[Translation]
I call this meeting to order.
Welcome to meeting number 150 of the House of Commons Standing Committee on Public Accounts.
[English]
Today's meeting is taking place in a hybrid format. Pursuant to the Standing Orders, members are attending in person in the room and remotely using the Zoom application.
Before we begin, I'd like to ask all in-person participants to read the guidelines written on the updated cards on the table. These measures are in place to help prevent audio feedback incidents and to protect the health and safety of all participants, especially our interpreters.
I have a kind reminder for all those in person and online. For the safety of our interpreters, it is important that your microphone be muted when you're not speaking.
[Translation]
Thank you all for your co-operation.
[English]
I remind you that all comments should be addressed through the chair.
[Translation]
Pursuant to Standing Order 108(3)(g), the committee resumed consideration of the report 1, ArriveCAN, referred to the committee on Monday, February 12, 2024.
[English]
I'd like to welcome all our witnesses.
From the Office of the Auditor General, we have with us Karen Hogan, Auditor General of Canada. It's nice to see you again.
We have Andrew Hayes, deputy auditor general, as well. It's good to have you back, sir.
We also have with us Sami Hannoush, principal. You've been here before, and it's good to see you again.
From the Department of Public Works and Government Services, we have Arianne Reza, deputy minister. It's nice to see you again. You've also been here previously. It's nice to have you and your team back.
We also have with us Catherine Poulin, assistant deputy minister, departmental oversight branch, and Dominic Laporte, senior assistant deputy minister, procurement branch. It's good to see you as well.
Again, we're going to begin with opening remarks.
Ms. Hogan, we'll kick off—
:
Thank you. I don't know if I can be as succinct as the Auditor General, but I will try.
Mr. Chair, thank you for inviting us here today to discuss the procurement processes related to ArriveCAN.
Let me begin by acknowledging that we are gathered on the unceded territory of the Algonquin Anishinabe people.
Joining me, as you noted earlier, are Mr. Laporte and Madam Poulin, both of whom are assistant deputy ministers at PSPC.
Mr. Chair, in addition to the measures I will describe momentarily, I want to acknowledge how frustrating it is for Canadians and parliamentarians alike not to hear simple and clear answers as they relate to ArriveCAN.
On behalf of PSPC, we remain focused on reinforcing the integrity of the procurement process and what we need to do to regain the trust of Canadians. To do so, we need to demonstrate that the system is fair, open and transparent.
The first contract associated with ArriveCAN was awarded in April 2020, in a period of great uncertainty and risk. Four and a half years later, we're still working with various independent reviewers and oversight bodies to understand the gaps that allowed this situation to occur and to put in measures to prevent this from happening again.
[Translation]
In this vein, PSPC has implemented a series of oversight measures, particularly when it comes to documenting requirements and decision-making during the procurement process.
Late last year, PSPC took the unprecedented step of suspending all departments and agencies' delegated authorities to procure professional services until they formally agreed to a new set of more rigorous terms and conditions, and were able to demonstrate adherence to PSPC.
To date, 99 departments and agencies, including the Canada Border Services Agency, have now signed on to these agreements that require them to include provisions in their solicitations which will result in increased transparency from suppliers on their pricing and their use of subcontractors.
[English]
Some of the other changes we've made to address recommendations from the procurement ombud and the Auditor General include the following. There are four: first, improving evaluation requirements to more effectively validate that suppliers have the necessary qualifications and proven work experience; second, improving documentation requirements to enhance the tracking of work progress and delivery timelines; third, requiring clients to review invoices in greater detail; and finally, improving training and assistance for contracting authorities within both PSPC and client departments.
In addition, we have created the contract quality assurance and record compliance office to review the completeness and accuracy of files as a proactive measure to address documentation shortcomings.
Mr. Chair, I would also like to say a few words regarding one of the methods of supply for professional services that has been the subject of much discussion in committee.
The task-based informatics professional services method of supply, or TBIPS, as it's commonly known, enables the government to pre-qualify suppliers and categorize their services into specific streams, enabling us to efficiently match government needs with service providers. Through TBIPS, the government buys IT services, such as software development, project management, cybersecurity, network support, database management, business analysis, quality assurance and technical support for government departments. TBIPS supports the participation of small and medium-sized enterprises, because it breaks projects down into smaller, task-based components, providing more opportunities to compete for government contracts. This, in turn, is a key enabler of economic growth in Canada.
[Translation]
Let me now move to our efforts to prevent and detect fraud, and address wrongdoing.
As you know, PSPC has been using data analytics to uncover a number of instances of individual subcontractors fraudulently billing the Government of Canada. We are currently in the process of seeking restitution to the Crown in these cases.
In this regard, PSPC has taken steps to further strengthen oversight of federal procurement with the establishment of Office of Supplier Integrity and Compliance. In addition to expanding our data analytics capacity, the new office has enabled us to better identify and mitigate the risk associated with suppliers of concern.
The office promotes fair competition and upholds public trust in federal procurement by boosting our capacity to better know with whom we are doing business.
[English]
In closing, my department is responsible for managing procurements and establishing contracts on behalf of departments and agencies. These, collectively, are worth $27 billion each year. We take this responsibility seriously, and I know our procurement officers work diligently every day to fulfill these important responsibilities. We remain committed to working to continue to improve and safeguard the integrity of the government's procurement system.
I close where I left off: For the trust of parliamentarians and Canadians, the integrity of the procurement system needs to be reinforced and become open, fair and transparent once again.
:
Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.
Thank you to all of the witnesses for their attendance today and for their previous attendance at numerous committees.
What we are talking about today, at least from my perspective, is the ongoing examination and prosecution of the ArriveCAN scandal. It clearly exposed the failures of Canada's broken procurement system and the fraudulent misuse of hard-earned taxpayer funds. One consistent response I get from Canadians from coast to coast is that they're demanding accountability, consequences and recovery. It is the two latter points, consequences and recovery, that will be the focus of my first round of questions.
Deputy Minister Reza, you've appeared numerous times at this committee and at government operations. A question was put to you when you appeared last June at government operations with respect to the total cases of contracting fraud that had been referred to lawful authorities, particularly the RCMP. I have your response to that question. You said, “We have previously referred many fraudulent overbilling cases from 2022, 2023 and 2024 to the RCMP,” but it was devoid of details.
I'm asking whether you could explain what you meant by “we have previously referred many...cases”. What does that mean? Can you give me a number, please?
:
I certainly will. Thank you very much for the question.
I want to give you a baseline. The procurement system within the Government of Canada, both at PSPC and more broadly, does about 400,000 procurement transactions. Those are contracts and contract amendments.
Since 2022, under the auspices of PSPC, we've started to use data analytics and mining approaches to be able to look at contracting data. At that time—and I think we'll have to break it into two—when I indicated the ones that had been referred, four cases had been referred. That was from 2022. We provided, in camera, to OGGO the names that were referred to the RCMP.
Since that time, there have been three further referrals to the RCMP, in October, for similar overbilling to the Government of Canada.
I'll dovetail on the Auditor General's report, which provided some detailed examples of the potential criminality, in my opinion, of certain contractors. GC Strategies, or Government of Canada Strategies, was one of them, led by Kristian Firth. He's completely under RCMP investigation. In fact, his home was raided the night before he was to testify at the bar of the House of Commons. He's definitely looking at fraud charges.
On the question of recovery, there was a motion passed in the House toward the latter end of the last session, which demanded that the government provide details on what steps it was taking for recovery. I have since asked a number of ministers, through a number of mediums, what steps they're taking for recovery, and I never get a clear answer. There's been no answer at all.
Ms. Reza, what instructions have you been given by , or any other minister, or the or the PMO, on recovery efforts?
:
Several measures have been put in place in light of the OAG report on ArriveCAN. I would say that task authorizations are clearly defined. In the past, maybe we had task authorizations that were vague. Now they're clearly defined.
Our deputy also spoke about the huge effort we've made in terms of quality assurance and records compliance. We've done three cycles of review, and 450 files have been reviewed by directors. The directors themselves are now personally committed to looking into files, in order to make sure the appropriate information is there. Basically, we learned from some of the challenges we were confronted with in the OAG report.
Also, I would say that a big, key take-away is the challenge function PSPC is playing. I'm asking our procurement officers to challenge the client. If, for example, we have a concern about a procurement strategy that is brought forward and non-compulsive, I say, “Please go ahead, challenge your client and make sure the procurement strategy is documented in its own file.”
A lot of key take-aways have been implemented in light of this OAG report.
Thank you very much to the witnesses for being with us today.
Our committee is coming to the end of its study on the ArriveCAN application, nearly a year after it was launched.
It's a good time to take stock, as a number of measures were announced when the Auditor General's report was tabled. Almost a year later, we should be seeing the first results. I will focus on that to begin with.
Before continuing, Ms. Reza, I would like to say that I found my colleague Ms. Yip's question about your background interesting.
Before you came to PSPC, you spent many years at CBSA. The issues raised by the Auditor General in her report couldn't have started in 2016. They likely go back to when the processes were in place—you were probably at CBSA. Is that your experience as well in terms of processes?
According to the Auditor General, the bookkeeping was among the worst she had seen in a number of years.
The problems probably didn't start in 2016. Did you notice the same problems when you were at the agency?
:
Thank you for the question.
I did not observe those issues when I was at CBSA.
In the end, when I was acting assistant deputy minister, I was responsible for managing expenses related to border processes for travellers. As part of my accountability mandate, I was also responsible for ensuring that budgets were properly prepared. So I haven't experienced that situation; I haven't seen the same thing.
I think it's very important to point out that the awarded contracts did not concern the ArriveCAN application file. The purpose of those contracts was to increase the number of consultants to help us manage the budget. I think that was among the points that were raised.
Currently, I am responsible for managing professional services contracts.
:
I'm very proud of the work done by our procurement officers. There's a great deal more transparency than there has been in the past.
Some of the things we've done include, for example, requiring suppliers to disclose the names of their subcontractors and their profit margins. There's also much more rigour in terms of the requirements for task authorizations. For example, the job description needs to be more specific than it used to be. What we saw with the ArriveCAN app must not reoccur. The job description was so vague that we weren't sure we could link what was expected of this app to another IT project.
So I'm very happy to say that we have done a lot of outreach with our clients. The Treasury Board Secretariat has also helped us a great deal in raising awareness among managers, who are primarily responsible for defining needs when they request funds. So the Treasury Board Secretariat has issued guidance to managers. In short, many measures have been taken.
As I mentioned, 450 procurement files were audited, and the compliance rate on those files was high. When we realize that certain things need to be improved, such as if we notice that a document was missing, we take a very constructive approach to our procurement officers. We've also created checklists to make sure that all the pieces of information that need to be in the procurement file are there.
I'm very impressed with the culture change we're seeing. All of this is being done in parallel with training activities. We have about 1,000 procurement officers who have completed our training on file management quality. All these things are moving us in the right direction.
:
Thank you, Mr. Chair. My questions today will be for witness Hogan.
There are so many additional important issues that the Auditor General's office needs to audit to serve Canadians with better transparency and oversight. One of those that I and my NDP colleagues are seized with is the financialization of housing and how the federal pension plans are contributing to the displacement of renters through the Public Sector Pension Investment Board, the PSPIB, as they contract out landlords to manage their multi-family real estate assets.
I want to refer to the PSPIB special examination report out of witness Hogan's office in 2021. We know that the PSPIB is a Crown corporation. The report stated, “During our audit, the secretariat communicated the government’s funding risk tolerance and long-term real rate-of-return objective for the pension assets that the corporation managed.” They were told what those risk tolerances and rate-of-return objectives were. The report also said, “the government’s real rate-of-return objective was 3.6% for the following 10 years and 4.0% thereafter.”
That was in 2021. Today, just recently, the PSPIB annual report shows that their 10-year net annualized return is 8.3%, more than double those objectives. Those returns are partially coming off the backs of displaced renters. In fact, ACORN Canada protests that the Public Sector Pension Investment Board's stake in exploitative financialized housing is causing harm.
If we think about the PSP investment board being one of the largest billion-dollar corporate financialized landlords, it certainly requires oversight, as this is happening under the government's watch. Who is overseeing renters and protecting people from private investment and tactics like the ones the PSP Investment Board is engaging in?
I would say they're engaging in it because we know, according to documents released in response to a recent access to information request, that the PSP Investment Board owns around half of Starlight Toronto's portfolio. Starlight is actually Starlight Investments, one of the largest landlords in Canada, a privately held real estate investment and asset manager that manages over 65,000 units. Prior to founding Starlight, their CEO ran TransGlobe, which earned a reputation for ignoring tenants' requests for maintenance and faced hundreds of charges for failing to do repairs and for violations of the fire code. Starlight has also applied for more above-guideline rent increases than any other landlord in Toronto. It was one of the top evictors during the pandemic and has targeted tenant organizers with evictions.
Witness Hogan, this is the government's partner in the pension funds. Are you aware of this reality?
The very pensioners that this fund is supposed to protect are asking for oversight, so I'm happy to hear this from witness Hogan. I'll be looking forward to that.
This comes from The Hill Times. The headline reads:
Union urges public sector pension fund not to pursue rent increases, mass evictions at Toronto apartment buildings
It goes on:
A union representing federal public servants says the pension fund that manages its members' retirement savings has joined with one of Canada's largest real estate firms to evict tenants who are resisting proposed rent increases at three rental...buildings in Toronto.
Union representatives and tenant organizers have criticized the Public Sector Pension Investment Board (PSPIB) and its operational arm...for its role in the joint venture with Starlight Investments, a global asset management company that is one of the largest privately held real estate firms in Canada.
I want to share this, witness Hogan, and I want to ask this question. I've tried to reach out to the newly appointed board chair. I have been refused a number of times any access to the PSP Investment Board chair. They've pushed me off to some other operational pieces. Obviously, there is no accountability for Canadians.
I just want to understand why a parliamentarian is not allowed access to the board of this Crown corporation, when this is exactly who they report to. They report to parliamentarians.
:
I think what's interesting is that there were, I think, three or four sole-source contracts where TBIPS was not used. In hindsight, that is one of the key issues. Had it gone through TBIPS, we may have had a very different outcome.
The contract referred to in the Auditor General's report, as well as the procurement ombudsman's report, where there were some irregularities, was actually through TBIPS, and work is under way there.
In general, TBIPS does a lot of business, and there's a lot of control and oversight. There are two separate streams. One is open to all vendors on the list. The list is periodically updated. I think it's an interesting opportunity, as well, to understand that there's a whole continuum of suppliers, from the micro suppliers, which have one to four employees, to the very large firms. We recently did an overview of the number of Canadians employed on government contracts through the SME lens and through TBIPS. I think, for all professional services, 280,000 Canadians were employed, providing service through SMEs to the Government of Canada through this vehicle.
:
So the answer is that you don't have control.
Okay, thank you.
I'm sorry, but I have so many questions to ask and so little time.
I keep coming back to the issue of non-competitive contracts because I always feel like I'm not getting good answers about that.
Since 2016, the number of non-competitive contracts reported on the open government portal has skyrocketed. It's gone up by about 30%. That's the percentage that was reported for all of 2023, the last full year for which data is available on non-competitive contracts compared to competitive contracts.
It was actually the report on the ArriveCan file that helped uncover the issue. The more we dug into it, the more we realized that the problem was much more widespread.
It is up to your department to resolve the situation by almost systematically awarding contracts competitively in order to obtain the best possible services at the best possible price for taxpayers.
In concrete terms, what are you doing about this?
:
I'll start by pointing out that, within the department, our objective is to award contracts competitively at a rate of about 80%, at a minimum.
I checked our figures, because I noted that you always talk about the 70-30 ratio, in percentage terms, for all departments.
It turns out that contracts are awarded competitively in approximately 83% of cases. I'm very relieved to see that.
My department handles only 20% of the contracts, because they are high value. I think you made an important point.
I'm looking to see what contracts we can award competitively through the system so that we can always achieve a reasonable level. From my perspective, that would be between 80% and 85%.
:
It is my responsibility as Auditor General of Canada to serve Parliament and support the House and the Senate. I will appear as many times as committees invite me. I think it's very important for us to talk about our work. The more we can talk about our work and the more committees are interested in our work, I hope the more positive and swift change will happen across the public service to improve the lives of Canadians. I'm always happy to be here.
When it comes to ArriveCAN, at this moment we are not planning on a fulsome follow-up on that audit. I do talk with Deputy Minister Reza occasionally around the progress they're making. We are looking at a way within our office to see how we can follow up on a more regular basis on many of the recommendations that we have issued, but I would expect that the public accounts committee will ask for regular updates on the detailed management action plan that was provided here.
When it comes to work coming up, I am expected to table some reports, hopefully, in December. That is our plan. The exact date is what we're trying to iron out.
There are five audits that are coming up. I'm trying to remember what they all are. For sure, one is on the Canada emergency business account, so CEBA is coming up. There is something on digital identity. There are programs for seniors, the Canada summer jobs program, and industrial and technological benefits. Those would be the five reports that will be tabled in the winter.
:
Perhaps you could try to come back to the committee with that. I'll move on.
The arrive scam contractor, GC Strategies, has gotten a lot of attention. Dalian has gotten comparatively less, even though Dalian is also a two-person company involved in the contract. They also appear to have done no actual work on the app.
Dalian had been identified by the government as an indigenous company. They operated in a joint venture with Coradix, which allowed Coradix, a larger, non-indigenous company, to get contracts under the indigenous set-aside. Dalian has now, though, been removed from the indigenous business list.
Can our officials advise as to why Dalian was removed from the indigenous business list? Were they never indigenous? Did they cease to be indigenous? What happened there?
:
You know what? I agree there were other problems, but they were taken off that list.
I'll just say that on indigenous procurement, very clearly, we have the sort of Spider-Man meme happening, where procurement officials are pointing at ISC, and ISC is pointing back at procurement. I asked a question in the House about this, and it was your minister, the , who responded to it. I wonder if this is why indigenous leaders are telling us that the program is such a mess. It's because you have ministers' departments pointing at each other and not getting it done.
On this point, I want to ask the Auditor General this, quickly. You've been asked by indigenous leaders to investigate abuses of the indigenous procurement program, abuses that indigenous leaders say are rampant. Can you give us an update on your plans and prospective timelines around investigating the indigenous procurement program?
Auditor General, you testified previously on ArriveCAN. I was not here when you testified, and I know that there have been many, many meetings on ArriveCAN at this committee, but it strikes me as odd that, from what I can glean from the evidence and testimony after all those meetings, we still don't know—at least, I still don't know, but maybe someone knows—who is ultimately responsible for having approved.... Where does culpability lie here, on an individual basis?
We've got Cameron MacDonald and Antonio Utano on the one hand. There have been allegations against Minh Doan. In all the reviews you've done.... I mean, can you give us a read from your perspective, given that you've done a deeper dive than we have?
:
I'll keep it limited to contracting, because there are so many audits and recommendations that we issued. When it comes to ArriveCAN—and I will also bring in the work that we did on professional services contracts—we saw the departments in question act during our audit. They provided clarification, for example, on the use of national master standing offers while we were doing our work, so there was a swift reaction.
I have said throughout these two audits that I don't believe more rules are needed but that the existing rules need to be better applied. I'm very happy to see that training is happening and that individuals are taking it. Hopefully, they will apply it.
I still believe the government needs to take a step back. Over the course of so many decades of my office issuing audits and internal audits, or the procurement ombud doing work, we always add recommendations that seem to add more layers of rules.
It's time to step back and ask, “Do we have too many rules?” Rules have been overtaken by events. Should we simplify, perhaps, some of the complexity of the rules, so that everyone can understand them and apply them better?
I'm not exactly sure why all of these situations are happening. Is it for speed to move around the rules? Are there too many rules? What exactly it is needs to be ironed out, but taking swift action is always something we're pleased to see.
:
We started to go back. We now have a new set of data analytical tools. We use all kinds of different software. We're now looking holistically across the Government of Canada to see where there is time fraud. We're looking at different contracts. We see the consultants underneath them. We see if they're working concurrently, for example, at the OAG or PSPC, and we identify time fraud. There's a methodology that goes with it.
The cases in which we see it's intentional and there's fraud get referred to the RCMP. Since we started doing this work, Madame Poulin has referred about seven cases to the RCMP.
There is also an association of restitution. They owe us money for the time fraud. Again, we've started to go to the contractors—our relationship is with the prime—to indicate that they had a resource that was cleared and doing work but was defrauding the Crown.
We put together a restitution package, as I noted earlier, before departments go after the fraud individually. It was not an efficient way to do it. Under the leadership of Madame Poulin.... She's put together a team to go out, negotiate with and advise contractors who don't know—I think that has been your experience—that they're involved in fraud or that the resources they've cleared or have working are involved in fraud. We then negotiate to get the monies back. I think this approach started in about June.
I'm going to build a bit on what my good friend Mr. McCauley was asking with regard to, but I'll go back to the TBIPS procurement vehicle and to SBIPS.
I think, when SBIPS was created, back in around 2009 or 2008, the point was to focus on solutions that.... It was easier for the government to manage costs, because I think there may have been some change orders that often happened through TBIPS. I'm just wondering whether or not your department is doing the analysis.
I think the Auditor General touched on a good point as well. I understand and fully respect our obsession to ensure that there is a fair, open, transparent and competitive process, but are the internal processes too long? Do they sort of discourage your client departments across the government, so that they may not be incentivized to use the current processes in place? They may go to you and say, “Well, this is why. We ran out of time. We need to do a sole-source contract.”
I hope I was clear enough, but if you can build on that....
I'm just wondering whether or not there's been some analysis done on.... I've heard Mr. Laporte mention the fact that it's longer to go towards an SBIPs procurement model, sometimes, but I'm wondering if PSPC has the capacity to do an analysis in terms of understanding whether the same project or the same results can be achieved through TBIPs or SBIPs. Yes, it may take a little time to go towards a contract award, but taking that little time will manage costs.
I'm wondering whether or not you guys are doing some of these analyses and whether or not you're talking to client departments to find out.... Let's say you had somebody at, for example, Health Canada, working on Oracle or something, or on an IT project, and somebody else was working at ESDC on a very similar project but using the same technology. Are you all doing these analyses, and are you able to compare them to manage costs?
:
We certainly do analyses, and we're going to be able to do more. TBIPS are very popular. They account for $1.7 billion worth of business. As I mentioned, there are 650 suppliers. TBIPS also uses categories. I would say that it's much more efficient to use TBIPS than to do your procurement yourself.
I'd like to discuss this in connection with fraud. One thing we've done is implement new time sheets that are much more precise. We encourage all client departments to use them to describe the work done to within half an hour. They are asked not to bill 7.5 hours without justifying what's being billed.
In this context, processes like TBIPS and Solutions-based informatics professional services, or SBIPS, help us prevent fraud and work with the client.
In addition, the Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat does a lot to build managers' awareness. When managers certify that conditions have been met under section 34 of the Financial Administration Act, that means something. They know that comes with a responsibility.
It's up to managers to ask questions to make sure that, when a client signs a time sheet, they've really ensured it is accurate.
We have put in place a number of auditing methods to encourage our clients to be as disciplined as possible with their contractors.
:
Let's recap for Canadians some of the important details of this scandal.
We have former minister of public safety , who was quoted as saying that he wanted someone's “head on a platter”, in terms of who chose GC Strategies. We have Minh Doan, a former senior executive at CBSA, who deleted four years' worth of emails three days after an ATIP requesting information on GC Strategies was received by the CBSA.
We have the highest level at both CBSA and PSPC involved in what was supposed to be an independent investigation. We've had senior officials, appointed by our very own , come to these committees and mislead, if not outright lie to, committee.
We have all the hallmarks of a cover-up and scapegoating going on in front of us. I say that because I'm mindful of Ms. Hogan's—the Auditor General's—comments that there are multiple layers of responsibility here.
However, I guess I can ask anyone at PSPC. Has anyone has been suspended or fired in relation to the mishandling of the ArriveCAN scandal, yes or no?
:
That doesn't surprise me at all.
What we have are two individuals, two mid- to lower-level individuals at CBSA—Cameron MacDonald and Antonio Utano— who have been scapegoated by the CBSA into accepting responsibility for the multiple problems exposed by this at least $60-million scandal, according to the Auditor General. It could be substantially more, but because of the abysmal paperwork at the CBSA and PSPC, she could offer only a guesstimate.
Therefore, those two individuals have been suspended and, at one point, suspended without pay. No one else has been suspended. No one else has been terminated. No one else has been outright fired for their incompetence in handling this particular scandal.
I want to spend some time on Minh Doan.
Ms. Hogan, were you made aware, prior to the release of the ArriveCAN report, that there were four years of missing emails from a senior CBSA executive, Minh Doan?
I want to follow up on Mr. Brock's questions, to some extent. I have to be honest that I share the concerns around the deleted emails. I think it's outrageous that emails are deleted and it's not possible to recover them. Similarly, I think it's outrageous that you have apparent kickbacks to civil servants who are responsible for drafting the terms of an RFP in close contact with the very company that ultimately is awarded that procurement and that contract.
The frustration I have is that there are fingers pointed one way and then there are fingers pointed the other way. Multiple internal investigations have been undertaken here. I asked the Auditor General questions, but maybe I could get procurement's perspective.
Deputy Minister, you and your team have presumably done a deep dive to see what happened here. When I ask who's culpable, I don't just mean who's responsible for signing the document. Ms. Hogan sort of said, well, the executive director is ultimately responsible. Yes, sure, but culpability is to assign blame. It's not who is responsible for signing on the dotted line but who is to blame for what happened with ArriveCAN.
:
Thank you. I like that kind of answer.
Ms. Reza, I want to follow up on some interesting questions that were asked earlier.
During the pandemic, you provided justifications on several occasions, and you signed contracts with GC Strategies. According to emails between PSPC and CBSA, one of your employees, Angela Durigan, raised concerns about the justifications, which seemed insufficient to award a multi-million-dollar non-competitive contract to GC Strategies.
This employee received a response from CBSA. That answer was dubious, but she thought she had all the answers she needed. It's as if she just needed to get the justifications and check a box, and the substance of the justifications didn't really matter. All it took to approve the PSPC contract was that justification. That's how the contract made its way through the department.
I know you weren't looking at the details at your level, but at some point in the chain of approval, PSPC did not do its duty and failed to ensure that contracts were awarded appropriately.
If an emergency were to arise again, what would be done differently? Obviously, I hope that never happens.
:
I gave the approval, but I did not award the contracts. There were three levels of approval. I just want to make that distinction; I didn't sign the contracts.
Second, there's the client's responsibility. The Auditor General talked about the executive director. It's the client's responsibility to provide the justification when it's a non-competitive contract. We discussed it, of course, because we were in a pandemic context. It's also important to note that the contracts that were awarded non-competitively did not attract the attention of the procurement ombudsman or the Auditor General. They were interested in the ones that were awarded competitively.
Third, in order to prepare for another such crisis, we've developed a list of situations to avoid, such as those that occurred during the pandemic. The supply chain was interrupted. We looked at what we need to do if that happens again. We know that the risk is real. We also looked at potential disruptions in terms of the quality and the dollar amount of the contracts. We had to think about preventing corruption and fraud.
Last, we had to look at what we should do when a non-competitive contract is renewed, as was the case with GC Strategies.
I know that, in the future, we'll have measures in place to prevent such situations from happening again. I can assure you that, if another crisis arises while I'm deputy minister, and departments ask me to award contracts non-competitively for professional services in an emergency situation, I'll tell them to forget it.
:
Thank you, Mr. Chair. My questions are again for witness Reza.
There was some mention today about a potential lack of training or following of rules. The Professional Institute of the Public Service of Canada has been talking about this for years—how the knowledge base, especially as it relates to IT, is eroding within the public service and there is more and more reliance on outsourcing.
It said:
Government outsourcing, especially outsourcing of IT personnel, is costing Canadians billions of dollars each year. From time to time, outsourcing may be necessary to augment staff compliments or bring in external skills and expertise. But years of unchecked spending on outsourcing has created a shadow public service of consultants operating alongside the government workforce.
I would add that it goes on to say there is gender inequality across Canada's public service. It said:
In IT, lucrative contracts are doled out to a male-dominant industry that has notoriously struggled with gender equity. While at the same time, lower paid and precarious temporary service contracts are disproportionately filled by women.
What I want to ask is how the hollowing out of expertise in the public service has affected the value for Canadian taxpayers.
Also, how do these “gentlemen's agreements”, as I call them in Parliament, dominate how contracts are handed out and doled out within the public service?
:
Thank you very much. I'm not crazy about the word “dole”, but we'll come back to that in a moment.
As I have said at previous committees, I look at service delivery to Canadians as a three-legged stool.
There has to be government staffing and HR. Do we have the right complement and training?
There's project management. Especially in the IT space, as you all know, we have many old systems, and transitioning to something new is extremely complex, with risks from cybersecurity and the cloud. We need to make sure that we have the right skill set internally.
We then have the procurement. Where can we augment, where necessary, with professional services to make sure we have that capacity?
I think it's a three-legged stool. We can't bring in the right folks if we don't have the right HR strategy and we're not attracting the right talent. We need to look at our project management, especially in IT, and make sure—in fact, I had this discussion just last week with the unions—that our staff are well trained to avoid having a dependency on professional services.
Since I've been in—
:
That's a very generous offer, because, as you can see, I brought my binders of committee testimony.
There are so many different elements to it, and making sure that we're.... I hear words like “not being truthful”. I've been coming to Parliament since 2010. I have told the truth at every committee—my first committee was on organized crime—and I continue to do so. I think that we try to be credible and helpful.
In terms of any specific issue, I do want to go back a bit to one comment about sole-source contracts versus competitive ones. As far as I know, the AG's concern was not in the non-competitive ones. We, of course, look at the various elements. We continually strive to always be competitive. One of the issues I didn't get a chance to come back on was the issue of.... Often, there's so much back-and-forth in the challenge function that it would have been faster to compete it. I think that's a key element.
The other issue I want to get across to parliamentarians and Canadians is that these professional service contracts for staff augmentation don't necessarily have a control—not from a procurement perspective, but from a project management perspective—and that is where I think we need to do a better job being able to articulate and keep very tight in terms of deliverables to avoid situations like the ones we've been talking about.
[Translation]
I'll ask Mr. Laporte to provide more details.
I want to thank Ms. Hogan, from the Office of the Auditor General, and Ms. Reza, from the Department of Public Works and Government Services, for their testimony and appearance today, as well as for their participation in the study of “Report 1: ArriveCAN”.
[Translation]
If you have questions or more information to share, please contact the clerk.
[English]
Ms. Zarrillo, I want to flag something for you. You had some questions off the top. While witnesses couldn't answer today, I'm going to work with you and Mr. Cannings, because , who's a member of this committee, had some questions around pension investments.
You're at the right place, and I appreciate it. I give members latitude to ask questions. You did so today, but you're at the right place for some of these questions. We have meetings coming up on public accounts, and I'll work with the NDP to try to schedule the right person for your party to ask some questions. You'll hear back from me, the clerk or the analyst on that, and we'll work with Mr. Cannings.
On that note, the meeting is adjourned.