:
I call this meeting to order.
Welcome to meeting number 87 of the Standing Committee on International Trade.
Today's meeting is taking place in a hybrid format, pursuant to the Standing Orders. Therefore, members are attending in person in the room and remotely using the Zoom application.
I need to make a few comments for the benefit of the witnesses and members.
Please wait until I recognize you by name before speaking. For those online, please mute yourself when you are not speaking. This is a reminder that all comments should be addressed through the chair. If any technical issues arise, please inform me immediately. We will need to suspend in order to ensure interpretation is properly restored before resuming the meeting. I ask all participants to be careful when handling the earpieces, in order to prevent feedback.
Pursuant to Standing Order 108(2) and the motion adopted by the committee on Tuesday, October 17, 2023, the committee is continuing its study on the 2023 strike at the port of Vancouver.
We have, today, the Canadian International Freight Forwarders Association, Bruce Rodgers, executive director, by video conference; and Julia Kuzeljevich, director, policy and regulatory affairs, by video conference. We have with us the Canadian Meat Council, Lauren Martin, senior director, government relations and policy. Back again, from the Greater Vancouver Board of Trade, we have Bridgitte Anderson, president and chief executive officer, by video conference. Ms. Anderson will be with us for only the first hour of the meeting.
We also have the Freight Management Association of Canada, Robert Ballantyne, former president and senior adviser. From the Mining Association of British Columbia, Tim McEwan, senior vice-president, corporate affairs, is with us by video conference. Joining us also is Michel Murray, union adviser with the longshoreman union at the port of Montreal, with whom we're still waiting to connect by video conference.
Welcome to you all. We will start with opening remarks and then proceed with rounds of questions.
Mr. Rodgers, I invite you to address the committee for up to five minutes, please.
:
Good morning. Thank you for having us appear today.
[Translation]
Madam Chair, committee members, on behalf of the Canadian International Freight Forwarders Association, or CIFFA, we'd like to thank you for the opportunity to speak to you today.
[English]
Very briefly, for those who may not know, freight forwarders take control of shipments, be they imports or exports, and move them to the ultimate customer by whatever transport mode is most cost-efficient. We represent roughly 12,000 employees of member firms, and they handle approximately 80% of freight traffic in Canada. Also, as our association represents port truckers—called drayage operators—customs brokers and other services sectors, we can legitimately claim to represent all the key players in Canada's supply chain.
The labour disruptions at west coast ports this last summer were a fairly serious blow to our members and to our customers. We feel it was also a sign that we need to start moving beyond the traditional and wasteful pattern of labour confrontation that has characterized the Canadian port industry.
The year 2023 was certainly the year of labour disputes in ports. We saw strikes on Canada's west coast and on the U.S. west coast as well. In the southeast of the U.S., although negotiations are currently under way, the union stated that members should prepare to go on strike next October. Now, we are looking at a possible strike at the port of Montreal.
:
We canvassed our members in anticipation of this appearance, asking about the impacts of the west coast strike last summer, and got reactions such as members saying that the most frustrating part of the Vancouver situation seemed to be the complete lack of understanding of supply chains in Canada. Media coverage focused on the impact to B.C., without any understanding of the volume of cargo arriving via B.C. ports, destined for inland centres…most notably southern Ontario.
This underlines a point we want to make to the committee. The victims of strikes aren't the workers, who generally get their back pay upon settlement, nor the port and labour business managers. The victims are ordinary small businesses. Nobody compensates them for their losses.
As a specific example of impacts to a forwarder's customers, who were impacted by the Vancouver situation, an importer stated that due to the late delivery of seasonal import items, they had a customer miss a deadline and the resulting order. As these goods are seasonal, they were unable to find another buyer. This customer is sitting on this inventory, and because of the money tied up in this, is unable to purchase other seasonal goods and keep their business moving forward.
From an exporter's perspective, we heard from one who had a customer who dealt with an overseas buyer on longer contracts of sale, such as 90 days to a year. As a result of the continued supply chain issues that have been happening in Canada, this buyer is now sourcing the majority of the volume from elsewhere in the world; the Canadian exporter gets a small portion of the volume they carried, and contracts of sale are on a single shipment of limited basis, such as 30 days.
There should be no doubt in anyone's mind that disruptions divert traffic; nor should you doubt that those disruptions can lead to permanent changes in shipping routes.
In a November interview, a supply chain manager in Inside Logistics made the point that in the past two years, they’ve seen east coast ports steal import volume from west coast ports as shippers looked to avoid backlogs and delays.
Now, as we look forward to the possibility of another disruption at the port of Montreal, our members are seeing shippers beginning to move away and find more reliable routings. There is no telling if these moves are temporary or permanent. We believe that Mr. Miao was asking about this last Thursday, and this is one of the most worrying aspects of service disruptions.
Inflation-related costs have driven up worker demands, while traffic has begun a significant decline, a decline that continues to this day. We fear it's going to be a difficult negotiation.
To conclude our remarks, following the west coast debacle this summer, talked about an in-depth examination of the port industry, with a focus on the future of port labour. On October 19, he issued a statement confirming that Anthony Giles and Kevin Banks have been contracted to begin the first part of this review process. Their work is due by December 31, which may be a day too late for the port of Montreal.
We see European employers and unions co-operating to ensure competitiveness and decent wages, yet in Canada we seem condemned to strikes as a requirement of negotiation. We hope and believe it's time for a better approach.
That concludes our report. Thank you very much.
:
Thank you very much, Madam Chair.
Good morning, everyone. I appreciate the invitation to appear on behalf of the Canadian Meat Council.
My name is Lauren Martin. I am the senior director of government relations and policy. We are pleased to provide comments regarding the strike at the port of Vancouver.
CMC represents Canada's federally licensed meat packers, meat processors and suppliers of equipment and goods to the meat industry. Our members process over 90% of Canada's pork and beef. Our members feed Canadians and the world with some of the highest-quality protein in the world. The Canadian red meat industry represents over $32 billion to the Canadian economy and supports 288,000 jobs across Canada.
As members of this committee well know, Canada's economy relies heavily on trade. With respect to red meat, Canada exports almost 70% of its pork and 50% of its beef to over 90 countries in the world, with lucrative trade relationships in Asian countries such as China and Japan, which are accessed via the western ports.
In 2022, Canadian processors exported $9.5 billion in red meat products, which include pork, beef, lamb and others. We could not efficiently or cost-effectively get these goods to market without reliable transportation infrastructure: ground, air and sea. Approximately 25% of Canada's total traded goods flows through the ports in western Canada. They are Canada's largest gateway, handling over 800 million dollars' worth of cargo, which includes red meat products, every single day.
Our members spend considerable resources creating and maintaining relationships with customers worldwide. When companies cannot fulfill orders reliably, this jeopardizes those relationships. As a result of our reliance on trade and the important markets accessed via the western ports, the impact of this dispute was far more profound than that of most other labour disruptions, though we did see an almost equally worrisome situation developing in the St. Lawrence Seaway this fall.
To position Canada as a competitive trading partner in the global economy, businesses must be able to get goods to and from market efficiently and reliably, as I've mentioned. Red meat cannot sit for days—let alone weeks—without spoiling. Given the nature of our goods, our supply chain is built to ship goods to market efficiently. We do not have the storage capacity to stockpile weeks of unshipped goods.
When our members are faced with an event that exceeds our storage capacity or even comes close to exceeding that storage capacity, they are forced to shut down production. Animals cannot move off the farm, which in turn has implications for farm families and their bottom lines, not to mention the implications for animal welfare. Events like this are felt in businesses and individuals along the supply chain, and gearing back up is not as simple as the flip of a switch.
I have now illustrated the challenging decisions that businesses must make when facing uncertainty. It is unfortunate that the strike happened when it did, with industries still struggling with the postpandemic fragility of supply chains, labour shortages, and inflation. It goes without saying that putting perishable products such as red meat at risk is also not in the public's best interests. These types of lengthy market disruptions add costs to businesses that put food on families' tables, impacting food affordability.
Canadians expected our elected officials to ensure that this labour dispute was resolved quickly. Instead, it dragged on for 35 days. The Greater Vancouver Board of Trade estimated that $10.7 billion in trade was impacted during the 35 days of strike action this past July. While we respect the workers' right to strike, those interests must be balanced against the public interest.
In the future, the federal government must be willing to intervene much sooner than it did this past summer and use all the tools it has at its disposal to bring parties to the table. Additionally, it should consider solutions such as maintenance of service provisions, which have been granted for grain, for all perishable products, such as red meat. We strongly recommend such measures, which will protect red meat's critical paths to market, our nation's trading reputation and food affordability for all Canadians.
That concludes my comments. Thank you very much.
:
Thank you very much, Madam Chair.
The Freight Management Association of Canada has been representing the freight transportation interests of Canadian industry to all levels of government since 1916. Despite appearances, I wasn't at the first meeting.
Voices: Oh, oh!
Mr. Robert Ballantyne: The FMA is not an industry-specific association. It has a focus on freight transportation by all modes of transport—air, marine, rail and truck—that impact the supply chains of companies in all industries. We have agriculture, mining, manufacturing, food processing and retail companies within our membership. Some of our retail members are household names.
In addition, the FMA is the Canadian member of the Global Shippers Forum. Through that relationship, we are involved in dialogue with various UN agencies that impact global trade, such as the International Maritime Organization.
The term “supply chain” is a good metaphor for the complex relationships of all stakeholders involved in moving goods from origin to destination. With the growth of international trade, these chains have become ever more complex. A chain is only as strong as its weakest link. If one of those links is broken, the entire chain is impacted.
As this committee is focused on Canada’s international trade, it becomes obvious that a work stoppage at a major “link” in the chain, like the port of Vancouver, will broadly impact the Canadian economy and Canada’s international customers. It can also have potential impacts on the health and safety of Canadians.
While the FMA respects the rights of workers, there has to be consideration of the resulting impacts of work stoppages in many industries that are critical to the functioning of the Canadian economy and Canadian society. How do we balance the rights of approximately 7,000 west coast port workers with the rights of millions of Canadians across the country, including other unionized workers?
The Canada Labour Code goes some distance in attempting to look at this conundrum. Here are a couple of the items.
The first is essential services. Subsection 87.4(1) of the Canada Labour Code requires that, during a strike or lockout, the employer, the trade union and the employees “must continue the supply of services, operation of facilities or production of goods to the extent necessary to prevent an immediate and serious danger to the safety or health of the public.” The second one is subsection 87.7(1), which requires the longshore industry to service grain vessels during a strike or lockout.
Regarding essential services, a case can be made that these should be expanded beyond the “immediate and serious danger to the safety or health of the public.” The major impacts on Canadian society of broken links in the supply chain caused by port and rail labour disruptions are such that Parliament should look at expanding the “essential services” definition to address these widespread and major impacts.
Also, while it's appropriate that grain vessels should continue to be serviced during a strike, it is time to consider extending this requirement to other commodities and industries, as my colleague Lauren already mentioned.
In preparing for this meeting, FMA reached out to a number of its member companies regarding the impacts they have experienced. Many of our importer members report that they have had to commence taking action in advance of a possible supply chain strike. This can add significant cost. If delayed products are seasonal or time-sensitive, it can result in lost sales and revenues.
Canadian prosperity depends on our international trade, and labour disruptions are one of several issues impacting Canada’s reputation as a reliable trading partner. In addition to strikes, we have seen floods and fires in western Canada that have impacted rail and trucking services in some areas. There have been instances of blockades of rail services by people protesting various issues across the country.
FMA obtains information each year from the Canada labour program on expiring transportation labour agreements. The 2023 list includes the west coast longshore agreement and the St. Lawrence Seaway agreement, which both expired on March 31. As mentioned, these agreements were not settled without strikes. It's also worth noting that, on December 31—about three weeks from now—the longshore workers contract at the port of Montreal ends, as do five railway agreements with CN, CPKC and Ontario Northland. Those will be expiring at the end of this month.
FMA is pleased to see the committee looking at these important issues, and we think it would be useful for Parliament to extend its consideration of labour relations to all of the links in the Canadian supply chain.
Thanks for the opportunity. I'm pleased to try to answer questions.
:
Good morning, Chair and members of the committee.
My name is Tim McEwan. I'm senior vice-president of corporate affairs with the Mining Association of British Columbia, or MABC for short.
I'm joining you today from the shared, traditional, ancestral and unceded territories of the Tsawwassen and other Coast Salish peoples.
MABC represents 17 operating mines, two smelters and more than a dozen development projects in British Columbia. Mining is a major user of Canada's west coast ports and is the largest shipping sector by volume using both rail and marine modes.
Most of British Columbia's production volume is shipped to international customers in Japan, Korea, India and others, and accounted for 28%, or $18 billion, of the total value of British Columbia's exports in 2022. British Columbia's mining industry employs approximately 35,000 people in our province, with an average annual salary of $139,000.
When mines and smelters curtail operations, the impacts are felt not only by our employees but also the 3,800 businesses and suppliers in communities across the province that depend on the industry for their economic livelihoods.
Last summer's strike occurred on the heels of unprecedented supply chain disruptions during the pandemic, record wildfires and atmospheric rivers that severed rail lines and highways. The strike had a major effect on B.C.'s mining and smelting sectors.
First, it disrupted the inbound delivery of key supplies and materials for our members' operations. This included new equipment and other inputs for capital projects and materials to support ongoing operations.
Second, from an outbound or export perspective, each mining operation in British Columbia was impacted differently by the strike due to factors such as the commodity being mined, the site location and the transportation mode used to ship the commodity. A few sites were able to divert shipments to other ports, albeit with increased costs, effort and time, but other operations did not have this option available. The inability to get products to international markets caused some mines to stockpile products on site or in railcars across B.C., all with physical and financial limits to how long they could do this.
With a prolonged strike or lockout, British Columbia's mining sector risks losing international customers to producers outside of Canada. Throughout the period, international customers were frequently asking about the strike and when it would end. The longer the strike continued, it was necessary for some MABC members to plan for shutdowns or temporary layoffs.
Beyond the immediacy of the strike, disruptions also caused significant congestion throughout the supply chain that took many weeks to fully resolve. Simply put, the longer a disruption persists, the longer it takes to clear congestion, while damage is done to customer relationships and Canada's reputation as a reliable supplier.
Given the size and scope of British Columbia's mining sector, the economic and reputational repercussions for our province and all of Canada—all of these—were substantial. The strike also had cascading consequences for workers, suppliers and communities, not only in British Columbia but also in mining communities across Canada. It's important to note as well that our industry has shared objectives with the governments of Canada and British Columbia to advance more critical mineral mines and to help with climate action and national and allied security imperatives.
The critical minerals opportunity includes billions of dollars of prospective investment, thousands of well-paid, family-supporting jobs, significant partnership opportunities with first nations and new contract and economic opportunities in communities throughout the province.
Secure, certain and predictable supply chains, including fluidity through west coast ports, are indispensable in our collective efforts to grow British Columbia and Canada as a low-carbon supplier of critical minerals to domestic and international markets. Moving forward, it's clear that, if Canada wants to strengthen trading relationships and grow our export economy, including critical minerals opportunities, the federal government needs more effective options to address labour disputes impacting the national economy.
MABC sees the review initiated by the under section 106 of the Canada Labour Code as an opportunity to provide these solutions. We urge the federal government to balance meaningful collective bargaining with solutions that safeguard British Columbian and Canadian supply chains and our international reputation as a preferred and reliable supplier for low-carbon critical minerals and metals.
I want to thank you today for the opportunity to provide some insights on last summer's strike at Canada's west coast ports.
I look forward to the question and answer session.
Thank you.
:
Good morning. I represent the Syndicat des débardeurs du Port de Montréal, a union that was founded in 1902 and therefore has been around for over 100 years.
Pursuant to House of Commons Standing Order 108, I appear before you to discuss the impact of the Port of Vancouver strike last summer. At the Port of Montreal, we're well placed to speak to the right to strike, since we exercised our right to do so in 2020 and 2021.
I feel a bit like a skunk at a garden party, as all the previous speakers talked about the supply chain and Canada's international reputation. I have to tell you that Canada signed an international agreement on the right to organize in 1972. The right to organize recognizes the right to strike and its counterpart, the right to lock out for the employer, as a foundational element. I must also remind you that the right to strike is recognized under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, as confirmed in the Saskatchewan decision.
With respect to restriction of the right to strike under the Canada Labour Code, I must once again remind you that the right to strike has been restricted before. In the late 1990s, further to the Sims report entitled “Seeking a Balance”, the Canada Labour Code was amended to restrict the right to strike by requiring both employers and unions to give 72 hours' notice before exercising the right to strike or lock out.
At the Port of Montreal, if we were to give 72 hours' notice before a strike, the ships would be off the coast of Newfoundland. So the supply chain wouldn't be interrupted. The 72 hours' notice gives time to find a temporary alternate route and maintain the supply chain. So I'm very surprised that all the speakers are talking about restricting the right to strike in any way, shape, or form.
We also talked about essential services, section 87.4 of the Canada Labour Code. Essential services have already been established.
On June 8, 2020, the Canada Industrial Relations Board issued a landmark decision on the Port of Montreal. He said that there was no essential service to maintain, since there was no imminent and serious danger to the public. Of course, there is an economic impact. Who would go on strike without there being an economic impact? Of course, the right to lock out also has an economic impact on workers. The balance already exists.
If you are to look at what is happening in the longshore industry, we think you should focus on section 34 of the Canada Labour Code. How are employers' organizations composed? Why were there strikes at the port of Vancouver last summer? Why were there strikes at the Port of Montreal two years ago? Perhaps because the real decision-makers weren't at the table. When we negotiate, we talk to human resources representatives. Shipping operators and shipping lines are not at the bargaining table.
That's what I understood during the most recent conflict in Vancouver, which I followed closely. Shipping lines and shipping operators were not at the bargaining table. So before we talk about the supply chain and international reputation, we should eliminate the danger at the source and ensure that the real decision-makers are at the bargaining table.
We believe that the committee should instead look at labour relations, see what that consists of and determine who sits at the table to bargain. At the Port of Montreal, we're currently negotiating with the employer's organization, and no decision-maker is sitting at the table. Even the president of the employer's organization is not at the bargaining table. Conciliation ended two days ago, and we're now in a mediation period. The employer has not even submitted its wage offers yet.
Before we talk about supply chain and reputation, the committee should really look at labour relations and who's sitting at the bargaining tables.
Thank you very much for your attention.
Good morning, Chair, vice-chairs and members of the committee.
I'm presenting today from the traditional territory of the Musqueam, Squamish and Tsleil-Waututh nations.
On behalf of our membership of over 5,000 businesses, I thank you for the opportunity to discuss the significant economic impacts of the 13-day strike this summer at Canada's west coast ports. This strike, the longest in almost four decades, unfolded against the backdrop of years of challenges in the supply chain, largely, outside of our control. The cumulation of these events impacted Canada's image and role as a stable partner in the global supply chain.
In March of 2020, the pandemic's effect began a tidal wave of imbalances in container trade as factories around the world shut down, leading to shortages, scarcity and hoarding. In July of 2021, wildfires damaged rail lines and brought train shipments to a grinding halt. In November of 2021, an atmospheric river caused billions of dollars in economic damage to two class I rail links and highway systems, which have been heroically rebuilt. These events highlight the extreme pressure that fuelled inflation and caused economic stress, some of which we were able to control and some of which we were not.
We know that we need to build climate resiliency into the supply chain, and our members are investing to do just that. These investments in our resiliency and growth will mean good-paying and often union jobs.
Against this backdrop, we were concerned in the months leading up to July 1 about what the short-term and long-term economic harm of a strike at the ports of Vancouver and Prince Rupert could be. We communicated to government and port-reliant industries about the damage that could occur if the strike shut down the ports. Regrettably, those fears came to fruition with a coast-wide strike on Canada Day.
During the strike, we launched a port shutdown calculator, a tool designed to visually depict the magnitude of trade disruption. The numbers were staggering, with 800 million dollars' worth of trade being disrupted each day. Our calculator estimated the value of trade disrupted to be a remarkable $10.7 billion.
This disruption reverberated across critical sectors nationwide, from manufacturing and retail to agriculture, energy and automotive dealers. Small businesses ran out of building and construction materials needed to build homes for Canadians. Local car dealers were awaiting shipments of vehicles and parts. Exporting industries lost their ability to move their products to market, making it more difficult to secure the global contracts that drive investment and employ Canadians. Pulp mills stood silent. Mining operations, as you heard, were curtailed, and businesses across Canada faced increased costs and prolonged wait times for goods. Moreover, the rerouting of goods destined for Canada to alternative ports not only incurred additional costs and delays for businesses but also needlessly amplified the environmental footprint of our trade.
While the strike unfolded in B.C., the effects were felt nationwide. We think of the port of Vancouver as “Canada's port”, for it moves as many goods as the next five largest ports combined, single-handedly accounting for approximately 25% of Canada's total traded goods. This means that long-term disputes like the ones we experienced this summer have far-reaching consequences that affect the entire nation.
Billions of dollars in goods bypassed Vancouver for other ports, especially Seattle and other U.S. and Mexican ports, as port swaps and diversions increased. All of this cost Canada. Businesses were unable to adequately plan their operations and staffing without knowing if the ports would be open from one minute to the next. This was made worse by the back and forth of strike action.
Throughout the strike and the aftermath, we consistently urged the federal government to explore additional tools to facilitate lasting agreements during labour disruptions that affect the entire economy. The review initiated by the , under section 106 of the Canada Labour Code is a key opportunity to do this.
In conclusion, I thank you once again for the opportunity to share insights into the impacts of the strike. We look forward to collaborating with the government to ensure that meaningful collective bargaining can take place without causing detrimental nationwide consequences to our economy and our reputation as a reliable and stable trading partner.
Thank you. I look forward to the questions and answers.
:
Thank you, Madam Chair.
I just want to state for the record, especially for Mr. Murray, that no one here is disputing the union's right to strike for better wages. That's unanimously supported by all parties in the House of Commons, but we do want to look at the economic impact of this strike. That's the whole point of this study.
I wanted to quickly follow up. I'm going to ask all three to answer—the freight forwarders association, the board of trade and the Freight Management Association of Canada.
There have been many sorts of reports on what the economic impact has been. I think the $10 billion is the value of the goods that were disrupted. What I want to talk about is the economic impact to the small businesses and others, because I don't think we have a good understanding of what that actual impact is, which includes the fact that these businesses may lose customers because their supply of product is now unstable. Therefore, companies go elsewhere to have those goods supplied.
Could all of you comment on that and whether or not you think that's been captured in any of the calculations of the economic impact?
Mr. Ballantyne, why don't you go first?
:
You're quite right that the calculator factors in only the value of goods. The Royal Bank did some analysis and found that 63,000 containers were impacted.
When we look at the broad economic impact, though, the calculator didn't take in the lack of inventory affecting small and medium-sized businesses around their sales, production or the other kinds of impacts that really come to bear, including the catch-up time it took after.
When we look at some of the sectors that we have heard from among our members at the Greater Vancouver Board of Trade, they include mining—my colleague Tim can speak specifically about mining—potash, forestry, car dealerships, trucking and agriculture. All of these industries did speak to the economic impacts, which were significant.
As far as I know, our calculator took in the value of traded goods and not the full economic impact. I don't know if that work has been done yet.
:
I'll speak on that as well.
I provided in our opening remarks two examples, specific examples, one from an importer perspective and one from an exporter perspective.
The importer was affected because, when you have a 13-day strike or labour disruption, we have to understand that one day of a strike takes about seven days of recovery to get the goods ultimately to where they were going because of the backlog that's created. It's not just the 13-day impact. It's up to two or three months of impact overall.
I provided two examples. One was an importer whose seasonal goods did not arrive in time. They're sitting on the product. They can't move it. They won't be able to move it for a year. They're impacted financially due to the fact that they have this product and, again, for a small importer, that's a significant impact overall.
The other one I provided was an example of an exporter and, again, it's due to Canada's unreliability in the supply chain that the overseas buyer is now sourcing from other countries. Again, somebody who had regular product, regular inventory, is leaving the country and outsourcing elsewhere, and they've been impacted overall.
:
Thank you, Madam Chair.
Mr. Murray, listening to you has raised my concern. I strongly believe that unions are required in any society. Unions have played a great role in protecting the rights of workers and providing benefits. However, listening to you now, I hear the casual attitude in your speech towards Canada's reputation and the supply chain disruptions, with no regard for the tens of thousands of workers affected by the strike of a few hundred workers.
Coming to the economic impact, probably later I'll go back and read your actual words. The words you used were that a balance exists.
How can I accept that? We talk about calculating the total economic impact of the disruption in trade as being worth $800 million a day with a cumulative effect of about $10.7 billion. If this is the attitude of the workers—whose right to unionize and right to strike I agree with—then maybe I should accept Mr. Ballantyne's proposal that we need to expand the definition of essential services.
Canada is a prosperous country, but 65% of our GDP comes from trade. We need trade to be flowing freely. There's a highly competitive world outside. We don't have the natural advantages we used to have once upon a time. It's a very competitive market out there and the Vancouver port, in the worldwide rankings on port efficiency, is ranked 347 out of 348.
We may quibble with the performance indicators and what have been considered to be the factors. However, we are not even close to anywhere near the top 25%. We are at the dead end and this is noted. In 2019, on the industry perceptions of export transport infrastructure quality, we came down from the top 10 to 32. When this is the case and when the unions are saying in a very casual manner that balance exists when it comes to economic impact, I'm really concerned.
If you have any thoughts on this, would you like comment for one minute? I have very limited time, and I have other questions to ask.
:
Thank you, Mr. Murray. I have very limited time and I have questions for other witnesses. Thank you.
Mr. Ballantyne, I know that “essential services” basically means we have to consider the safety and health of the public.
Should we not consider the livelihoods and how many people are directly affected by a strike in very critical infrastructure? As well as the losses.... I can understand the corporate losses, like those that Ms. Martin mentioned with the red meat, with its very limited life cycle, going to waste.
I can understand that, but should the livelihoods of tens of thousands of workers being directly affected be part of the consideration when we define essential services?
:
Thank you, Madam Chair.
It's a pleasure to join you on this important study. Good morning to my colleagues and to the witnesses who are with us this morning.
Before asking my questions, I'd like to set the record straight. Earlier, my colleague Mr. Seeback mentioned that his party wasn't against the right to strike. However, if someone isn't against the right to strike, they don't ask that Parliament be recalled to pass a bill to end a strike. However, that's what the leader of the Conservative Party did last July during the Port of Vancouver dispute. In their defence, I remind the committee that the premiers of Alberta and Saskatchewan did the same thing. I want to put things in context for the people watching us. So we can dispense with the pleasantries.
I will now ask my questions. Mr. Murray, you talked about the importance of getting to the root of the problem. If we want to avoid disputes, we need to bring the stakeholders to the table. In your presentation, you talked about the use of special legislation, something you experienced at the Port of Montreal, for example. That didn't happen at the Port of Vancouver but, as you point out, Canada has a dismal record when it comes to passing special legislation to force workers to return to work. You experienced it in April 2021.
Can you tell us about the consequences of passing special legislation on workers' rights during the dispute at the Port of Vancouver last summer?
:
Special legislation was imposed on us by Minister Filomena Tassi. I need to describe the circumstances of the dispute at the time. We had said that the employer had taken three measures against us and that if it withdrew them, the union would withdraw its notice to strike and people would return to work. The employer didn't withdraw them, the government legislated them and we had special legislation passed.
It imposed arbitration of disputes, which took place at the Port of Montreal. All that has resulted in is that all demands, both employer and union, that were on the bargaining table in 2020 and 2021 have been postponed to 2023. The problem has just been put on hold. It's a well-known fact that arbitrators avoid very specific places in collective agreements for fear of upsetting the balance between the parties.
The arbitrator took a year to hear us, and now that arbitration of disputes is done, the vast majority of respective claims are back on the bargaining table this year. So nothing was resolved by imposing arbitration of disputes through special legislation.
I don't want anyone to say I have a casual attitude, but I must point out that the legislation was passed when the Liberal government had a majority, whereas it did not when the strike happened at the Port of Vancouver.
:
The current section 34 of the Canada Labour Code was written in 1970, following a royal commission called the Picard commission.
The good old days of employers' organizations, where people were hired by the shipping companies to do the work, are gone. There's no representative of shipping lines and shipping companies at the bargaining tables. It's as if your committee or a minister of international affairs had to negotiate an international treaty with another country, but sent the parliamentary gardener to negotiate. We should send department officials or the minister himself. In our case, during our negotiations, the real decision-makers were not at the bargaining table. The same thing happened in Vancouver; the BC Maritime Employers Association had exactly the same problem.
Have you heard of any problems at the Port of Halifax? You have not. Halifax has been negotiating for the last two years, and there was a settlement this year. You know what? Representatives of shipping lines and shipping companies were at the bargaining table. There was no disruption at the Port of Halifax to get a four-year contract. At the Port of Montreal, as in Vancouver, we have to go back to the root of their absence. The reason there are problems with labour relations is that the real decision-makers are not sitting at the bargaining tables. If ever there was one special law that should be passed, it's the law that would force the real decision-makers, the representatives of shipping companies and shipping lines, to take a seat at the bargaining table.
Thank you to all the witnesses here today.
I'm going to continue with Monsieur Murray.
We've heard a narrative here throughout this study that Canada's reputation is tattered and then a list of reasons why: that it's the pandemic, that it's climate change, the atmospheric rivers and the fires, and then that it's this strike we had in Vancouver. We haven't had a strike at the port of Vancouver since 1969, so things have been going well there. In 2010, as we heard in our last meeting, the BCMEA, this group of employers, ran the negotiations for the employers. They weren't the decision-makers, and that has caused delays.
I'm not sure if that was the reason why workers were locked out in 2018, but we heard from the union in Vancouver that they would put in their response to a position within a day and it would take seven or 10 days for the employer to come back. That's what causes these delays.
It seems that everybody is quick to blame labour for a labour disruption when we have container shipping companies and container ports around the world making record profits and we see inflation at record levels. The workers want a share of those profits to be able to handle that inflation, because they want to continue living acceptable lives, yet they're the ones who get the blame when the employers don't negotiate in good faith, it seems, or at least not in an efficient way.
I'm wondering if you could comment on that bit of a rant of mine, especially around this narrative that it always seems to be the union's fault when there's a strike.
:
You're absolutely right. I don't think there's a union in Canada that's happy to go on strike. It's a pressure tactic we use on our employers and shipping companies. No one gets any pleasure out of it. We do it to get a settlement more quickly.
You're absolutely right that the management structure, both at the BCMEA and the Maritime Employers Association, or MEA, prevents us from talking to the real decision-makers.
I will say it again: In Halifax, the real decision-makers are at the bargaining table, and there's been no labour dispute. It's the same thing with the longshoremen in Vancouver. They have union demands, and the people at the bargaining table don't make a decision and have to forward those demands to a board of directors, which is a kind of star chamber. We never meet with a board of directors like that.
I'll go back to my original point. Section 34 of the Canada Labour Code really needs to be reviewed if we want to eliminate or minimize possible labour disputes. It's the same for us at the Port of Montreal; before 2020, the last disruptions dated back to 2000, 20 years ago, when management imposed a seven-day lockout. We really need to review the management structure so that the real decision-makers are at the table.
You're absolutely right. It's very easy to blame the workers who go on strike, to call them “casual”, as a member did a little earlier, but we don't do that for fun. We really want to negotiate better working conditions for our people, and that's the only role that unions must play.
:
In our last dispute, in 2020-21, one of the companies used scabs; circumstances led to some incidents that no one wanted. This created a lot of tension on the picket lines and at the bargaining table, since a number of scabs had been used during the longshore strike at the Port of Montreal.
I think everyone knows the story. Before anti‑scab legislation was put in place, there was confrontation, there was violence, and no one wanted that. However, when you go on the picket line or are locked out and people come in to do your job, obviously things get a little heated and people get a little more aggressive. That's not desirable at a bargaining table. No one wants external events to disrupt what's going on at a bargaining table. I believe that anti‑scab legislation will certainly defuse all the tension that may exist.
In 2020, we experienced tension with scabs with a company owned by Logistec, in Quebec. That created a lot of tension, which necessarily disrupted negotiations.
:
Thank you, Madam Chair.
I'd like to thank the witnesses for being here with us.
Before asking my questions, I'd like to come back to what my colleague next to me said and tell him that we never wanted to force workers back to work during that strike. People blamed the government for not taking action.
I was surprised to see that my colleague was very upset and that he wanted to put on a show. That really surprised me.
My first question is for Mr. Rodgers.
In your opinion, how can we define what essential services are? From what I'm hearing, the economy is not an essential service.
:
Mr. Rodgers, I'll address you again.
If I understand correctly, one day on strike puts a company six days behind, I believe. That's what you said earlier.
This strike, which was settled after 13 days, put things three months behind schedule.
After that strike, the economy didn't return to normal. Business owners continue to suffer losses.
Can you tell me how much the strike has cost? Do you have any figures on that?
:
Thank you, Madam Chair.
Thank you to all the witnesses for being here today.
I'd like to go back a little bit. Before the strike happened at the port of Vancouver, as we know, postpandemic there was a huge impact on the supply chain due to the pandemic. I remember a stakeholder in my riding of Richmond Centre telling me that a cargo container was costing more than $10,000.
Since the strike began in July, are we still looking at the impact of the recovery from the pandemic?
Maybe Mr. Ballantyne or Mr. Rodgers can share some comments with us on that.
The information on that is always somewhat variable, and it may vary from company to company or industry to industry.
One of our member companies indicated that for that 13-day strike, there was about a 14-week impact in total. Because things have to start changing several weeks in advance, a lot of companies will start making alternative arrangements before a strike, because they want to be prepared in case the strike happens. Then, as has been stated previously, there is the time to recover from the actual strike. I think Bruce mentioned that there was something like a week for every day of a strike, something along those lines. That seems to be the general consensus.
:
Scabs could be used again in any dispute, whether it be a strike or a lockout affecting workers under federal jurisdiction.
That's what we're currently seeing at the Port of Québec.
At the risk of repeating myself, the employees of Quebec Saint-Laurent, or QSL, have now been locked out for 14 months. They're going to spend a second Christmas on the picket lines, and scabs have been doing their job for the last 14 months.
If the goal is to soften labour relations and to create winning conditions for everyone so that the parties reach an agreement as quickly as possible, the anti‑scab bill should come into force immediately after it receives royal assent.
The special act, An Act to provide for the resumption and continuation of operations at the Port of Montreal, came into force immediately after royal assent.
So I don't see why 18 months are needed to implement such fundamental provisions for workers under federal jurisdiction.
:
Thank you, Madam Chair.
Thank you to all of the witnesses for taking the time to be here today.
I want to begin with Mr. Rodgers or Ms. Kuzeljevich.
The impact, as we've heard it, on the shipment side is about $13 billion, with a net economic loss of about $1 billion. It seems a lot of that's due to the unpredictability and uncertainty that the strike, or the lead-up to the strike, caused.
Going back to when the collective agreement expired on March 31, 2023, would you not agree that there's certainly potential for that to be much higher than those numbers? Are there potentially lingering effects that then continue on poststrike?
:
Thank you, Madam Chair.
We're talking today about finding measures or solutions to ensure that, in the future, the negotiation process can continue at the table. I think that we all agree that the best negotiations happen at the bargaining table.
The government tabled Bill .
To make sure that we're all on the same page, I'd like to say the following. The bill aims to amend current legislation and modernize the way Canada's marine and railway transportation systems operate; remove systemic barriers to create a more fluid, secure and resilient supply chain; expand Canada port authorities' mandate over traffic management; position Canada's ports as strategic hubs that support national supply chain performance and effectively manage investment decisions for sustainable growth; improve the government's insight into ports and their operations; and modernize provisions on rail safety, security and transportation of dangerous goods.
In its current form, the bill is a win‑win approach. Of course, the bill could be strengthened. That's our focus right now.
I want to hear the witnesses' views on this matter.
First, do they agree that the best agreements are made by the parties at the bargaining table?
Second, I would like to ask each witness to comment on the legislation. Some witnesses have already made suggestions, but others haven't yet had the opportunity to do so. What does it mean for the members and sectors that you represent?
Ms. Martin, I'd like you to answer the question first. The other witnesses can then respond.
:
Thanks very much for the question.
I'm ill-equipped to speak to Bill .
I would say that, generally, our association—and I personally—support free collective bargaining. It is constitutionally entrenched in this country.
In this circumstance, though, when matters bargain to an impasse, there need to be—and we're very pleased to see the review the is undertaking under section 106 of the Canada Labour Code—tools that can be used to keep parties at the table so they can come to a fair and equitable resolution. In some cases, that may mean binding arbitration, final offer selection arbitration or other means to resolve a dispute.
:
Thank you, Madam Chair.
Thank you to the witnesses for being with us today.
I just want to follow up on some of the questions earlier and some of the comments that were made by the Canadian International Freight Forwarders. They talked about issues such as the potential impacts, for example. There's this notion that it always feel like, instead of avoiding strikes, strikes become a requirement of negotiations, which only ends up hurting businesses.
Mr. Rodgers, you said, with the possible threat coming to Montreal, that you're already understanding that the freight suppliers and so on are already moving and transitioning supplies to avoid Montreal because of this threat.
Can you detail that? Would you know, for example, how much has already been moved away from that in terms of the cost or how much that represents in terms of costs?
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If you could share some of that with us, that would be greatly appreciated.
Ultimately, the worry is that those companies won't come back. What they'll do is end up finding those alternative routes and then ultimately just continue to avoid the port of Montreal, which hurts both sides. To our point here all together, that's why I think it's incumbent on both sides to work together amicably so that they can get a resolution and a fair agreement that benefits all. Ultimately, if we lose that business, it will never come back.
On the notion of one day of the strike and seven days to recover, we had the Global Automakers here the other day, and they basically confirmed those statistics by saying that it just added another 60 days in the backlog to their delivery. My concerns are that situation as well.
Mr. Rodgers, I think in your opening remarks.... You haven't come forward with ideas, but you said that there has to be another way to avoid this. I was just wondering if you had any concrete ideas or suggestions on how we can avoid this continual labour strife that we find at the ports?
:
Thank you very much to all the witnesses.
The thing about going towards the end or last is that lots of my questions have been asked.
There is one question I'd like to ask our panellists, because we've been discussing lots of things. Would they agree with our government's position that the best deals, when it relates to labour, are at the bargaining table?
I'll just go around the horn here for a yes or a no from everyone. It's a question that we've put forward. It's our strong belief that the best deals are made at the bargaining table.
I'll start with Mr. McEwan, because you're right there on my screen.
The reason I ask is that everyone seems to be in agreement with that statement. What we have heard—and it's backed by further evidence from before—is that replacement workers prolong strikes or lockouts, because it takes the focus off the table. We're not getting serious negotiations. That's an issue, and it prolongs things. There is evidence again and again throughout Canadian history.
I put this on the floor. If we do not want to see long-term strikes or lockouts, and they're happening under the current system, we ought to be changing it so there is a focus at that table that everyone agrees to.
While I have the floor, I just want to mention as well about Canada's reputation. I'm also co-chair of the Canada-Japan...and as such have quite a bit of dialogue with politicians from Asia, as well as businesses. They were here just recently at the end of August and September. They view Canada as a very reliable partner, especially with Russia's illegal war against Ukraine, and with what China is doing in the South China Sea and the East China Sea..
It's not just the Japanese. The people in the area are very excited about the Indo-Pacific strategy, because they're identifying not only peace and security but opportunities for trade.
One of the questions I would have for the group is about the capacity of our west coast ports, because they really want to do more deals with Canada. They see us as having a great reputation. We're stable. We're like-minded on democracy and capitalism. What is the capacity? Do we need to invest more in infrastructure to make sure we can meet the needs of our friends from very ASEAN countries—the Philippines or Japan—as they're looking for more safety and security and coming to Canada? What is our capacity?
As well, what are any of the threats? I always think of SWOT—strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats. One of the people here had identified some of the climate changes that are happening, including rising or lowering sea levels and fires.
I'm going to start with Mr. McEwan, because I think he was one of the people who talked about weather events and such and how they could disrupt supply chains.
:
I understand that it's hard to respond when faced with the truth, Madam Chair.
Here's the situation. People are spreading misinformation. When they're confronted with the truth, they raise points of order and they don't want the analysts to help us with our work.
I have no choice but to ensure that the people in this room and the people tuning in receive the correct information. Bill passed third reading on April 29, 2021. As you might expect, it received royal assent. This special bill was introduced by the government, meaning the Liberal party, with the support of its friends in the Conservative party. It's troubling when one of my colleagues tries to make me look ignorant because I'm new to the committee, and tells me that his party doesn't support special legislation. It's very dangerous.
I'll turn to Mr. Murray. We can't ask the analysts questions, but we can certainly ask the witnesses questions.
Mr. Murray, you were involved in the labour dispute covered by this special legislation. Do you remember who introduced this bill? Who supported it? We mustn't believe that things were done automatically. It was a minority government.
I'd like to turn to Mr. McEwan. You made a good case as to why mining is important now. One of your members, Teck Resources, has a big smelter in my riding that's very important for all the reasons you said, plus it's one of the biggest employers in my riding.
I also want to ask you what your members face when it comes to the whole supply chain. Shipping ports, obviously, are important, but I'm just wondering. Rail service, especially, seems to be critical for mining. It deals in big heavy stuff that has to be transported.
To get through the narrative that all the problems with supply chain issues seem to come down to workers who want a fair share of profits, I want to ask you about the other issues facing your members when it comes to supply chains.
:
Sure. Thanks for the question, Mr. Cannings.
Our members, as I said in my opening remarks, in the past few years—as we all have—have faced supply chain challenges from the pandemic and from the wildfires and the atmospheric rivers. There were supply chain disruptions as a result of the atmospheric rivers particularly.
Mr. Sheehan spoke to this earlier. As we think about the trade opportunities in the Indo-Pacific, we need to ensure—particularly in British Columbia—that our roads, rails and ports are resilient in the face of those challenges, so we've advocated to both orders of government the need for investment in those areas.
In respect of the strike situation last summer, our position would be that we do support free and collective bargaining and we do believe the best outcomes are achieved at a bargaining table, but we also support business continuity. It's absolutely critical that the waterfront in our west coast ports be accessible and be fluid to support the export of our commodities and the inbound materials we need in order to operate.
A strike of any duration—or a lockout, for that matter—should not be tolerated, and that's why the section 106 review is timely—to figure out what the tools are that can be deployed when we bargain to impasse and what the timing points are around the deployment of those kinds of tools.
:
Thank you very much, Madam Chair.
I was really happy that Mr. Sheehan decided to bring up the question of infrastructure with respect to our trade infrastructure.
I have a paper from the Canada West Foundation that talks about the port of Vancouver strike. In that paper, they say that in 2013 Canada had the 10th-best global trade infrastructure in the world and that, as of 2023, it has the 32nd-best trade infrastructure. Canada's trade infrastructure, after eight years of this Liberal government, has plummeted from 10th to 32nd.
I was wondering if any of the witnesses today would like to comment on whether or not there is a desperate need for trade infrastructure here in Canada.
:
I'll jump in on that one initially.
We believe there is. There's a significant impact overall. On the earlier comment about the expansion progress and whether we have capacity, we know that the Roberts Bank terminal 2 project in Vancouver is going to add 1.6 million containers into that port sometime in 2030.
Part of the problem Canada has is the amount of time it takes for some of these projects to be approved and put into place. When the Roberts Bank terminal 2 expansion project was first presented.... It's going to take 20 years from concept until actually starting to operate, which is far too long. We can't wait that long.
What we are doing now and how we're trying to position it, knowing that there are going to be 1.6 million more containers in about the next seven to eight years, is, do we have the right infrastructure? Do we have the rail connections? Do we have the roads? Do we have the terminal operations? Do we have the land available? All of these things have to be taken into consideration now.
We can't wait until the container terminal is built and the containers hit the ground to try to figure out what we do with them. We're well aware of it well in advance, and we have to start taking those initiatives today.
:
That's an important question because one major issue we faced was a lack of information. There was a concerted effort on the part of Transport Canada to get stakeholders on a daily call, which was immensely helpful. However, there was a good degree of silence behind some of the negotiations taking place, and there was a lack of cohesive information. One day it was on and then one day it was off. One day there were threats of layoffs at one of the railways and the next day that was off.
Relaying that information back to our members is part of my job and it became problematic because there seemed to be this lack of transparency. Understandably, when negotiations take place we can't hear all about it, but there needs to be a mechanism to deliver that information we talked about. What could make the negotiation process better for all the stakeholders is relaying some sort of concrete information back to the affected stakeholders within a reasonable time frame.
Our members were affected by that uncertainty. Although we can't calculate it, there is definitely an uncertainty cost to the length of time that these negotiations and decisions take.
On one of the earlier questions, an improvement could be determining a timeline around these negotiations.