:
This meeting is called to order.
Hello, everyone.
Welcome to meeting number 156 of the House of Commons Standing Committee on Public Accounts.
[English]
Today’s meeting is taking place in a hybrid format, pursuant to the Standing Orders. Members are attending in person in the room and remotely using the Zoom application.
Before we begin, I would ask all in-person participants to read the guidelines written on the updated cards on the table. These measures are in place to help prevent audio and feedback incidents and protect the health and safety of all participants, including, and especially, the interpreters. I kindly remind all those in person and online that, for the safety of our interpreters, it is very important that your microphone is muted when you are not speaking.
[Translation]
Thank you all for your cooperation.
Pursuant to Standing Order 108(3), the committee is resuming consideration of the Auditor General of Canada's Report 8, entitled “Canada Emergency Business Account“, from Reports 8 to 12, referred to the committee on Monday, December 2, 2024.
[English]
I would like to welcome our witnesses, some of whom are with us in person and some of whom are joining us remotely.
From the Office of the Auditor General, we have Karen Hogan, Auditor General of Canada.
It's nice to see you and members of your team again.
We have Andrew Hayes, deputy auditor general; and Mélanie Cabana, principal.
Thank you all for coming in.
From Export Development Canada, joining us remotely, we have Mairead Lavery, president and chief executive officer.
To you and all of your team members, thank you for making yourselves available today.
We have Mr. Scott Moore, executive vice-president, finance, and chief financial officer; and Todd Winterhalt, senior vice-president, international markets, and head of communications and public affairs.
We'll begin with opening remarks from our two groups of witnesses.
Ms. Hogan, you have the floor, please.
I am pleased to be here today to discuss my report on the Canada Emergency Business Account program, or CEBA, which was tabled in the House of Commons on Monday.
I would like to begin by acknowledging that we are on the traditional unceded territory of the Algonquin Anishinabe people.
I am accompanied today by Andrew Hayes, Deputy Auditor General, and Mélanie Cabana, the principal who was responsible for this audit.
The Canada Emergency Business Account program was put in place during the COVID‑19 pandemic to help small Canadian businesses cover expenses they could not defer.
[English]
We found that Export Development Canada, EDC, acted quickly to provide $49.1 billion in loans to help almost 900,000 small businesses across Canada. However, the program was not managed with due regard for value for money.
We found significant weaknesses in EDC’s contract management. It relied on a single vendor, Accenture, to deliver the program. The non-competitive contracts awarded to Accenture represented 92% of the total value of $342 million in contracts related to the CEBA program.
EDC gave too much control to Accenture over key aspects of contracts, such as the scope of work and pricing. EDC failed to exercise basic controls in contract management, such as monitoring whether amounts paid aligned with the work performed. Since ongoing program delivery uses Accenture’s proprietary IT systems, EDC will have to rely on these non‑competitive contracts until at least 2028.
[Translation]
We also found that neither the Department of Finance nor Global Affairs Canada provided effective oversight of value for money. There was an accountability void that resulted in basic program elements, including measuring outcomes, being delayed or not completed. Finance Canada did not challenge EDC's administrative spending, or provide an overall spending limit. As of March 31, 2024, that spending totalled $853 million.
[English]
While 91% of loans were issued to eligible businesses, we estimated that about $3.5 billion went to ineligible recipients. I am concerned that EDC only partially agreed with our recommendation that it should carry out additional work to identify all ineligible recipients and recover the amounts involved.
Unlike other COVID-19 programs, CEBA is a loan program, with repayments that will be ongoing for several years, while action on defaulted loans is just beginning. Value for money will be further compromised without better monitoring and improved plans to recover defaulted loans.
[Translation]
This concludes my opening statement.
We would be pleased to answer any questions the committee may have.
:
Thank you, Mr. Chair and members of the committee, for inviting me here today.
[English]
Thank you for the opportunity to contribute to the committee's study of the Auditor General's Report regarding the performance of the Canada emergency business account program. I would like to begin by highlighting a few important notes.
EDC worked collaboratively with the Office of the Auditor General. We accept the recommendations of the audit. We are focused on improving our controls and reporting and have established a clear process to collect on all loans, including amounts owing from ineligible recipients. This process is under way.
For those who may be less familiar, EDC is a Crown corporation that operates under a mandate to support and grow Canada's export trade. We help mitigate risks for thousands of Canadian exporters and investors, as well as for international buyers, through our suite of financing solutions, insurance products, knowledge products and connection services. As the committee may know, EDC has been consistently profitable throughout its 80-year history.
Before we begin discussing the Government of Canada's emergency business account, I would first like to say EDC understands the importance of taking stock of what worked well and what could have been better. Let's recall that when this program was announced, Canadians were boarding repatriation flights, our borders were closed to non-essential travel, and provinces were declaring states of emergency. Schools, offices and businesses were forced to shutter, and Canada's unemployment rate was on its way to a record high.
On March 27, the Government of Canada announced the creation of the Canada emergency business account program, directing EDC to administer it under the Canada Account. It expanded EDC's mandate so we could work directly with domestic businesses. Through this program, eligible small businesses and not-for-profits were provided up to $60,000 in partially forgivable loans. For many business owners, those loans helped them keep their lights on, pivot to new ways of doing business or, in some cases, avoid bankruptcy.
Acting as the program administrator for the emergency business account, we had to essentially build a bank within EDC, developing complex infrastructure that did not exist. We created systems capable of funding, tracking and collecting 900,000 loans. We created processes that allowed us to share information with nearly every bank and credit union in the country.
The program began accepting applications on April 9, less than two weeks after the government's announcement. When the federal government announced the program, EDC was already at capacity, supporting customers and delivering other relief programs specifically for Canadian exporters. Undertaking this program required us to mobilize both internal and external resources quickly, so that we could pivot to supporting non-exporting small Canadian businesses and not-for-profits.
These businesses employ 9.7 million people in Canada. We know they form the backbone of the economy, and we know they are often the most vulnerable in times of crisis. We understood that this program was mission-critical, but we would not have been able to deliver on what the government asked of us without specialized, third party support. In the end, over 21 months, we partnered with more than 230 financial institutions to deliver almost 900,000 loans, totalling $49.1 billion in emergency support, to more than 75% of all Canadian small businesses from coast to coast.
For context, in a typical year, EDC extends about 300 loans. While processing applications and delivering these emergency loans to businesses, we were also adapting and finding solutions to the government's decisions to expand eligibility, increase loan amounts and extend deadlines. With each change, we worked to deliver pandemic relief as quickly and efficiently as possible, and we succeeded at a reasonable cost of approximately $300 per loan.
Still, there is always an opportunity to improve our practices, especially with a “first of kind” program launched in an unprecedented time, and this audit offers important recommendations for how we can do so. We are working to implement all of the Auditor General's recommendations.
EDC has already identified some similar areas for improvement and is implementing an action plan. We anticipate that a number of improvements will be in place before the end of this year.
Thank you again for inviting us to contribute to your study.
I look forward to the discussion and the opportunity to offer more information on EDC's role.
Thank you.
I would tend to think however that for a program involving 900,000 businesses, if you felt that you had neither the expertise nor the ability to offer such small loans to so many businesses, you would have put that in writing. I have to agree though that it is not in any way EDC's business model.
I'm referring to the principle of covering yourself, something public servants are very familiar with. I will not mention the three letters associated with that principle.
We would ask you kindly to look for that information and provide us with the related documents. We would like to see what happened, right from the beginning.
Let us turn now to the 19 contracts awarded to Accenture.
You appeared before the Standing Committee on Public Accounts this past February. At the time, I asked you about Accenture. The English-language press reported that you relied on a single company to deliver work valued at hundreds of millions of dollars, without a competitive process.
You said then that there were 31 contracts, with a total value of $208 million.
Why did you say that? Now we are talking about 19 contracts with a value of $313 million. How could you forget $105 million in the process?
Mr. Moore, let's turn to the call centre, which you have talked about in glowing terms.
The call centre received three contracts for a total of $27 million. You said it received about 450,000 calls, as I remember.
That seems strange because the newspapers reported at the time that MPs were receiving tons of phone calls at their offices. In addition, the Canadian Federation of Independent Business stated that it received tens of thousands of calls related to the CEBA because business people had no one else to turn to.
How can it be that, on the one hand, you said you received a high volume of calls while, on the other, business people could not get through?
People had to call, dozens of times, a number that was not working or they simply could not get through.
There are two possibilities: either the tens of thousands of businesses that contacted us are not telling the truth, even though they always say the same thing, or your version does not represent what really happened.
Did anyone check the number and the quality of the calls reported to you?
Thank you to all the witnesses for being here again today.
Thank you, Ms. Hogan.
I know that we've now questioned you twice—once on Monday, and now you're here again—so thank you for that.
I'm going to ask you a question off the top that I know I asked on Monday, but just for the purposes of this study, I'd like to get it on the record. One of your mandates is to make sure we're getting value for money when we use taxpayers' money in Canada. Here, we have a program where it seemed that it worked very well in getting the money out the door and helping these businesses. I think most of your criticism has come from how we're trying to recover that money. Also, then, there are some issues around contracts, which I'll get to.
One thing I was hearing from businesses—and we just heard from Ms. Lavery about the panic and the desperation in a lot of these businesses—is that they needed more time to repay these loans. Initially, I think, the deadline was the end of 2022. There was an extension made to 2023, but even then I was getting a lot of concern.
Did you look at anything that would model the benefits to Canada, to the government, of adding another year's extension to make sure that we didn't bankrupt thousands of businesses and that we'd be able to recover that money? Did you look at that at all or were you just looking at the mechanics, the audit of the books, as we see?
Shockingly, to everyone, I support this motion.
It's very clear that we have a very large problem before us. We have three executives from EDC who, even though they're just blocks away, couldn't even be bothered to show up to defend themselves in person and have been very obvious in their attempts to not answer simple yes-or-no questions. I asked, I think, five times before they were finally pressured to actually respond. It's clear, I believe, that they are hiding some things.
It's very clear that we have a lot of issues.
We've heard directly from EDC that they were aware of Accenture taking advantage of taxpayers, yet they sat idly by and did nothing.
We've seen the government state to the Auditor General that she didn't properly acknowledge how tough times were. We have $3 billion of taxpayers' money that disappeared into the ether of ineligible grants, yet somehow, the government says we didn't properly acknowledge that COVID was happening. However, we've heard repeatedly from the Auditor General that COVID is not an excuse for ignoring the rules.
We have many people to hear from. We heard repeatedly today that EDC is going to work with Finance, but we have the Department of Finance stating that, “Finance Canada has no legislative requirements to provide oversight of administrative expenditures” on behalf of CEBA. Finance states that “the administration of the CEBA program was delegated to...EDC”, and “the Board of Directors...is responsible for providing oversight”. This motion calls to have the board show up.
We also have within EDC a very large executive committee. I'll find the exact name for you here. They have a senior vice-president and chief legal officer responsible for CEBA, yet they could not bother to provide that person for us today. That's Miguel Simard. The motion also includes the senior vice-president of EDC, who, apparently, is responsible for CEBA—at least that's what's on their website. That's in the motion as well.
We need to hear from Finance as to why the finance department forced this program onto EDC when EDC was very clear it did not have the capacity. We need to hear from Finance as to why it's saying it bears no responsibility because it's the board of directors that's responsible.
We need to hear more from EDC officials about why they did not push back. If they're doing only 300 loans a year, at an average of one a day, and then, all of a sudden, they're being told to do about 25,000 a day, there's obviously an issue. We need to delve more into why EDC did not push back more and why Finance apparently thought it was a good idea to have EDC—which does only, again, a minimal number of loans—administer 90,000 loans and $90 billion of Canadian taxpayers' money, when, clearly, they said they did not have the capacity to do so.
I also think we need to hear a lot more from the Auditor General on the differences between what EDC is saying and what the Auditor General's report is saying, as well as between what the Auditor General is saying and what the government is saying.
I'm sorry. I'm losing my voice. I'm suffering from a cold.
I will let it go. I'll finish up there. I reserve the right to speak a bit more once my voice recovers.
Thank you, Chair.
Obviously, ducking from accountability seems to be the rule of the day with this motion. Maybe it's a bit too close to home for these Liberals after this meeting, but I digress.
First of all, saying that we shouldn't have any meetings during this time period really handcuffs our committee and prevents us from doing our job. It's preventing us from looking at, for example, CEBA, the first point of the motion, until after January 27, 2025, while also ending and killing other motions. Despite the fact that we actually had a subcommittee meeting to discuss this, here we are with this Liberal guillotine motion, as it's called. It's interesting that when there are hard-hitting studies, the Liberals are eager to dispose of them, yet they come here and try to say all the great things they're doing out of the darkness of this report.
Let's talk about this motion at hand and why it is important that we look at the CEBA motion and not kill it until seven or eight weeks from now. What we heard today, in the limited testimony from our virtual participants from EDC, is, quite frankly, unacceptable. It fails to address the seriousness of this report. It fails to actually provide forthright and clear answers to what I would say are very simple questions. The fact that Mr. McCauley had to ask yes-or-no questions multiple times is, quite frankly, unacceptable.
There's the fact that they accepted responsibility for a program, knowing full well that they didn't have the capacity to do it. There's the fact that hundreds of millions of dollars went to Accenture, despite the fact that Accenture didn't actually deliver the loans. It was the financial institutions that were delivering the loans. You have a breakdown in documentation. I mean, Mr. McCauley and I quipped a bit about GC Strategies being involved in terms of what happened here.
It's interesting; if you read the April 2020 testimony from the minister at the time, , she said, “In fact, the decision-maker on the loan will be that financial institution, the bank or the credit union, to the customers. I would encourage businesses to go to their financial institution to see if they are able to get that support.” However, we have this example where EDC, which was not a loan provider.... I think they said in total they did somewhere in the neighbourhood of 300 loans internationally, but now there was an expectation to do hundreds of thousands of loans.
It was doomed to be a challenge from the start. What we've seen now with the Auditor General's report is that, unfortunately, that has come to fruition. The fact that Accenture was delivered on a sole-source contract, something that our colleague Madame Sinclair-Desgagné highlighted several months ago, is, frankly, unacceptable. It does not comply with the rules.
You know, I hear some people trying to justify it, that we were in a pandemic and things had to happen fast. The Auditor General dispelled that and said very clearly today that perhaps there could have been a case made for the initial contract, but there were off-ramps all the way around where quick procurement requests for proposals could have been undertaken that would not have been sole-source contracts. That's the real challenge.
We had questions. Mr. Morantz helped me with one of my questions. He was quite interested in the forgivable portion of those loans. For some of these loans that were supposed to have a forgivable portion, in some cases it was $10,000 and in some cases it was $20,000, depending on which intake it was. Where's that money now? If it wasn't eligible for the loan itself, surely the non-repayable portion would be ineligible as well, yet here we are, not getting those answers.
The big concern I had from today was that I believe 17 cases were found to have been potentially fraudulent. They were referred to the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. Those totalled in the amount of $1 million. A million dollars went to potentially fraudulent activities. That's significant.
I know there are Canadians out there right now who are really suffering, really trying to pinch their pennies together to make sure that they have something on the dinner table at Christmas this year and have something underneath the tree for their young kids. We see sky-high food bank use, yet we have an example here of $1 million of financing just going out to potentially fraudulent activities.
That's just the fraudulent side of things for those who are ineligible, with over $3.5 billion. No normal Canadian, no average Canadian, will ever see $3.5 billion in their bank account, yet that's the amount that has been taken out the door by ineligible payments. I think it's highly unacceptable.
There is the situation with Finance Canada and the , we assume, because the Minister of Finance is accountable for everything within the department, through the deputy minister, who is currently Mr. Forbes. He is the person under the Financial Administration Act who is responsible. That's just to respond to the earlier comment from the previous motion, on which debate has now been adjourned. It is the current accounting officer, the deputy minister, who is subject to accountability to this very committee.
The fact that they were told to deliver this program despite the fact that they did not have the capability or the capacity to do so, was, frankly, unacceptable. If you look on the Export Development Canada website, it says, “As international risk experts, we help Canadian companies to navigate, manage and take on risk to support their growth beyond Canada's borders.”
Their work is not in loans. They are not a lending agency to domestic Canadian businesses. To go from talking about, potentially, 300 loans to, I believe, talking about, potentially, 900,000.... It simply boggles the mind that this was something that Finance Canada allowed, even forced upon them, and that EDC actually accepted it. They actually had to have a change in their mandate to even be allowed to do this work to begin with.
The fact that this was actually setting off alarm bells on day one is just, frankly, astonishing. EDC as a corporation has really failed the litmus test of basic accountability standards. The Auditor General made it very clear, and I'm going to quote a very brief sentence. She wrote this on page 19: “Basic cost controls were missing in EDC's management of CEBA contracts”.
They didn't know what they were doing. They didn't have even the most basic cost controls on these contracts, but they allowed it just to go without being accountable. It's truly astonishing. Again, hundreds of millions went to Accenture, which then awarded another contract to its own subsidiary.
It just gets worse. You would have thought that the ArriveCAN study was bad, but this one is even worse. Again, we have a government that tries to explain it away. I heard one Liberal MP say that it's not so bad because 91% of businesses were eligible. Yes, but 9%, representing $3.5 billion, were not. That's the thing the Liberals don't understand. That is a boatload of money that is hard to come by in the current economic climate.
I found a lot of things disappointing about the witness testimonies coming to us by Zoom, despite the fact that their head office is 450 metres from this very building, but I digress on that point. I really was disappointed that they failed to take accountability. There were no admissions that they failed. There were no admissions that they had made mistakes or that they had failed in their basic fundamental principles to protect taxpayers' dollars. They really didn't do that. I shouldn't just focus on EDC, because it's not the only one that failed. Finance is equally, if not more, culpable in this case.
The Auditor General pointed out pretty clearly in 8.42 of the report that, “there were very different interpretations amongst the departments regarding their responsibilities and accountabilities”. She went on to say, “no department took the lead to implement basic program elements.” It seems like each of the departments experienced this program differently. No one is accountable. No one was taking the lead. No one is taking accountability for how this program unfolded.
When we look at how this could have been better managed, we really have to question why this was even allowed. This was simply unacceptable.
Chair, I foreshadowed that I would make a small amendment to this. I move, in the first point, where it says, “Any further meetings on Report 8, Canada Emergency Business Account, take place after January 27, 2025”, that “January 27, 2025” be replaced with “December 5, 2024”. I think that's a common sense amendment. Hopefully, it will be acceptable.
:
My points will be quite clear and succinct, I hope.
I think several aspects of the motion are consistent with what the subcommittee decided, that is, to conclude the study on the ArriveCan app and the study on SDTC, and to proceed with the study on the CEBA.
First, I did not have the chance to speak to the previous motion regarding the CEBA, but since that is the first item, we need to conduct a real study on the CEBA. The Auditor General's report is in fact quite scathing when it comes to EDC's management and the hundred of millions of dollars that flowed to Accenture, once again, for what specific deliverables we do not know.
I think it is our duty as parliamentarians to do the work as quickly as possible, but we also have to remember our families. We also have to consider requests from our constituents during the parliamentary break. Since the CEBA study isn't urgent, I would be agreeable to keeping the first item as it is written. So I am opposed to Mr. Nater's proposed amendment.
That being said, as parliamentarians we also have to exercise good judgment in emergencies. So I disagree with item 9 in Ms. Khalid's motion, which would prevent us from holding emergency meetings.
As to the first item, I agree that there will be no meetings on Report 8 before January 27, 2025, but I think the committee has a duty to meet in the event of an emergency.
I'm not sure if it's possible, but I would also like to propose a subamendment.
:
I'm not sure what that was, but thank you for your intervention, Mr. Drouin.
The reality is that, sometimes, things are important and we have to plow through. I, as the chair of another committee, have to fly out to be there in person, because those are our roles. You would have to be here, as well, Chair. That is part of the job of being a chair. That's a sacrifice you have to make. The rest of us on this committee, including me, can sit in our homes and Zoom in for two hours. I do not think that is such a sacrifice, especially when we're looking at $3 billion of taxpayers' money given out to ineligible applicants.
I'm sorry. I hear a big sigh from the Liberal side. I apologize if they're worried about taxpayers' money being wasted.
We saw the same thing in this committee a couple of years ago, when the Auditor General pointed out $27 billion stolen from taxpayers through ineligible applicants. We heard from the CRA that they were not interested in tracking down this money. We heard the CRA—despite not putting forward any information of their own—state that the Auditor General was incorrect. In my riding of Edmonton West, we have.... I often speak about it. It's called the Veterans Association Food Bank. It's a food bank that provides food, pet food, diapers and a lot of goods to our veterans, RCMP members on pension and first responders. Now, in the city of Edmonton, which has one of the highest incomes in a country as wealthy as Canada, we have veterans relying on food banks. They went to the government to ask for $11 million, I think, for a refrigeration system, and they got back zero, yet, somehow, we have $3 billion to happily give away to people who are ineligible.
Therefore, if I'm asked to spend two hours on a break week to determine how we can stop $3 billion from going to ineligible people and redirect it to the Veterans Association Food Bank, another food bank or other charitable causes, yes, I will find those two hours to do so. I'm the chair of a committee, like you. I would expect that, for something this important, you will get on the plane yourself, Mr. Chair, and get out here for the two hours and find the time. Members of Parliament are given incredible leeway to set their own schedules. Being able to set two hours aside for something so important.... Regardless of whether it's a break week or a sitting week, it's still a working week. I'm sure every one of us—all 338 in the House—can find those two hours for something so important.
My other concern about this motion as written, and I'm glad my colleague addressed it.... It allows for a 106(4). I was conferring with my colleague, Mr. Nater, who is probably the most learned about Bosc and Gagnon in the House. I often just call it “the big green book”. A 106(4) doesn't call a set of meetings, such as the one we're having today on this mega-billion-dollar scandal. It calls a meeting to decide whether there will be a meeting. If we have a 106(4) and gather on a break week, I'm sure the Liberals will find time for that. We bring through a motion to have meetings. Is that then stopped by this motion? We went through this with Phoenix, which, by the way, the Liberals fought against way back in 2016. A 106(4) doesn't set up meetings to look into things. It sets up a meeting to allow for a motion for an investigation. The way I read this motion—not the amendment but the motion itself—is that we can have a 106(4) for something urgent. Again, I'll ask my colleague Mr. Nater to correct me, and perhaps the clerk. If we look at a 106(4), we could come in, have the meeting, put through a motion to study it, and the Liberals with their NDP colleagues could vote that down.
Having an option for a 106(4) meeting over a break week is basically.... Perhaps I understand the intent. I won't attribute it to malice. It does not allow emergency meetings. It allows an emergency meeting to call a meeting, which would then be voted down by the Liberals and our NDP colleague.
I will support Mr. Nater's amendment. As much as I dislike being here on a break week, I will get on the plane or I will get on Zoom if necessary to look at these important issues.
Whether it is $3 billion, Finance Canada saying, “We're not responsible; EDC is,” or EDC saying, “Well, we'll oversee it with Finance Canada,” which we heard today.... This is despite the fact that Finance put in its response to the AG report that it wasn't responsible; the board was responsible. However, EDC said it would work with Finance to recover the money.
I don't think EDC even read the report or the responses, because Finance said it's not responsible for clawing back any money; the EDC board is. EDC is saying, “Well, we'll work together with Finance Canada.”
I think we need to get at this as soon as possible to see how we're going to get that money back. Are we leaving it to Accenture to claw the money back?
I find it's the ultimate irony. If you look at the EDC website, it actually states that EDC offers insurance to “Protect your business against the risk of unpaid invoices.” Here's EDC offering insurance. It's in the business of protecting businesses against the risk of unpaid invoices, and it cannot look after unpaid invoices; it has to send them out to Accenture.
I'd like to find out why the CRA is not going after this. It goes after student loans. It has all the documentation. I assume it has social insurance numbers to be able to claw back the money from tax returns, like we do with overpayments for EI.
I found this out when I spent a couple of years as an EI appeals chair. Even if the government makes a mistake and tells someone, “Yes, go ahead and fill out the EI form that way,” it's up to the constituent, the citizen, to ensure that they're filling it out correctly. Even if EI gives them the wrong information, they're still accountable. There are 1,800 pages of rules, and they're still accountable. However, if they make that mistake and EI claws it back, it will go after them by reducing their child benefit and taking it back from tax returns.
We haven't heard what they're doing. They'll do this against an ordinary Canadian who makes a mistake, but here we have fraud. There are only 17 cases. I'd like to find out how many more there are, because it doesn't sound like they were thorough.
Here we have $3 billion in ineligible payments, and there's no talk of sending the CRA after them. There's no talk of withholding tax returns or sending them to collection agencies. It sounds like they're waiting for the contract to expire with Accenture.
I think this requires looking after immediately, not waiting. I think in the original amendment there's a month and a half to look at this. This requires immediate attention.
We saw with the EDC president and the people who showed up today that they couldn't have less concern about this. They even have a senior vice-president of legal—it's right on their web page—and CEBA is right there in his job title.
EDC couldn't be bothered to show up today. I was polite to them. I'm frankly disgusted that these high-level executives could not get off their butts to walk two or three blocks to be here in person to talk to us about this scandal. This is outrageous. There were billions wasted, and they can't even be bothered to show up.
They couldn't even be bothered to send the person responsible for CEBA, who's listed proudly on their website.
I apologize. I'm like a teenager. My voice is cracking again.
I'm just dumbfounded. We sit here again and again at this committee, for years now, and we hear from the bureaucrats, “We'll get around to it later.” You then have a Liberal saying, “Well, you know, a year and a half is too quick a time to get a response back.”
Good Lord. At a 7-Eleven, a worker making minimum wage has more accountability for their actions than executives who are making $200,000 or $300,000. EDC got bonuses—