there a way we could make it so that the animals wouldn't have to be loaded and unloaded as much as they are now under these new regulations?

     Thank you for the question.

    Yes, we have certainly put a lot of thought into this issue, and it is something that's very concerning for our members. As you know, a driver—at least the way I understand it—can't drive more than 13 hours, or after having been on duty for 14 hours. The ELD, or electronic logging device, will automatically begin calculating a driver's hours of service as soon as the truck reaches approximately six kilometres an hour, which doesn't always align with when the animals are actually loaded onto the truck.

     That can have some unintended and adverse consequences, both from an animal welfare perspective and from a biosecurity perspective because, as you said, there are these rest stops where animals can commingle and they can spread disease. I'm sure it wasn't ever anyone's intended effect or impact, but it's something we need to look at.

    One of the things we would recommend is looking at better alignment and closer alignment with the U.S. regulations, in this case, especially since there's so much cross-border traffic between Canada and the U.S.

    I was just going to put that on the record. Something whereby they have about a 150-mile radius at their home and at their destination that isn't considered to be logging hours is something that would be really beneficial here in Canada.

    I'll turn it over to Mr. Lehoux.

    Thank you, Mr. Steinley. I'd like to thank the witnesses for being here.

    Mr. Lampron or Mr. Berrigan, in your last intervention, you talked about international trade, which generates a lot of traffic at the border. We know that we have a long border with the United States.

    Do you have any information on the ability of the Canadian Food Inspection Agency, in co‑operation with border services, to conduct all the necessary controls at our borders?

    We have been asking for this for a long time. These people are showing good will, and I think they want to do a good job. However, they need additional resources in terms of personnel, knowledge and training. They need training, among other things, on what to look for.

    Your answer is yes, Mr. Lampron. Yes, these people are doing what they can, but additional resources are needed, such as more veterinarians when shipments arrive at the border. I understand that there are problems in this area.

    There's also the whole issue of infectious diseases, such as avian influenza, which we've been talking about a lot in the past few minutes, and foot-and-mouth disease, which affects other production sectors, such as pork and beef.

    Are you reassured by the information we have from the agency on all the controls that are being done?

    As I said, it's important. I have the figures. If ever there was an infection in the hog sector, and even if it was a wild boar, we would have to stop all exports overnight, under our trade agreements. That's billions of dollars of market share in 77 countries that would be affected by a shutdown.

    As I understand it, we don't have enough resources to react more quickly the day this happens, even if nobody wants it to happen.

    The point of what I'm saying about biosecurity is really to ensure that we have the right resources in a timely manner, should anything happen.

    Yes, it's important.

    Do I still have some time left, Mr. Chair?

    Unfortunately, you only have 10 seconds left.

    I shouldn't have asked the question, Mr. Chair.

    I'm confident that you're going to share that time with the committee.

    You're putting words in my mouth, Mr. Chair.

    Mr. Louis, you have the floor for five minutes.

    Thank you, Chair.

    Thank you to all the witnesses for appearing.

    Maybe I will start with Dr. Joly from the Canadian Wildlife Health Cooperative.

    You've reported in the past that we are likely to see increases in cases as climate change contributes more to the spread of diseases. You've mentioned that previously in reports, and then today you're talking about different migration patterns. It sounded like you were inferring it would be by air, but it could also be by land. Is that correct?

    Absolutely.

    The Ontario Federation of Anglers and Hunters is seeing and, I believe, looking into cases of EHD, or epizootic hemorrhagic disease, which is a viral disease that affects white-tailed deer. I know you have reported AHD in B.C. You've also mentioned that early detection is crucial for identifying these new and emerging diseases and threats, and the important role that hunters can play cannot be overstated. There are many hunters in my riding.

    What role would hunters have in detecting EHD or AHD across the country? What education is being done, and how can we improve on that?

     Thank you for the question.

    I want to reiterate how important hunters are. These are people who are on the land and who know what's normal. In any kind of disease situation, unless you know what's normal, you can't detect the abnormal, so that integration, that co-operation with hunters and indigenous people and whoever else is on the land, is critical to what we do.

    We at the Canadian Wildlife Health Cooperative put a ton of effort into education for that very reason. For example, we're working with the Government of British Columbia right now to revise a very popular manual called “Diseases You Can Get From Wildlife”, which goes through in great detail the types of diseases and how to avoid getting those. We're doing a refresh on that document right now.

    Our website, for example, is full of material intended for people exactly like hunters, who are on the ground and who can tell us when something is different, such as whether a lesion is something they've never seen before. They often have decades of experience butchering animals. When they say, “Hey, this is something weird,” and they call us, send us an email or use our online reporting app or even the mobile app that we're developing right now for reporting, that first notification is crucial for us to be able to see what's going on on the ground. At the end of the day, there are very few of us in our labs in Saskatoon, Guelph or Saint-Hyacinthe, so we need that co-operation with people who are on the land.

    I appreciate your saying that.

    You're working with provinces, with all different levels of government and also with the associations like the anglers and hunters. That's good.

    You also mentioned that diseases don't care what side of the fence the animal's on. I imagine it would apply to diseases that they don't care what side of the border animals are on. With this maybe increased migration, are you co-operating with organizations similar to yours in the States to trade information to predict where things are going?

    Absolutely. The U.S. Geological Survey National Wildlife Health Center is a lab based in Madison, Wisconsin, and that's the U.S. centre for wildlife disease research. The U.S. Department of Agriculture also has their own wildlife research. We're talking with them all the time. For example, we co-host the World Organisation for Animal Health wildlife collaborating centre with the USGS National Wildlife Health Center. The idea is that we're on the phone with them all day. In fact, while I was sitting here I had an email from Jonathan Sleeman, who's the former director of the USGS National Wildlife Health Center. It's right in our name. We're a co-operative, and we want to collaborate with those people who share the same goal of healthy wildlife.

    I have a minute left.

    On invasive species, are you studying insects as well? I'm specifically asking about the spotted lanternfly, which is in the States, and we're concerned about its migrating up.

    We do work with the Canadian Council on Invasive Species, for example. We've worked on feral swine and the SF file, but when it comes to insects, that's a little bit outside our bailiwick.

    I appreciate that.

    With my last 30 seconds, Monsieur Lampron, what can sectors do, different organizations do, to help each other? Do they share information among commodities?

    Yes, data sharing is definitely necessary, but it would be important to invest in general research to determine the causes of diseases, how they break out, or the role of immigration. That would be a good thing.

    I wish I had more time.

    Thank you.

    That's all the time you have.

    I'll now give the floor to Mr. Perron for two and a half minutes.

    Thank you, Mr. Chair.

    Dr. Joly, you talked about the importance of surveillance. In previous interventions, you said that there are very few of you and that you need the help of hunters and first nations, in particular. I understand that, but today, what everyone seems to be saying is that efforts are being made, but that more resources should be devoted to prevention.

    Do you think you need more resources yourself? Do you think the Canadian Food Inspection Agency has enough resources?

    Thank you for the question.

    I'm sorry, but I only speak English.

    I would love to be able to answer in French—one day.

    Of course, we all need resources. Avian influenza is a perfect example of that. All of our labs went way beyond their capacities—people working late, working weekends. We ran out of money, and one of our labs actually had to stop testing for avian influenza because we simply didn't have enough money. Particularly when it comes to surge capacity, we just don't have the resources.

    This is why we're working towards implementing a plan called the pan-Canadian approach to wildlife health. It is essentially my mandate as a new CEO to fund this work. This work is about strengthening capacity across the country for us to respond to wildlife health. It's about reducing disparity across the country. We currently have big gaps across the north, for example, and even in areas in southern Canada, where we don't have good surveillance. We're trying to improve anticipation and trying to get ready to deal with problems five years from now—to get ready today for the problems of the future. Ultimately, this plan is about improving efficiency.

     We absolutely do need more resources to really solidify our work.

    Thank you very much.

    In closing, Mr. Lampron, I would ask you for a very brief answer, because you will have only about 10 seconds.

    On the subject of border inspection, to pick up a bit on the points raised by Mr. Lehoux, you say that spent hens and poorly identified dairy products are getting into the country because of a lack of resources. Are you afraid that diseases that could be detected if we had the necessary resources are entering the country?

    Yes. These diseases are always frightening. So we have to have as many means as possible to try to counter them. I'm glad to hear about working with other countries. That's also very important.

    Thank you.

    Thank you very much, Mr. Lampron and Mr. Perron.

    Mr. MacGregor, you have two and a half minutes.

     Thank you, Chair.

    Monsieur Lampron, you've had a preview of the question I am going to ask.

    Just to make it clear, we have seen CFIA investigations where they have been looking at the cause of an outbreak on a farm and the biosecurity standards or guidelines on the farm were not followed. This has been documented. I know the guidelines are voluntary.

    For an organization like yours that represents thousands of farmers, we're only strong if everyone is following them. I'm wondering if there's a role for the CFIA to get more involved in these voluntary guidelines, or does the CFA have a process by which, after an investigation, you get more involved with the farm in question?

    I'm just thinking of our trying to be as prepared as possible and trying to prevent these outbreaks. If some farms are not pulling their weight while others are, I think that could be a very real disservice to their neighbours. You see what I'm trying to get at here.

    Thank you for the question, but we think it's better not to make it mandatory.

    It takes information. People need to be aware of the biosecurity consequences and risks. That is what the associations representing each production are trying to communicate. I'm not sure we would get any better results by making it mandatory. It's mainly a matter of awareness and research, as we were saying earlier. It's important to know why people are doing this. You have a better chance of doing that by informing and educating people.

    Even if it's mandatory, people won't necessarily do it. As we've seen on the ground, when people are well educated, they take good biosecurity measures. We have to give them information.

    On that last point then, you're in favour of its remaining voluntary. Do you think then that the CFIA could just play a little bit of a better role in promoting what the guidelines are? Is there a gap in that?

    Ultimately, is there a recommendation that we as a committee could make with respect to the CFIA's role on the voluntary guidelines? Does it need to be more active?

    Yes, I agree with that. We say we need more resources, and that's part of it. Each organization has its own responsibilities, and the responsibility of the CFIA needs to be better known. This must be part of the general information to be given to producers, and even to the public. They need to be told to pay attention to biosecurity.

    Thank you very much, Mr. MacGregor.

    Thank you, Mr. Lampron.

    Folks, that brings us to the end of our first panel here this afternoon.

    On behalf of the committee, I want to thank Mr. Joly, Mr. Lampron, Ms. Lockwood and Mr. Berrigan for jumping in and providing great testimony that I know will be helpful to the committee in its deliberations in the days ahead.

    Colleagues, we're going to take a brief pause to get ourselves set up for the second panel. Please don't go far. We are a little bit behind, and I want to make sure that I can get you out of here slightly after 5:30.

    The meeting is suspended.

    I call the meeting back to order.

    I would now like to welcome the second group of witnesses who are joining us by videoconference.

    First, we have Jean‑Pierre Vaillancourt, full professor at the Université de Montréal. He'll be appearing as an individual. From the Canadian Animal Health Institute, we have Catherine Filejski, president and chief executive officer. Finally, we have Martin Pelletier, consultant for the Fédération des producteurs d'œufs du Québec.

    Each witness will have five minutes.

    Dr. Vaillancourt, you have the floor for five minutes.

    Thank you, Mr. Chair.

    I will make my presentation in French, but I will answer questions in English when they come to me in that second language.

    First of all, I would like to make a comment on backyard farms. It was said that backyard farms were a problem because they were a reservoir of a number of pathogens. However, research has shown that backyard farms aren't a major risk factor for avian influenza if there is no epidemiological link between the backyard farm and commercial farms. In France, research has been done that shows the opposite, that is to say that it is often the commercial farms that will infect the backyard farm, in terms of avian influenza.

    I sent the committee a sheet containing a number of points, but I'll highlight just a few. The first is the need for standards for new construction, new farms. You can erect a new building 30, 50 or 60 metres from another on the same site, but in the case of a new farm, it's important not to erect a building next to an existing building, which would increase regional density.

    Countries like Italy and Australia have measures in place, and that's what Canada lacks. We need a centralized computer system linking the provincial and federal laboratories. More or less, it's important to control these diseases, whether it's highly pathogenic avian influenza or African swine fever, among others. It's a question of communication and rapid intervention. That's why the information must be computerized and available to people, who can use it to react.

    We also need data banks in Canada, not only for reportable diseases, but also for endemic diseases that we want to eradicate or limit as much as possible. These aren't reportable diseases, but it would be important for Canada to have these shared information banks.

    We often talk about the “one health” approach, which involves a number of players, including the Public Health Agency of Canada. The people at the agency are very well-intentioned, but they aren't familiar with the animal industries. It's a problem. If a pathogen like H5N1 avian influenza becomes zoonotic, the agency has to be on the front line. The problem is that it often lacks the information it needs to make sound decisions. We really need to work on that. Between that agency and the Canadian Food Inspection Agency, for example, industries need to work better together in the preparation of such zoonotic diseases.

    We need to invest in technologies to increase compliance, which was mentioned by the people on the first panel. We're familiar with biosecurity measures, but a number of data from around the world show that there is a lack of compliance. We need to invest in technologies to increase that.

    I was able to raise $126,000 U.S. The United States sought me out and asked me to invest in it. The same project didn't even go beyond the letter of intent stage in Canada. There's a gap. We need to find ways to increase compliance, because human nature is such that, in general, we don't always follow the rules.

    There's an absence of structures to supervise non-quota commercial farms. That's a problem right now. We've seen it with the conversion of buildings used for hog farming to duck farming. It's a problem in the east and, in the west, we have colonies with different species in the same place. We really need to look at these factors, because they're important, not only for poultry, but for other animal species too.

    The main problem will be to increase biosecurity on the farm and to have a regional perspective.

    Thank you, Mr. Vaillancourt.

     Now we will have Ms. Filejski, please.

    It's over to you for up to five minutes.

     Thank you, Mr. Chair.

    Good afternoon, Mr. Chair and committee members. My name is Catherine Filejski. I am both a licensed veterinarian and the current president and CEO of the Canadian Animal Health Institute, or the CAHI.

    CAHI is the trade association that represents the developers, manufacturers and distributors of animal pharmaceuticals, biologics, feed additives, veterinary health products and animal pesticides. We are a national association serving as the trusted science-based voice of the Canadian animal health industry since our founding in 1968. Our full member companies are responsible for the sales of approximately 95% of Canada's animal health market.

    Biosecurity plays a critical role in animal health management by preventing and controlling the spread of diseases. As a result, biosecurity preparedness is essential for the well-being of animals and Canadians alike. The availability of effective veterinary medicines, including vaccines, plays a key role in Canada's preparedness to deal with both foreign animal diseases and outbreaks of endemic diseases that have an impact on production.

    The growing challenges of climate change, increased international trade and the emergence of new diseases are putting pressure on the Canadian animal health industry to safeguard the health of our flocks and herds, while still continuing to innovate and adapt to remain competitive in the global market.

    The industry also faces many other challenges including its small size, representing just 10% of U.S. animal health sales and only 2.5% of the global animal health market. Given the substantially smaller size of our national flocks and herds, Canada is a lower-tier commercial market for veterinary medicines offering a lower return on investment than other jurisdictions.

    A Canadian regulatory environment that is not adequately aligned with those of major animal health markets like the United States and the EU makes veterinary product development, introduction and maintenance in Canada increasingly difficult. When this lack of alignment is then paired with steep increases of up to 500% in regulatory fees for the licensing of veterinary pharmaceuticals, the result is both a loss of existing products from the market and a significant impediment to the entry of new innovative products into that market. We are already seeing the effects of this with a dramatic 40% decrease in the availability of licensed veterinary drugs on the Canadian market over the past five years.

    COVID-19 highlighted for us the importance of drug and vaccine availability in Canada. Animal health, however, was out of the spotlight of direct pandemic response, and disruptions to international veterinary supply chains received little attention. Consequently, we have increased vulnerabilities in the system now, yet veterinary supply chain disruptions are consistently deemed to be a lower priority, despite the significant risks they pose to animal health, welfare and biosecurity.

    Those vulnerabilities are at risk of being further exacerbated by other government policies such as those currently being developed to regulate the so-called forever chemicals—that is, per- and polyfluoroalkyl substances or PFAS. PFAS are used in a wide range of products and industries with active ingredients in drugs, both human and veterinary, accounting for about 5% of the total notified uses of PFAS since 1994.

    In the animal health industry, PFAS are found not only in veterinary drugs but also in other medicines, medical equipment such as catheters and surgical devices, and personal protective equipment such as masks and gloves. They are also used in the production of pesticides and animal feed and are key components in manufacturing equipment, consumables, drug delivery devices and packaging.

    Earlier this year, the federal government released a draft “state of PFAS” report for consultation, which set out the rationale for a class-wide ban on the use of all PFAS in Canada. A growing number of jurisdictions, including the EU and some states in the United States, are addressing or proposing to address PFAS broadly as a class. All those who have tackled that problem by implementing class-wide bans have also recognized the need to identify exemptions for essential or non-avoidable uses of PFAS, either at the outset of such initiatives or subsequent to the implementation of bans that proved to have unintended consequences. PFAS used in veterinary medicines need to be exempted as essential and/or unavoidable uses in any Canadian regulation going forward.

     Canada's animal health industry plays a key role in biosecurity preparedness by providing the veterinary medicines that veterinarians and producers need to prevent, treat and control disease outbreaks. However, bringing products to market is just the first step, and the ability to maintain products on the market once they are registered here needs to be taken into consideration as the Canadian government looks to the future. If we are successfully going to prepare for and navigate emerging disease threats, ensuring the availability of veterinary medicines needs to become a government priority. We look forward to working with the federal government departments more closely in order to tackle the growing challenges that the animal health industry faces in Canada.

     I thank you, Mr. Chair and members of the committee, for the opportunity to put the animal health industry's perspectives on biosecurity preparedness before you today.

    Thank you very much, Ms. Filejski.

    We'll go to our last witness, Mr. Pelletier, for five minutes.

    Thank you, Mr. Chair. Good afternoon, members of the Standing Committee on Agriculture and Agri-Food.

    As the representative of the Fédération des producteurs d'œufs du Québec, I'll deliver my remarks in French, but I can answer your questions in English or French.

    The federation represents about 200 egg producers and about 100 pullet growers whose farms are spread out across Quebec. The Quebec flock totals nearly six million laying hens that produce just under two billion eggs to meet the demand of consumers in Quebec.

    The reason producers have been able to meet consumer demand is that they have kept their birds healthy over the years and have always made quality and biosecurity top priorities. They've developed strict, precise rules for egg production and storage. Over the past few years, they've also implemented programs to manage certain pathogens, such as salmonella, which can cause food poisoning. This was all done successfully in collaboration with Quebec's Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food.

    We know various diseases can affect poultry, and some are worse than others. Each disease requires its own control or eradication strategy. To prevent and manage the diseases that present the greatest threat to the sector's economic health, the federation works with leading industry partners in Quebec, such as other producer associations, millers, slaughterhouses and hatcheries.

    In 2004, all these partners created the Équipe québécoise de contrôle des maladies avicoles, or EQCMA, which has been working with governments for years to develop and improve an avian influenza emergency response plan. The industry has also collaborated on plans to respond to other infectious diseases affecting commercial poultry, such as infectious laryngotracheitis and Mycoplasma gallisepticum. The EQCMA adopted strategies for those two diseases in 2010.

    The EQCMA's primary mandate is to prevent disease, so we've developed biosecurity protocols that serve as a foundation for the work Quebec's poultry sector stakeholders and producers are doing together. We are currently revising those protocols to develop teaching tools that will help improve biosecurity on farms and in the operations of other stakeholders.

    Since 2022, we, like the global poultry sector, have been facing a new threat: a strain of highly pathogenic avian influenza initially spread by wild birds. To date, Canada has recorded 330 cases of this type of influenza resulting in the loss of nearly eight million birds. Quebec has seen 47 cases over the past two years, 20 of which affected flocks under quota production. Members of the federation have had only two cases of avian influenza.

    We know the Canadian Food Inspection Agency has lead responsibility and legal authority to intervene to eradicate this disease, which has cost Canadian taxpayers over $200 million to date. However, industry partners have a vital role to play in intervening to eradicate this disease. In Quebec, the EQCMA coordinates this shared responsibility. CFIA resources have been pushed to their limit over the past two years, so the industry itself has taken on more responsibility for intervention in recent months.

    The federation and its EQCMA partners have therefore set to work to find solutions to a number of problems, including depopulation of infected flocks, disposal of dead birds and identifying specialized external suppliers. Given the scale of the challenges, particularly rapid depopulation of infected flocks, the EQCMA is investigating new technologies for rapid, humane depopulation. Some of those technologies require significant investment. We appreciate the contribution that Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada confirmed last week for work on one new technology.

    However, we would like to see the establishment of a specific fund like the one for African swine fever preparedness to equip the poultry sector in Quebec and the rest of the country with better tools to deal with future outbreaks of avian influenza, which will likely remain a threat for many years to come.

    Thank you for inviting me to appear before the committee. I'm available to answer your questions.

    Thank you, Mr. Pelletier.

    We'll move on to questions.

    Mr. Lehoux, you have six minutes.

    Thank you, Mr. Chair. I thank the witnesses for being here with us today.

    Mr. Pelletier, you said there have been a lot of losses over the past two years. The existing program covers euthanasia and, if necessary, disposal of infected carcasses. Are there measures to compensate producers? We know there are costs associated with those animals before they are euthanized.

    At the moment, the Canadian Food Inspection Agency offers compensation that covers the value of the birds and the cost of depopulation and carcass disposal. However, there's no compensation for cleaning and disinfecting infected sites, and those costs are significant. In Quebec, the industry set up insurance to compensate producers, but our insurance plan has really been put to the test the past two years because of that.

    Okay, thanks.

    Dr. Filejski, you said a lot about vaccines and the importance of vaccine development. We know that many new strains of pathogens are emerging. You say there aren't enough resources. The private sector is doing its part, but could it be better equipped to support the development of new vaccines as quickly as we need them?

    I'll take this opportunity to ask you a second question. If I understand one of the last things you said correctly, the government's priorities aren't really focused on that. What should the Canadian government be doing?

     To answer the first question, certainly the development of new vaccines is a large portion of what the private sector does in terms of research and innovation. That said, Canada is a market that depends pretty much exclusively on the development of vaccines in the larger markets, and their production in those larger markets is similar to what we found with COVID vaccines during the pandemic, whereby we don't have a lot of domestic production facilities. We have some for autogenous vaccines in the veterinary sector, but we are highly dependent on the import of the vast majority of veterinary vaccines that we use.

    As a result, the Canadian voice at the table in terms of determining what vaccines are developed is usually subordinate to those of the larger markets. That's another challenge we face in general as an industry here. Certainly, the global nature of diseases right now and the global spread of diseases work to a certain extent in our favour in terms of Canadian priorities being shared by those of the United States, but it's sometimes difficult, I think, to ensure that our voice is heard appropriately and that our needs are met with respect to that.

    As for the second question you had in terms of priorities, I think what industry worries about is that we often have challenges in terms of identifying the availability of veterinary drugs and vaccines that are regulated by Health Canada, and we are, therefore, always competing against the importance of the availability of human drugs and vaccines—and rightly so. However, it can be very difficult to prioritize the availability of the veterinary drugs when it means that we may have to pull resources from activities geared towards ensuring that there are infant flu vaccines on the shelves in pharmacies as well.

    I think anything we can do in terms of bringing government attention to the priority that needs to be given to veterinary drugs and vaccines as a way of ensuring that we are protecting the health of our livestock in this county and, therefore, our trade interest is always beneficial.

    Thank you, Dr. Filejski.

    You mentioned government priorities, and we know these issues are important, but is there actually a detailed plan to respond to pandemics at this point? Is anyone making sure everyone has the resources they need to respond to these situations appropriately should they arise? We know what happened in the last couple of years with avian flu, but it could happen in other agricultural sectors too.

     Certainly, I think there's a large push right now to look at the development of a foot-and-mouth disease vaccine bank, specifically one that is domestic to Canada and not just the one that is shared across North America. There are priorities around that and, I think, some work. However, to a certain extent, we're also dealing with it case by case. Foot-and-mouth disease is one, but African swine fever is another story entirely. We don't have vaccine candidates for that, right now. Avian flu is also handled differently.

    Looking at a more comprehensive approach—not necessarily just a hazard-by-hazard approach in terms of specific diseases—and at the issue of the availability of vaccines and drugs cohesively, as an industry and as a nation, would be beneficial to every disease we might possibly be looking at in the future.

    Thank you, Dr. Filejski.

    Dr. Vaillancourt, you said a lot about computerization, information centralization and databases. You said there's a lot of work that needs to be done on that. What recommendations would you make to the Canadian government to ensure better information distribution in general?

    Essentially, federal authorities need to be able to work with each province, or at least with the provincial lab system to digitize information so it can be accessed quickly. Then a computer system has to be set up.

    Vets would benefit from access to databases of the viral genomes of different strains. Making that happen will take leadership on the part of the industry.

    Thank you, Dr. Vaillancourt and Mr. Lehoux.

    Colleagues, I probably should have said off the top that we are a little tight on time. I propose we just do six minutes for each party. If you have any very last-minute, burning questions, we can allow a bit of discretion, but I'll warn the parties moving forward.

    To my Liberal colleagues, split your time accordingly.

    We'll go over to you, Mr. Drouin, for six minutes.

    I will be splitting my time with the good member of Parliament for Malpeque.

    Dr. Vaillancourt, you talked about zoonosis and the lack of co‑operation between Canada and other countries. How are those other countries collaborating to investigate zoonosis and everything related to that?

    Variants of the H5N1 virus that's in Canada now do have zoonotic potential. It hasn't really happened yet, but it could. As long as the virus isn't zoonotic, the Canadian Food Inspection Agency is responsible for working with livestock producers. If at some point it looks like the virus is making people sick, responsibility shifts over to the Public Health Agency of Canada, and that's as it should be.

    We've noticed that people are more used to dealing with problems with different industries in cities than in rural areas. Those people mean well, and they're very good at what they do, but they could make decisions that would make things worse from a public health perspective. The H5N1 virus is an example of that. Quebec's public health authorities wanted all employees to wear fitted N95 masks. That shows they don't really understand the level of risk related to employees' contact with animals. Better collaboration and communication with those people will take work, and that needs to be facilitated.

    Thank you for your comment.

     Dr. Filejski, you've talked about the availability of vet drugs in Canada and how, perhaps, Health Canada needs more resources. Is that something you're hearing from those who manufacture drugs?

     Are they saying there aren't enough resources at Health Canada to approve drugs in Canada or just to do the re-evaluation right now?

    I think the one we hear most often has to do with drugs that are currently on the market. Health Canada has performance standards that it needs to meet in reviewing current submissions for new drugs. The division of Health Canada that is responsible for that is the veterinary drugs directorate. When we are talking about trying to either make label changes or approve foreign sites for a manufacturer, we're dealing with a different branch of Health Canada. It's the regulatory operations branch, and it does not have a veterinary-specific team. In that case, we're competing against the needs of the human pharmaceutical world.

     I think, in general, the review times for Canada are longer than they are in the United States. That makes things like joint reviews of new drugs difficult, because the U.S. is not willing to wait for Canada to go through its entire review process. As a result, products will either hit the market in the United States first, or they just won't come to Canada at all because there are additional time and resources that are just not worth the return on investment in terms of the market size.

    Thank you.

    Dr. Filejski, I have a quick question based on the conversation you just had with Member Drouin.

    Are the drugs you're talking about new drugs, or are they existing drugs that are being used in the United States presently?

    New drug submissions are one thing, and that's what the veterinary drugs directorate deals with. The other part that we face challenges with is keeping the drugs that we have registered on the market here, and that's what the regulatory operations enforcement branch deals with.

    In terms of trying to bring drugs to the market here that are already on the market in the United States, we don't have the ability to have any kind of joint reviews, nor do we have the ability to essentially grandfather in or recognize foreign approvals by the USDA or the European Medicines Agency. That would be really beneficial in cutting down both the time it takes to register something that's already registered somewhere else and, probably, the costs that would be associated with doing a complete review of something that regulatory authorities we consider to be trusted regulators have already done.

    I have a quick question. Was it expedited by COVID-19, relevant to animal health and human health, on the drugs and vaccines side?

    Do you mean expedited in terms of delays? It didn't help.

    We certainly saw backups in the veterinary supply chains, which we were also seeing on the human side of things. There's been a bit of a perfect storm of factors over the last five years that the pandemic certainly contributed to.

    Thank you.

    I'm going to switch to Dr. Vaillancourt.

    The previous panel talked about having a disparity across the country relevant to several things inside biosecurity. You mentioned something about regional differences in your preamble. I was wondering if you could expand on what you think. You mentioned the industry, but you also likely mentioned local governments.

     Can you expand on what you were identifying there that may be an issue?

    There are some things going on, depending on the species, but essentially.... For example, in Quebec right now, we've had several swine farms that have been transformed into duck farms. That's been done by whomever has the means of doing it, and there is no consideration for whether it is wise to do it in this particular place. We've had situations where you have duck farms now that are very close to egg layers and turkey farms, and it has resulted in more cases in Quebec of high path AI, as an example.

    People can build a new farm and a new barn within 100 metres of an existing farm, as long as they respect the regulations for the water table and all that. There is no consideration for the risk represented by building a new facility so close to another one, so that's problematic.

     Thank you very much, Mr. Vaillancourt and Mr. MacDonald.

    I'll go to the Bloc Québécois next.

    Mr. Perron, you have the floor for six minutes.

    Thank you for joining us.

    Mr. Pelletier, you talked about a specific fund for avian flu. Can you expand on that? What are you recommending?

    Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada created a $23.4‑million fund for African swine fever. It began taking applications last fall and will be open until March 31, 2025. Projects are happening all over Canada to better prepare for African swine fever outbreaks, everything from developing new technology to acquiring equipment and facilities.

    I think that, having gone through the avian flu cases, many provinces want better tools, but that means allocating substantial resources. That's what I meant by my comment.

    So you're suggesting the creation of a fund similar to the one for swine fever. Okay.

    The other thing you mentioned is the fact that producers are compensated for the value of the birds, but not for cleaning and disinfecting facilities. Are you making a recommendation about that? What does being left to their own devices mean to producers?

    In the United States, the federal government covers the cost of cleaning and disinfection. In Canada, the government has never offered compensation for that even though stakeholders have argued for it. That lack of compensation is the reason the industry in Quebec decided to set up a fund. As I said, the fund is now under tremendous pressure because of payouts. Plus, not all producers signed on. Of course additional compensation for cleaning and disinfection would be welcome.

    Thank you.

    Mr. Vaillancourt, you proposed a few things. If I understand correctly, when you talked about standards for new facilities, you said there should be rules preventing facilities from being too close to one another in order to avoid infection. That would mean a system like supply management, for example, for small farms located some distance from one another. I imagine you would support that.

    The rules you're proposing include specific distances. Do you have data to support that?

    Yes, absolutely, we have data.

    Look at how Italy does it. Italy had huge avian flu problems in early 1999-2000, so now it requires four or five risk factors to be considered when anyone wants to build a new facility or start up a new farm somewhere. One of those factors is distance from existing sites. If someone wants to start up a new farm in Italy, in general, it has to be at least two kilometres from other farms. However, for large breeding herds, the distance can be even greater. It depends on the type of livestock you want to raise, but there are data about that in the scientific literature.

    When you talk about converting an agricultural operation from one species to another, say, from pigs to geese, that's what you're referring to. We have no way of knowing if a farm will make the switch and would, as a result, be too close to other farms that would be at risk if it does. Am I understanding correctly?

    In Quebec, we created a situation that made people with pig farms stop production, but they still wanted to make use of their buildings, which is understandable. However, there aren't any rules around how that's done, so we realized there was a problem because it created too much livestock density, and that contributed to the number of infection sites we had.

    Okay, so there has to be some regulation.

    You also recommended a computerized system with a database, a registry for every disease, including endemic ones that aren't reportable, to help with prevention. But you're saying it should be Canada-wide. Is that what you mean?

    Yes, Canada-wide would be great, but not for all diseases. We'd have to select the important diseases for each type of livestock.

    Okay, thank you.

    Dr. Filejski, I know what you meant when you said Canada is too small a market for vaccine and drug producers. What can we do about that? Are you saying that our agencies don't have the funds to evaluate drugs available in other countries, or that the government needs to invest more in research and development? If you have another solution, I'm all ears.

     I think the biggest thing we can do to make the Canadian market more attractive in terms of bringing products here has to do with better aligning our regulatory requirements, for both new products and existing products, with those of the large markets, particularly the United States and the European Union.

    I think it's a matter of the better use and more effective use of foreign decisions in terms of the licensing of products by regulatory authorities that we consider to be trusted. There's a core group of those. There are five of them. They collaborate a lot.

    Thank you. Sorry to cut you off, but do you think we need to expedite regulations for per- and polyfluoroalkyl substances?

    Ms. Filejski, go ahead.

    I gave all the other parties another extra minute. Don't worry about trying to get it all in in 15 seconds.

    You have one minute.

    Is that for PFAS? Okay.

    We share the concerns about environmental contamination and all of the issues that surround PFAS. What I think we're trying to be very cautious about is to build on the experience of other jurisdictions that have already gone down the road of doing a class-wide ban using an extremely broad definition of what a PFAS is. Bans that have been implemented have had to be walked back because people have realized that all of a sudden they were not going to have inhalational anaesthetics, and they were all of a sudden not going to have certain non-steroidal anti-inflammatories because these compounds would now fall into this very broad definition.

    I think we should look at the experience of other jurisdictions and take into consideration very carefully how we define PFAS and what rationale is. Also, we must make sure.... All of our drugs and all the packaging we use in our drugs have to go through very rigorous regulatory requirements as it is, which includes their management throughout their life cycle from product inception right through to disposal of remaining product and packaging.

    When we look at developing PFAS regulations in this country, we need to be very careful, I think, that we don't have unintended consequences from those bans that will then essentially really curtail our ability to have access to products, both human and veterinary, with respect to drugs and vaccines.

    Thank you, Ms. Filejski and Mr. Perron.

    Lastly, Mr. MacGregor, you have the floor for six minutes.

    I know you can do it in six minutes. If you do need a little bit extra, Mr. MacGregor, I can give it to you.

    Go ahead.

    How very generous you are, Mr. Chair. Thank you very much.

    Dr. Vaillancourt, I would like to turn to you. You have my apologies if you have covered this in previous answers. I just want to make sure that, for my sake and for our eventual committee report, we get some clarity.

    I think you have looked at the effect of surveillance cameras on biosecurity protocols on farms. I think you concluded that those methods did fail to improve long-term compliance. I was taking a few notes during your opening statement. You talked about the need for investment in technology to ensure compliance. You may have heard in the first hour that I was asking the CFA about the voluntary protocols in place and how we learn from previous mistakes and how we ensure compliance in the future.

    Can you tell us specifically what technologies you are referring to other than surveillance cameras? Can you just delve into that a little bit more deeply for me, please?

    Yes, briefly, we can use sensors. For example, we use microchips in boots essentially. If people do not change their boots when they need to go from one zone to another zone, in the anteroom that will be detected. If they do not activate the Purell dispenser to clean their hands, that can also be recorded. It can be associated with them. To get in they could have a magnetic card to identify themselves. We have ways of gathering data using that information, and then we do training to improve compliance.

    You can say it's mandatory and you need to have this or that, but we're dealing with human beings and human nature. You need to work on technologies that are human nature-proof. I didn't say idiot-proof but human nature-proof. Using sensors is one good way to go.

    That will almost certainly aid the CFIA in after-the-fact investigations. If they're trying to trace how a disease outbreak happened, that data would be very helpful. We may not be in favour of making these compliance rules mandatory, but what would you like to see as a follow-up to that important data gathering?

    How do we ensure compliance from the lessons learned from, hopefully, the widespread use of that technology?

     I mentioned technology at the farm per se, but we already have companies that can use sensors and they have geofencing around sites. People have an application on their phone, and when they get in, we know who they are, when they're coming in, the risks they may represent and all that.

    We need to look into this because we're looking at big data here, but if we do it properly it could be, of course, very confidential. We need to respect that because growers would be very concerned if you had Big Brother gathering information like this, but it can be done with them basically in control of that information and using it for regional biosecurity.

    You cannot just biosecure each farm one at a time. You need to look at it at a regional level.

    That's a good point to make.

    Also, in exchanges with colleagues in previous interventions, you talked about how, when establishing a new farm, you have to pay attention to the distance between a new farm and an existing one.

    I want to turn to the subject of backyard flocks, because in my neck of the woods, it's a very rural area and people love keeping chickens. They love being able to go out every morning and collect their eggs. People feel very strongly attached to that farming practice. They feel it's a very important part of our local food security. How do you envision those two worlds living side by side, where we are both paying attention to the very real biosecurity concerns that may be present from backyard flocks, especially with avian influenza, and also trying to make sure that people's sense of food security and providing for their own families is also not disturbed?

    What could we reasonably do to alleviate those problems?

    The first thing is that the people with backyard flocks tend not to look at the commercial operations as being necessarily friendly, because they look at them often as the bad guys. There's a place here for provincial and possibly federal governments—even municipal governments—to come in and help.

    What I'm talking about here is to register these backyard flocks. You have to register your dog. You have to prove that your dog has its rabies vaccine, its medal and all that. Why shouldn't backyard flocks demonstrate that they are vaccinated against different pathogens? If we know where they are and who they are, then we can provide information to improve the health of these backyard flocks.

    You're right. They're there. They're never going to disappear. Research has shown that if there's not an epidemiological link, like somebody working with a backyard flock and then going straight into a commercial barn, it's not that big of a risk per se. However, they are a reservoir, so there's a place for the government there.

    Thank you very much, Mr. MacGregor.

    Thank you very much to all of our witnesses. We appreciate your testimony.

    We are going in camera for a couple of minutes, colleagues, so we'll excuse our witnesses.

    Those of you who are online, you're free to go, and thanks again.

    Members, just stick around for a couple of minutes.

    [Proceedings continue in camera]